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子刺激计划，其中包括对个人和中小型企业的支助32，而许多低收入国家则敦促金融机构考虑向其债务人提供贷款重组。33 但是，随着经济在 2021 年重新恢复，全球银行业监管机构必须确保消费者、数亿个人和中小企业免受掠夺性贷款和隐性苛刻条件之苦。34 | businesses,32 many low-income countries rather urged financial institutions to consider extending loan restructuring to their debtors.33 However, banking regulators worldwide must ensure that consumers, and hundreds of millions of individuals and small- and medium-sized enterprises, are protected from predatory lending and hidden onerous conditions, as economies open up in 2021.34 |
13. 移民也受到这场大流行病的严重影响。有证件的移民劳动力“在[经济合作与发展组织]国家一些受影响最严重的部门中[……]几乎占到工人总数的30%”。35 然而，由于他们的移民身份，即使身为合法居民，移民工人往往也面临难以言喻的困难，最先失去工作，缺乏在危机时期帮助养家的社会资本。36例如，在中东各地，许多移民工人被雇主抛弃，无家可归，陷入困境，这往往会对女性移民产生更严重的影响。37 | 13. Migrants have also been heavily affected by the pandemic. The documented migrant workforce makes up “almost 30 per cent of workers in some of the most affected sectors in [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries”. 35 Yet, given their migrant status, even when legally resident, migrant workers nevertheless tend to face unspeakable hardships, are among the first to lose their jobs and lack the social capital that helps to sustain households in times of crisis.36 Across the Middle East, for example, many migrant workers were abandoned by their employers and left homeless and stranded, which tended to have an even more severe impact on women migrants.37 |
14. 这场大流行病最严重的影响之一是全球学校教育几近瓦解。2020 年初检疫隔离措施最严格的时候，多达 15.2 亿儿童和青年无法到校上课，占大中小学学生人数的 87%。38 学校不仅是学术学习和职业准备的场所，还发挥着核心的社会化作用。39 学校还是高收入和低收入国家贫困儿童的重要安全区和营养中心，而且“教育持续中断可能导致童工、童婚现象增加”。40 虽然数字技术为学习 | 14. One of the greatest effects of the pandemic has been the near collapse of schooling across the globe. At the height of quarantine measures in early 2020, up to 1.52 billion children and young people, representing 87 per cent of the population attending school and college, were out of class.38 Not only do schools constitute places for academic learning and professional preparation, they also play central socialization roles.39 They are also important safe zones and feeding centres for deprived children in high- and low-income countries, and the “sustained disruption of education … could lead to a rise in child labour and child marriage”. |
而且“教育持续中断可能导致童工、童婚现象增加”。40 虽然数字技术为学习的连续性提供了重要机会，但全球有大量家庭无法获得可靠的在线学习基础设施和设备。“据[国际电信联盟]估计，仍有 36 亿人无法上网，其中大多数人生活在最不发达国家”。41 此外，较低收入家庭的父母往往缺乏陪伴孩子进行在线学习所需的工作/生活平衡。这造成了不可接受的不平等，其结果是，在全球各30 同上，第 9 页。 | 40 While digital technologies have offered important opportunities for continuity in learning, reliable online learning infrastructure and equipment is not accessible to a significant proportion of families across the globe. “According to [the International Telecommunication Union], an estimated 3.6 billion people remain offline, with the majority of the unconnected living in the least developed countries.”41 Moreover, parents in lower income families tend to lack the work-life balance needed to accompany children in online learning. That has created unacceptable inequalities to the effect that, across the globe, from high- to low-income countries, children from high-income backgrounds have been able to continue with their learning in some form, while their less privileged counterparts, even in the very same countries, lost much of their 2020 academic year.42 |
32 基金组织，《世界经济展望》，第 xiii 页。 | 32 IMF, World Economic Outlook, p. xiii. |
33 James Anyanzwa, “Kenya: how lenders laced COVID-19 loans relief with hidden pain”, Daily Nation,19 October 2020. 可查阅 https://allafrica.com/stories/202010190948.html。 | 33 James Anyanzwa, “Kenya: how lenders laced COVID-19 loans relief with hidden pain”, Daily Nation, 19 October 2020. Available from https://allafrica.com/stories/202010190948.html. |
34 Patricia Andago, “COVID-19: regulatory measures could widen Kenya’s financial access gap”,The Elephant, 18 September 2020. 可查阅 www.theelephant.info/data-stories/2020/09/18/covid-19-regulatory-measures-could-widen-kenyas-financial-access-gap/。 | 34 Patricia Andago, “COVID-19: regulatory measures could widen Kenya’s financial access gap”, The Elephant, 18 September 2020. Available from www.theelephant.info/data-stories/2020/09/18/covid-19-regulatory-measures-could-widen-kenyas-financial-access-gap/. |
35 联合国，《共担责任》，第 8 页。 | 35 United Nations, “Shared responsibility”, p. 8. |
36 见 https://gaatw.org/publications/Kenya_Country_Report.pdf。 | 36 See https://gaatw.org/publications/Kenya_Country_Report.pdf. |
37 Zecharias Zelalem, “Abandoned in Lebanon, African domestic workers just want to go home”,Mail and Guardian, 14 September 2020. 可查阅 https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-09-14-abandoned-in-lebanon-african-domestic-workers-just-want-to-go-home/。以及 “Report: 29 million girls, womenvictims of modern slavery”, Daily Star, 10 October 2020。可查阅 www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2020/Oct-10/512914-report-29-million-girls-women-victims-of-modern-slavery.ashx。 | 37 Zecharias Zelalem, “Abandoned in Lebanon, African domestic workers just want to go home”, Mail and Guardian, 14 September 2020. Available from https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-09-14- abandoned-in-lebanon-african-domestic-workers-just-want-to-go-home/; and “Report: 29 million girls, women victims of modern slavery”, Daily Star, 10 October 2020. Available from www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2020/Oct-10/512914-report-29-million-girls-women-victims-of-modern-slavery.ashx. |
38 联合国，《共担责任》，第 9 页；以及基金组织，《世界经济展望》，第 xiv 页。 | 38 United Nations, “Shared responsibility”, p. 9; and IMF, World Economic Outlook, p. xiv. |
39 同上。 | 39 Ibid. |
40 同上。 | 40 Ibid. |
41 同上。 | 41 Ibid., |
师及千百万名默默无闻的辅助工作人员正受到 COVID-19 感染的潜在威胁。44 因此，学校复课虽然是符合各国国家利益的重要举措，对各代人的心理健康也很重要，但复课的同时，必须对健康和安全以及执行 COVID-19 安全规程所需设施进行大量投资，卢旺达的学校复课战略就是一个例子。45 在大流行病爆发前学校 | staff, are threatened by the potential occurrence of COVID-19 infections.44 Thus, school reopening, while a critical element of the national interest of States and important for the mental health of whole generations, must be accompanied by critical investment in health and safety and the facilities necessary to implement COVID-19 safety protocols, as exemplified by the school reopening strategy of Rwanda. |
行大量投资，卢旺达的学校复课战略就是一个例子。45 在大流行病爆发前学校已经人满为患的国家，安全风险更大，如果没有大规模的公共投资来扩大学校的基础设施，这种风险是无法合理承受的。 | 45 In countries where schools were already overcrowded before the pandemic, this risk is even greater and cannot reasonably be borne without significant public investment in expanding school infrastructure. |
16. 国际法申明，为确保人人免受饥饿，各国有国际合作的义务，并应共享科学知识并“计及粮食输入及输出国家双方问题，确保世界粮食供应[……]公平分配”。46 由于抗击大流行病的措施破坏了全球供应链，许多国家的食物供应突然中断，威胁到千百万人的食物权，特别是城市贫民。在粮食分配系统高度集中和一体化的发达经济体中，影响更为明显。47 学校关闭也影响了富裕和贫穷经济体的儿童获得营养食物。48 世界粮食计划署(粮食署)申明了国际团结的各项基本原则，可以减轻为抗击疫情所采取的措施预计将对粮食获取渠道造成的损害，包括监测价格和支持社会安全网，这些原则在 2020 年 4 月提出后不久就得到多边机构的大力支持。49 | 16. International law affirms the obligation of international cooperation to ensure freedom from hunger, in scientific knowledge-sharing and, “taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies”.46 As measures to combat the pandemic struck down global supply chains, access to food was suddenly cut off for many, threatening the right to food of millions, in particular the urban poor. Impacts were more acutely felt in advanced economies with highly centralized and integrated food distribution systems.47 School closures also affected children’s access to nutritious food in rich and poor economies.48 The World Food Programme (WFP) has affirmed fundamental principles of international solidarity as ways of mitigating the harm to access to food which is expected to result from measures taken to combat the pandemic, including monitoring prices and supporting social safety nets, principles which were largely supported by multilateral agencies soon after they were recommended in April 2020.49 |
44 联合国，《共担责任》，第 9 页。 | 44 United Nations, “Shared responsibility”, p. 9. |
45 Bertrand Byishimo and Lavie Mutanganshuro, “Over 22,500 classrooms to be completed by September,says Mineduc”, The New Times, 9 June 2020. 可查阅 www.newtimes.co.rw/news/over-22500-classrooms-be-completed-september-says-mineduc。 | 45 Bertrand Byishimo and Lavie Mutanganshuro, “Over 22,500 classrooms to be completed by September, says Mineduc”, The New Times, 9 June 2020. Available from www.newtimes.co.rw/news/over-22500-classrooms-be-completed-september-says-mineduc. |
46 《经济社会文化权利国际公约》第十一条第二款。 | 46 Article 11 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. |
47 Ignacio Felix and others, “US food supply chain: disruptions and implications from COVID-19”,McKinsey and Company, 2 July 2020. 可查阅 www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/us-food-supply-chain-disruptions-and-implications-from-covid-19。 | 47 Ignacio Felix and others, “US food supply chain: disruptions and implications from COVID-19”, McKinsey and Company, 2 July 2020. Available from www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/us-food-supply-chain-disruptions-and-implications-from-covid-19. |
48 United States of America, Centres for Disease Control, “Considerations for food pantries and fooddistribution sites”, 8 December 2020. 可 查 阅 www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/food-pantries.html。 | 48 United States of America, Centres for Disease Control, “Considerations for food pantries and food distribution sites”, 8 December 2020. Available from www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019- |
ncov/community/organizations/food-pantries.html。 | ncov/community/organizations/food-pantries.html |
49 Simona Beltrami, “How to minimize the impact of coronavirus on food security”, World FoodProgramme Insight, 16 March 2020. 可查阅 https://insight.wfp.org/how-to-minimize-the-impact-of-coronavirus-on-food-security-be2fa7885d7e 。 另 见 www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2020/04/21/joint-statement-on-covid-19-impacts-on-food-security-and-nutrition。B. 公民及政治权利17. 在所有 COVID-19 控制措施侵犯了公民权利和政治权利的情况中，根本挑战都与公共卫生紧急情况下的安全问题有关。50 在许多国家，法律的暂停适用和无数的“封锁”措施“必然使权力集中在政治家和其他官员手中”，同时，停止了传统上通过法院和议会监督等方式对紧急权力行使的制约。51 这种集中的权力并非总能得到公平或适当的使用。52 因此，COVID-19 暴露了许多国家宪法和法治保障的弱点。53 尽管如此，在应对紧急情况时，各国有义务确保执法行动除其他外，遵守合法性、必要性、相称性、有人负责和不危及生命的原则。5418. 保持身体距离已经被无可争议地确立为控制这场大流行病的必要措施。55虽然这种必要性不可避免地要求对行动、结社和集会自由施以某些合理限制，但其中许多措施被滥用。56 有大量报告称，国家机构滥用紧急权力，不公正地实施 COVID-19 限制，以规避对国家越权的制约57，包括任意和大规模逮捕、警察过度使用武力实施宵禁、敲诈勒索、驱逐、不公正地使用刑事程序和法院程序，以及使用监禁处罚来打击违反隔离规则者，导致合法拘留中心人满为患，进一步加剧病毒传播。58 据报告，在一些国家，公民们更有可能死于实施“封锁”措施，而不是死于 COVID-19 本身。5919. 铁腕式的安全措施总是伴随着对言论自由和媒体自由的严格和非法限制，并且经常使记者身陷险境。60 此外，在 2020 年进行了选举的一些国家，COVID-19 | 49 Simona Beltrami, “How to minimize the impact of coronavirus on food security”, World Food Programme Insight, 16 March 2020. Available from https://insight.wfp.org/how-to-minimize-the-impact-of-coronavirus-on-food-security-be2fa7885d7e. See also www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2020/04/21/joint-statement-on-covid-19-impacts-on-food-security-and-nutrition. |
50 Fombad, “Editorial introduction to special focus”. | 50 Fombad, “Editorial introduction to special focus”. |
51 同上，第 368 页。 | 51 Ibid, p. 368 |
52 Anne Applebaum, “The people in charge see an opportunity”, The Atlantic, 23 March 2020. 可查阅www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/when-disease-comes-leaders-grab-more-power/608560/;and Justus B. Aungo, “Exposed: limits of State and public trust during the COVID-19 pandemic inKenya”, African Arguments, 11 November 2020. 可 查 阅https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/11/exposed-limits-of-state-and-public-trust-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-kenya/。 | 52 Anne Applebaum, “The people in charge see an opportunity”, The Atlantic, 23 March 2020. Available from www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/when-disease-comes-leaders-grab-more-power/608560/; and Justus B. Aungo, “Exposed: limits of State and public trust during the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya”, African Arguments, 11 November 2020. Available from https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/11/exposed-limits-of-state-and-public-trust-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-kenya/. |
53 Charles Manga Fombad and Lukman Adebisi Abdulrauf, “Comparative overview of the constitutional | 53 Charles Manga Fombad and Lukman Adebisi Abdulrauf, “Comparative overview of the constitutional framework for controlling the exercise of emergency powers in Africa”, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2. |
framework for controlling the exercise of emergency powers in Africa”, African Human Rights LawJournal, vol. 20, No. 2.54 人权事务委员会，关于和平集会权(第二十一条)的第 37 号一般性意见(2020 年)；非洲人权和民族权委员会第 449 (LXVI)号决议，第 2 段；以及美洲人权委员会第 1/2020 号决议。55 见 https://africacdc.org/download/guidance-on-community-social-distancing-during-covid-19-outbreak/。56 见 www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=553。57 Applebaum, “The people in charge”; and Aungo, “Exposed: limits of State and public trust”.58 见 www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=553。59 Simbarashe Gukurume, “Zimbabwe: abductions, brutality, demolitions: when the State becomes moreharmful than COVID-19”, New Zimbabwe, 24 May 2020. 可查阅https://allafrica.com/stories/202005240128.html; and www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/20/uganda-authorities-weaponize-covid-19-repression。60 University of Pretoria. Centre for Human Rights, The Erosion of the Rule of Law in Eritrea: SilencingFreedom of Expression (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press, 2015); and James Nkuubi “When guns | 19. Strong arm securitization is always accompanied by severe and unlawful restrictions to free speech and media freedoms and too often puts journalists in danger.60 In addition, COVID-19 control measures have been abused to facilitate more systematic political repression in some of the States that conducted electoral processes during 2020.61 Of the rights related to any electoral process, free speech, assembly, association and movement are critical. In one East African State, opposition politicians were systematically intimidated and harassed on the campaign trail.62 In another State in that region, an opposition presidential candidate was arrested while campaigning for the 2021 presidential elections and charged in court for violating COVID-19 protocols, sparking off deadly protests. 63 Of the 18 electoral processes that were scheduled for 2020 on one continent alone, at least 9 had been postponed by the end of 2020.64 Some of the elections have proceeded under conditions reportedly characterized by severe securitized constraints that ensured the contested victories of the 54 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights resolution 449 (LXVI), para. 2; and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights resolution 1/2020. 55 See https://africacdc.org/download/guidance-on-community-social-distancing-during-covid-19- outbreak/. 56 See www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=553. 57 Applebaum, “The people in charge”; and Aungo, “Exposed: limits of State and public trust”. 58 See www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=553. 59 Simbarashe Gukurume, “Zimbabwe: abductions, brutality, demolitions: when the State becomes more harmful than COVID-19”, New Zimbabwe, 24 May 2020. Available from https://allafrica.com/stories/202005240128.html; and www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/20/uganda-authorities-weaponize-covid-19-repression. 60 University of Pretoria. Centre for Human Rights, The Erosion of the Rule of Law in Eritrea: Silencing |
Freedom of Expression (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press, 2015); and James Nkuubi “When gunsgovern public health: examining the implications of the militarised COVID-19 pandemic response fordemocratisation and human rights in Uganda”, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2.控制措施被滥用，以便开展更有系统性的政治镇压。61 在与选举进程相关的权利中，言论、集会、结社和行动自由的权利至关重要。在东非的一个国家，反对派政治人士在竞选过程中受到持续恐吓和骚扰。62 在该区域的另一个国家，一名反对派总统候选人在开展 2021 年总统选举竞选活动时被捕，并因违反 COVID-19 规程而被起诉，引发了严重抗议。63 仅在一个大陆，截至 2020 年底，计划于当年进行的 18 场选举中至少有 9 场推迟举行。64 一些选举是有条件进行的，据称所实施的严苛的安全限制确保了现任者获胜，引发争议。65 在这些选举中，有报告称发生任意逮捕关键人物(如记者和反对派政治人士)、选举暴力和强迫流离失所的事件。6620. 与此相关的是，尽管在卫生紧急事件期间追踪接触者是防止疾病传播的一个重要方面，而且使用数字解决方案极大地便利了这项工作，特别是在真正全球性的大流行病中，但数字解决方案也遭到滥用。各国为便利“接触者追踪”和确保遵守检疫隔离规则而采取的一些监控方法引发了关于隐私权和数据保护的关切，特别是有时国家会强制使用这些方法。67 大规模监控应用程序推动建立的集中化和不透明的数据库，建立时并没有保障措施，据称原因是时间不够，这对人权构成了长期威胁，即使在所谓的“先进民主国家”也是如此。68 存在令人不安 | Freedom of Expression (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press, 2015); and James Nkuubi “When guns govern public health: examining the implications of the militarised COVID-19 pandemic response for democratisation and human rights in Uganda”, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2. |
61 见 www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/20/uganda-authorities-weaponize-covid-19-repression。 | 61 See www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/20/uganda-authorities-weaponize-covid-19-repression. |
62 见 www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=539。 | 62 See www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=539. |
63 Derrick Wandera, “Bobi Wine granted bail, directed to comply with COVID-19 SOPs”, Daily Monitor,20 November 2020. 可 查 阅 www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/bobi-wine-granted-bail-directed-to-comply-with-covid-19-sops-3205022。 | 63 Derrick Wandera, “Bobi Wine granted bail, directed to comply with COVID-19 SOPs”, Daily Monitor, 20 November 2020. Available from www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/bobi-wine-granted-bail-directed-to-comply-with-covid-19-sops-3205022. |
64 科摩罗――联邦议会(2020 年 1 月)；喀麦隆――国民大会、参议院和地方(2020 年 2 月)；多哥――总统(2020 年 2 月)；埃及――众议院(2020 年 4 月至 5 月)；马里――国民议会(2020 年 5 月)；埃塞俄比亚――人民代表院和民族州议会(2020 年 5 月)；布隆迪――总统(2020 年 5 月 20 日)、国民议会和地方(2020 年 6 月)；科特迪瓦――总统(2020 年 10 月)；几内亚――国民议会和总统(2020年 10 月)；坦桑尼亚――总统和国民议会(2020 年 10 月)；索马里――人民院(2020 年 10 月)；塞舌尔――总统(2020 年 10 月至 12 月)；布基纳法索――总统和国民议会(2020 年 11 月)；纳米比亚――国家、区和地方(2020 年 11 月)；加纳――总统和国民议会(2020 年 12 月)；乍得――立法和地 方 (2020 年 8 月 ) ；加蓬 ―― 参 议 院 (2020 年 末 或 2021 年 初 ) 。 | 64 Comoros – Union Assembly (January 2020); Cameroon – National Assembly, Senate and local (February 2020); Togo – President (February 2020); Egypt – House of Representatives (April–May 2020); Mali – National Assembly (May 2020); Ethiopia – House of People’s Representatives and regional state councils (May 2020); Burundi – President (20 May 2020), National Assembly and local (June 2020); Côte d’Ivoire – President (October 2020); Guinea – National Assembly and President, (October 2020); Tanzania – President and National Assembly (October 2020); Somalia – House of the People (October 2020); Seychelles – President (October–December 2020); Burkina Faso – President and National Assembly (November 2020); Namibia – national, regional and local (November 2020); Ghana – President and National Assembly (December 2020); Chad – legislative and local (August 2020); and Gabon – Senate (late 2020 or early 2021). |
(www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/africa-watch-2020-election-season-across-africa; www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections; and www.idea.int/news-media/news/covid-19-electoral-landscape-africa)。 | (www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/africa-watch-2020-election-season-across-africa; www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19- impact-elections; and www.idea.int/news-media/news/covid-19-electoral-landscape-africa). |
65 见 www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20395.doc.htm。 | 65 See www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20395.doc.htm. |
66 AL TZA 3/2020。可查阅 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments；www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26117&LangID=E；以及www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26632&LangID=E。 | 66 AL TZA 3/2020. Available from https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments; www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26117&LangID=E; and www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26632&LangID=E. |
67 Astrid Prange, “Will Germans trade privacy for coronavirus protection?” Deutsche Welle, 29 March2020. 可查阅www.dw.com/en/will-germans-trade-privacy-for-coronavirus-protection/a-52943225。 | 67 Astrid Prange, “Will Germans trade privacy for coronavirus protection?” Deutsche Welle, 29 March 2020. Available from www.dw.com/en/will-germans-trade-privacy-for-coronavirus-protection/a-52943225. |
68 Woojin Lim ”“Assessing the implications of digital contact tracing for COVID-19 for human rightsand the rule of law in South Africa”, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2.长期被边缘化的群体而言。69 这种担忧不仅适用于国家(民主或不自由)，也适用于全球各国有公共授权、私营、商业化的应用，或是国家与私营部门企业的合作项目70，在欧洲71、北美72、中东和北非73、中美和南美74、非洲75 和亚太地区76都有例子。21. 居家限制虽必要但困难重重，许多国家实施的居家限制也在大流行病期间提高了家庭压力水平，压力来自缺乏活动、社会交往被切断以及在许多情况下遭受的收入和生计损失。疫情伊始，对于封锁措施下人群精神健康权利的担忧就得到重点强调，特别是生活空间可能狭小的低收入家庭成员。77 此外，人们被限制居家期间，家庭暴力和性别暴力的发生率也有所增加。78 还有报告称，包括强迫童婚(本身与学校大规模关闭有关)、切割女性生殖器官和早孕在内的有害做法有所增加。79 | 68 Woojin Lim ”“Assessing the implications of digital contact tracing for COVID-19 for human rights and the rule of law in South Africa”, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2. |
69 Sara L.M. Davis, “Contact tracing apps: extra risks for women and marginalized groups”, Health andHuman Rights Journal, viewpoints, 29 April 2020. 可查阅 www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/contact-tracing-apps-extra-risks-for-women-and-marginalized-groups/; Karen Carter and others, “Digitalcontact tracing and surveillance during COVID-19: general and child-specific ethical issues”, InnocentiResearch Brief, November 2020; and Fombad, “Editorial introduction to special focus”。 | 69 Sara L.M. Davis, “Contact tracing apps: extra risks for women and marginalized groups”, Health and Human Rights Journal, viewpoints, 29 April 2020. Available from www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/contact-tracing-apps-extra-risks-for-women-and-marginalized-groups/; Karen Carter and others, “Digital contact tracing and surveillance during COVID-19: general and child-specific ethical issues”, Innocenti Research Brief, November 2020; and Fombad, “Editorial introduction to special focus”. |
70 Bobbie Johnson, “The US’s draft law on contact tracing apps is a step behind Apple and Google”, MITTechnology Review, 2 June 2020. 可查阅 www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/02/1002491/us-covid-19-contact-tracing-privacy-law-apple-google/；and Dima Samaro and Marwa Fatafta, “COVID-19 contact-tracing apps in MENA: a privacy nightmare”, Access Now, 18 June 2020. 可查阅www.accessnow.org/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps-in-mena-a-privacy-nightmare/。 | 70 Bobbie Johnson, “The US’s draft law on contact tracing apps is a step behind Apple and Google”, MIT Technology Review, 2 June 2020. Available from www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/02/1002491/us-covid-19-contact-tracing-privacy-law-apple-google/; and Dima Samaro and Marwa Fatafta, “COVID-19 contact-tracing apps in MENA: a privacy nightmare”, Access Now, 18 June 2020. Available from www.accessnow.org/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps-in-mena-a-privacy-nightmare/ |
71 见 www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/bahrain-kuwait-norway-contact-tracing-apps-danger-for-privacy/。 | 71 See www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/bahrain-kuwait-norway-contact-tracing-apps-danger-for-privacy/. |
72 Amos Toh and Deborah Brown, “How digital contact tracing for COVID-19 could worsen inequality”,Just Security, 4 June 2020. 可查阅 www.justsecurity.org/70451/how-digital-contact-tracing-for-covid-19-could-worsen-inequality/。 | 72 Amos Toh and Deborah Brown, “How digital contact tracing for COVID-19 could worsen inequality”, Just Security, 4 June 2020. Available from www.justsecurity.org/70451/how-digital-contact-tracing-for-covid-19-could-worsen-inequality/. |
73 Samaro and Fatafta, “COVID-19 contact-tracing”. | 73 Samaro and Fatafta, “COVID-19 contact-tracing”. |
74 见 www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/investigation-reveals-serious-concerns-over-guatemala-covid-19-app/; and www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa。 | 74 See www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/investigation-reveals-serious-concerns-over-guatemala-covid-19-app/; and www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa. |
75 Lim, “Assessing the implications”; Nkatha Kabira and Robert Kibugi, “Saving the soul of an Africanconstitution: learning from Kenya’s experience with constitutionalism during COVID-19”, AfricanHuman Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2; and Victor Kapiyo, “The erosion of digital rights in thefight against COVID-19 in Kenya”, Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and SouthernAfrica, 22 September 2020. 可查阅 https://cipesa.org/2020/09/the-erosion-of-digital-rights-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-in-kenya/。 | 75 Lim, “Assessing the implications”; Nkatha Kabira and Robert Kibugi, “Saving the soul of an African constitution: learning from Kenya’s experience with constitutionalism during COVID-19”, African Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 20, No. 2; and Victor Kapiyo, “The erosion of digital rights in the fight against COVID-19 in Kenya”, Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa, 22 September 2020. Available from https://cipesa.org/2020/09/the-erosion-of-digital-rights-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-in-kenya/. |
76 Josh Taylor, “Privacy concerns over Australian businesses collecting data for COVID contact tracing”,The Guardian, 10 August 2020. 可查阅 www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/aug/11/privacy-concerns-over-australian-businesses-collecting-data-for-covid-contact-tracing; andwww.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/how-china-used-technology-to-combat-covid-19-and-tighten-its-grip-on-citizens/。77 美洲人权委员会第 1/2020 号决议，章节 B.I 以及第 11 和第 52 段；Mustapha Dumbuya andothers, “The impact of technology on mental health during COVID-19” AfricLaw, 22 May 2020。可查阅 https://africlaw.com/2020/05/22/the-impact-of-technology-on-mental-health-during-covid-19/。78 见 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26533&LangID=E；www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25808&LangID=E；以及 | 76 Josh Taylor, “Privacy concerns over Australian businesses collecting data for COVID contact tracing”, The Guardian, 10 August 2020. Available from www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/aug/11/privacy-concerns-over-australian-businesses-collecting-data-for-covid-contact-tracing; and www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/how-china-used-technology-to-combat-covid-19-and-tighten-its-grip-on-citizens/. |
22. 在这种严峻的背景下，独立专家谨提醒各国，具有约束力的国际法律框架对在公共卫生紧急状态下减损公民权利和政治权利提出了要求，主要见于《公民及政治权利国际公约》的规定。80《公约》第四条确实给予各国一定余地，在当局正式宣布紧急状态且危及国本的情况下，可以减损其条款，但仅限于紧急情况绝对必要的程度，而且减损措施不得违背各国根据国际法承担的其他义务，并且不得引起所述的任何形式的歧视。此外，根据该条款，各国不得减损某些人权，如生命权和免受酷刑或残忍、不人道和有辱人格的待遇或处罚的权利、禁止奴役以及思想、良心和宗教自由权。 | 22. Against that sombre background, the Independent Expert respectfully reminds States of the requirements imposed by the binding international legal framework for derogations from civil and political rights in times of a public health emergency, as provided principally under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.80 Article 4 of the Covenant does allow a degree of room for States to derogate from its provisions in a time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, but only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that the derogative measures are not inconsistent with States’ other obligations under international law and do not involve any of the stated forms of discrimination. What is more, under that provision, States are not permitted to derogate at all from certain human rights, such as the rights to life and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition against slavery and the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. |
三. 国际团结对于在大流行病期间和之后实现人权的必要性 | III. The international solidarity imperative for the realization of human rights during and after the pandemic |
A. 道德依据 | A. The ethical rationale |
23. COVID-19 大流行凸显了人类和社会的相互关联性，特别是我们共同的脆弱性。81 小马丁·路德·金牧师在他 1963 年著名的《伯明翰监狱的来信》中恰当而深刻地阐述了这一点，他指出：“我们都落在相互关系无可逃遁的网里，由命运将我们结为一体。对一处的直接影响，对他处便是间接影响。”同理，“那里”爆发的 COVID-19 疫情显然也是“这里”的 COVID-19 问题。82 当生活在“那里”的世界上绝大多数人民的人权悬于一线时，“我们”在“这里”也根本没有办法更充分地享有人权。83 这涵盖了那些“其他人”的发展权、健康权、受教育权、食物权、住房权和工作权。84 | 23. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the intensity of our interconnectedness as human beings and societies, especially our mutual vulnerability.81 That point was aptly and memorably articulated by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., in his famous Letter from the Birmingham Jail of 1963, in which he noted that: “We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one, directly affects all indirectly.” Along the same lines, it should be clear that a COVID-19 outbreak “over there” is also a COVID-19 problem “right here”.82 There is simply no way of enjoying “our” human rights more fully “over here” while the human rights of the vast majority of the world’s peoples who live “over there” hangs in the balance.83 That includes the rights of those “others” to development, health, education, food, shelter and work. 84 |
24. 然而，在考虑国际团结对于在大流行病期间和之后实现人权之必要性的道德依据时，必须正视现实政治的国际关系观与道德公共决策的呼声之间未得到充分讨论的概念冲突。罕有异议的是，我们生活在一个高度相互关联和唇亡齿寒的世界，有着货物和服务的大规模跨境贸易以及人员流动；因此，同样显而易见的是，面对 COVID-19 大流行，我们没有多少余地被单纯的国家或地方自利蒙住眼睛。事实上，在大流行病的背景下，道德方面的必要性与现实政治密不可分，至少应该如此。 | 24. In considering the ethical rationale for the international solidarity imperative for the realization of human rights during and after the pandemic, however, it is important to confront the underdiscussed conceptual clash between the realpolitik view of international relations and the calls for ethical public policymaking. There is little disagreement that we 77 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights resolution 1/2020, sect. B.I and paras. 11 and 52; Mustapha Dumbuya and others, “The impact of technology on mental health during COVID-19” AfricLaw, 22 May 2020. Available from https://africlaw.com/2020/05/22/the-impact-of-technology-on-mental-health-during-covid-19/. 78 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26533&LangID=E; www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25808&LangID=E; and www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26369&LangID=E. 79 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights resolution 449 (LXVI). 80 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; see also, in the context of the pandemic, articles 3, 43 and 44 of the International Health Regulations. 81 United Nations, “Shared responsibility”, p. 1. 82 Okafor, “International solidarity, human rights and life on the African continent ‘after’ the pandemic”. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. live in a highly interconnected and mutually vulnerable world, with massive cross-border trade in goods and services and movement of persons; it should therefore also be clear that the COVID-19 pandemic gives us little meaningful room to be blinded by mere national or local self-interest. In fact, in the context of the pandemic, the ethical imperative is – or at least it should be – inextricably connected to the realpolitik. |
25. 团结是反对不公正、压迫和控制的堡垒。当被压迫者彼此孤立，感到脆弱或无力采取社会行动时，不公正就会滋生。85 各国和其他国际行为者之间的国际团结也是如此。团结是对“他者”人性的承认，因此是地方、国家和国际各级和谐社会生活的重要组成部分。80 《公民及政治权利国际公约》第四条；在大流行病的背景下，另见《国际卫生条例》第三条、第四十三条和第四十四条。81 联合国，《共担责任》，第 1 页。82 Okafor, “International solidarity, human rights and life on the African continent ‘after’ the pandemic”.83 同上。84 同上。85 与希巴克·奥斯曼的访谈，欧洲委员会南北中心。可查阅 www.coe.int/en/web/north-south-centre/interviews。 | 25. Solidarity constitutes a bulwark against injustice, oppression and control. Injustice thrives when the oppressed are isolated from each other and feel vulnerable or incapable of social action.85 The same is true of international solidarity among States and other international actors. Solidarity is a recognition of the humanity of the “other” and therefore a critical component of harmonious social life at the local, national and international levels. |
B. 法律依据 | B. The legal rationale |
26. 国际团结在法律上也植根于这样一种普遍信念，即和谐的国际生活的基础不只是停止或避免针对其他国家的恶意行动的消极义务，还包括开展合作的积极义务。86 国际法规定了合作以促进人权的义务，这是国际团结的一个方面。87《联合国宪章》是当代最终确定和管理国际关系的宪法，其基本宗旨之一是实现国际合作，以解决国际间属于经济、社会、文化及人类福利性质之国际问题，且不分种族、性别、语言或宗教，增进并激励对于全体人类之人权及基本自由之尊重(第一条第三款)。在《宪章》第五十五条和第五十六条中，所有会员国承诺采取共同及个别行动与联合国合作，以实现其中所载的宗旨，包括不分种族、性别、语言或宗教，普遍尊重和遵守全体人类的人权和基本自由。在这场大流行病的背景下，《国际卫生条例》第三条以强制性语言不仅提及人的尊严、人权和基本自由，还提及《联合国宪章》和《世界卫生组织组织法》，澄清在传染病控制的背景下必须适用国际团结和人权88，公共卫生紧急情况下的国际合作义务是必要的，具有法律约束力。89 | 26. International solidarity is also legally rooted in the universal conviction that harmonious international life is based not only in the negative obligations to cease or desist from malign actions against other States but also in positive obligations to cooperate.86 International law establishes the obligation to cooperate to advance human rights, an aspect of international solidarity.87 In the Charter of the United Nations, the constitution that ultimately frames and governs global relations in our time, one of its fundamental purposes is asserted as the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion (Art. 1 (3)). In Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, all Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization to achieve the purposes set forth therein, which include universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. In the context of the pandemic, the reference in article 3 of the International Health Regulations, in mandatory language, not only to dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, but also to the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of WHO, clarifies that international solidarity and human rights must be applied in the context of infectious disease control88 and that the obligation of international cooperation in public health emergencies is imperative and legally binding.89 |
27. 《世界人权宣言》第二十二条承认国际合作对实现所有人的经济、社会和文化权利的作用。同样，《经济社会文化权利国际公约》规定提供国际援助和合作，特别是经济和技术援助和合作，据以实现经济、社会和文化权利(第二条第一款)。在实现适当生活水准权和免受饥饿方面基于自由同意的国际合作(第十一 | 27. In article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the role of international cooperation is recognized in everyone’s entitlement to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. Similarly, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, is mandated as a means of achieving economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2 (1)). |
一款)。在实现适当生活水准权和免受饥饿方面基于自由同意的国际合作(第十一条)，以及科学和文化领域的国际合作(第十五条第四款)都是《公约》缔约国的相关义务。《发展权利宣言》规定促进基于主权平等、相互依赖、各国互利与合作的新的国际经济秩序，并鼓励遵守和实现人权(第 3 条第 3 款)，同时规定各国对创造有利于实现发展权的国家和国际条件负有主要责任(第 3 条第 1 款)，充分尊重关于建立国家间友好关系和合作的国际法原则(第 3 条第 2 款)。90 在《维也纳 | International cooperation based on free consent in the context of realizing the right to an adequate standard of living and freedom from hunger (art. 11), and in the scientific and cultural fields (art. 15 (4)), are relevant obligations of States parties to the Covenant. In the Declaration on the Right to Development, the promotion of a new international economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and cooperation among all States is mandated, and the observance and realization of human rights is encouraged (art. 3 (3)), with States bearing the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development (art. 3 (1)) in full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States (art. 3 (2)).90 In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, |
重关于建立国家间友好关系和合作的国际法原则(第 3 条第 2 款)。90 在《维也纳宣言和行动纲领》中，世界人权会议重申，加强人权领域的国际合作对于充分实现联合国的宗旨至关重要(第一部分，第 1 段)，同时敦促各国互相合作，确保发展和消除发展障碍(同上，第 10 段)。 | the World Conference on Human Rights reaffirmed that the enhancement of international 85 Interview with Hibaaq Osman, Council of Europe North-South Centre. Available from www.coe.int/en/web/north-south-centre/interviews. 86 General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). 87 Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations; article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and A/HRC/35/35, annex, art. 2 (c); see also, in the context of the pandemic, articles 3, 43 and 44 of the International Health Regulations. 88 International Health Regulations, p. 6. 89 Article 44 of the International Health Regulations. 90 See also Human Rights Council resolution 44/2. cooperation in the field of human rights was essential for the full achievement ofthe purposes of the United Nations (part I, para. 1), while urging States to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development (ibid., para. 10). |
四. 大流行病背景下国际团结的差距 | IV. Gaps in international solidarity in the context of the pandemic |
28. 2003 年严重急性呼吸系统综合症(SARS)疫情之后于 2005 年对《国际卫生条例》的修订是适时和有预见性的。与之前限制更多的版本不同，这一版的《条例》授予世卫组织更多权力来采取行动，在充分尊重人权的同时协调全球应对传86 大会第 2625 (XXV)号决议。87 《联合国宪章》第五十五条和第五十六条；《经济社会文化权利国际公约》第二条第一款；A/HRC/35/35，附件，第 2 条(c)项；在大流行病的背景下，另见《国际卫生条例》第三、第四十三和第四十四条。88 《国际卫生条例》，第 6 页。89 《国际卫生条例》，第四十四条。90 另见人权理事会第 44/2 号决议。染病爆发的措施，并据此执行国际团结的职责。91 为了最大限度地提供防治传染病所需的信息，《条例》授权世卫组织从国家和非国家行为者处获取信息，并可要求各国提供进一步的信息，同时作为一项最大限度的法律，对所允许的权利和国际贸易以及交通规定了最严格的限制。《条例》第三条申明，其执行应充分尊重人的尊严、人权和基本自由，要求以干扰性最小的方式限制人权(第三十一条和第四十三条)。92 | 28. The revision of the International Health Regulations in 2005, after the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, was opportune and prescient. Unlike its earlier more restrictive versions, the current Regulations better empower WHO to act to coordinate global responses to infectious disease outbreaks, while fully respecting human rights, and to do so as a function of international solidarity.91 To maximize the flow of information necessary to combat infectious diseases, the Regulations mandate WHO to receive information from State and non-State actors and to seek further information from States and, as a law of maximums, delineate the most severe restrictions to rights and international trade and traffic allowable. Article 3 of the Regulations affirms that their implementation should be with the full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, requiring the least intrusive means for limiting human rights (arts. 31 and 43).92 |
29. 传染病爆发是公共事件，比任何其他事件都更加突出人的地位、国际生活中和谐关系的必要性“以及人权法平衡相互冲突但同样紧迫的问题的能力”。93 | 29. Infectious disease outbreaks are public events that, more than any others, accentuate the place of the human person, the need for harmonious relations in international life “and the capacity of human rights law to balance competing yet equally compelling issues”. |
和谐关系的必要性“以及人权法平衡相互冲突但同样紧迫的问题的能力”。93根据《条例》第四十三条，虽然各国可以自主实施额外卫生措施来应对突发公共卫生事件，但这些措施必须与风险相称，符合人权要求，并有科学证据支持。另一方面，第四十四条概述了各国在建设国家公共卫生系统方面相互合作和援助的法律义务。这意味着各国共同负有并彼此分担着促进《条例》中所确定的核心公共卫生能力的国际责任。94 因此，《条例》为评估在 COVID-19 大流行期间，各国为帮助更加充分地实现人权展现或未展现国际团结的情况提供了国际法中的合理依据。95 独立专家在下文列举了一些欠缺国际团结的实例，说明了各国未展现出国际团结的程度。 | 93 Under article 43 of the Regulations, while States can implement sovereign additional health measures to respond to public health emergencies, those measures must be proportional to the risk, aligned with human rights imperatives and backed by scientific evidence. Under article 44, on the other hand, the legal duty of States to collaborate and assist one another in building national public health systems is outlined. That constitutes a common and shared international responsibility to facilitate the core public health capacities identified in the Regulations.94 As such, the Regulations form a valid basis in international law for assessing the extent to which States have, or have not, expressed international solidarity in aid of the fuller realization of human rights during the COVID-19 pandemic.95 The Independent Expert sets out below some examples of the kinds of gaps that are indicative of the extent to which States have not done so. |
30. 2020 年 3 月，两个东亚国家停止出口大米。此后不久，两个东欧国家停止出口小麦。类似地，“在全球范围内，(至少)有二十几个国家有样学样，开始囤积用于出口的粮食初级商品，因为他们错误地预判在无情的 COVID-19 大流行中会出现全球粮食短缺。总体而言，[至少]有十七个主要粮食供应国在疫情爆发的前几周对农产品出口施加了某种形式的限制”。96 令人欣慰的是，这些国家很快撤销了指令，这帮助确保了全球粮食价格不会像 2007 年和 2008 年全球金融危机期间那样飙升。这些事件提醒我们注意粮食过度商品化的陷阱，以及重新思考经济发展模式的必要性。9731. 2020 年 4 月，来自两个西欧国家的政治人士指控一个强大的北美国家没收了一个欧洲国家已经付款的数千个防护口罩，称其为“现代海盗行为”。98 这些 | 30. In March 2020, two East Asian States stopped rice exports. Shortly thereafter, two Eastern European States stopped wheat exports. Similarly, “around the world, [at least] two dozen nations took the cue and started hoarding their primary food exports in false anticipation of global shortages amid the unrelenting COVID-19 pandemic. In total, [at least] 17 major food supply nations placed some form of constraint on agricultural exports in the early weeks of the pandemic.”96 Thankfully, those States quickly rescinded their directives, which helped to ensure that global food prices did not spike, as happened in 2007 and 2008 |
91 Humphrey Sipalla, “Love in a time of Ebola: Africa deserves a human rights determination”, AfricLaw,6 November 2014. https://africlaw.com/2014/11/06/love-in-a-time-of-ebola-africa-deserves-a-human-rights-determination; and Jeremy Youde, “Mediating risk through the International Health Regulationsand bio-political surveillance”, Political Studies, vol. 59, No. 4. | 91 Humphrey Sipalla, “Love in a time of Ebola: Africa deserves a human rights determination”, AfricLaw, 6 November 2014. https://africlaw.com/2014/11/06/love-in-a-time-of-ebola-africa-deserves-a-human-rights-determination; and Jeremy Youde, “Mediating risk through the International Health Regulations and bio-political surveillance”, Political Studies, vol. 59, No. 4. |
92 Sipalla, “Love in a time of Ebola”; and Youde, “Mediating risk”. | 92 Sipalla, “Love in a time of Ebola”; and Youde, “Mediating risk”. |
93 Sipalla, “Love in a time of Ebola”. | 93 Sipalla, “Love in a time of Ebola”. |
94 见 https://yfile.news.yorku.ca/2020/12/06/new-research-shows-most-countries-are-violating-international-law-during-pandemic/。 | 94 See https://yfile.news.yorku.ca/2020/12/06/new-research-shows-most-countries-are-violating-international-law-during-pandemic/. |
95 大致参见 Habibi and others, “The Stellenbosch consensus”；以及《国际卫生条例》。 | 95 See, generally, Habibi and others, “The Stellenbosch consensus”; and the International Health Regulations. |
96 Darius Okolla, “Food protectionism and nationalism in the age of COVID-19”, The Elephant, 31 July2020. 可查阅 www.theelephant.info/features/2020/07/31/food-protectionism-and-nationalism-in-the-age-of-covid-19/。 | 96 Darius Okolla, “Food protectionism and nationalism in the age of COVID-19”, The Elephant, 31 July 2020. Available from www.theelephant.info/features/2020/07/31/food-protectionism-and-nationalism-in-the-age-of-covid-19/. |
97 Nicholas Wasonga Orago, “Commonification of food as an approach for the achievement of foodsecurity and the realisation of the right to food for all”, Strathmore Law Journal, vol. 4, No. 1.98 见 www.dw.com/en/us-accused-of-seizing-face-mask-shipments-bound-for-europe-canada/a-53010923。令人遗憾的行为埋下了伏笔。该条款规定的合作建设国家公共卫生系统的义务，必然禁止对国家执行挽救生命的必要卫生规程的努力(如采购医疗设备)进行故意和非法干涉。这也可以被称为过度医学民族主义或保护主义的案例，涉及囤积诊断工具、治疗方法和疫苗。 | 31. In April 2020, politicians from two Western European States accused a powerful North American State of confiscating thousands of protective face masks that one of the European States had already paid for, calling it “an act of modern piracy”.98 Those aggressive acts, early in the pandemic, set the stage for unfortunate acts which were also possibly unlawful under article 44 of the International Health Regulations. The duty to collaborate in building national public health systems imposed by that provision surely prohibits wilful and unlawful interference with national efforts to implement necessary life-saving health protocols, such as the procurement of medical equipment. It can also be said to be an instance of excessive medical nationalism or protectionism, which involves the hoarding of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. |
32. 从 2020 年 11 月开始，世界一些地区的各种制药公司和公共医疗机构开始宣布其 COVID-19 候选疫苗具有惊人的有效性和安全性。令人遗憾的是，这些声明只是加剧了已然不公的状况，加速了疫苗竞赛。甚至在这些声明之前，已经有抱怨称，“仅占世界人口 13%的富裕国家已经垄断了 COVID-19 主要候选疫苗所承诺剂数的一半以上(51%)”。99 此外，乐施会长期以来一直警告说，主要制药公司根本没有能力生产足够所有人使用的疫苗，因此，至少在 2022 年之前，世界有近三分之二(61%)的人口无法获得疫苗。100 即便 2020 年 12 月开始实际疫苗接种之时，情况也没有显著改善。更加令人担忧的是，有报告称，一些国家可能要到 2024 年才能获得数量可观的疫苗。101 | 32. From November 2020, various drug companies and public medical institutes in certain parts of the world began announcing the impressive effectiveness and safety levels of their COVID-19 vaccine candidates. Unfortunately, those announcements only accelerated an already inequitable situation and the race for vaccines. Even before the announcements, complaints were made that “wealthy nations representing just 13 per cent of the world’s population have already cornered more than half (51 per cent) of the promised doses of leading COVID-19 vaccine candidates”.99 In addition, Oxfam has long warned that the major pharmaceutical companies simply do not have the capacity to make enough vaccines for everyone, leaving nearly two thirds (61 per cent) of the world’s population without the prospect of receiving a vaccine until at least 2022.100 Even at the commencement of the roll out of actual vaccinations, in December 2020, the situation had not improved significantly. That is even more worrisome against the backdrop of reports that some countries may not acquire a significant quantity of vaccines until 2024.101 |
33. 这些疫情应对措施还让人想起关于知识产权对于加剧和维持获得基本药物的不平等方面之作用的现有关切。102 全球艾滋病流行就是一个例子：制药公司利用专利人为限制可拯救生命的药物的供应，并抬高价格。联合国艾滋病毒/艾滋病联合规划署(艾滋病署)和人民疫苗联盟的其他成员此后曾呼吁采用新的办法，按照《国际卫生条例》第四十四条的规定，通过分享知识和最大限度地增加供应，把公共卫生放在首位。如下文所述，在世界贸易组织(世贸组织)的主持下还设计了一个替代制度，尽管范围有限。 | 33. Those kinds of responses to the pandemic also recall existing concerns over the role of intellectual property rights in advancing and maintaining inequities in access to essential medicines.102 An example is the global AIDS epidemic, in relation to which corporations used patents to artificially restrict supplies of life-saving medicines and to inflate their prices. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and other members of the People’s Vaccine Alliance have since called for a new approach that puts public health first by sharing knowledge and maximizing supply, as mandated in article 44 of the International Health Regulations. As will be discussed below, an alternative regime, however limited in scope, was also devised under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). |
34. 2020 年 3 月 3 日，世界上最大的药物生产国之一限制了 26 种药物成分和药物的出口，包括扑热息痛和各种抗生素。这些限制是对另一个药物成分生产国供应链中断的回应。103 随后，前一个国家对羟氯喹(一种试验性 COVID-19 疗法)实施了出口禁令，尽管该禁令已于 2020 年 4 月 6 日解除。104 2021 年 1 月 3 日，还是这个国家暂时禁止出口在其领土上生产的所有牛津-阿斯利康疫苗，这些疫苗由一个签订了为发展中国家生产 10 亿剂疫苗的组织生产。几周内，一个区域性组织也对其成员国领土内生产的疫苗实施了出口管制。105 这些举措可能导致低99 见 www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/small-group-rich-nations-have-bought-more-half-future-supply-leading-covid-19。100 同上；另见联合国，《共担责任》第 1 页。101 Steve Hendrix and Shira Rubin, “Israel is starting to vaccinate, but Palestinians may have to waitmonths”, The Washington Post, 20 December 2020. 可 查 阅 www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-vaccine-palestinians-coronavirus/2020/12/18/f1d8d572-4083-11eb-b58b-1623f6267960_story.html。102 见 www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/。103 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “India limits medicine exports after supplies hit by coronavirus”, The Guardian,4 March 2020. 可查阅 www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/04/india-limits-medicine-exports-coronavirus-paracetamol-antibiotics。104 Akash Bisht, “India lifts drug export ban after Trump’s ‘retaliation’ threat”, Al Jazeera, 7 April 2020.可查阅 www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/7/india-lifts-drug-export-ban-after-trumps-retaliation-threat。105 见 www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55860540。 | 34. On 3 March 2020, one of the world’s largest drug producing States restricted the export of 26 pharmaceutical ingredients and drugs, including paracetamol and various antibiotics. The restrictions were in reaction to supply chain disruptions in another State that produces pharmaceutical ingredients.103 Subsequently, the former State imposed an export ban on hydroxychloroquine, an experimental COVID-19 treatment, although that ban was 97 Nicholas Wasonga Orago, “Commonification of food as an approach for the achievement of food security and the realisation of the right to food for all”, Strathmore Law Journal, vol. 4, No. 1. 98 See www.dw.com/en/us-accused-of-seizing-face-mask-shipments-bound-for-europe-canada/a-53010923. 99 See www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/small-group-rich-nations-have-bought-more-half-future-supply-leading-covid-19. 100 Ibid. See also United Nations, “Shared responsibility”, p. 1. 101 Steve Hendrix and Shira Rubin, “Israel is starting to vaccinate, but Palestinians may have to wait months”, The Washington Post, 20 December 2020. Available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-vaccine-palestinians-coronavirus/2020/12/18/f1d8d572-4083-11eb-b58b-1623f6267960_story.html. 102 See www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/. 103 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “India limits medicine exports after supplies hit by coronavirus”, The Guardian, 4 March 2020. Available from www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/04/india-limits-medicine-exports-coronavirus-paracetamol-antibiotics. lifted on 6 April 2020.104 On 3 January 2021, the same State temporarily banned, for a three-month period, the export of all the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines manufactured in its territory by an organization that had been contracted to make 1 billion doses for developing nations. Within weeks, a regional organization also enacted export controls regarding vaccines manufactured within the territory of its members. 105 Such moves could lead to low-income |
收入国家要到 2021 年 3 月或 4 月，或更晚时候才能收到 COVID-19 疫苗全球获取(COVAX)机制下的第一批疫苗。106 | nations receiving their first doses under the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) initiative beginning only in March or April 2021 or later. |
取(COVAX)机制下的第一批疫苗。106 | 106 |
35. 还应该指出的是，在大流行病的背景下，某些单方面和非针对性的制裁可能对国际团结构成严重和非法威胁，造成严重的人权问题。针对部分国家的全方位单方面制裁只会继续阻碍这些国家快速获得 COVID-19 相关诊断工具、治疗方法和疫苗的能力，它们的卫生系统和社会保护系统已经千疮百孔，长期制裁便是部分原因。事实上，制裁对这些国家中的穷人和弱势群体伤害最大，包括摧毁为数百万人提供生计的中小型企业。107 单方面强制性措施对享受人权的不良影响问题特别报告员于 2020 年 4 月呼吁取消阻碍各国抗击 COVID-19 的单方面制裁，2020 年 8 月 7 日独立专家与其他任务负责人共同重申了这项呼吁。108 此外， | 35. It should also be noted that certain unilateral and non-targeted sanctions can constitute serious and unlawful threats to international solidarity in the context of the pandemic, which render them a serious human rights issue. Blanket unilateral sanctions against certain States have only continued to impede the capacity of those States to readily acquire COVID-19 related diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines, along with the existing dilapidation of health and social protection systems occasioned, in part, by the long-standing sanctions. In reality, the sanctions hurt the poor and vulnerable in those societies the most, including by decimating small- and medium-sized businesses that provide livelihoods for millions of people.107 The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights called for the lifting of unilateral sanctions that prevented countries from combating COVID-19, in April 2020, an appeal which the Independent Expert joined other mandate holders in reiterating on 7 August 2020. |
2020 年 8 月 7 日独立专家与其他任务负责人共同重申了这项呼吁。108 此外，2020 年 11 月 25 日特别报告员在安全理事会的讲话中回顾，人道主义豁免和人道主义援助动作慢、费用高、不透明、不充分，也没有效力。109 鉴于《国际卫生条例》规定的合作义务具有约束力，并注意到“单方面措施只有在不违反任何国家的国际义务的情况下才合法”110，在这场大流行病的背景下，单方面强制性措施在某些情况下可能构成有损于维护人权的国际团结的非法行动。 | 108 In addition, in her address to the Security Council on 25 November 2020, the Special Rapporteur recalled that humanitarian exemptions and humanitarian aid were slow, expensive, non-transparent, insufficient and ineffective.109 Given the binding obligations to cooperate under the International Health Regulations, and noting that “unilateral measures are only legal if they do not breach any international obligation of States”,110 in the context the pandemic, unilateral coercive measures may in some cases constitute unlawful action injurious to international solidarity in aid of human rights. |
五. 为在大流行病期间及之后实现人权展现国际团结的正面案例 | V. Positive expressions of international solidarity for the realization of human rights during and after the pandemic |
36. 独立专家注意到 COVID-19 大流行期间的许多良好做法。由世卫组织及其合作伙伴发起的“获取 COVID-19 工具(ACT)加速计划”是一项全球协作项目，旨在加速 COVID-19 诊断工具、治疗方法和疫苗的开发、生产和公平获取。该计划于 2020 年 4 月启动，迄今已认捐 56 亿美元，仍需要 37 亿美元，此外，2021 年还需要 239 亿美元来实现其目标。其成员包括流行病防范创新联盟、全球疫苗免疫联盟、全球抗击艾滋病、结核病和疟疾基金、国际药品采购机制、创新性新诊断基金会、韦尔科姆信托基金、世界银行集团和比尔及梅林达·盖茨基金会。111截至 2020 年 9 月，已评估了 50 项诊断测试，预计将向低收入国家提供 1.2 亿份低价优质快速检测试剂。在治疗方法方面，ACT 加速计划的合作伙伴正在评估1,700 多项临床试验，并为低收入国家多达 290 万名患者提供了地塞米松，还达成了一项帮助促进低收入和中等收入国家未来获得单克隆抗体治疗的协议。112世卫组织继续在 ACT 加速计划的卫生系统对接支柱下评估 100 多个国家的卫生系统瓶颈和能力差距。106 见 www.indiatoday.in/coronavirus-outbreak/story/adar-poonawalla-india-bar-serum-institute-export-oxford-astrazeneca-covid19-coronavirus-vaccine-months-1755592-2021-01-04。107 Simon Tisdall, “In the age of COVID, sanctions against ‘rogue states’ just spread the misery”, op-ed,The Guardian, 18 October 2020. 可查阅 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/18/in-the-age-of-covid-sanctions-against-rogue-states-just-spread-the-misery。 | 36. The Independent Expert has noted many good practices during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, convened by WHO and its partners, is a global collaboration aimed at accelerating the development and production of, and equitable access to, COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. The scheme was launched in April 2020, and $5.6 billion has been pledged to date, with $3.7 billion still needed, in addition to a further $23.9 billion needed in 2021 to achieve its aims. Its membership includes the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, the Gavi Alliance, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Unitaid, the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics, the Wellcome Trust, the World Bank Group and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.111 As at September 2020, 50 diagnostic tests had been assessed, and 120 million affordable quality rapid tests were expected to be made available to low-income States. In the area of therapeutics, ACT-Accelerator partners are evaluating over 1,700 clinical trials and have secured dexamethasone for up to 2.9 million patients in low-income countries and an agreement to help to facilitate future access to monoclonal 104 Akash Bisht, “India lifts drug export ban after Trump’s ‘retaliation’ threat”, Al Jazeera, 7 April 2020. Available from www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/7/india-lifts-drug-export-ban-after-trumps-retaliation-threat. 105 See www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55860540. 106 See www.indiatoday.in/coronavirus-outbreak/story/adar-poonawalla-india-bar-serum-institute-export-oxford-astrazeneca-covid19-coronavirus-vaccine-months-1755592-2021-01-04. 107 Simon Tisdall, “In the age of COVID, sanctions against ‘rogue states’ just spread the misery”, op-ed, The Guardian, 18 October 2020. Available from www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/18/ |
in-the-age-of-covid-sanctions-against-rogue-states-just-spread-the-misery。 | in-the-age-of-covid-sanctions-against-rogue-states-just-spread-the-misery. |
108 见 https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1069732。 | 108 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1069732. |
109 见 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/UCM/UCM-Arria-Formula-meeting.pdf。 | 109 See https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/UCM/UCM-Arria-Formula-meeting.pdf. |
110 同上。 | 110 Ibid. |
111 关于 ACT 加速计划的常见问答(www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/faq)。 | 111 ACT-Accelerator frequently asked questions (www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/faq). |
37. COVAX 机制是 ACT 加速计划的疫苗支柱。其目的是通过加快为所有国家寻找有效疫苗、支持生产能力和提前购买供应，实现全球公平获得 COVID-19 疫苗，以便到 2021 年底 20 亿剂疫苗得到公平分配。113该机制的根本目的是减轻“自筹资金”国家囤积行为的负面影响，加入 COVAX 的国家同意，在出资组的所有国家都获得足够本国 20%的人口接种的疫苗剂数之前，所接受疫苗剂数不超过本国 20%人口接种所需，并且只要求足够本国 10%至 50%的人口接种的疫苗剂数，选择接种不到 20%的国家除外。114 在这个框架内，还有一个完全独立的筹资机制，即预先市场承诺，它将为低收入国家获得 COVID-19 疫苗提供支助。115 | 37. The COVAX Facility is the vaccine pillar of the ACT-Accelerator. It is aimed at effecting equitable, global access to COVID-19 vaccines by speeding up the search for an effective vaccine for all countries, supporting manufacturing capabilities and buying supply in advance, so that 2 billion doses can be fairly distributed by the end of 2021.113 Essentially aimed at mitigating the negative effects of hoarding by “self-financing” States, the States that have joined COVAX have agreed not to receive enough doses to vaccinate more than 20 per cent of their respective populations until all countries in the financing group have been offered that amount and to only request enough doses to vaccinate between 10 and 50 per cent of their populations, with the exception of those countries that have opted to receive fewer than 20 per cent. |
资机制，即预先市场承诺，它将为低收入国家获得 COVID-19 疫苗提供支助。115截至 2020 年 11 月 19 日，已有 180 多个国家已经加入机制，相当于世界近三分之二的人口，其中包括 94 个高收入国家，它们全部作出了具有法律约束力的承诺。116 尽管 COVAX 仍是希望的灯塔，并且已经实现了一些承诺，但一些重要的自筹资金国家，主要是较富裕的国家，仍拒绝加入，或寻求与各制造商达成双边采购协议，而不是继续遵守对 COVAX 的承诺。 | 114 Within that framework there is also an entirely separate funding mechanism, the advance market commitment, which will support access to COVID-19 vaccines for lower-income States.115 By 19 November 2020, more than 180 countries, representing nearly two thirds of the world’s population, had joined, including 94 higher-income countries, all of which had made legally binding commitments.116 Although COVAX remains a beacon of hope, and is already realising some of its promise, a number of significant self-financing States, mostly the richer ones, continue to either refuse to join or pursue bilateral purchase agreements with the various manufacturers rather than remain committed to COVAX. |
38. 同样，COVID-19 团结应对基金是世卫组织和联合国基金会与瑞士慈善基金会合作发起的一项倡议。117 该基金支持世卫组织的 COVID-19 战略准备和应对计划，特别是其跟踪和了解病毒传播的目标，以确保世界各地的患者获得所需的护理，一线工作人员获得必要的用品和信息，并加快疫苗研发和为所有需要者提供治疗。得到支持的伙伴包括流行病防范创新联盟、联合国儿童基金会(儿童基金会)、粮食署、联合国难民事务高级专员公署(难民署)和联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处。该基金得到了许多国家和公司的支持，大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国近 10,000 名患有慢性病的患者也通过 DrugStars 移动药物应用程序提供了支持。118 中国人口福利基金将引导中国企业、慈善机构和个人向该基金捐 | 38. Similarly, the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund is a WHO and United Nations Foundation initiative, in partnership with the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation.117 The Fund supports the WHO COVID-19 strategic preparedness and response plan, in particular its goals to track and understand the spread of the virus, to ensure that patients around the world receive the care that they need and that front-line workers receive essential supplies and information and to accelerate research and development of a vaccine and treatments for all who need them. Among the partners supported are the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), WFP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The Fund has been supported by a wide range of States and corporations, as well as close to 10,000 patients in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland living with chronic conditions through the DrugStars medication mobile application. |
了支持。118 中国人口福利基金将引导中国企业、慈善机构和个人向该基金捐款。119 | 118 The China Population Welfare Fund will channel donations from Chinese companies, charities and individuals towards the Fund.119 |
39. 儿童基金会预计，根据 COVAX 倡议，2021 年将向低收入国家提供近 20 亿剂 COVID-19 疫苗。120 全球南方国家为每一剂疫苗支付的费用不超过 3 美元，而且承诺是它们将获得 10 亿支配套注射器和针头，因此预计这些国家将首先为保健工作者接种疫苗，然后为其他弱势群体，如老年人和患有基础疾病的人接种疫苗。121 难民署确认非洲开发银行为萨赫勒中部地区的被迫流离失所问题应对113 见 www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax。114 见 www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained。115 同上。116 Jayati Ghosh, “Is this a vaccine apartheid?”, Daily Monitor, 19 November 2020. 可 查 阅www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/is-this-a-vaccine-apartheid--3202524。117 见 www.who.int/news/item/13-03-2020-who-un-foundation-and-partners-launch-first-of-its-kind-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund。118 见 www.healtheuropa.eu/patients-donate-to-who-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund/103549/。119 见 www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/who-s-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund-receives-financial-support-from-the-china-population-welfare-fund。120 Lin Taylor, “Africa: UNICEF says to ship 2 billion COVID-19 vaccines to poor nations in 2021”,Thompson Reuters Foundation, 23 November 2020. 可查阅 https://allafrica.com/stories/202011240038.html。121 John Muchangi, “How Covid-19 vaccines will reach Kenya”, The Star, 24 November 2020. 可查阅www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-11-23-how-covid-19-vaccines-will-reach-kenya/。工作捐助了 2000 多万美元，美洲开发银行和世界银行也联合捐助了 20 亿美元，支持委内瑞拉难民及其收容社区应对疫情，世界银行以赠款而不是贷款的形式通过国际开发协会难民窗口向难民收容国提供了 10 亿美元，供其申请使用。122 在 | 39. UNICEF projects the delivery of nearly 2 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines in 2021 to low-income countries under the COVAX initiative.120 With each dose costing States in the global South no more than $3, and with the promise of their receiving 1 billion accompanying syringes and needles, those States will each be expected to first vaccinate health-care workers, then other vulnerable groups such as older persons and those living with underlying medical conditions.121 UNHCR has recognized the contribution of the African Development Bank of over $20 million towards the forced displacement response in the Central Sahel, as 112 Ibid. 113 See www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax. 114 See www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained. 115 Ibid. 116 Jayati Ghosh, “Is this a vaccine apartheid?”, Daily Monitor, 19 November 2020. Available from www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/is-this-a-vaccine-apartheid--3202524. 117 See www.who.int/news/item/13-03-2020-who-un-foundation-and-partners-launch-first-of-its-kind-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund. 118 See www.healtheuropa.eu/patients-donate-to-who-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund/103549/. 119 See www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/who-s-covid-19-solidarity-response-fund-receives-financial-support-from-the-china-population-welfare-fund. 120 Lin Taylor, “Africa: UNICEF says to ship 2 billion COVID-19 vaccines to poor nations in 2021”, Thompson Reuters Foundation, 23 November 2020. Available from https://allafrica.com/stories/202011240038.html. 121 John Muchangi, “How Covid-19 vaccines will reach Kenya”, The Star, 24 November 2020. Available from www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-11-23-how-covid-19-vaccines-will-reach-kenya/. well as the joint contribution of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank of $2 billion in support of Venezuelan refugees and their host communities, in response to |
过国际开发协会难民窗口向难民收容国提供了 10 亿美元，供其申请使用。122 在区域一级，非洲联盟代表非洲疾病控制和预防中心，通过其非洲 COVID-19 疫苗采购工作组，非洲医疗用品平台，为非洲临时获得了 2.7 亿剂 COVID-19 疫苗。123 非洲联盟还与一家制药公司签署了另外购买 4 亿剂疫苗的协议。124 同样在非洲，西非国家经济共同体(西非经共体)成员同意对 COVID-19 疫苗采取集中采购办法，指示西非经共体委员会设立一个疫苗周转基金，并呼吁各国政府、开发银行、私营部门和合作伙伴向该基金捐款。该基金将用于通过短期集中采购和中长期区域生产保证为该区域获取 COVID-19 疫苗。125 | the pandemic, and the World Bank making available $1 billion from the International Development Association refugee window available on request to refugee hosting countries in the form of grants, not loans.122 At the regional level, the African Union has secured a provisional 270 million COVID-19 vaccine doses for Africa, through its COVID-19 African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team, the Africa Medical Supplies Platform, on behalf of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention.123 The African Union has also signed an agreement with a pharmaceutical company to purchase an additional 400 million vaccine doses.124 Also in Africa, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members have agreed to a pooled procurement approach for COVID-19 vaccines, instructing the ECOWAS Commission to set up a vaccine revolving fund and calling upon national Governments, development banks, the private sector and partners to contribute to the fund. The fund will be used to secure COVID-19 vaccines in the region through short-term pooled procurement and medium- to long-term regional manufacture.125 |
40. 疫情初始阶段，古巴向许多国家提供了医疗援助，特别是其有经验的医务人员，以帮助抗击 COVID-19。意大利是第一个受益的国家，2020 年 3 月有 52 名古巴医生抵达意大利，2020 年 4 月又有第二批医生抵达。126 获得古巴医务人员支持的其他国家包括安道尔、几内亚比绍127、海地、牙买加、肯尼亚、墨西哥、尼加拉瓜、卡塔尔128、圣基茨和尼维斯、南非129、苏里南、多哥130、委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国和越南。131 西班牙加泰罗尼亚自治政府也得到古巴的帮助。132 截 | 40. At the beginning of the pandemic, Cuba sent health aid, in particular its experienced human capital in the medical field, to many States to help in the fight against COVID-19. Italy was the first country to receive 52 Cuban doctors in March 2020, and it received a second group in April 2020.126 Other States that have received medical personnel support from Cuba include Andorra, Guinea-Bissau,127 Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Qatar,128 Saint Kitts and Nevis, South Africa,129 Suriname, Togo,130 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam. |
利瓦尔共和国和越南。131 西班牙加泰罗尼亚自治政府也得到古巴的帮助。132 截 | 131 The Generalitat of Catalonia in Spain also received help from Cuba. |
利瓦尔共和国和越南。131 西班牙加泰罗尼亚自治政府也得到古巴的帮助。132 截至 2020 年 6 月底，古巴已派出 3,000 多名卫生工作者帮助海外抗击 COVID-122 见 www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/5f7b0d574/high-commissioners-opening-statement-71st-session-excom.html。 | 132 By the end of June 2020, Cuba had sent over 3,000 health-care workers to help to fight COVID-19 abroad133 – an important expression of international solidarity to contain the pandemic, which advanced human rights considerably, and which was undertaken while Cuba was still under sanctions imposed by a global superpower.134 |
至 2020 年 6 月底，古巴已派出 3,000 多名卫生工作者帮助海外抗击 COVID-122 见 www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/5f7b0d574/high-commissioners-opening-statement-71st-session-excom.html。123 见 https://africacdc.org/news-item/amsp-opens-covid-19-vaccines-pre-orders-for-55-african-union-member-states/。124 见 www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-j-j-vaccine/jj-agrees-to-supply-african-union-with-up-to-400-million-covid-shots-idUSKBN2BL0QS。125 见 www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/UK-Communique%CC%81-Final-58th-AHSG_VF.pdf。126 Sylvia Poggioli, “For help on coronavirus, Italy turns to China, Russia and Cuba”, NPR, 25 March2020. 可查阅 www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/25/821345465/for-help-on-coronavirus-italy-turns-to-china-russia-and-cuba。127 Felix Tih, “Cuban medical team in Guinea-Bissau to combat COVID-19”, Anadolu Agency, 29 June2020. 可查阅 www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/cuban-medical-team-in-guinea-bissau-to-combat-covid-19/1893700。128 见 https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/4/18/cuba-sends-medics-to-qatar-to-help-fight-coronavirus。129 见 https://english.alarabiya.net/en/coronavirus/2020/04/27/Coronavirus-Cuban-sends-200-doctors-to-help-South-Africa-fight-COVID-19。 | 41. Other States have also expressed pandemic-related international solidarity in a similar way. Italy received critical medical supplies from China and the Russian Federation. 135 Although China was the first country to be hit by the pandemic, it has sent personnel and supplies of drugs and personal protective equipment to various States across Asia, Africa, Europe and South America. Countries like Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Sudan and Zimbabwe have 122 See www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/5f7b0d574/high-commissioners-opening-statement-71st-session-excom.html. 123 See https://africacdc.org/news-item/amsp-opens-covid-19-vaccines-pre-orders-for-55-african-union-member-states/. 124 See www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-j-j-vaccine/jj-agrees-to-supply-african-union-with-up-to-400-million-covid-shots-idUSKBN2BL0QS. 125 See www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/UK-Communique%CC%81-Final-58th-AHSG_VF.pdf. 126 Sylvia Poggioli, “For help on coronavirus, Italy turns to China, Russia and Cuba”, NPR, 25 March 2020. Available from www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/25/821345465/for-help-on-coronavirus-italy-turns-to-china-russia-and-cuba. 127 Felix Tih, “Cuban medical team in Guinea-Bissau to combat COVID-19”, Anadolu Agency, 29 June 2020. Available from www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/cuban-medical-team-in-guinea-bissau-to-combat-covid-19/1893700. 128 See https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/4/18/cuba-sends-medics-to-qatar-to-help-fight-coronavirus. 129 See https://english.alarabiya.net/en/coronavirus/2020/04/27/Coronavirus-Cuban-sends-200-doctors-to-help-South-Africa-fight-COVID-19. |
130 见 www.togofirst.com/en/health/1304-5331-cuba-sends-doctors-to-help-togo-fight-covid-19。 | 130 See www.togofirst.com/en/health/1304-5331-cuba-sends-doctors-to-help-togo-fight-covid-19. |
131 见 https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/covid-19-battle-cuba-gifts-drugs-sends-doctors-to-assist-vietnam-23130.html。 | 131 See https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/covid-19-battle-cuba-gifts-drugs-sends-doctors-to-assist-vietnam-23130.html. |
132 Carlota Perez, “Cuba sends health aid to 15 countries to fight coronavirus”, Atalayar, 12 April 2020。可查阅 https://atalayar.com/en/content/cuba-sends-health-aid-15-countries-fight-coronavirus。 | 132 Carlota Perez, “Cuba sends health aid to 15 countries to fight coronavirus”, Atalayar, 12 April 2020. Available from https://atalayar.com/en/content/cuba-sends-health-aid-15-countries-fight-coronavirus. |
联邦获得了重要的医疗用品。135 虽然中国是第一个受疫情袭击的国家，但它已经向亚洲、非洲、欧洲和南美洲的许多国家派遣了人员，供应了药品以及个人防护设备。阿尔及利亚、布基那法索、科特迪瓦、吉布提、刚果民主共和国、埃塞俄比亚、尼日利亚、苏丹和津巴布韦等国在抗击 COVID-19 大流行方面获得了医学专家的帮助，更多国家从中国专家的网络研讨会中受益。136 中国还承诺在两年内向东盟国家提供类似的国际援助。137 在拉丁美洲，中国的公共和私营部门 | 135 Poggioli, “For help on coronavirus”. received medical experts to help them to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, and more than States have benefitted from webinars by Chinese experts.136 China has also committed to providing similar international aid over a two year period to Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
年内向东盟国家提供类似的国际援助。137 在拉丁美洲，中国的公共和私营部门行为方为各国应对 COVID-19 的行动提供了援助，中国政府向委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国政府提供了“未说明数量的断层扫描仪、除颤器、抗病毒药物、镇静剂和手套”。138 美利坚合众国向加勒比国家提供了 220 万美元，以“加大风险沟通 | countries.137 In Latin America, Chinese public and private sector actors have contributed to the COVID-19 response in various countries, with the Government of China providing “an unspecified number of tomographs, defibrillators, antivirals, sedatives and gloves” to the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. |
手套”。138 美利坚合众国向加勒比国家提供了 220 万美元，以“加大风险沟通努力”。139 美国也向一些非洲国家运送了呼吸机。140 联合王国呼吁高收入国家为全球获得 COVID-19 疫苗提供支助，并通过 COVAX 倡议提供了 5 亿英镑(6.84亿美元)协助向世界各地分发疫苗。141 联合国各机构向委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国 | 138 The United States of America has provided $2.2 million to Caribbean countries to “scale up risk communication efforts”.139 The United States has also sent ventilators to some African countries.140 The United Kingdom has called upon high-income countries to support global access to COVID-19 vaccines and has provided £500 million ($684 million) to aid in the distribution of vaccines across the world through the COVAX initiative.141 Various United Nations agencies have extended significant |
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