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亿美元)协助向世界各地分发疫苗。141 联合国各机构向委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国提供了大量支持；难民署和美国提供了 465 万美元的人道主义援助；儿童基金会提供了 32 万美元；联合国人口基金提供了 40 万美元；通过卫生组织提供了 100万美元。142 | support to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; UNHCR and the United States provided $4.65 million in humanitarian assistance; UNICEF has provided $320,000; the United Nations Population Fund $400,000; and $1 million was provided through WHO.142 |
42. 2020 年 10 月 2 日，印度和南非向世贸组织与贸易有关的知识产权问题理事会提出申请，要求“为了预防、控制和治疗 COVID-19,不强制执行[《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》]的某些条款”。143 它们提出这一请求，目的是中止履行《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》关于医疗产品的义务，包括遏制疫情所需的药品、疫苗、治疗方法、诊断工具、医疗用品和测试数据144，以便低收入国家能够133 见 https://english.alarabiya.net/en/coronavirus/2020/04/27/Coronavirus-Cuban-sends-200-doctors-to-help-South-Africa-fight-COVID-19。134 见 www.democracynow.org/2020/3/24/cuba_medical_diplomacy_italy_coronavirus。135 Poggioli, “For help on coronavirus”. | 42. On 2 October 2020, India and South Africa applied to the Council for Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of WTO for a “waiver from certain provisions of the [Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)] for the prevention, containment and treatment of COVID-19”.143 By that request, they sought the suspension of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement on medical products, including drugs, vaccines, treatments, diagnostics, medical supplies and test data, 144 needed to control the pandemic, with a view to enabling low-income countries to gain access to the tools. Most developed countries have, as at November 2020, opposed the waiver request, whereas most developing countries have supported it.145 Limiting patent protections for COVID-19 related medical products and services will facilitate access to lower-cost generic versions of COVID-19 vaccines.146 Just like for the global AIDS epidemic, compulsory licensing can “[alleviate] insufficient supplies of necessary pharmaceuticals as well as [mitigate] prohibitively expensive drug prices”.147 |
135 Poggioli, “For help on coronavirus”.136 Nyawira Mwangi, “China’s aid to Africa in fighting COVID-19”, China Global Television Network,18 June 2020. 可查阅 https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/06/18/chinas-aid-to-africa-in-fighting-covid-19/。137 Pizaro Gozali Idrus, “China ‘ready’ to include ASEAN in $2B COVID-19 aid”, Andalou Agency,29 May 2020。可查阅 www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-ready-to-include-asean-in-2b-covid-19-aid/1857846。138 见 www.wilsoncenter.org/aid-china-and-us-latin-america-amid-covid-19-crisis。139 同上。140 Tal Axelrod, “Trump adds Africa to growing list of areas US sending ventilators”, The Hill, 25 April2020. 可查阅 https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/494646-trump-commits-to-sending-ventilators-to-several-countries。141 见 www.montageafrica.com/the-uk-in-the-push-for-equitable-vaccine-supplies/；142 另见 www.wilsoncenter.org/aid-china-and-us-latin-america-amid-covid-19-crisis。143 世界贸易组织，IP/C/W/669 号文件。144 Ronald Labonte and Mira Johri, “COVID-19 drug and vaccine patents are putting profit before people”,The Conversation, 5 November 2020. 可查阅 https://theconversation.com/covid-19-drug-and-vaccine-patents-are-putting-profit-before-people-149270。获得这些工具。截至 2020 年 11 月，大多数发达国家反对免除执行请求，而大多数发展中国家支持这一请求。145 限制对 COVID-19 相关医疗产品和服务的专利保护将有助于获得 COVID-19 疫苗的低成本仿制药。146 就像全球艾滋病流行一样，强制许可可以“[缓解]必要药品供应不足的问题，同时也可以[缓解]药品价格过高令人望而却步的问题”。14743. 世界各地的一些慈善机构，如马云公益基金会148，也对 COVID-19 大流行做出了回应，除其他外，为预防、治疗、医学研究提供支持，为弱势群体提供生计支持。149 相应的机构，如开放社会基金会，已做出响应，投资数百万，为因国家侵犯公民权利而勉力维持的弱势群体提供紧急救济。15044. 2020 年 4 月，二十国集团同意重组最不发达国家的双边债务，将偿还义务冻结至 2020 年底。暂停偿债倡议及其通过国际货币基金组织的特别提款权调动额外流动性的行动151，是联合国贸易和发展会议发起的倡议之一，这些倡议很早就认识到 COVID-19 大流行病对低收入国家享有发展权的威胁。债务减免或暂停偿债仍然是确保人权的疫情后复苏的核心所在。152 调动财政资源防治疫情是符合《国际卫生条例》第四十四条第一款第(三)项规定的国际合作义务的积极行动。15345. 维持疫情爆发前的人道主义合作和技术合作，特别是全球南方国家的合作，以及在南南和三方合作背景下的合作154，是 COVID-19 期间和之后国际团结的一145 同上；另见 https://msf.or.ke/en/magazine/msf-calls-kenya-support-landmark-move-ban-patents-covid-medicines-and-tools。146 Saeed Shah, “Developing countries push to limit patent protections for COVID-19 vaccines”, The Wall | 43. Some philanthropic institutions across the globe, such as the Jack Ma Foundation,148 have also responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with support for prevention, treatment, 136 Nyawira Mwangi, “China’s aid to Africa in fighting COVID-19”, China Global Television Network, 18 June 2020. Available from https://africa.cgtn.com/2020/06/18/chinas-aid-to-africa-in-fighting-covid-19/. 137 Pizaro Gozali Idrus, “China ‘ready’ to include ASEAN in $2B COVID-19 aid”, Andalou Agency, 29 May 2020. Available from www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-ready-to-include-asean-in-2b-covid-19-aid/1857846. 138 See www.wilsoncenter.org/aid-china-and-us-latin-america-amid-covid-19-crisis. 139 Ibid. 140 Tal Axelrod, “Trump adds Africa to growing list of areas US sending ventilators”, The Hill, 25 April 2020. Available from https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/494646-trump-commits-to-sending-ventilators-to-several-countries. 141 See www.montageafrica.com/the-uk-in-the-push-for-equitable-vaccine-supplies/; and see also www.wilsoncenter.org/aid-china-and-us-latin-america-amid-covid-19-crisis. 143 World Trade Organization, document IP/C/W/669. 144 Ronald Labonte and Mira Johri, “COVID-19 drug and vaccine patents are putting profit before people”, The Conversation, 5 November 2020. Available from https://theconversation.com/covid-19- drug-and-vaccine-patents-are-putting-profit-before-people-149270. 145 Ibid; see also https://msf.or.ke/en/magazine/msf-calls-kenya-support-landmark-move-ban-patents-covid-medicines-and-tools. 146 Saeed Shah, “Developing countries push to limit patent protections for COVID-19 vaccines”, The |
Street Journal, 17 September 2020. 可查阅 www.wsj.com/articles/developing-countries-push-to-limit-patent-protections-for-covid-vaccines-11600355170 ； 另 见 Jobaira Nasrin Khan,“Pharmaceutical patents in the era of COVID-19: the aftermath on developing countries”, Jurist,10 May 2020。可查阅 www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/05/jobaira-khan-pharmaceutical-patents-covid19/。 | Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2020. Available from www.wsj.com/articles/developing-countries-push-to-limit-patent-protections-for-covid-vaccines-11600355170; see also Jobaira Nasrin Khan, “Pharmaceutical patents in the era of COVID-19: the aftermath on developing countries”, Jurist, 10 May 2020. Available from www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/05/jobaira-khan-pharmaceutical-patents-covid19/. |
147 Hilary Wong, “The case for compulsory licensing during COVID-19”, viewpoints, Journal of GlobalHealth, 19 November 2020. 可查阅 www.jogh.org/documents/issue202001/jogh-10-010358.htm；另见美洲人权委员会第 1/2020 号决议，第 9 段。 | 147 Hilary Wong, “The case for compulsory licensing during COVID-19”, viewpoints, Journal of Global Health, 19 November 2020. Available from www.jogh.org/documents/issue202001/jogh-10- 010358.htm; see also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights resolution 1/2020, para. 9. |
148 Mwangi, “China’s aid to Africa”. | 148 Mwangi, “China’s aid to Africa”. |
149 见 https://candid.org/explore-issues/coronavirus。 | 149 See https://candid.org/explore-issues/coronavirus. |
150 见 www.opensocietyfoundations.org/newsroom/open-society-to-increase-commitment-to-global-covid-19-response。 | 150 See www.opensocietyfoundations.org/newsroom/open-society-to-increase-commitment-to-global-covid-19-response. |
151 Constant Munda, “UN faults Kenya for ignoring G20 COVID debt relief offer”, Business Daily,6 November 2020. 可查阅 www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/un-faults-kenya-for-ignoring-g20-covid-debt-relief-offer-2732218。 | 151 Constant Munda, “UN faults Kenya for ignoring G20 COVID debt relief offer”, Business Daily, 6 November 2020. Available from www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/un-faults-kenya-for-ignoring-g20-covid-debt-relief-offer-2732218. |
152 美洲人权委员会第 1/2020 号决议，第 17–18 段；以及基金组织，《世界经济展望》，第 xiv页。 | 152 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights resolution 1/2020, paras. 17–18; and IMF, World Economic Outlook, p. xiv. |
153 《国际卫生条例》，第 26 页。 | 153 International Health Regulations, p. 26. |
154 “关于加强国际合作的初步研究”，会议室文件，第 14 段。可查阅 www.ohchr.org/ | 154 “Preliminary study on enhancement of international cooperation”, conference room paper, para. 14. |
154 “关于加强国际合作的初步研究”，会议室文件，第 14 段。可查阅 www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Session12/Pages/Index.aspx。 | Available from www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/ |
EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Session12/Pages/Index.aspx。 | Session12/Pages/Index.aspx. |
47. 在本报告中，独立专家重申了国家在应对 COVID-19 大流行的可持续措施中的核心作用，并从健康、人权以及和平与安全法角度强调了合作与团结的国际法律义务。他还阐述了道德依据，并提出了具有约束力的法律依据，呼吁各国重新全面致力于国际团结，并确保不阻碍其国民在这方面采取行动。独立专家赞扬各国、多边机构、慈善机构和私营部门行为方在调集人力、智力、财政和物质资源抗击这场迅速又令人不安的疫情方面的国际团结行动。独立专家注意到，世界许多地方出现了违反人权规范系统滥用紧急权力的令人不安的趋势。同样重要的是，对整个经济、家庭生计和全世界数十亿人的个人梦想的毁灭性影响，再次激发了承诺消除不平等的呼声。国际团结有许多积极表现的例子，本报告仅明确讨 | Expert notes the disturbing trend witnessed in many parts of the world of the systematic abuse of emergency powers in violation of human rights norms. As importantly, the devastating effects of whole economies, household livelihoods and the personal dreams of billions of people around the world reinvigorate calls for a recommitment to the fight against inequality. |
发了承诺消除不平等的呼声。国际团结有许多积极表现的例子，本报告仅明确讨论了其中的几个，这些例子再次证明了国际合作的道德和法律基础是多么牢固。独立专家还注意到在疫情期间出现的令人遗憾的国际团结差距，其中最令人关切的是过度的“疫苗民族主义”行动，涉及囤积疫苗和其他 COVID-19 控制产品，从而大大降低了国际社会作为一个整体控制和战胜疫情的机会。 | The numerous examples of positive expressions of international solidarity, of which only a few could be explicitly discussed in the present report, reaffirm the robustness of the ethical and legal rationales of international cooperation. The Independent Expert has also noted the unfortunate gaps in international solidarity that have been manifested during the pandemic, most concerning of which were actions towards excessive “vaccine nationalism” that involved the hoarding of vaccines and other COVID-19 control products in a way that significantly reduced the chances of controlling and defeating the pandemic as a world community. |
七. 建议 | VII. Recommendations |
48. 独立专家建议各国： | 48. The Independent Expert recommends that States: |
(a) 紧急撤销任何可能威胁或违反国际法，包括国际人权法和《国际卫生条例》规定的具有约束力的通过合作展现国际团结之义务的卫生保健措施和行动，特别是囤积疫苗、治疗方法和诊断工具的行为，这些行为会大大减少在全球范围内迅速控制和战胜 COVID-19 大流行的机会，因为除非所有国家都安全，否则任何国家都不能在疫情中幸免于难，特别是考虑到病毒恶性变异的明显可能性以及这种变异通过贸易和旅行的传播； | (a) Urgently withdraw any health-care-related measures and actions that may constitute threats to, or violations of, binding international solidarity, through cooperation, obligations under international law, including under international human rights law and the International Health Regulations, especially any hoarding of vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics in a way that significantly reduces the chances of the rapid, worldwide control and defeat of the COVID-19 pandemic, given that no State will be safe from the pandemic unless and until all States are safe from it, especially given the distinct possibility of malign mutations of the virus and the spread of such variants through trade and travel; |
(b) 紧急建立或充分实施《国际卫生条例》第五条和第十三条以及附件 1 中规定的最低核心公共卫生能力要求，以此作为一项可靠措施，在充分尊重人权并155 同上，第 18 段。156 同上；Wale Adebanwi, “Government-led service: the Nigerian Technical Aid Corps”, VoluntaryAction, vol. 7, No. 2,; www.acp.int/content/news-nigerias-technical-aid-corps-acp-countries-expand-brazil-venezuela-vietnam; and Kelechi Deca, “Nigeria can deploy the Technical Aid Corp as weaponof diplomacy”, Afrikan Heroes, 6 November 2019。可查阅 https://afrikanheroes.com/2019/11/06/nigeria-can-deploy-the-technical-aid-corp-as-weapon-of-diplomacy/。符合其国际团结义务的情况下，为控制当前和未来的大流行病做好准备，并且应通过《条例》第四十四条和其他条款中概述的“合作和援助”来实现到这一点； | (b) Urgently establish or implement fully the minimum core public health capacities specified in articles 5 and 13 of and annex 1 to the International Health Regulations as a sure measure to prepare for the control of the current and future pandemics, in full respect for human rights, as well as consistent with their international solidarity obligations, and to do so through “collaboration and assistance” as outlined in article 44 and other provisions of the Regulations; |
(c) 紧急重新考虑并撤销在疫情背景下对享有公民权利和政治权利构成威胁的任何立法或行政行动，特别是确保执法机构的行为不会不合理地损害这些权利，并立即开展或重振司法和行政补救机制的工作，以确保许多国家在疫情发生后滥用紧急权力的众多受害者得到公正对待； | (c) Urgently reconsider and reverse any actions, legislative or administrative, that constitute threats to the enjoyment of civil and political rights in the context of the pandemic and especially ensure that the conduct of law enforcement agencies does not unjustifiably impair such rights, and immediately establish or reinvigorate the work of redress mechanisms, both judicial and administrative, to ensure justice for the many victims of abuses of emergency powers implemented by many States in the wake of the pandemic; |
(d) 撤回反对意见，支持向世贸组织与贸易有关的知识产权问题理事会提出的申请，要求明确许可 COVID-19 的诊断工具、治疗方法和疫苗可以不受《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》某些条款的约束，以确保迅速普及 COVID-19 保健和疫苗接种。 | (d) Withdraw their objections and support the application to the WTO Council for Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights for the explicit exemption of COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure rapid universal access to COVID-19 care and vaccination. |
49. 独立专家建议各国、多边机构和其他行为方提供贷款，维持并尽可能扩大目前的债务暂停偿还制度和取消债务，这两者都将有助于释放全球南方国家所需的额外资源，特别是在短期内控制 COVID-19 大流行所需的资源，并提振在COVID-19 控制措施造成或加剧的衰退中挣扎的经济。 | 49. The Independent Expert recommends that States and multilateral agencies and other actors that lend funds to maintain and possibly expand the current debt suspension regimes and implement debt cancellations, both of which will help to free up the additional resources needed by States in the global South, especially to control the COVID-19 pandemic in the short term, and to stimulate economies struggling with the downturn caused or exacerbated by COVID-19 control measures. |
安全理事会 Distr.: General | Security Council Distr.: General |
3 July 2002 | 3 July 2002 |
02-47141 (C) 170702 170702 | 02-47142 (E) 170702 |
02-47141 (C) 170702 170702 | *0247142* |
2002 年 6 月 28 日安全理事会关于反恐怖主义的第 1373(2001)号决议 | Letter dated 28 June 2002 from the Chairman of the Security |
2002 年 6 月 28 日安全理事会关于反恐怖主义的第 1373(2001)号决议所设委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信 | Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council |
反恐怖主义委员会收到了格鲁吉亚根据第 1373（2001）号决议第 6 段提交的报告增编（见附件）。 | The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached addendum to the report from Georgia submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex). |
请将本函及其附件作为安全理事会的文件分发为荷。 | I should be grateful if you could arranged for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council. |
杰里米·格林斯托克（签名） | (Signed) Jeremy Greenstock Chairman Counter-Terrorism Committee |
附件 | Annex |
2002 年 6 月 20 日格鲁吉亚常驻联合国代表团临时代办给安全理事会关于反恐怖主义的第 1373（2001）号决议所设委员会主席的信 | Letter dated 20 June 2002 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism |
谨随函转递一些资料(见附文一和二)，补充格鲁吉亚根据 1373(2001)号决议第 6 段提交并由格鲁吉亚机构间反恐怖主义委员会主席杰马勒·加赫基泽签署的从前报告。 | I have the honour to transmit herewith information additional to the report submitted by Georgia pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001), signed by the Chairman of the Interagency National Counter-Terrorism Commission, Mr. Jemal Gakhokidze (see enclosures I and II). |
附文一 | Enclosure I |
关于对恐怖主义威胁进行早期侦查和预先模拟，以便保障欧亚走廊安全的提案我们在此提出“关于对恐怖主义威胁进行早期侦查和预先模拟，以便保障欧亚走廊安全的方案”草案供审议，并在可行的情况下进一步总结归纳。我们认为， | Proposals for early detection and advance modeling of the terrorism threats with a view of guaranteeing the security of the Eurasia Corridor |
亚走廊安全的方案”草案供审议，并在可行的情况下进一步总结归纳。我们认为，上述方案开始实施后无疑将会加强欧亚走廊的稳定，及时防止恐怖主义的威胁。对恐怖主义威胁进行这类预先模拟将使我们能够实施最有效率、最有利的防止恐怖主义行为的措施。同时也会更便于为履行这一职能做出正确的组织上和机构上的决策。 | We would like to offer the draft program for the consideration and for further generalization in the case of its feasibility: “The Program for Early Detection and Advance Modeling of the Terrorism Threats with a View of Guaranteeing the Security of the Eurasia Corridor”. In our opinion, the commencement of the implementation of the mentioned program would, no doubt, enhance the stabilization of the Eurasia Corridor, its timely safeguarding against terrorism threats. Such kind of advanced modeling of terrorism threats would enable us to implement the most efficient and advantageous measures for the prevention of the acts of terrorism. It would make easier the process of adopting correct organizational and structural decisions for the discharge of this function. |
首先让我们考虑一下这一问题的迫切性： | Let us first of all consider the pressing nature of this problem: |
格鲁吉亚最基本的战略目标就是建设一个独立、民主、和平的国家，能够在发展及加强东西方间和南北方间多边关系这一领域，发挥位处欧亚交叉口的重要作用。 | The most essential strategic goal of Georgia is to build up an independent, democratic and peaceful state, which would be capable to play an important part on the crossroads of Europe and Asia in the field of development and reinforcement of multilateral relations between the East and the West, the North and the South. |
欧亚走廊的充分运转对于实现这一战略目标特别重要，因为它为格鲁吉亚充分发挥其地缘政治职能以及获得国际社会对国家独立的认可，提供了实际机会。在这一方面，欧亚走廊对格鲁吉亚的重要性远远超出了经济方面。实际上，这一走廊对于在本区域，尤其是在格鲁吉亚建立一个新的世界秩序和文明制度，具有重要的政治、经济、地缘政治和国际意义。 | Full-scale performance of the Eurasia Corridor is of particular importance for the attainment of this strategic goal, as far as it opens up the actual opportunities for Georgia to fully discharge its geopolitical functions and to obtain the international guarantees for the state independence. In this respect the importance of the Eurasia Corridor for Georgia goes far beyond the economic implication. Actually, it acquires the political, economic, geopolitical and international significance for the establishment of the new world order and civilized system in the region and particularly in Georgia. |
因此我们认为，保障上述走廊的安全，不仅是格鲁吉亚，而且是整个区域和国际社会的最重要任务之一。 | Thus, in our mind, guaranteeing the security or the mentioned Corridor is one of the most important tasks of not only Georgia, but of the whole regional and international community as well. |
我们还想补充指出，保护这一走廊超出了军事范畴。由于政治、社会、民族、犯罪和其它一系列有时比较反常的问题（这些问题可能成为威胁的主要方面），经常要求在本区域开展复杂的全球性过程。由于我们这一区域有争议的地缘政治过程而更加强调急需制定措施，早期侦查及预防这类威胁。 | We would also like to add, that the protection of the Corridor goes beyond the military aspects. Political, social, ethnic, criminogenic and a range of other problems, sometimes atypical ones, which might become the main aspect of a threat, frequently entail complicated and global processes in this region. The controversial geopolitical processes of our region moreover emphasize the urgency of the development of the measures for the early detection of such threats and their prevention. |
根据上述情况，我们认为对必要措施进行预防性模拟，以便对这类威胁（指的是内部和外部基本的军事和非军事危险）进行早期侦查及预防，是保障欧亚走廊安全的基本前提条件之一。 | Proceeding from the above said, we consider the preventive modeling of the measures necessary for the early detection of the threats and their avoidance as one of the essential preconditions for guarantying the security of the Eurasia Corridor (meaning the basic military and non-military internal and external hazards). |
同时，在适当考虑到这一问题重要性的情况下，我们认为应该在格鲁吉亚国家安全理事会的框架内详细拟订这一分析预测系统和加以实行。 | At the same time, with due consideration of the importance of the problem, we consider that such an analytical and predictive system should be elaborated and enacted within the framework of the National Security Council of Georgia. |
项目的目标：主要目的是通过在欧亚走廊的整个格鲁吉亚部分采用对威胁进行早期侦查和预防性模拟的系统，促进走廊的安全。 | The Goal of the Project. The main purpose is the promotion of security of the Corridor through the implementation of the system of early detection and preventive modeling of the threats throughout the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor. |
这一项目的主要任务如下： | The main tasks of the project are to be the following: |
· 确定威胁的政治背景；· 确定威胁的社会背景；· 确定威胁的民族－政治性质；· 对欧亚走廊格鲁吉亚部分面临的潜在威胁进行分类；· 绘制欧亚走廊格鲁吉亚部分的人口图、地形图、犯罪情况图、交通图和其它情况图； | • Establishment of the political background of the threats; • Establishment of the social background of the threats; • Establishment of the ethno-political nature of a threat; • Classification of the potential threats on the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor; • Drafting of the demographic, topographic, criminogenic, communication and other maps for the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor; • Establishment of the monitoring system on the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor; • Elaboration of the comparative analytical systems for the acts of terrorism already committed on the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor; • Creation of the legal and confidential databases concerning the terrorists and the terrorist organizations located close to the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor; • Establishment of the monitoring systems in the major points of the Corridor crossing Georgia; • Monitoring of the terrorist environment; • Modeling of the measures for the early detection of the threats and their counterbalancing. |
· 对威胁的早期侦查和制衡措施进行模拟。主要预期成果： | Anticipated major outcomes: |
执行项目的主要任务后将使我们能够利用下列技术，保障欧亚走廊格鲁吉亚部分的稳定：· 技术上和智能上先进的数据库；· 一个合理并且最有利的系统，以获取、处理预防威胁方面的分析－预测信息并予以系统化；· 先进的方法框架，以拟订预防性措施，查明并早期侦查各种威胁；· 模拟威胁的电脑程序；· 反恐怖主义系统方案；· 欧亚走廊格鲁吉亚部分的各种安全计划和地图。 | The implementation of the major tasks of the project would enable us to use the following to secure the stability of the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor: • Technologically and intellectually advanced databases; • Rational and the most advantageous system of obtaining, processing and systematization of the analytical-predictive information for the prevention of the threats; • Advanced methodological framework for the elaboration of the identification and the early detection of the threats and preventive measures; • Threat modeling Computer programs; • Counter terrorism systematic programs; • Security schemes and maps of the Georgian part of the Eurasia Corridor. |
负责项目实施工作的机构和潜力：· 由格鲁吉亚国家安全理事会负责对项目的实施情况进行整体管理；· 项目的直接执行人应是格鲁吉亚国家安全理事会的人员和根据特定任务的具体性质选定的独立分析中心；· 格鲁吉亚和外国的科学家、专业人员和专家也应该参加项目的实施。 | The structure and potential of the Project implementation: • The overall management of the Project implementation shall be vested with the National Security Council of Georgia; • Direct executors of Project shall be the personnel of the National Security Council of Georgia and the independent analytical centers chosen according to the specific nature of the set tasks; • Georgian and foreign scientists, specialists and experts should as well participate in the implementation of the Project. |
实施项目预计所需时间期限：3－4 年 | Anticipated period for the implementation of the Project: 3-4 years. |
根据阿塞拜疆、格鲁吉亚和土耳其等国共同遵守的区域原则，不难确定需要制定这样一个方案。这一方案的主要目的应该是保障巴库－第比利斯－杰伊汉石油管道和巴库－第比利斯－埃尔祖鲁姆天然气管道的区域安全。在以后各个阶 | It is not difficult or debatable to ascertain, that the elaboration of a similar program, based on a regional principle for such countries, as they are Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey. The main purpose of this program should be the guaranteeing the regional security of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline. |
油管道和巴库－第比利斯－埃尔祖鲁姆天然气管道的区域安全。在以后各个阶段，中亚各国也应该参与实施这样一个方案。自然，在我们谈到安全问题时，我们主要指的是恐怖主义威胁，尽管该词有很广的意义。 | At the next stages the countries of Central Asia should as well be involved in the implementation of such a program. Naturally when speaking about the security, we mainly mean the menace of terrorism, despite the broad meaning of this term. |
总而言之，我们认为，即使在全球一级，根据这一原则拟订反恐怖主义方案不仅是适宜的，而且是绝对必要的。 | To sum up, we would like to say, that the elaboration of the counter terrorism programs based on this principle even at a global level is not only expedient, but absolutely necessary as well. |
格鲁吉亚机构间反恐怖主义委员会主席 | Chairman of the Interagency National Counter-Terrorism Commission |
格鲁吉亚国家安全理事会副秘书 | Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia |
法学学位应考人 | Candidate of Legal Sciences |
附文二 | Enclosure II |
解决阿布哈兹境内核材料问题的提案 | Proposal for resolving the problems of nuclear materials located on the territory of Abkhazia |
谨向阁下转递格鲁及亚根据第 1373（2001）号决议第 6 段提交的报告增编。 | I have the honor to forward to you addendum to the Report submitted by Georgia pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001). |
9 月 11 日恐怖袭击事件之后，我们已经通知安全理事会反恐怖主义委员会，格鲁吉亚国家安全理事会成立了机构间反恐怖主义委员会，以针对处理恐怖主义的威胁，作为国际反恐怖联盟一个成员协调国内努力，并确保格鲁吉亚全面执行安全理事会第 1373（2001）号决议和全国反恐怖主义方案。 | As we have already informed the Security Council antiterrorist Committee in the aftermath of September 11th terrorist attacks the National Security of Georgia established an Interagency Counter-terrorism Commission to address threats of terrorism, to coordinate country’s efforts as of a member of International Antiterrorist Coalition of States and to ensure full implementation of Georgia of the UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and its national program of fighting against terrorism. |
正是在这方面，让我们深感不安的是核恐怖主义的威胁，因为有可能偷运核材料，而且国内还有许多放射性来源。格鲁吉亚没有探测核材料的装备，边界处处可通过，冲突区内有些地区常年没有法律秩序，暴力不断，变成了犯罪分子的“天堂”，因此核材料很有可能落入恐怖分子－原教旨分子手中。自从 1995 年以来，格鲁吉亚境内共发现有 197 个以上未经记录的放射性来源，主要是由苏联即当时的俄罗斯军队留下的。俄罗斯掌握这些材料的地点，这些资料多属机密，但对格鲁吉亚人民就很危险，潜在的恐怖分子很容易获得。 | It is in this context we are particularly alarmed by the threats of nuclear terrorism given the possibility of smuggling the nuclear materials and presence of multiple radioactive sources in the country. Unequipped for detecting nuclear materials and porous borders, pockets of endemic lawlessness and violence in the zone of conflicts turns into “safe haven” for criminals, make likelihood of falling the nuclear materials into possession of terrorist-fundamentalists real. For more than 197 unaccounted sources of radiation have been found in Georgia since 1995, mainly left by the Soviet, then Russian Army, the data of their location held by Russia is mostly classified making them dangerous for the Georgian population and easily accessible for potential terrorists. |
2000 年时，国家安全部反恐怖中心截获了三公斤浓缩铀-235。这表明问题越来越严重。在这种情况下，格鲁吉亚政府就更有理由关注位于冲突区内的放射性来源问题，即苏呼米物理技术研究所（前苏联核研究所）和俄罗斯古达乌塔军事基地。格鲁吉亚政府曾征求国际原子能机构提供援助，评估阿布哈兹地区的核材料情况，并为此制定安全保障安排。 | Interception of 3 kg of enriched of Uranium-235 in 2000 by the Antiterrorist Center of the Ministry of State Security points at growing magnitude of the problem. All the more in this situation the Government of Georgia has all grounds to be concerned by the problem of radioactive sources located in the zone of conflict, namely in the Sukhumi Physical and Technical Institute (SPTI, former Soviet nuclear research institute) and the military base of Russian Federation in Gudauta. The Government of Georgia sought assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in assessing the nuclear situation in Abkhazia and working out safely and security arrangements for these radioactive materials. |
2000 年 9 月 28 日和 29 日，在原子能机构主持下，联合国协助格鲁吉亚和阿布哈兹方面同俄罗斯方面在苏呼米开会，讨论放射性材料安全储存问题。专家们认为该研究所的储存设备情况极差，但对于如何长期解决问题，意见不一。核能源部代表得到阿布哈兹方面的支持，认为应在阿布哈兹山区新建核材料储藏设施，并表示愿意为此拨出 600 万美元。 | In 28-29 September 2002, the UN facilitated the meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz side together with their Russian counterparts in Sukhumi under the aegis of the IAEA to discuss the problem of safety storage of the radioactive materials, the experts evaluated the state of the Institute’s storing facility as disastrous but diverged in proposing long-term solution of the problem. The representatives of the Ministry of Atomic Energy backed by the Abkhaz side insisted on building a new nuclear material storage in the mountainous regions of Abkhazia and expresses readiness to allocate 6 million US dollars for this purpose. |
人怀疑其是否可行。最重要的是，格鲁吉亚政府和原子能机构一直在谈判，准备在格鲁吉亚东部建造安全的核废料储藏点，这样就不必在阿布哈兹分离政权所控制而格鲁吉亚政府无法控制的动荡地区另建设施。俄罗斯联邦如果仍反对国际核查古达乌塔军事基地，则若决定把放射性材料从基地转到阿布哈兹境内的新储藏点，那么放射性材料落入恐怖分子之手的危险就会大增。 | Implementation of proposal of the ministry of Atomic Energy itself would inevitably raise numerous, very serious concerns casting doubt on its plausibility. First and foremost the Government of Georgia and IAEA have been negotiating the construction of secure, nuclear waste storage site in Eastern Georgia so that there is no building another facility in the volatile territory controlled by the Abkhaz separatist regime and thus beyond the reach of the Government of Georgia. The danger of falling the radioactive materials into the possession of the terrorists may considerably increase would Russian Federation still objecting to internationalverification of the closure of the Gudauta military base decide to transfer the radioactive materials from the base to the new storage site in Abkhazia. |
从更广的区域角度来看，阿布哈兹地区很有可能被用作偷运核材料和从欧洲以外把核材料偷偷运入格鲁吉亚的前哨。阿塞拜疆－格鲁吉亚边界没有装置探测核材料的设备，使问题更加严重。不能排除通过阿布哈兹以及俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚边界的茨欣瓦利地区/南奥塞提亚地区非法运输放射性材料的可能性。因为在那里，俄罗斯单方面为分离区域简化签证制度。 | In a wider, regional prospective, the region of Abkhazia may well be used as an outpost for smuggling nuclear materials both stored and smuggled into Georgia from outside to Europe. The situation exacerbated by the fact that the Azerbaidjani-Georgian border is nor equipped with the means of detection so that remains porous for nuclear materials. Illegal transportation of radioactive materials can not be excluded through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Osetia sections of the Russian-Georgian border, where Russia unilaterally established the simplified visa regime for the separatist regions. |
2001 年 5 月，应格鲁吉亚政府的邀请，原子能机构代表团访问了苏呼米。访问团广泛研究了苏呼米物理技术研究所的核安全状况，随后，原子能机构决定在议程中列入在格鲁吉亚东部建造核材料储藏点的项目。 | In May 2001, by invitation of the Government of Georgia the mission of the IAEA visited Sukhumi. After the mission extensively studied the nuclear safety situation in the SPTI the IAEA decided to include into its agenda the item on necessity of construction of the site for nuclear material storage in Eastern Georgia. |
格鲁吉亚政府在协调理事会（这是联合国在格鲁吉亚阿布哈兹主导的和平进程机构，由冲突中的格鲁吉亚一方和阿布哈兹一方，以及联合国秘书长之友小组：法国、联合王国、美国、德国、俄罗斯组成）议程中列入了核材料安全问题。随后，格鲁吉亚方面和阿布哈兹方面签署了《解决苏呼米物理研究所和其他组织的放射性废物问题第三工作组决议》（见附件）。该决议建立了一个合作框架，具体要求编制放射性来源和废物清单，提供临时安全措施，直到这些放射性物质永久储藏地点安排妥当。尽管该决议目标并不宏大，但决议的执行仍需要国际原子能机构提供技术和财政援助。 | The Government of Georgia brought the issue of safety of nuclear materials into the agenda of Coordinating council (organ of the UN-led peace process in Abkhazia, Georgia, composed of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to the conflict and the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General, namely France, United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Russia). Consequently the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed Resolution of Working Group III Regarding Radioactive Waste on the Territory of Sukhumi Physical Institute (SPTI) and other Organizations (see annex). The Resolution sets out a framework for cooperation that entail inter alia creation of roster of radioactive sources and waste and provides for temporary safety measures until the permanent storage area for these radioactive substances is arranged. Notwithstanding modest objectives of the Resolution the technical and financial assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency remains crucial for its implementation. |
有鉴于此，格鲁吉亚政府认为需要在以下领域给予援助： | Given aforesaid Government of Georgia deems necessary to register need for assistance in the following: |
· 协助向格鲁吉亚边防警察和海关提供探测放射性物质的设备和培训； | • assistance in providing the Border Guard and Customs of Georgia with the equipment for detecting the radioactive agents and training; |
· 协助安装安全设备（监测录像机、感应警报等），为姆兹赫塔的核反应堆安全提供更多保障； | • assistance in providing additional safeguards for safety of nuclear reactor in Mtskheta through installing security equipment (surveillance video cameras, sensor alarms etc.); |
· 协助向格鲁吉亚海军和边防警察提供装备和培训，监测黑海海域的放射 | • assistance in equipping and training the Georgian Navy and the Border Guard with the means of monitoring of radiation in the Black Sea Basin; |
· 协助同俄罗斯进行谈判，公布关于格鲁吉亚境内放射性来源地点的资料。 | • assistance in negotiating with Russia release of the data on location of radiation sources in the territory of Georgia; |
· 协助提供数据收集和分析设备，以及放射性来源探测设备。 | • assistance in providing equipment for data collecting and analysis as well as detecting the radiation sources. |
格鲁吉亚-阿布哈兹协调理事会关于苏呼米物理技术研究所核材料问题的第三工作组会议不久将召开。前次会议商定的解决办法仍未落实。格鲁吉亚方面愿意培训阿布哈兹专家，提供探测设备，并让这些设备在阿布哈兹境内运行两周。此后，将对阿布哈兹境内核材料进行精确登记。 | The meeting of 3rd working group of Georgian-Abkhaz Coordinating Council which concerns the issue of nuclear materials located in the base of Sukhumi Physical-Technical Institute will be held in the nearest future. This solutions taken on previous meeting has not been yet implemented. Georgian side is ready to conduct the training for Abkhaz specialists, to give the searching equipment andto send this equipment machine to Abkhaz territory for two weeks. Consequently the precise register of nuclear materials located on the territory of Abkhazia will be conducted. |
全国机构间反恐怖主义委员会主席 | Chairman of the Interagency National Counter-Terrorism Commission, |
格鲁吉亚国家安全理事会副秘书 | Deputy Secretary of National Security Council of Georgia, |
安全理事会 Distr.: General | Security Council Distr.: General |
23 January 2023ChineseOriginal: French(C) 260123 270123 | 23-01144 (E) 250123 270123 |
*2301144* | *2301144* |
2023 年 1 月 18 日刚果民主共和国常驻联合国代表团临时代办给安全理 | Letter dated 18 January 2023 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of |
2023 年 1 月 18 日刚果民主共和国常驻联合国代表团临时代办给安全理事会主席的信 | the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council |
奉我国政府指示，谨随函转递刚果民主共和国副总理兼外交部长克里斯托夫·卢通杜拉·阿帕拉·潘·阿帕拉发布的刚果民主共和国政府关于北基伍安全局势的公报(见附件)。 | On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the communiqué of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning the security situation in North Kivu issued by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’Apala (see annex). |
请将本公报及其附件作为安全理事会文件分发为荷。临时代办 | I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council. |
维多利亚·廖洛查·列塔(签名) | (Signed) Victoria Liolocha Lieta |
年 1 月 18 日刚果民主共和国常驻联合国代表团临时代办给安全理事会主席的信的附件 | Annex to the letter dated 18 January 2023 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council |
刚果民主共和国政府关于北基伍安全局势的公报2022 年 12 月 15 日，在达累斯萨拉姆在特设核查机制负责人在场的情况下， | Communiqué of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerning the security situation in North Kivu |
刚果民主共和国政府关于北基伍安全局势的公报2022 年 12 月 15 日，在达累斯萨拉姆在特设核查机制负责人在场的情况下，东非共同体防务首长和东非共同体区域部队指挥官制定了时间表，根据这一时间表，“3·23”运动恐怖分子必须遵照 2022 年 11 月 23 日罗安达微型首脑会议后发表的公报，在 2023 年 1 月 15 日星期日之前撤离他们在刚果领土上占领的所有地区，以便在这些地区重建国家权力，让流离失所的刚果人民能够返回家园。 | According to the schedule established by the chiefs of defence staff of the East African Community (EAC) and the commander of the EAC Regional Force in the presence of the Head of the Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism in Dar-es-Salaam on 15 December 2022, as at Sunday, 15 January 2023, pursuant to the Final Communiqué issued following the Luanda mini-summit held on 23 November 2022, the M23 terrorists were to leave all the areas they occupied in Congolese territory, in order to enable State authority to be re-established in those areas and the displaced Congolese people to return to their homes. |
刚果民主共和国政府注意到，“3·23”运动恐怖分子和为他们撑腰的卢旺达当局一如既往，完全无视东非共同体、非洲联盟、安全理事会和双边伙伴明确表达的各自立场，再次未能履行承诺。 | The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo notes that, as usual, the M23 terrorists and the Rwandan authorities who support them have once again failed to keep their commitment, in total defiance of the East African Community, the African Union, the United Nations Security Council and the clear individual positions of bilateral partners. |
事实上，在破坏微型首脑会议的各项决议和嘲弄签署上述最后公报的国家元首之后，他们一再采用拖延战术，假意从基布姆巴和鲁马加博军营撤出，而实际上其周围地区和进出道路仍在他们的控制之下。“3·23”恐怖组织和卢旺达国防军于 2022 年 11 月 29 日晚至 30 日在 Kishishe 和 Pambo 地区屠杀了 227 名无辜的刚果平民。他们继续向马西西高原发动军事进攻，拒不遵照 2022 年 11 月 8 日在布琼布拉举行的东非共同体成员国防务首长会议和 2022 年 11 月 23 日罗安达微型首脑会议的决定，向刚果民主共和国一侧的萨比尼奥山撤退。 | Indeed, after sabotaging the resolutions of that mini-summit and making a mockery of the Heads of State who signed the above-mentioned Final Communiqué by repeatedly employing delaying tactics and staging sham withdrawals from the territory of Kibumba and from the Rumagabo military camp, the surrounding localities and access roads of which are still under their control, the M23 and the Rwandan Defence Forces massacred 227 innocent Congolese civilians in the localities of Kishishe and Pambo on the night of 29 to 30 November 2022. They have continued their military offensive towards the Masisi Plateau instead of withdrawing towards the Sabinyo Mountain, on the Democratic Republic of the Congo side, as decided by both the chiefs of defence staff of the States members of the East African Community at their meeting held in Bujumbura on 8 November 2022 and the Luanda mini-summit of 23 November 2022. |
东非共同体、根据罗安达进程设立的特设核查机制和大湖区问题国际会议的扩大核查机制联合小组的任务，是确定“3·23”恐怖组织是否已切实撤出基布姆巴。联合小组还确定，该组织仍占领着该地区，并继续通过征税和其他强制性征税来勒索民众。该组织还阻止联合小组成员继续执行任务，并迫使他们折返。 | The joint EAC-Ad Hoc Verification Mechanism team set up under the Luanda process and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), mandated to determine whether or not M23 had effectively withdrawn from Kibumba, has also established that the group is still occupying that locality and continues to hold the population to ransom through taxes and other mandatory levies. Moreover, it has prevented the joint team from pursuing its mission and has forced it to reverse course. |
综上所述，刚果民主共和国政府： | From the foregoing, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: |
1. 注意到“3·23”运动一再拒绝履行 2022 年 11 月 23 日罗安达微型首脑会议制定的和平计划的要求，该计划是内罗毕和罗安达和平进程的一部分，并符合联合国安全理事会的建议； | 1. Takes note of the repeated refusal by M23 to fulfil the requirements of the peace plan established by the Luanda mini-summit of 23 November 2022 as part of the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes and pursuant to the recommendations of the United Nations Security Council; |
2. 注意到卢旺达拒不遵守在内罗毕进程和罗安达进程中以及在 2022 年 11月 23 日罗安达微型首脑会议上作出的承诺，并拒绝停止支持“3·23”恐怖组织，拒不停止袭击刚果民主共和国； | 2. Takes note of the non-compliance by Rwanda with the commitments made under the Nairobi and Luanda processes and at the Luanda mini-summit of 23 November 2022, and of its refusal to stop supporting the M23 terrorist group and attacking the Democratic Republic of the Congo; |
3. 呼吁联合国、非洲联盟、东非共同体、大湖区问题国际会议和双边伙伴承担起责任，特别是根据自身的机制和规则，制裁继续藐视这些机制和规则并在刚果民主共和国东部违反国际法和侵犯基本人权的卢旺达当局和“3·23”运动领导人。 | 3. Calls upon the United Nations, the African Union, the East African Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and bilateral partners to assume their responsibilities, in particular by sanctioning, based on their own mechanisms and rules, the Rwandan authorities and the leaders of M23 who continue to defy them and to violate international law and fundamental human rights in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. |
无论如何，在重申致力于内罗毕和罗安达和平进程以解决刚果民主共和国东部的安全危机、并在大湖区建立持久的和平与稳定的同时，刚果民主共和国政府将承担其所有宪法责任，维护刚果国家的领土完整和主权，并保护本国人民。在这方面，我国不打算软化立场，也不打算与任何人谈判。 | In any case, while renewing its commitment to the Nairobi and Luanda peace processes for the resolution of the security crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and for the establishment of lasting peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will assume all its constitutional responsibilities to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Congolese State and to protect its people. It does not intend to waiver or negotiate with anyone in that regard. |
刚果民主共和国随时准备并将采取一切手段进行自卫，以落实我国国家元首2022 年 9 月 20 日在联合国大会第七十七届常会上发表的声明，即：“我们，刚果民主共和国人民，这次决心不惜一切代价，彻底结束我国东部的不安全状况”。 | The Democratic Republic of the Congo stands ready and will defend itself by all means, in line with the declaration made by its Head of State on 20 September 2022 at the seventy-seventh ordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly that: “We, the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are determined this time to put a definitive end to the insecurity in the east of our country, whatever the cost.” |
大 会 Distr.: General | General Assembly Distr.: General |
October 2020ChineseOriginal: English(C) 141020 161020 | October 2020 |
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