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After initialization, SUNSPOT monitors running processes for instances of MsBuild.exe, which is part of Microsoft Visual Studio development tools. Copies of MsBuild.exe are identified by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value, 0x53D525. The hashing algorithm used for the comparison is ElfHash and is provided in Python in Figure 1 | ['T1057'] |
The “WmiApCom.bat” file is simply used to start “WmiApCom”, which happens to be the exact same file as the one dropped by the malicious Word documents. However, this is most likely meant to be a mechanism to update the compromised host with a new version of the LOWBALL malware | ['T1105'] |
Although it has only recently been launched, IcedID already uses redirection attacks. The redirection scheme IcedID uses is not a simple handover to another website with a different URL. Rather, it is designed to appear as seamless as possible to the victim. These tactics include displaying the legitimate bank’s URL in the address bar and the bank’s correct SSL certificate, which is made possible by keeping a live connection with the actual bank’s site | ['T1185'] |
TG-3390 uses DLL side loading, a technique that involves running a legitimate, typically digitally signed, program that loads a malicious DLL. CTU researchers have observed the threat actors employing legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants in analyzed samples. The DLL acts as a stub loader, which loads and executes the shell code. The adversaries have used this technique to allow PlugX and HttpBrowser to persist on a system | ['T1574.002'] |
messengers. Figures 9 and 10 show FakeM attempting to resemble MSN or Yahoo. Messenger traffic, as the first 32-bytes contain data that resemble legitimate traffic generated by these chat programs | ['T1001.003'] |
At execution, it installs an application-defined Windows hook. The hook gets windows messages indicating when a network drive has been attached. Upon adding a network drive, the hook calls its “RecordToFile” file stealer method | ['T1056.004'] |
The first way in which the malware can be launched is by hijacking a DLL. Being placed in the same folder as explorer.exe, the wrapper DLL is loaded during the Windows startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library located in the %windir%\system32 folder | ['T1574.001'] |
proxy-servers, web-servers, or software update servers. After that, these intermediary servers are used by ProjectSauron as internal proxy nodes for silent and inconspicuous data exfiltration, blending in with high volumes of legitimate traffic | ['T1090.001'] |
As mentioned in the Hermes to Ryuk section, Ryuk uses a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Without the private key provided by WIZARD SPIDER, the files cannot be decrypted and are unrecoverable. A thread is created for the encryption of each file and each file is encrypted with its own AES key. After the file has been encrypted, a file extension of .RYK is appended to the file. All directories will have a ransom note of (RyukReadMe.txt) written to the directory | ['T1486'] |
The original variant of FakeM generates network beacons to its C2 server that begin with a 32-byte header that in most cases is meant to blend into network traffic generated by legitimate applications. Following this 32-byte header, the original variant of FakeM includes data encrypted using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of “YHCRA” and bit rotation between each XOR operation | ['T1573.001'] |
Carbanak campaigns can also use legitimate programs and remote access software for command and control. They also employ standard non-application layer protocols for communication. | ['T1095'] |
After this, the Carbanak backdoor can then be used to log keystrokes and capture screenshots, steal and delete cookies, inject malicious code on sites, and monitor various traffic. For lateral movement, the malware abuses remote and system administration tools. | ['T1539', 'T1113', 'T1550.004', 'T1020.001', 'T1056.003'] |
For FIN7 attack routines, data can be compressed and/or encrypted before being exfiltrated. | ['T1560'] |
FIN7 gathers information on network shares. | ['T1039'] |
The other infection chain involves an attached .XLS file containing an Excel formula that utilizes a PowerShell command (Figure 2) to access paste.ee, a Pastebin alternative, that accesses a second encrypted PowerShell command (Figure 3). | ['T1059', 'T1566.001', 'T1059.001'] |
In Carbanak attacks, the groups’ attacks can involve logging into services that accept remote connections and using stolen password hashes through the “pass the hash” method | ['T1550.002', 'T1110.002'] |
On the other hand, FIN7 takes advantage of Mshta, a utility that can execute VBScript, and scheduled tasks to run malicious code on user systems. | ['T1053.005', 'T1053', 'T1218.005'] |
In both Carbanak and FIN7 attacks, communication with users’ compromised systems is done through bypassing firewalls or network detection systems via commonly used ports, using connection proxies to avoid direct connections to the threat group’s infrastructure, employing the command-and-control channel to remotely copy files from an external system, blending in with existing network traffic by using standard application layer protocol, and taking advantage of standard cryptographic protocol to disguise command-and-control traffic. | ['T1090'] |
Panda Stealer is deployed through spam emails posing as business quote requests to lure unwary victims into opening malicious Excel files. We have identified two infection chains: in one, an .XLSM attachment contains macros that download a loader (Figure 1). Then, the loader downloads and executes the main stealer. | ['T1598.002', 'T1566.001', 'T1137.001'] |
FIN7 attacks can and inject code into processes and hijack the search order used to load DLL files. | ['T1574.001'] |
Decoding these PowerShell scripts revealed that they are used to access paste.ee URLs for easy implementation of fileless payloads. The CallByName export function in Visual Basic is used to call the load of a .NET assembly within memory from a paste.ee URL. | ['T1059.005', 'T1059.001'] |
Carbanak also collects information on accounts, files and directories, group permissions, and registries. | ['T1083'] |
FIN7 utilizes guardrails to restrict execution and abused utilities that allow indirect command execution that can go past security restrictions | ['T1480'] |
After moving through the network and identifying assets to target, the next step would be to gather key data. At the collection phase, Carbanak and FIN7 campaigns harvest data from local system sources and through input and screen capture (as performed in a related campaign using the Tirion malware). | ['T1113', 'T1056'] |
They also add programs to a startup folder that can be referenced with a registry run key. We detected a variant of the Carbanak malware that adds registry entries and keys as an autostart technique. Credentials of existing valid accounts were also abused. | ['T1547.001'] |
Cobalt Strike was also used to continuously communicate with the main command-and-control (C&C) server. | ['T1587.001', 'T1583.004'] |
This example of BazarLoader generated command and control (C2) activity, retrieving BazarBackdoor using HTTPS traffic from 104.248.174[.]225 over TCP port 443. | ['T1043'] |
Use the latest attack patterns, Kubernetes (K8s) or Docker API targeting, which were featured in two reports focusing on TeamTNT operations, Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT and Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. | ['T1588.002'] |
The attacker then executed a persistent malicious PowerShell code that was used to download and execute another PowerShell backdoor file in the server from the malicious IP address 185[.]82[.]219[.]201, as shown in Figure 7. | ['T1590.005', 'T1059.001', 'T1027.003', 'T1216', 'T1546.013', 'T1059', 'T1064'] |
The PowerShell command executed after the Microsoft Exchange exploitation is responsible for downloading and executing another PowerShell script from the command-and-control (C&C) server 185[.]82[.]219[.]201 | ['T1059', 'T1059.001', 'T1064', 'T1546.013', 'T1059.003'] |
This PowerShell backdoor was observed to be related to the SystemBC malware as a service. The script has a hard coded C&C server IP address and port number to connect to, with data passed to the “Rc4_crypt” function before connection. | ['T1059.001'] |
In our case study, approximately two minutes after Cobalt Strike activity started, a tool to enumerate an AD environment appeared on the infected host at C:\ProgramData\AdFind.exe. | ['T1588.002', 'T1595'] |
Our analysis shows that the Crimson RAT malware is compiled as a .NET binary with minimal obfuscation. This could indicate that the cybercriminal group behind this campaign is possibly not well-funded. | ['T1140', 'T1001', 'T1588.001', 'T1587.001'] |
Earth Karkaddan actors are known to use the Crimson RAT malware in its campaigns to communicate with its command-and-control (C&C) server to download other malware or exfiltrate data. | ['T1588.001', 'T1587.001', 'T1583.004'] |
After downloading and executing these files, one of the child processes created other files and the executable setup.exe/setup-installv1.3.exe, which was extracted from 320yea_Teamviewer_15206.zip via WinRAR.exe. This file seems to be the source of most of the downloaded malicious files, as seen in the following figure. | ['T1204.002'] |
The BazarLoader DLL was immediately copied to another location and made persistent through the Windows registry | ['T1547.001', 'T1112', 'T1543.003'] |
These infections provide backdoor access that criminals use to determine whether the host is part of an Active Directory (AD) environment. If so, criminals deploy Cobalt Strike and perform reconnaissance to map the network | ['T1595', 'T1592'] |
The malicious Excel spreadsheet was discovered on Wednesday, Aug. 18, 2021, and it has a last modified date of Tuesday, Aug. 17. The filename had an .xlsb file extension. This file has macros designed to infect a vulnerable Windows host with BazarLoader. Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the Excel file. | ['T1137.001', 'T1587.001', 'T1588.001'] |
Once the executable file is executed, it will proceed to unzip a file named mdkhm.zip and then execute a Crimson RAT executable named dlrarhsiva.exe. | ['T1588.001'] |
BazarLoader is Windows-based malware spread through various methods involving email | ['T1588.001', 'T1587.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1566.001', 'T1534', 'T1598.002', 'T1566'] |
The loaded module is a simple dropper. Upon loading the module, the AutoOpen method will be invoked. The malicious code in this method drops the final payload executable into %AppData%\service.exe and executes it (see Figure 6) | ['T1574.005', 'T1574', 'T1569.002', 'T1543.003'] |
The spreadsheet’s macro code retrieved a malicious Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file for BazarLoader from the following URL | ['T1204.001'] |
this Excel template was created by a threat actor trying to instill confidence by taking advantage of the DocuSign brand name and image. | ['T1137.001', 'T1221'] |
Crimson RAT can steal credentials from browsers, collect antivirus information, capture screenshots, and list victim drives, processes, and directories. We have observed how an infected host communicates with a Crimson RAT C&C server to send exfiltrated information including PC name, operating system (OS) information, and the location of the Crimson RAT malware inside the system. | ['T1592', 'T1589', 'T1590', 'T1125', 'T1555.003', 'T1056', 'T1113', 'T1003'] |
Cobalt Strike leads to reconnaissance of an infected host’s environment. In our lab environments, this reconnaissance activity can start within a few minutes after Cobalt Strike traffic first appears. | ['T1588.001', 'T1587.001'] |
In this case, a Cobalt Strike DLL file was sent through Bazar C2 traffic and saved to the infected Windows host under the user’s AppData\Roaming directory | ['T1564.003'] |
Cobalt Strike is an adversary simulation platform developed for penetration testers by Raphael Mudge, founder of Strategic Cyber LLC. Designed for interoperability with other platforms such as Metasploit, NMAP, and Powershell Empire, it can be run using Armitage, a graphic user interface (GUI) developed by Mudge, initially for Metasploit. Armitage and Cobalt Strike are designed around a team server that allows for the sharing of information and the ability to direct and execute well-coordinated actions. | ['T1061'] |
Even though network monitoring and detection capabilities do not come easy for many organizations, they can generally offer a high return on investment if implemented correctly. Malware has to contact its C2 server if it is to receive further instructions. This article will demonstrate how to detect this communication before threat actors accomplish their objectives. There are a couple of factors that we can utilize to fingerprint any suspicious traffic and subsequent infrastructure. Before we get into that part, we should first discuss what makes Cobalt Strike so versatile. | ['T1102.002', 'T1102.003'] |
Fifteen minutes after domain enumeration, we observed successful lateral movement to two endpoints on the network. Ten minutes after lateral movement, a PowerShell Cobalt Strike loader executed as a service on a server. Even though the execution was not successful, the threat actors kept trying, a total of eight times, until it finally worked. Windows Defender real-time monitoring was then disabled, the LSASS.exe process was dumped using SysInternals ProcDump, and privilege was escalated to “SYSTEM” using named pipe impersonation. | ['T1569.002', 'T1068', 'T1546.013'] |
As days go by, more of the reported ransomware attacks turn out to be related to the new Pay2Key ransomware. The attacker followed the same procedure to gain a foothold, propagate and remotely control the infection within the compromised companies. | ['T1189'] |
SUGARDUMP using SMTP for C2 communication – dated to late 2021-early 2022. This variant was downloaded from a known UNC3890 C2 (URL: hxxp://128.199.6[.]246/3-Video-VLC.exe), and is a slightly more advanced version with similar credential harvesting functionality. | ['T1041'] |
Trickbot is the most common malware distributed by Emotet, but it is not the only one. Qakbot is another type of malware frequently dropped on Emotet-infected Windows hosts. | ['T1588.001'] |
Essentially, the TDSS botnet kad.dll module is more or less the same as cmd.dll in terms of control function. By running nodes.dat files containing a list of IP addresses of Kad clients in addition to ktzerlrules, which contains a command to download a new nodes.dat file from cybercriminal servers, the owners of the botnet can both include their infected computers in the publicly accessible Kad network and remove them from the network. The publicly accessible Kad network contains no more than 10 TDSS infected computers. This makes replacing the ktzerules file as inefficient as possible, which prevents other cybercriminals from taking control over the botnet. The total number of TDSS infected computers on the closed network number tens of thousands. | ['T1059', 'T1588.001', 'T1587.001'] |
We can apply this same concept across other executable traits, such as BOOSTWRITE’s export DLL name (DWriteImpl.dll), to create quick and easy rules that can aid in quick discovery as seen in Figure 7. | ['T1129'] |
HenBox attempts to hide itself from the app launcher view by running the following code, passing the parameters COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE_DISABLED (2) and DONT_KILL_APP (1) to the setComponentEnabledSetting() method. | ['T1564'] |
As our research technique of fingerprinting exploit writers exceeded our initial expectations, we were on the lookout for more exploits to investigate. Soon enough, we came across this blog post from Kaspersky detailing how Sodin (a.k.a Sodinokibi, or REvil), an infamous ransomware, is using a 1-Day exploit for CVE-2018-8453. | ['T1588.006', 'T1203', 'T1210'] |
The first spear phish from group “Admin@338” was sent to a foreign government in the Asian Pacific region on March 10, 2014 – just two days after the flight disappeared. The threat actors sent a spear-phishing email with an attachment titled, “Malaysian Airlines MH370.doc” (MD5: 9c43a26fe4538a373b7f5921055ddeae). Although threat actors often include some sort of “decoy content” upon successful exploitation (that is, a document representing what the recipient expected to open), in this case, the user is simply shown a blank document. | ['T1566.001', 'T1203', 'T1566'] |
However, for version 3 things are different. This is how the report of the email_accounts_grabber module appears for Emotet version 3: | ['T1129', 'T1588.001', 'T1586.002'] |
Skidmap, a Linux malware that we recently stumbled upon, demonstrates the increasing complexity of recent cryptocurrency-mining threats. This malware is notable because of the way it loads malicious kernel modules to keep its cryptocurrency mining operations under the radar. | ['T1588.001'] |
APT3 (also known as UPS), the actors responsible for Operation Clandestine Fox has quietly continued to send waves of spearphishing messages over the past few months. This actor initiated their most recent campaign on November 19, 2014 targeting multiple organizations. The attacker leveraged multiple exploits, targeting both CVE-2014-6332 and CVE-2014-4113. CVE-2014-6332 was disclosed publicly on 2014-11-11 and is a Windows OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution vulnerability. CVE-2014-4113 is a privilege escalation vulnerability that was disclosed publicly on 2014-10-14. | ['T1587.004', 'T1566.003', 'T1534'] |
In March, we discovered a targeted campaign to distribute Milum, a Trojan designed to gain remote control of devices in target organizations, some of which operate in the industrial sector. The first signs of this operation, which we have dubbed WildPressure, can be traced back to August 2019; still, the campaign remains active. The Milum samples we have seen so far do not share any code similarities with any known APT campaigns. The malware provides attackers with remote control over infected devices, allows downloading and executing commands, collecting and exfiltrating information and installing upgrades in the malware. | ['T1588.001'] |
We did not observe the initial access for this case but assess with medium to high confidence that a malicious email campaign was used to deliver an Excel (xls) document. Following the opening of the xls document, the initial Qbot DLL loader was downloaded and saved to disk. Interestingly, the name of the DLL contained a .html extension to disguise the portable executable nature of the payload. Once executed, the Qbot process creates a scheduled task to elevate itself to system. | ['T1566.001', 'T1204.002', 'T1566.002'] |
Although there are no previously known malicious Android applications attributed to the StrongPity group, we strongly believe that the threat actor is in the process of actively developing new malicious components that can be used to target Android platforms. | ['T1505'] |
SHA256 file hashes for 119 malspam attachments, 30 extracted Redaman executable files, and 30 dropped Redaman DLL files found from September through December 2018. Information is available at: https://github.com/pan-unit42/iocs/blob/master/Redaman_banking_malware/2018-09-thru-2018-12-file-hashes-for-Redaman-banking-malware.txt . | ['T1566.001', 'T1598.002'] |
It’s clear from our research that the quality of the WannaCry code is poor and the developers made many mistakes, enabling many of those infected to recover encrypted data. The way the attackers handled ransom payments limited their ability to capitalise on the spread of the worm. Multiple attempts were made to track transactions to the bitcoin wallets used by the attackers. Although estimates of how much money the attackers made vary, they run into tens of thousands, rather than hundreds . | ['T1486'] |
According to our research partner in Japan, the original EvilPost attack in December 2015 arrived as a spear-phishing email with a Word document attached. | ['T1566.001', 'T1598.002'] |
In early April, Emotet acquired a module for distribution over wireless networks (MD5: 75d65cea0a33d11a2a74c703dbd2ad99), which tried to access Wi-Fi using a dictionary attack. Its code resembled that of the Network Spreader module (bypass.exe), which had been supplemented with Wi-Fi connection capability. If the brute-force was successful, the module transmitted data about the network to C&C. | ['T1588.001'] |
We investigated a long-running espionage campaign, dubbed A41APT, targeting multiple industries, including the Japanese manufacturing industry and its overseas bases, which has been active since March 2019. The attackers used vulnerabilities in an SSL-VPN product to deploy a multi-layered loader we dubbed Ecipekac (aka DESLoader, SigLoader and HEAVYHAND). We attribute this activity to APT10 with high confidence. Most of the discovered payloads deployed by this loader are fileless and have not been seen before. We observed SodaMaster (aka DelfsCake, dfls and DARKTOWN), P8RAT (aka GreetCake and HEAVYPOT), and FYAnti (aka DILLJUICE Stage 2) which in turn loads QuasarRAT. In November and December 2020, two public blog posts were published about this campaign. One month later, we observed new activities from the actor with an updated version of some of their implants designed to evade security products and make analysis harder for researchers. You can read more in our public report. | ['T1588.001', 'T1588.006'] |
Along with the HTTP part, the binary part was also updated. The encryption remained the same, but Emotet dropped Google Protocol Buffer and switched to its own format. The compression algorithm also changed, with zlib replaced by liblzf. More details about the new protocol can be found in the Threat Intel and CERT Polska reports. | ['T1048.003'] |
In November 2018, Cisco Talos published research on an attack campaign named DNSpionage. It involved attacks using malware to compromise individual endpoints, but most interestingly described an effort to specifically hijack DNS entries of government organizations to redirect visitors to likely malicious, adversary operated systems. Both FireEye and Crowdstrike followed up with their own assessments for the DNS hijacking efforts, and described operations extending back to January 2017. No attribution to any known adversary groups was provided, other than that the target radius was primarily in the Middle East and the adversary was also likely operating out of that region. | ['T1584.002', 'T1583.002', 'T1496', 'T1189'] |
Although the targeting profile is the same as the Russian banking cluster, the TTPs are very different. In particular, the use of tooling stands out from other clusters of CARBON SPIDER activity. As with other clusters, the primary infection vector is targeted spear phishing emails that use exploits for a variety of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office: | ['T1203', 'T1588.006', 'T1566'] |
1) Function similarity – Important functions in both BYEBY and wincore.dll have almost the same implementation. One such function is the payloads’ main thread function. | ['T1588.001', 'T1055.003'] |
Another indicator of a Qakbot infection is HTTPS traffic to cdn.speedof[.]me. The domain speedof[.]me is used by a legitimate Internet speed test service. Although this is not malicious traffic, we frequently see traffic to cdn.speedof[.]me during Qakbot infections. Figure 20 shows this activity from our pcap. | ['T1090.004'] |
Malicious use of Responder was first publicly documented on August 11, 2017 as being used by APT28, also known as Fancy Bear. The tool was used against hotel visitors to spoof NetBios resources. Victims were coerced into connecting to UDP port 137 and disclosing credentials over SMB to APT28, which the threat actor then used to gain elevated access to the network. | ['T1557.001', 'T1043', 'T1021.002'] |
With the amount of overlap between the other components in these separate campaigns, we decided to compare the Pirpi payloads delivered by the UPS group using CVE-2014-1776 and CVE-2015-3113. From here on, we will refer to these two payloads as Pirpi.2014 (CVE-2014-1776) and Pirpi.2015 (CVE-2015-3113), whose details are listed in Table 1. Unit 42 discovered several similarities between the two Pirpi variants, as well as a few equally important differences, both of which are worth discussing. We also compared the Pirpi.2014 and Pirpi.2015 payloads to other known Pirpi samples in an attempt to determine which variant they most closely resemble. | ['T1588.006'] |
Next we compared the codebase for setting registry keys. The code reuse displayed in Figure 4 is the sequence that sets the IEHarden registry keys and other keys used throughout TidePool and Operation Ke3chang malware. | ['T1547.001', 'T1112'] |
Another infamous banker Trojan, Kronos, caught up with Edge in 2016. We checked out its capabilities on a Windows 10 virtual machine. In the code of the new Kronos version we found a function that checks the name and checksum of a process, as well as the hashes of the functions hooked by the malware. | ['T1056.004'] |
CARROTBALL, initially discovered in an attack during October 2019, is a simple FTP downloader utility which facilitates the installation of SYSCON, a full-featured Remote Access Trojan (RAT) which leverages FTP for Command and Control (C2). It was found embedded in a malicious Word document sent as a phishing lure to a US government agency and two non-US foreign nationals professionally associated with North Korea. | ['T1059', 'T1566'] |
The success of the Dropping Elephant group is striking given that no zero-day exploits or advanced techniques were used to target high-profile victims – it’s clear that by applying security updates and improving the security awareness of staff, the success of attacks like this can be prevented. At the start of the year we predicted that APT groups would invest less effort in developing sophisticated tools and make greater use of off-the-shelf malware. Dropping Elephant provides a further example of how low investment and use of ready-made toolsets can be very effective when combined with high quality social engineering. | ['T1587.001'] |
In my previous blog, I noted that a variant of the Cerber downloader was seen using BITS for a brief period of time and 10 out of these 11 samples were Microsoft Word documents leading to Cerber. | ['T1197'] |
In early 2015, a new Emotet modification was released, not all that different from the previous one. Among the changes were: new built-in public RSA key, most strings encrypted, ATS scripts for web injection cleared of comments, targets included clients of Swiss banks. | ['T1592.004'] |
A C&C address (103.82.52[.]18) which was found in one of MosaicRegressor’s variants (MD5:3B58E122D9E17121416B146DAAB4DB9D) was observed in use by the ‘Winnti umbrella and linked groups’, according to a publicly available report. Since this is the only link between our findings and any of the groups using the Winnti backdoor, we estimate with low confidence that it is indeed responsible for the attacks. | ['T1587.001'] |
Both MPK variants include key loggers that are extremely similar in functionality in addition to having the same strings used for headers within the key log file. The MPK IRC Bot monitors active application windows and writes the title of the open window along with the logged keystrokes to a file at “%temp%\Save.tmp”. The MPK Trojan also monitors specifically for windows that are likely to contain login forms for popular web-based email clients, such as titles that contain: | ['T1554'] |
AveMaria is a new botnet, whose first version we found in September 2018, right after the arrests of the FIN7 members. We have medium confidence that this botnet falls under the FIN7 umbrella. In fact, AveMaria is a classic infostealer bot that collects all possible credentials from various types of software: browsers, email clients, messengers, etc., and can act as a keylogger. Since the beginning of 2019, we have collected more than 1300 samples and extracted more than 130 C2s. | ['T1114', 'T1587.001'] |
. . MuddyWater has conducted various campaigns against entities spread throughout the U.S.A, Europe, Middle East and South Asia.. . A typical TTP employed by the group is the heavy use of scripting in their infection chains using languages like PowerShell and Visual Basic coupled with the frequent use of living-of-the-land binaries (LoLBins).. . Cisco Talos recently observed a campaign operated by MuddyWater targeting users in Turkey. This campaign consists of the use of malicious PDFs and Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to serve as the initial infection vector. These maldocs were named in such a way as to masquerade as legitimate documents from the Turkish Health and Interior Ministries.. . Next, the malware executes a series of scripts deployed on the infected endpoint to serve as downloaders and instrumentors for additional payloads.. . We've also discovered the use of flags or tokens in attacks conducted by this threat actor in this campaign. These tokens are meant to signal a successful infection of a target by the group's malicious artifacts.. . . . | ['T1203'] |
Pony is a popular downloader program that can download additional malware onto the infected system. It is also equipped with a number of plugins that may be used to steal stored credentials for various applications such as FTP clients, web browsers, email clients, and other software. Pony is also commonly known as Fareit. | ['T1539', 'T1555'] |
In recent years, malware delivery mechanisms have changed from fixed media (diskettes) to email (e.g. the infamous LoveLetter email worm) and direct network attacks (e.g. CodeRed). The most recent step in the evolution process is a move to delivering malware via the world wide web. | ['T1102'] |
We determined the string in the pre tags is the actor provided password, which the webshell uses as a key to decrypt the embedded payload. We determined this by following the process in which the TwoFace++ loader webshell uses the actor provided password to authenticate and decrypt the embedded webshell: | ['T1552.004'] |
We found a Coinminer bundled with the legitimate installer of video conferencing app Zoom, luring users who want to install the software but end up unwittingly downloading a malicious file. The compromised files are not from Zoom’s official download center, and are assumed to come from fraudulent websites. We have been working with Zoom to ensure that they are able to communicate this to their users appropriately. | ['T1588.001', 'T1554', 'T1195.002', 'T1574.005'] |
In August 2019, FireEye released the “Double Dragon” report on our newest graduated threat group, APT41. A China-nexus dual espionage and financially-focused group, APT41 targets industries such as gaming, healthcare, high-tech, higher education, telecommunications, and travel services. APT41 is known to adapt quickly to changes and detections within victim environments, often recompiling malware within hours of incident responder activity. In multiple situations, we also identified APT41 utilizing recently-disclosed vulnerabilities, often weaponzing and exploiting within a matter of days. | ['T1595.002', 'T1046'] |
Most modifications of Trojan.Win32.Waldek are distributed via removable media and include functionality to collect information on infected systems and send it to the attackers. Based on the system data collected, the attackers create packages of additional malware to be installed on the infected system using the relevant Waldek functionality. | ['T1025', 'T1543', 'T1005', 'T1091'] |
After decoding and decrypting with the XOR key “DARKMATTER” it gets the real C&C URL ‘banhamm.com‘. | ['T1140'] |
LockBit 2.0 is known for its extortion tactics, encrypting devices and demanding a ransom | ['T1486', 'T1588.001'] |
Vidar can also receive settings from the C&C that tells it exactly what to do. | ['T1588.001'] |
LockBit 2.0 enumerates system information such as hostname, shares, and domain information | ['T1082'] |
Once deployed, Prestige ransomware payloads will drop ransom notes named ""README.txt"" in the root directory of each drive it encrypts. | ['T1486'] |
The threat actor used RDP on Active Directory using leaked accounts. The actor dropped scanning tools, Nmap.exe and Nping.exe, for scanning the network. Next, the scheduled task was pushed by the group policy domain machine. | ['T1484', 'T1053.005'] |
An attacker sends an e-mail with a malicious Tar archive attached. | ['T1566.001', 'T1598.002'] |
QAKBOT can use VBS to download and execute malicious files | ['T1588.001'] |
The PHP malware achieves persistence by adding scheduled tasks on the host to execute daily and at regular intervals. At the same time, a generated TMP file runs a parallel process to launch the stealer component. | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
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