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That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "daughter's attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter's mother and the mother's husband in moving to dismiss",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "daughter's attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter's mother and the mother's husband in moving to dismiss",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 U.S. 6, 17",
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 U.S. 506, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | a |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 U.S. 6, 17",
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 U.S. 6, 17",
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | a |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 U.S. 506, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | a |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 U.S. 506, 514",
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | b |
Plaintiffs next objection, found in section "B," is that the Magistrate Judge mischaracterized Plaintiffs argument that, were the Court to refuse to recognize jurisdiction, such a holding "would be a violation of due process." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.\"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... \"",
"sentence": "See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation ... ”); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”)."
} | 3,878,035 | b |
The court can determine class members' consent through class-wide proof. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "301 F.R.D. 292, 299",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to strike class claims as immature because discovery would reveal whether proposed class members' claims are susceptible to generalized proof",
"sentence": "See Buonomo v. Optimum Outcomes, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 292, 299 (N.D.Ill.2014) (denying motion to strike class claims as immature because discovery would reveal whether proposed class members’ claims are susceptible to generalized proof); cf. Gene & Gene L.L.C. v. Bio-Pay, L.L.C., 541 F.3d 318, 329 (5th Cir.2008) (reversing the trial court’s class certification because the defendant had “culled fax numbers from a variety of sources over a period of time, such that class-wide proof of consent [wa]s not possible”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "541 F.3d 318, 329",
"parenthetical": "reversing the trial court's class certification because the defendant had \"culled fax numbers from a variety of sources over a period of time, such that class-wide proof of consent [wa]s not possible\"",
"sentence": "See Buonomo v. Optimum Outcomes, Inc., 301 F.R.D. 292, 299 (N.D.Ill.2014) (denying motion to strike class claims as immature because discovery would reveal whether proposed class members’ claims are susceptible to generalized proof); cf. Gene & Gene L.L.C. v. Bio-Pay, L.L.C., 541 F.3d 318, 329 (5th Cir.2008) (reversing the trial court’s class certification because the defendant had “culled fax numbers from a variety of sources over a period of time, such that class-wide proof of consent [wa]s not possible”)."
} | 12,310,254 | a |
There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 S.W.2d 262, 264",
"parenthetical": "construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builder’s hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute); City of LaPorte v. Taylor, 836 S.W.2d 829, 831-32 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting that legislature has provided limited statutory remedy supplanting materialman’s lien in construction contract for public-works project, consistent with Texas Constitution’s express exemption of public property from forced sale); see also Quincy Lee Co. v. Lodal & Bain Eng’rs, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1980) (construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that builder's hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builder’s hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute); City of LaPorte v. Taylor, 836 S.W.2d 829, 831-32 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting that legislature has provided limited statutory remedy supplanting materialman’s lien in construction contract for public-works project, consistent with Texas Constitution’s express exemption of public property from forced sale); see also Quincy Lee Co. v. Lodal & Bain Eng’rs, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1980) (construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien)."
} | 8,395,598 | b |
There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "18 S.W. 563, 563",
"parenthetical": "holding that builder's hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builder’s hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute); City of LaPorte v. Taylor, 836 S.W.2d 829, 831-32 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting that legislature has provided limited statutory remedy supplanting materialman’s lien in construction contract for public-works project, consistent with Texas Constitution’s express exemption of public property from forced sale); see also Quincy Lee Co. v. Lodal & Bain Eng’rs, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1980) (construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "602 S.W.2d 262, 264",
"parenthetical": "construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builder’s hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute); City of LaPorte v. Taylor, 836 S.W.2d 829, 831-32 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting that legislature has provided limited statutory remedy supplanting materialman’s lien in construction contract for public-works project, consistent with Texas Constitution’s express exemption of public property from forced sale); see also Quincy Lee Co. v. Lodal & Bain Eng’rs, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1980) (construction contract with entity created under article XVI, section 59 of Texas Constitution will in no event give rise to lien)."
} | 8,395,598 | a |
The defense did not offer the evidence under the first or second exceptions. We hold that the evidence did not qualify under the third exception because it was not relevant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reputation and opinion evidence about victim's past sexual behavior \"are not relevant indicators\" of consent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is “so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant’s version”); see also United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994), quoting United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1988) (reputation and opinion evidence about victim’s past sexual behavior “are not relevant indicators” of consent). Accordingly, we hold that the military judge did not err in excluding SSgt W’s testimony about SrA B’s sexual orientation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 MJ 174, 179-80",
"parenthetical": "alleged victim's sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oi consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is \"so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant's version\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is “so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant’s version”); see also United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994), quoting United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1988) (reputation and opinion evidence about victim’s past sexual behavior “are not relevant indicators” of consent). Accordingly, we hold that the military judge did not err in excluding SSgt W’s testimony about SrA B’s sexual orientation."
} | 431,937 | b |
The defense did not offer the evidence under the first or second exceptions. We hold that the evidence did not qualify under the third exception because it was not relevant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "44 MJ 174, 179-80",
"parenthetical": "alleged victim's sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oi consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is \"so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant's version\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is “so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant’s version”); see also United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994), quoting United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1988) (reputation and opinion evidence about victim’s past sexual behavior “are not relevant indicators” of consent). Accordingly, we hold that the military judge did not err in excluding SSgt W’s testimony about SrA B’s sexual orientation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "855 F.2d 1528, 1533",
"parenthetical": "reputation and opinion evidence about victim's past sexual behavior \"are not relevant indicators\" of consent",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sanchez, 44 MJ 174, 179-80 (1996) (alleged victim’s sexual life-style irrelevant to issue oí consent, without a showing that the sexual conduct is “so particularly unusual and distinctive as to verify the defendant’s version”); see also United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994), quoting United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11th Cir.1988) (reputation and opinion evidence about victim’s past sexual behavior “are not relevant indicators” of consent). Accordingly, we hold that the military judge did not err in excluding SSgt W’s testimony about SrA B’s sexual orientation."
} | 431,937 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 P.2d 1234, 1235",
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 P.2d 1234, 1235",
"parenthetical": "sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into \"victim\" category",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into \"victim\" category",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "415 A.2d 406, 409",
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "415 A.2d 406, 409",
"parenthetical": "statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "21 N.W.2d 593, 593",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | 11,104,231 | b |
[P 13.] Several jurisdictions, under statutes awarding costs of "investigation or prosecution," have held that costs of prosecution include extradition costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "21 N.W.2d 593, 593",
"parenthetical": "where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to \"pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.\"",
"sentence": "Maupin, 801 P.2d at 487; State v. Balsam, 130 Ariz. 452, 636 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Ct.App.1981) (sum expended to send a deputy sheriff to Ohio, where defendant was arrested, and bring him back to Arizona for prosecution was a prosecution cost); Skillman v. State, 696 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); People v. Lemons, 824 P.2d 56 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (extradition cost to bring defendant to answer charges was a cost of prosecution and improperly designated as restitution to the police department which did not fall into “victim” category); Comm’wlth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 409 (1980) (statute providing for recoupment from defendant of prosecution costs interpreted as encompassing cost of extradition); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.2d 593, 593 (1946) (where defendant was charged in Nebraska, arrested in South Dakota and extradited to Nebraska, noting the Nebraska court required him to “pay the costs of the criminal prosecution including the costs of the first extradition.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "711 A.2d 669, 673",
"parenthetical": "cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Lewis, 167 Vt. 533, 711 A.2d 669, 673 (1998) (cost of extraditing a defendant after he escaped from custody and fled the jurisdiction were not costs of prosecution, and were properly chargeable to him as restitution owed to the Department of Corrections, the victim of his crime of escape)."
} | 11,104,231 | a |
Addressing the gravamen-of-the-offense factor in Ervin, the State asserts that the focus of the indecency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct, which shows that the Legislature intended for the State to be able to punish a criminal defendant multiple times. To support its argument, the State cites three related cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33",
"parenthetical": "holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature of conduct’ crime— then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.”); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (holding in a jury-unanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conduct-oriented offense); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 S.W.3d 848, 848",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct -- that is, the offense is a 'nature of conduct' crime-- then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature of conduct’ crime— then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.”); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (holding in a jury-unanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conduct-oriented offense); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct)."
} | 7,093,520 | b |
Addressing the gravamen-of-the-offense factor in Ervin, the State asserts that the focus of the indecency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct, which shows that the Legislature intended for the State to be able to punish a criminal defendant multiple times. To support its argument, the State cites three related cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "235 S.W.3d 711, 717",
"parenthetical": "holding in a jury-unanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conduct-oriented offense",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature of conduct’ crime— then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.”); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (holding in a jury-unanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conduct-oriented offense); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33",
"parenthetical": "holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct",
"sentence": "See Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848 (“[I]f the focus of the offense is the conduct — that is, the offense is a ‘nature of conduct’ crime— then different types of conduct are considered to be different offenses.”); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (holding in a jury-unanimity case that indecency with a child by contact is a conduct-oriented offense); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding in a multiple-punishment case that aggravated sexual assault focuses on prohibited conduct)."
} | 7,093,520 | a |
Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court's interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 N.W.2d 860, 860",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff' in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide",
"sentence": "See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); cf. Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (noting that “the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff’ in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide). If the legislature had intended to advance those policies by excluding pre-verdict UIM payments from the definition of collateral sources, it could have expressly so provided."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "574 N.W.2d 425, 425",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous",
"sentence": "See Wynkoop, 574 N.W.2d at 425 (recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous). It is the role of the legislature, not this court, to properly effectuate the policy concerns respondent references."
} | 7,065,919 | b |
Respondent also raises several policy arguments in support of the district court's interpretation. Because the plain language of the collateral-source statute encompasses UIM payments made prior to the verdict, we have no occasion to look beyond the text of the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "779 N.W.2d 860, 860",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff' in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide",
"sentence": "See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); cf. Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (noting that “the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff’ in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide). If the legislature had intended to advance those policies by excluding pre-verdict UIM payments from the definition of collateral sources, it could have expressly so provided."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 N.W.2d 283, 286",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.\"",
"sentence": "See Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987) (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987); cf. Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (noting that “the question of a potential windfall to the plaintiff’ in a situation where the collateral-source statute does not apply is for the legislature to decide). If the legislature had intended to advance those policies by excluding pre-verdict UIM payments from the definition of collateral sources, it could have expressly so provided."
} | 7,065,919 | b |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "28 F.3d 565, 570",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | 5,737,284 | b |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | 5,737,284 | a |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | 5,737,284 | a |
Lippitt did not need to seek help from prison officials he alleges were corrupt to preserve his duress defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "728 F.2d 691, 694",
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Contento-Pachon, 728 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1984) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt police to preserve duress defense); see also United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1994) abrogated on other grounds, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2487, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006) (defendant not required to seek help from arguably corrupt prison guards to preserve duress defense)."
} | 5,737,284 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 3100, 3100",
"parenthetical": "ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys' fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 3100, 3100",
"parenthetical": "ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys' fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | 519,620 | b |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | 519,620 | b |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | 519,620 | a |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.2d 1318, 1333",
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1551, 1551",
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | 519,620 | b |
. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the risk of not being the prevailing party in a SS 1983 case and, therefore, not being entitled to an award of attorneys' fees may ever justify an upward adjustment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court may take contingent nature of attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 2412",
"sentence": "See also LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1333 (9th Cir.1985) (district court may take contingent nature of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412), amended, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir.1986)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1551, 1551",
"parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case\"",
"sentence": "Pennsylvania, 106 S.Ct. at 3100 (ordering case set for reargument on whether attorneys’ fees chargeable to a losing defendant under the Clean Water Act and comparable statutes may be enhanced based on risk of loss); Blum, 465 U.S. at 901 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 17. But see Blum, at 903, 104 S.Ct. at 1551, (Brennan, J., concurring) (\"It is clear ... that Congress authorized district courts to award upward adjustments to compensate for the contingent nature of success, and thus for the risk of nonpayment in a particular case”)."
} | 519,620 | b |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly stated that both the inspections and the overall scheme were, as the majority itself recognizes, "properly administrative." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | 3,730,402 | b |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly stated that both the inspections and the overall scheme were, as the majority itself recognizes, "properly administrative." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 717, 717",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | 3,730,402 | a |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly stated that both the inspections and the overall scheme were, as the majority itself recognizes, "properly administrative." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | 3,730,402 | a |
The Court held that these searches were exempted, in part because "an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this 'closely regulated' business." Moreover, although Burger upheld the regulatory scheme against a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court explicitly stated that both the inspections and the overall scheme were, as the majority itself recognizes, "properly administrative." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.\"",
"sentence": "See Burger, 482 U.S. at 717, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 693, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The case also presents the question whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional ....”); id. at 716, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (\"The discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect.”) (emphases added)."
} | 3,730,402 | a |
A showing of probable cause requires "proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense." A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 331, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 118, 129",
"parenthetical": "noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause)."
} | 11,564,217 | a |
A showing of probable cause requires "proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense." A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 331, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause)."
} | 11,564,217 | a |
A showing of probable cause requires "proof of facts and circumstances that would convince a reasonable, honest individual that the suspected person is guilty of a criminal offense." A grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 331, 353",
"parenthetical": "noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means",
"sentence": "See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (noting that under both common law and section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by evidence that it was procured by corrupt means); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (noting that a grand jury indictment satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that an arrest warrant must be based on probable cause)."
} | 11,564,217 | b |
Schmitt's attorney submitted an itemized bill. It appears most, if not all, of the charges were made in pursuit of a change of venue. On remand, the district court should consider this billing request, as well as time spent on taking this appeal, in awarding Schmitt attorney fees and costs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "326 N.W.2d 278, 278",
"parenthetical": "remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine award of appellate attorney fees",
"sentence": "See Bankers Trust, 326 N.W.2d at 278 (remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine award of appellate attorney fees); see also In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 233 (Iowa 2012) (remanding to allow the district court to evaluate the amount of attorney fees that should be awarded)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "814 N.W.2d 215, 233",
"parenthetical": "remanding to allow the district court to evaluate the amount of attorney fees that should be awarded",
"sentence": "See Bankers Trust, 326 N.W.2d at 278 (remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine award of appellate attorney fees); see also In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 233 (Iowa 2012) (remanding to allow the district court to evaluate the amount of attorney fees that should be awarded)."
} | 6,806,859 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 P.2d 378, 381",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | b |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 Utah 404, 413",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | a |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "464 P.2d 378, 381",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | b |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | b |
P 9 There was no question then, and there is no question today, that the answer to the first question is "yes." Legislators alone are charged with the exercise of the essential powers inherent in the very concept of the legislative branch -- the power to vote on proposed laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\" 'Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.' \" (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "57 P.2d 734, 738",
"parenthetical": "finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties",
"sentence": "See Tite v. State Tax Comm’n, 89 Utah 404, 413, 57 P.2d 734, 738 (1936) (finding that only legislature has authority to pass laws fixing tax penalties); see also Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970) (“ ‘Legislative power ... is the authority to make laws.’ ” (quoting In re Opinion of Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939)))."
} | 11,613,150 | b |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs' \"suddenly discovered affection for arbitration\" came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 43; see also Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (holding that plaintiffs’ “suddenly discovered affection for arbitration” came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute). Moreover, “[ajrbitration clauses were not meant to be another weapon in the arsenal for imposing delay and costs in the dispute resolution process.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | 11,474,007 | a |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs' \"suddenly discovered affection for arbitration\" came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 43; see also Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (holding that plaintiffs’ “suddenly discovered affection for arbitration” came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute). Moreover, “[ajrbitration clauses were not meant to be another weapon in the arsenal for imposing delay and costs in the dispute resolution process.”"
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | 11,474,007 | a |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.2d 44, 44",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | 11,474,007 | a |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.2d 44, 44",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | 11,474,007 | b |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 F.2d 726, 726",
"parenthetical": "denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 221, 221",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | 11,474,007 | b |
Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing "a party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "614 F.2d 701, 701",
"parenthetical": "finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 221, 221",
"parenthetical": "finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 44 (finding waiver where the parties had engaged in considerable discovery, and cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and decided before the defendant moved to compel arbitration); Menorah Ins., 72 F.3d at 221 (finding waiver where defendant refused original request for arbitration and litigation had been proceeding for over a year); cf. Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (denying plaintiffs motion to vacate dismissal and compel arbitration where case had been dismissed with prejudice for plaintiffs failure to prosecute); Reid Burton Constr., Inc., 614 F.2d at 701 (finding that defendants were properly denied the right to arbitrate where both parties had prepared for trial, the defendants had denied they were subject to the bargaining agreement providing for arbitration, and the defendants did not indicate desire to arbitrate until trial was underway)."
} | 11,474,007 | b |
Another tactic is to characterize a case as involving equitable claims rather than damages, or artfully pleading, in bad faith, an amount of damages less than the $50,000.00 minimum jurisdictional amount. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand should have been granted where complaint did not allege injuries \"facially likely\" to exceed $50,000.00",
"sentence": "See e.g., Marcel v. Pool Company, 5 F.3d 81 (5th Cir.1993) (remand properly denied where complaint “facially apparent” that damages could easily exceed $50,000.00); cf. Asociación Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Química, 988 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.1993) (remand should have been granted where complaint did not allege injuries “facially likely” to exceed $50,000.00)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remand properly denied where complaint \"facially apparent\" that damages could easily exceed $50,000.00",
"sentence": "See e.g., Marcel v. Pool Company, 5 F.3d 81 (5th Cir.1993) (remand properly denied where complaint “facially apparent” that damages could easily exceed $50,000.00); cf. Asociación Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Química, 988 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.1993) (remand should have been granted where complaint did not allege injuries “facially likely” to exceed $50,000.00)."
} | 3,860,098 | b |
That is not to say that non-discriminatory laws insulating a group of primarily local companies from competition do not have a negative impact on interstate commerce. Such laws, though, are best reviewed under the undue burden test, and are not subject to strict scrutiny. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "477 F.3d 49, 49-50",
"parenthetical": "a local law that does not give an advantage to local companies over out-of-state competitors is reviewed under the undue burden test",
"sentence": "See also Town of Southold, 477 F.3d at 49-50 (a local law that does not give an advantage to local companies over out-of-state competitors is reviewed under the undue burden test)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 S.Ct. 1797, 1797",
"parenthetical": "nondiscriminatory local laws \"which treat instate private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, do not 'discriminate against interstate commerce' \" and are subject to the undue burden test",
"sentence": "See United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1797 (nondiscriminatory local laws “which treat instate private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, do not ‘discriminate against interstate commerce’ ” and are subject to the undue burden test)."
} | 3,768,058 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting that \"[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired\"",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 F.3d 260, 260",
"parenthetical": "qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 F.3d 260, 260",
"parenthetical": "qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting that \"[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired\"",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | 5,899,811 | a |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting that \"[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired\"",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting that \"[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired\"",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | 5,899,811 | a |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | 5,899,811 | a |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action\" and noting that \"[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired\"",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
Dunbar is distinguishable because in that case there was no evidence that the plaintiff was not qualified to continue holding her position. Because plaintiff has failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he was qualified to continue serving as police chief when Hale was removed from office on October 1, 2004, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie element of a Title VII retaliation claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 F.Supp.2d 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination",
"sentence": "See also Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1506 & n. 3 (“a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a pri-ma facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and noting that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”); Bynum, 41 F.Supp.2d at 653 (holding that plaintiffs decertification by the Army that rendered him unqualified to continue serving as a JROTC teacher precluded him from establishing prima facie case of discrimination)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA",
"sentence": "See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260 (qualification a prima facie element of an ADEA retaliation claim); Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 & n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 817, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 34 (2003) (retaliation claims are analyzed the same under Title VII and the ADEA)."
} | 5,899,811 | b |
App., Vol. 3, at 313. We agree with the magistrate judge's conclusion that this provider's form supports, and does not contradict, the ALJ's RFC finding. Thus, we find no reversible error in the ALJ's failure to discuss this opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.3d 578, 578-79",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]n ALJ's failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ's assessment of residual functional capacity.\"",
"sentence": "See Mays, 739 F.3d at 578-79 (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity.”); see also Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.2004) (“When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant’s RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened.”). For the same reason, we conclude the ALJ’s failure to discuss the assessments of two state agency psychologists, Drs."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "379 F.3d 945, 947",
"parenthetical": "\"When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant's RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened.\"",
"sentence": "See Mays, 739 F.3d at 578-79 (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity.”); see also Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.2004) (“When the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimant’s RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened.”). For the same reason, we conclude the ALJ’s failure to discuss the assessments of two state agency psychologists, Drs."
} | 4,196,875 | a |
Moreover, "the statutory exemptions established by SS 1108 are defenses which must be proven by the defendant." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by SS 1108",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by § 1108); see also Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.”); Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under § 1106 qualifies for an exemption under § 1108.”); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1215 (“[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "835 F.3d 670, 676",
"parenthetical": "\"We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.\"",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by § 1108); see also Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.”); Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under § 1106 qualifies for an exemption under § 1108.”); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1215 (“[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.”)."
} | 12,267,983 | a |
Moreover, "the statutory exemptions established by SS 1108 are defenses which must be proven by the defendant." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "749 F.3d 671, 685",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under SS 1106 qualifies for an exemption under SS 1108.\"",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by § 1108); see also Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.”); Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under § 1106 qualifies for an exemption under § 1108.”); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1215 (“[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by SS 1108",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by § 1108); see also Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.”); Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under § 1106 qualifies for an exemption under § 1108.”); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1215 (“[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.”)."
} | 12,267,983 | b |
Moreover, "the statutory exemptions established by SS 1108 are defenses which must be proven by the defendant." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "829 F.2d 1215, 1215",
"parenthetical": "\"[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.\"",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by § 1108); see also Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.”); Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under § 1106 qualifies for an exemption under § 1108.”); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1215 (“[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by SS 1108",
"sentence": "Braden, 588 F.3d at 601 (vacating district court judgment that dismissed cause of action because the plaintiff failed to plead facts that showed he was not exempted by § 1108); see also Allen v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 835 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold squarely that the section 408 exemptions are affirmative defenses for pleading purposes, and so the plaintiff has no duty to negate any or all of them.”); Fish v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 749 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden of proof is on a defendant to show that a transaction that is otherwise prohibited under § 1106 qualifies for an exemption under § 1108.”); Lowen, 829 F.2d at 1215 (“[Because the fiduciary has a virtual monopoly of information concerning the transaction in question, it is in the best position to demonstrate the absence of self-dealing. Placing the burden of proof on the fiduciary [to establish that the transaction in question fell under an exemption] is thus justified.”)."
} | 12,267,983 | b |
Thus, taken as a whole, the record evidence shows that the plaintiffs primary duty was to make sales. See Olivo v. GMAC Mortg. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that MLOs who sell mortgage loan packages fulfill the sales requirement of the outside sales exemption",
"sentence": "Corp., 374 F.Supp.2d 545, 550 (E.D.Mich.2004) (in determining whether an employee is an outside salesperson, “[c]ourts have considered whether the employee: (1) must solicit new business; (2) receives sales training; (3) was hired and denominated as a salesman; (4) was paid on a . commission basis; (5) was required to meet minimum production standards; and (6) was subject to direct or constant supervision”); see also FLSA2006-11, DOL Opinion Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Acting Administrator, 2006 WL 1094597, (Mar. 31, 2006) (noting that MLOs who sell mortgage loan packages fulfill the sales requirement of the outside sales exemption); see also WH-115, DOL Opinion Letter from Robert D. Moran, Administrator, 1971 WL 33052, (Jan. 15, 1971) (“[A]n employee who actually obtains an application for ... a loan would be engaged in exempt type work; the consideration ... being the ... interest paid for the amount loaned”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "374 F.Supp.2d 545, 550",
"parenthetical": "in determining whether an employee is an outside salesperson, \"[c]ourts have considered whether the employee: (1",
"sentence": "Corp., 374 F.Supp.2d 545, 550 (E.D.Mich.2004) (in determining whether an employee is an outside salesperson, “[c]ourts have considered whether the employee: (1) must solicit new business; (2) receives sales training; (3) was hired and denominated as a salesman; (4) was paid on a . commission basis; (5) was required to meet minimum production standards; and (6) was subject to direct or constant supervision”); see also FLSA2006-11, DOL Opinion Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Acting Administrator, 2006 WL 1094597, (Mar. 31, 2006) (noting that MLOs who sell mortgage loan packages fulfill the sales requirement of the outside sales exemption); see also WH-115, DOL Opinion Letter from Robert D. Moran, Administrator, 1971 WL 33052, (Jan. 15, 1971) (“[A]n employee who actually obtains an application for ... a loan would be engaged in exempt type work; the consideration ... being the ... interest paid for the amount loaned”)."
} | 3,884,285 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | 11,575,069 | a |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408",
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
Subsets and Splits