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BONDUPDATER waits to receive an instruction from the C2 server that starts with “E” before writing the downloaded data to the supplied filename. After receiving the “E” instruction, the Trojan will write the base64 decoded data to the file and process the newly created file. Figure 27 shows the C2 server providing the “E” instruction within the TXT answer. In the current example, the Trojan would treat the newly saved file as a script thanks to the filename ending with the “0” character. The Trojan would run the contents of the file using “cmd.exe” and save the output to a file named “proc10100” that will be uploaded to the C2 server. | ['T1059.003'] |
Based on posts on an underground forum, we believe that the developer of Chthonic supplies binaries to other cyber-criminals and rents out the C2 infrastructure. Therefore, this distribution of victims likely represents several otherwise unconnected cyber-crime operations. | ['T1588.001', 'T1583'] |
When the news broke in 2014 about a new sophisticated threat actor dubbed the Turla Group, which the Estonian foreign intelligence service believes has Russian origins and operates on behalf of the FSB, its kernelmode malware also became the first publicly-described case that abused a third-party device driver to disable Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE). This security mechanism was introduced in Windows Vista to prevent unsigned drivers from loading into kernel space. Turla exploited the signed VirtualBox driver, VBoxDrv.sys v1.6.2, to deactivate DSE and load its unsigned payload drivers afterward. | ['T1211'] |
Since December 2017 security researchers have been seeing samples of MS Office documents in spearphishing emails related to the Winter Olympics uploaded to VirusTotal. The documents contained nothing but slightly formatted gibberish to make it look like the text had an encoding problem, encouraging the user to press a button to “Enable Content”. | ['T1566.001'] |
Interestingly, the ChChes samples we observed were digitally signed using a certificate originally used by HackingTeam and later part of the data leaked when they were themselves hacked. Wapack labs also observed a similar sample targeting Japan in November. It’s not clear why the attackers chose to use this certificate, as it was old, had been leaked online, and had already been revoked by the time they used it. Digital certificates are typically used because they afford an air of legitimacy, which this one definitely does not. | ['T1596.003'] |
The authors of Black Lambert included a couple of very interesting details in the sample, which read as the following: toolType=wl, build=132914, versionName = 2.0.0. Looking for similar samples, we were able to identify another generation of related tools which we called White Lambert. While Black Lambert connects directly to its C&C for instructions, White Lambert is a fully passive, network-driven backdoor. | ['T1587.001'] |
In Figure 4, the first DNS query to resolve is. . yFIOr645245444143544544.windows64x[.]com which acts as an initial beacon. The first five characters (yFIOr) are random and have no purpose other than generating random subdomains in order to avoid DNS caching. The next two characters (64) signify the Hex notation of the d request type, which is the request type for the initial beacon as noted in Table 3. The request type is followed by the system specific hostname hardcoded into the sample, which in this case is 5245444143544544 for <REDACTED>. | ['T1583.002'] |
As soon as the proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2020-9054 was made publicly available last month, this vulnerability was promptly abused to infect vulnerable versions of Zyxel network-attached storage (NAS) devices with a new Mirai variant – Mukashi. | ['T1588.006'] |
This is exceedingly noisy traffic. Furthermore, Hancitor has demonstrated a noticeable lack of stealth in deploying and using this ping tool. Such an unusual EXE file is easy to notice, especially when the results of its scan are saved as a text file in the same directory. | ['T1588.002', 'T1588.002'] |
In our previous article, we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days. | ['T1584.005', 'T1588.006', 'T1203'] |
Palo Alto Networks WildFire observed commands provided by the C2 server for the known Helminth samples. The commands, as seen below, show that the threat actors are attempting to do initial information gathering on the system, including available user accounts, username, computer name, running tasks, services, network services and if remote desktop is enabled. | ['T1033', 'T1049', 'T1590', 'T1082'] |
The Wekby group continues to target various high profile organizations using sophisticated malware. The pisloader malware family uses various novel techniques, such as using DNS as a C2 protocol, as well as making use of return-oriented programming and other anti-analysis tactics. | ['T1583.002'] |
While analyzing this intrusion, we observed further persistence via scheduled tasks associated with post-exploitation activities.. . This scheduled task with name HpSupport executed a Cobalt Strike Beacon kaslose64.dll both on the Domain Controller and the File Server: | ['T1053.005', 'T1053'] |
Without the encrypted AES key appended to the encrypted files, even if the private key used for encryption was recovered, the files could not be decrypted. Therefore, the Hermes executable used in the FEIB SWIFT attack appears never to have been used to ransom the machine, but rather to destroy the victim’s data. | ['T1486'] |
In total Unit 42 has seen over 50 versions of these weaponized documents spanning from late October through to March. We’ve used these to lay out a timeline, which will be referenced throughout the remainder of this blog, of the milestones of evolution that provides some insight into why the changes are made. Note: This figure does not cover all versions seen but simply milestone changes. It does however start with the first version created on October 23rd, last saved 25th October and first seen by our Wildfire cloud sandbox 26th October. | ['T1587.001'] |
Throughout the intrusion, the injected Cobalt Strike Processes utilized various named pipes for inter-process communications. Many of these pipes used default Cobalt Strike pipe patterns. | ['T1055'] |
This update to Emissary allowed the Trojan to run as a service. The configuration now contains settings for the Emissary service, which the Trojan will store in and access from the following registry keys: | ['T1574.011'] |
. . The bot will report key information back to the C&C, including the result of the various custom API executions. The first communications include any hard-coded C&C followed by the DGA. Shifu uses RC4 encryption in the network communications. Notably, the key for the samples analyzed by iSIGHT Partners is actually the default RC4 key included with the Crypto library, further suggesting this malware is under development. The following is the key observed: | ['T1587.001'] |
Figure 32 shows QUADAGENT issuing DNS requests with incrementing sequence numbers and the C2 providing the session identifier and pre-shared key within the IPv6 answers. The screenshot also shows the Trojan sending a DNS query to notify the C2 that it successfully received the data. | ['T1583.002'] |
For this method, Ransom Cartel uses a tool named ""DonPAPI,"" which can search hosts for DPAPI blobs containing Wi-Fi keys, RDP passwords, and credentials saved in web browsers and then download and decrypt them locally on the machine. | ['T1587.001'] |
It also can make and send screenshots to the C&C, as well as any file that matches a specified mask. | ['T1113'] |
Using spear-phishing emails that contained malicious Amazon-themed documents, the group targeted an employee of an aerospace company in the Netherlands and a political journalist in Belgium. | ['T1566.003'] |
It reads and executes commands from a text file stored in Mega cloud storage | ['T1530'] |
BlackLotus claims to come with anti-virtual machine (anti-VM), anti-debug, and code obfuscation features to block malware analysis attempts. The seller also claims that security software cannot detect and kill the bootkit as it runs under the SYSTEM account within a legitimate process. | ['T1497'] |
These credentials are then used to compromise Linux ESXi servers and authenticate to their vCenter web interfaces. | ['T1199'] |
CreepyUp: uploads any file to the C&C server. | ['T1105'] |
The browser extension serves as adware and an infostealer, leaking all of the user’s search engine queries. We discovered significant changes and additions of capabilities throughout this campaign's evolution, and we predict further changes as this campaign continues. | ['T1217'] |
Creates new users’ accounts | ['T1136.001'] |
The campaign commences via a SPAM email containing a malicious new URL being sent to potential victims. The URL landing page presents the recipient with a password for a ZIP file. | ['T1566.002'] |
UEFI bootkits are planted in the system firmware and are invisible to security software running within the operating system because the malware loads in the initial stage of the booting sequence. | ['T1542.001'] |
During the defense evasion phase, anti-malware and monitoring software is often disabled. Firewall rules have occasionally been seen being disabled as well. | ['T1489', 'T1489'] |
With the upsurgence of ProxyShell, webshells have become more common entry points. | ['T1505.003', 'T1505.003'] |
Adds newly created accounts to the administrators group to maintain elevated access. | ['T1098'] |
Most of the fake lures for this campaign are related to games, subtitle files, adult videos, and cracked MS Office applications. These are hosted in ZIP format on legitimate file hosting services. | ['T1189'] |
The implanted VBS file is capable of reporting information about infected machines and downloading additional payloads with an encoded format | ['T1059.005'] |
In one case the attackers used one module for taking screenshots and another for uploading them to the C&C server | ['T1113'] |
Identity theft via hijacking user-profiles and stealing their cryptocurrency, or using popular accounts to spread malware and/or scams | ['T1083'] |
During the extraction, a JSP webshell is deployed on one of the public directories used by the webmail component. The attacker can browse to the webshell to start executing arbitrary commands on the victim machine. | ['T1059'] |
Obscure secure messaging client as delivery vehicle for malware and cloak for malicious activity | ['T1573'] |
Compromises users’ saved passwords from browsers. | ['T1555.003'] |
Process Explorer, Process Monitor and PCHunter have been utilized to discover any anti-malware or monitoring software and terminate it. | ['T1057', 'T1057'] |
The ZIP file contains a single .ISO file. The use of an ISO file is an attempt to defeat the “Mark of the Web (MOTW),” which tags files as being downloaded from the internet. It subjects these files to additional security measures by Windows and endpoint security solutions. | ['T1553.005'] |
AnyDesk has been the most common legitimate desktop software used to establish an interactive command and control channel, with ConnectWise seen slightly less frequently. | ['T1219', 'T1219'] |
By using DoH, attackers can hide DNS queries from C&C domains. If SSL/TLS traffic is not being inspected using man-in-the-middle (MitM) techniques, DNS queries to the C&C server will therefore go unnoticed. | ['T1572'] |
Uses encoded PowerShell commands. | ['T1027'] |
Mailman: communicates with a C&C server to receive commands and writes them to a file. It also sends the file with output from commands to the C&C server. | ['T1071'] |
Affiliates have been seen brute forcing exposed RDP services and compromising accounts with weak passwords. | ['T1078.003', 'T1133'] |
Uses Rclone to exfiltrate data to cloud sharing websites (such as PCloud and MegaSync). | ['T1567.002'] |
Clears Windows PowerShell and WitnessClientAdmin log file. | ['T1070.003'] |
Those campaigns relied on social engineering attacks through LinkedIn, pushing .NET Core malware masquerading as a PDF document supposedly containing details about a marketing project. | ['T1566.003'] |
Victims receive spear phishing emails with attached malicious zip files - typically password protected or HTML file. That file contains an ISO file. | ['T1566.001'] |
Finally, the threat actors shut down VMs, terminate all related processes, and encrypt Vmware-related files (.log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp and .vmsn). | ['T1486'] |
Uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs. | ['T1070.001'] |
Deletes rules in the Windows Defender Firewall exception list related to AnyDesk | ['T1562.004'] |
Dumps password hashes for use in pass the hash authentication attacks. | ['T1550.002'] |
For C&C communication, POLONIUM abuses common cloud services such as Dropbox, OneDrive, and Mega. | ['T1136.003'] |
The only known method of delivering stolen information to cybercriminals is by sending a ZIP archive to an embedded control center. | ['T1102'] |
The ransomware payload is copied to an Active Directory Domain Controller and deployed to systems using the Default Domain Group Policy Object | ['T1570'] |
TechnoCreep is a previously undocumented C# backdoor that communicates with a C&C server via TCP sockets. In this case, commands are not read from a file, but received in an exchange of messages | ['T1071'] |
It is able to steal autofill information from web browsers, cookies, saved credit cards, browser history, coin wallets and Telegram databases. | ['T1185'] |
Credentials that have either been reused across multiple platforms or have previously been exposed. Additionally, this includes VPN accounts - not just domain and local accounts. | ['T1078'] |
LockBit 2.0 is typically executed via command line arguments via a hidden window. Windows SysInternals PsExec has been utilized for both persistence and execution purposes. Its ability to execute processes on other systems spread the ransomware and assisted in reconnaissance activities. | ['T1059'] |
It was quite common to see scheduled tasks used to create persistence for the ransomware executable, PsExec, and occasionally some defense evasion batch scripts. | ['T1053.005'] |
In rare cases, LockBit 2.0 has been observed to create accounts for persistence with simple names, such as `a.` | ['T1136.001'] |
LockBit 2.0 enumerates system information such as hostname, shares, and domain information. | ['T1082'] |
MEGASync is the leading way for LockBit 2.0 affiliates to exfiltrate data from clients with it being occasionally replaced by RClone. | ['T1041'] |
LockBit 2.0 is known for its extortion tactics, encrypting devices and demanding a ransom. | ['T1486'] |
The NewsBeef APT previously engaged in long-term, elaborate social engineering schemes that take advantage of popular social network platforms. Previous analysis of the NewsBeef APT indicates that the group focuses on Saudi Arabian (SA) and Western targets, and lacks advanced offensive technology development capabilities. | ['T1593.001'] |
Kimsuky has searched for vulnerabilities, tools, and geopolitical trends on Google search engine to target victims | ['T1593.002'] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have performed “Kerberoasting,” whereby they obtained the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Tickets for Active Directory Service Principal Names (SPN) for offline cracking. | ['T1090.003', 'T1558.003'] |
identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and to execute other commands. | ['T1059.003'] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used credentials of existing accounts to maintain persistent, long-term access to compromised networks. | ['T1078'] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exfiltrated credentials and exported copies of the Active Directory database ntds.dit. | ['T1003.003'] |
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used previously compromised account credentials to attempt to access Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords. | ['T1555'] |
BlackMatter may wipe backup systems. | ['T1561'] |
BlackMatter remotely encrypts shares via SMB protocol and drops a ransomware note in each directory. | ['T1486'] |
BlackMatter uses srvsvc.NetShareEnumAll MSRPC function to enumerate and SMB to connect to all discovered shares, including ADMIN$, C$, SYSVOL, and NETLOGON. | ['T1021.002'] |
BlackMatter uses EnumServicesStatusExW to enumerate running services on the network. | ['T1007'] |
BlackMatter uses NtQuerySystemInformation to enumerate running processes | ['T1057'] |
BlackMatter leverages LDAP and SMB protocol to discover all hosts in the AD. | ['T1018'] |
BlackMatter leverages legitimate remote monitoring and management software and remote desktop software, often by setting up trial accounts, to maintain persistence on victim networks. | ['T1133'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been assessed to perform reconnaissance on Microsoft® 365 (M365), formerly Office® 365, resources with the intent of further gaining information about the networks. These scans can be automated, through Python® scripts, to locate certain files, paths, or vulnerabilities. The cyber actors can gain valuable information on the victim network, such as the allocated resources, an organization’s fully qualified domain name, IP address space, and open ports to target or exploit. | ['T1595', 'T1590'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using VPSs from cloud service providers that are physically distributed around the world to host malware and function as C2 nodes. | ['T1583', 'T1583'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have exploited known vulnerabilities in Internet-facing systems. [1] For information on vulnerabilities known to be exploited by Chinese statesponsored cyber actors, refer to the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section for a list of resources. Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed: Using short-term VPS devices to scan and exploit vulnerable Microsoft Exchange® Outlook Web Access (OWA® ) and plant webshells. Targeting on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments to gain access to cloud resources. Deploying a public proof of concept (POC) exploit targeting a publicfacing appliance vulnerability. | ['T1190'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed conducting spearphishing campaigns. These email compromise attempts range from generic emails with mass targeted phishing attempts to specifically crafted emails in targeted social engineering lures. These compromise attempts use the cyber actors’ dynamic collection of VPSs, previously compromised accounts, or other infrastructure in order to encourage engagement from the target audience through domain typo-squatting and masquerading. These emails may contain a malicious link or files that will provide the cyber actor access to the victim’s device after the user clicks on the malicious link or opens the attachment. | ['T1566.001', 'T1566.002'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: gaining credential access into victim networks by using legitimate, but compromised credentials to access OWA servers, corporate login portals, and victim networks. | ['T1078.001', 'T1078.002'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike, webshells, or command line interface tools, such as schtask or crontab to create and schedule tasks that enumerate victim devices and networks. | ['T1053.003', 'T1053.005'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed conducting spearphishing campaigns that encourage engagement from the target audience. These emails may contain a malicious link or file that provide the cyber actor access to the victim’s device after the user clicks on the malicious link or opens the attachment. | ['T1204.001', 'T1204.002'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using benign executables which used Dynamic Link Library (DLL) loadorder hijacking to activate the malware installation process. | ['T1574.001'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed creating a new sign-in policy to bypass MFA requirements to maintain access to the victim network. | ['T1556.001'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed planting web shells on exploited servers and using them to provide the cyber actors with access to the victim networks. | ['T1505.003'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed executing malware shellcode and batch files to establish new services to enable persistence | ['T1543.003'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Injecting into the rundll32.exe process to hide usage of Mimikatz, as well as injecting into a running legitimate explorer.exe process for lateral movement. Using shellcode that injects implants into newly created instances of the Service Host process (svchost). | ['T1055.001', 'T1055.002'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using the 7- Zip utility to unzip imported tools and malware files onto the victim device. | ['T1140'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using benign executables which used DLL loadorder hijacking to activate the malware installation process. | ['T1564'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed Base64 encoding files and command strings to evade security measures. | ['T1218.005', 'T1218.011'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed exploiting Pulse Secure VPN appliances to view and extract valid user credentials and network information from the servers. | ['T1212'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed targeting the LSASS process or Active directory (NDST.DIT) for credential dumping. | ['T1003.001', 'T1003.003'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using multiple implants with file system enumeration and traversal capabilities. | ['T1083'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using commands, including net group and net localgroup, to enumerate the different user groups on the target network. | ['T1069'] |
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