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(Emphasis added.) Thus, if Defendant was incarcerated in California, or any other state, awaiting extradition for this forgery charge, he would be entitled to credit for the time served. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "780 P.2d 880, 890",
"parenthetical": "defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes",
"sentence": "State v. Mahler, 128 Ariz. 429, 430, 626 P.2d 593, 594 (1981) (defendant arrested on fugitive warrant, waived extradition); People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763, 764 (Colo.App.1982); State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 757, 780 P.2d 880, 890 (1989) (defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 Haw. 231, 231-32",
"parenthetical": "lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed",
"sentence": "See Brant, 72 Haw. at 231-32, 813 P.2d at 855 (lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed)."
} | 12,259,606 | a |
(Emphasis added.) Thus, if Defendant was incarcerated in California, or any other state, awaiting extradition for this forgery charge, he would be entitled to credit for the time served. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "780 P.2d 880, 890",
"parenthetical": "defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes",
"sentence": "State v. Mahler, 128 Ariz. 429, 430, 626 P.2d 593, 594 (1981) (defendant arrested on fugitive warrant, waived extradition); People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763, 764 (Colo.App.1982); State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 757, 780 P.2d 880, 890 (1989) (defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "813 P.2d 855, 855",
"parenthetical": "lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed",
"sentence": "See Brant, 72 Haw. at 231-32, 813 P.2d at 855 (lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed)."
} | 12,259,606 | a |
Indeed, it is plausible that, from a third-party perspective, Defendant Best's conduct would have appeared to be in the ordinary course of his police business-- taking a private citizen from his official vehicle, while in his official uniform, to his office in MPD headquarters. Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a theory of respondeat superior liability for the District stemming from Defendant Best's 'alleged sexual abuse of the Plaintiff at MPD headquarters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.Supp.2d 398, 398",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to dismiss on the basis of section 219(2)(d) because there was a fact issue as to whether an executive of a company used the instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee",
"sentence": "See Sipper, 821 F.Supp.2d at 398 (denying motion to dismiss on the basis of section 219(2)(d) because there was a fact issue as to whether an executive of a company used the instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee); see also Doe v. Forrest, 176 Vt. 476, 853 A.2d 48, 61 (2004) (“What makes the circumstances of this case virtually unique from a policy perspective is 'the extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a citizen. A number of courts have talked about this power in finding vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assaults by police officers.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"What makes the circumstances of this case virtually unique from a policy perspective is 'the extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a citizen. A number of courts have talked about this power in finding vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assaults by police officers.\"",
"sentence": "See Sipper, 821 F.Supp.2d at 398 (denying motion to dismiss on the basis of section 219(2)(d) because there was a fact issue as to whether an executive of a company used the instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee); see also Doe v. Forrest, 176 Vt. 476, 853 A.2d 48, 61 (2004) (“What makes the circumstances of this case virtually unique from a policy perspective is 'the extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a citizen. A number of courts have talked about this power in finding vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assaults by police officers.”)."
} | 12,417,810 | a |
Indeed, it is plausible that, from a third-party perspective, Defendant Best's conduct would have appeared to be in the ordinary course of his police business-- taking a private citizen from his official vehicle, while in his official uniform, to his office in MPD headquarters. Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a theory of respondeat superior liability for the District stemming from Defendant Best's 'alleged sexual abuse of the Plaintiff at MPD headquarters. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 F.Supp.2d 398, 398",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to dismiss on the basis of section 219(2)(d) because there was a fact issue as to whether an executive of a company used the instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee",
"sentence": "See Sipper, 821 F.Supp.2d at 398 (denying motion to dismiss on the basis of section 219(2)(d) because there was a fact issue as to whether an executive of a company used the instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee); see also Doe v. Forrest, 176 Vt. 476, 853 A.2d 48, 61 (2004) (“What makes the circumstances of this case virtually unique from a policy perspective is 'the extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a citizen. A number of courts have talked about this power in finding vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assaults by police officers.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "853 A.2d 48, 61",
"parenthetical": "\"What makes the circumstances of this case virtually unique from a policy perspective is 'the extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a citizen. A number of courts have talked about this power in finding vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assaults by police officers.\"",
"sentence": "See Sipper, 821 F.Supp.2d at 398 (denying motion to dismiss on the basis of section 219(2)(d) because there was a fact issue as to whether an executive of a company used the instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee); see also Doe v. Forrest, 176 Vt. 476, 853 A.2d 48, 61 (2004) (“What makes the circumstances of this case virtually unique from a policy perspective is 'the extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a citizen. A number of courts have talked about this power in finding vicarious liability in cases involving sexual assaults by police officers.”)."
} | 12,417,810 | a |
Doc. 37 at PP 43, 47, 49-53, 76, 80, 83. Taken together, those allegations are sufficient to state an unfair conduct claim under the ICFA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "762 F.Supp.2d 342, 353-54",
"parenthetical": "where complaint alleged \"several injuries resulting from defendant's allegedly deceptive representations about HAMP, including wrongful foreclosures, increased fees, costs incurred to avoid foreclosure, loss of opportunities to pursue refinancing or loss mitigation strategies, and emotional distress,\" plaintiff adequately stated a claim under analogous Massachusetts consumer protection statute",
"sentence": "See Windy City, 536 F.3d at 672 (allegation of specific unfair conduct and resulting harm sufficient to state an ICFA unfairness claim); see also Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.Supp.2d 342, 353-54 (D.Mass.2011) (where complaint alleged “several injuries resulting from defendant’s allegedly deceptive representations about HAMP, including wrongful foreclosures, increased fees, costs incurred to avoid foreclosure, loss of opportunities to pursue refinancing or loss mitigation strategies, and emotional distress,” plaintiff adequately stated a claim under analogous Massachusetts consumer protection statute)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 F.3d 672, 672",
"parenthetical": "allegation of specific unfair conduct and resulting harm sufficient to state an ICFA unfairness claim",
"sentence": "See Windy City, 536 F.3d at 672 (allegation of specific unfair conduct and resulting harm sufficient to state an ICFA unfairness claim); see also Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.Supp.2d 342, 353-54 (D.Mass.2011) (where complaint alleged “several injuries resulting from defendant’s allegedly deceptive representations about HAMP, including wrongful foreclosures, increased fees, costs incurred to avoid foreclosure, loss of opportunities to pursue refinancing or loss mitigation strategies, and emotional distress,” plaintiff adequately stated a claim under analogous Massachusetts consumer protection statute)."
} | 5,914,458 | b |
Based on the fact that Gaumond successfully completed the probationary period, he contends that he has a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. However, Section 3-01 creates no entitlement to continued employment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52",
"parenthetical": "holding that assistant professor's mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university's tenure system",
"sentence": "Board of Regents, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit “must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.”); see also Gray v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that assistant professor’s mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university’s tenure system)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "408 U.S. 564, 569-70",
"parenthetical": "A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit \"must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.\"",
"sentence": "Board of Regents, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit “must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.”); see also Gray v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that assistant professor’s mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university’s tenure system)."
} | 9,309,978 | b |
Based on the fact that Gaumond successfully completed the probationary period, he contends that he has a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. However, Section 3-01 creates no entitlement to continued employment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit \"must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.\"",
"sentence": "Board of Regents, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit “must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.”); see also Gray v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that assistant professor’s mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university’s tenure system)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52",
"parenthetical": "holding that assistant professor's mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university's tenure system",
"sentence": "Board of Regents, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit “must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.”); see also Gray v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that assistant professor’s mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university’s tenure system)."
} | 9,309,978 | a |
Based on the fact that Gaumond successfully completed the probationary period, he contends that he has a constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. However, Section 3-01 creates no entitlement to continued employment. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit \"must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.\"",
"sentence": "Board of Regents, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit “must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.”); see also Gray v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that assistant professor’s mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university’s tenure system)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52",
"parenthetical": "holding that assistant professor's mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university's tenure system",
"sentence": "Board of Regents, v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (A person claiming a property inter est in a benefit “must have more than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must ... have a legitimate claim to it.”); see also Gray v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 150 F.3d 1347, 1350-52 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that assistant professor’s mere presence as a member of the faculty beyond a seven-year probationary period did not demonstrate that she was protected by public university’s tenure system)."
} | 9,309,978 | a |
Instead of accounting for this contradictory record evidence, the ALJ ignored the opinions of Buck's therapists and Vickers, selectively citing to temporary improvements in Buck's functioning. Given the episodic nature of bipolar disorder, short-lived improvements in functioning are consistent with the diagnosis and cannot, by themselves, constitute substantial evidence to override treating source opinions that Buck was significantly impaired. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "296 F.3d 871, 881",
"parenthetical": "\"Bipolar disorder is a severe psychiatric illness marked by episodes of mania and depression, impairment of functioning-- both cognitive and behavioral, and is frequently complicated by psychotic symptoms (e.g. delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.2011) (concluding that the ALJ erred in “holding] against [claimant] two instances where he was able to function, even though his alleged disability involves attacks of muscle weakness ... that come and go”); see also Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir.2002) (“Bipolar disorder is a severe psychiatric illness marked by episodes of mania and depression, impairment of functioning— both cognitive and behavioral, and is frequently complicated by psychotic symptoms (e.g. delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking).”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "659 F.3d 1228, 1234",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the ALJ erred in \"holding] against [claimant] two instances where he was able to function, even though his alleged disability involves attacks of muscle weakness ... that come and go\"",
"sentence": "See Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.2011) (concluding that the ALJ erred in “holding] against [claimant] two instances where he was able to function, even though his alleged disability involves attacks of muscle weakness ... that come and go”); see also Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir.2002) (“Bipolar disorder is a severe psychiatric illness marked by episodes of mania and depression, impairment of functioning— both cognitive and behavioral, and is frequently complicated by psychotic symptoms (e.g. delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking).”) (emphasis added)."
} | 3,643,536 | b |
Second, there was ample evidence in the records to support the district-court's finding that Herrera oversaw the preparation, purchase and diversion of large quantities of pseudoephedrine through both JDI and G&H. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "60 F.3d 1400, 1410",
"parenthetical": "holding that, where \"the district court was able to estimate drug quantity, there is no reason to depart from 2D1.1.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 827 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming a four-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 where defendant oversaw procurement and distribution of large quantities of cocaine); see also United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1410 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that, where “the district court was able to estimate drug quantity, there is no reason to depart from 2D1.1.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "51 F.3d 820, 827",
"parenthetical": "affirming a four-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. SS 3B1.1 where defendant oversaw procurement and distribution of large quantities of cocaine",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 827 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming a four-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 where defendant oversaw procurement and distribution of large quantities of cocaine); see also United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1410 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that, where “the district court was able to estimate drug quantity, there is no reason to depart from 2D1.1.”)."
} | 3,703,652 | b |
Dish Rep. Br. at 22-23. The change in the law merely allows for an offer to sell a patented product to constitute infringement. It says nothing new about whether the use of an infringing product to promote products and services can be advertising injury. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the relevance of this change in the law \"because Intouch's complaint alleges an infringement based on Amazon's use of its patented product, [and therefore the] amendments do not affect the outcome here\"",
"sentence": "Amazon, 85 P.3d at 977 n. 20 (rejecting the relevance of this change in the law “because Intouch’s complaint alleges an infringement based on Amazon’s use of its patented product, [and therefore the] amendments do not affect the outcome here”); see also Tradesoft Techs., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 137, 746 A.2d 1078, 1086 (App. Div.2000) (specifically rejecting the argument that the change in the patent laws changed the scope of “advertising injury” coverage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "specifically rejecting the argument that the change in the patent laws changed the scope of \"advertising injury\" coverage",
"sentence": "Amazon, 85 P.3d at 977 n. 20 (rejecting the relevance of this change in the law “because Intouch’s complaint alleges an infringement based on Amazon’s use of its patented product, [and therefore the] amendments do not affect the outcome here”); see also Tradesoft Techs., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 137, 746 A.2d 1078, 1086 (App. Div.2000) (specifically rejecting the argument that the change in the patent laws changed the scope of “advertising injury” coverage)."
} | 3,839,046 | a |
Dish Rep. Br. at 22-23. The change in the law merely allows for an offer to sell a patented product to constitute infringement. It says nothing new about whether the use of an infringing product to promote products and services can be advertising injury. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the relevance of this change in the law \"because Intouch's complaint alleges an infringement based on Amazon's use of its patented product, [and therefore the] amendments do not affect the outcome here\"",
"sentence": "Amazon, 85 P.3d at 977 n. 20 (rejecting the relevance of this change in the law “because Intouch’s complaint alleges an infringement based on Amazon’s use of its patented product, [and therefore the] amendments do not affect the outcome here”); see also Tradesoft Techs., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 137, 746 A.2d 1078, 1086 (App. Div.2000) (specifically rejecting the argument that the change in the patent laws changed the scope of “advertising injury” coverage)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "746 A.2d 1078, 1086",
"parenthetical": "specifically rejecting the argument that the change in the patent laws changed the scope of \"advertising injury\" coverage",
"sentence": "Amazon, 85 P.3d at 977 n. 20 (rejecting the relevance of this change in the law “because Intouch’s complaint alleges an infringement based on Amazon’s use of its patented product, [and therefore the] amendments do not affect the outcome here”); see also Tradesoft Techs., Inc. v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 329 N.J.Super. 137, 746 A.2d 1078, 1086 (App. Div.2000) (specifically rejecting the argument that the change in the patent laws changed the scope of “advertising injury” coverage)."
} | 3,839,046 | a |
. We have approved constitutional decisions of the district courts based on different constitutional grounds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "831 So.2d 93, 110-11",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the defendant's equal protection challenge to determinations made under the sexual offender involuntary commitment statute was properly a due process claim",
"sentence": "See State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1126, 1129 (Fla.1986) (agreeing that the subject statute was unconstitutional, but rejecting the district court's reasoning that the statute was overbroad and vague and holding instead that statute violated due process); see also Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 110-11 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the defendant’s equal protection challenge to determinations made under the sexual offender involuntary commitment statute was properly a due process claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "489 So.2d 1125, 1126, 1129",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that the subject statute was unconstitutional, but rejecting the district court's reasoning that the statute was overbroad and vague and holding instead that statute violated due process",
"sentence": "See State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1126, 1129 (Fla.1986) (agreeing that the subject statute was unconstitutional, but rejecting the district court's reasoning that the statute was overbroad and vague and holding instead that statute violated due process); see also Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 110-11 (Fla.2002) (concluding that the defendant’s equal protection challenge to determinations made under the sexual offender involuntary commitment statute was properly a due process claim)."
} | 9,248,986 | b |
Moreover, there is no indication that the jury made specific findings as to drug quantity. In light of the indictment's ambiguous allegation as to the quantity of cocaine base involved, and because of Apprendi, we conclude that the failure to require specific findings regarding the quantity of cocaine constitutes a "plain or obvious" error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 461, 468",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be \"plain at the time of appellate consideration\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that the judge’s issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (“[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be “plain at the time of appellate consideration”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the judge's issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that the judge’s issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (“[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be “plain at the time of appellate consideration”)."
} | 11,170,977 | b |
Moreover, there is no indication that the jury made specific findings as to drug quantity. In light of the indictment's ambiguous allegation as to the quantity of cocaine base involved, and because of Apprendi, we conclude that the failure to require specific findings regarding the quantity of cocaine constitutes a "plain or obvious" error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be \"plain at the time of appellate consideration\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that the judge’s issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (“[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be “plain at the time of appellate consideration”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the judge's issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that the judge’s issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (“[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be “plain at the time of appellate consideration”)."
} | 11,170,977 | b |
Moreover, there is no indication that the jury made specific findings as to drug quantity. In light of the indictment's ambiguous allegation as to the quantity of cocaine base involved, and because of Apprendi, we conclude that the failure to require specific findings regarding the quantity of cocaine constitutes a "plain or obvious" error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be \"plain at the time of appellate consideration\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that the judge’s issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (“[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be “plain at the time of appellate consideration”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the judge's issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 227 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (concluding that the judge’s issuance of findings that increased the statutory maximum constituted an obvious error, satisfying the first two prongs of the Olano standard); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (“[I]n a case ... where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be “plain at the time of appellate consideration”)."
} | 11,170,977 | b |
As well, the Plaintiffs assertion that Odom made racial comments every time he visited Brownsville is conclusory and non-specific. Without more, the Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of Odom's alleged racially derogatory language. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 495, 501",
"parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.\"",
"sentence": "See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language “on numerous occasions” but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged “constant harassment” but only identified “a few specific discriminatory comments”); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Fed.Appx. 259, 259-60",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language \"on numerous occasions\" but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion",
"sentence": "See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language “on numerous occasions” but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged “constant harassment” but only identified “a few specific discriminatory comments”); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.”)."
} | 4,159,253 | b |
As well, the Plaintiffs assertion that Odom made racial comments every time he visited Brownsville is conclusory and non-specific. Without more, the Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of Odom's alleged racially derogatory language. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "96 F.3d 830, 836",
"parenthetical": "finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory",
"sentence": "See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language “on numerous occasions” but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged “constant harassment” but only identified “a few specific discriminatory comments”); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 495, 501",
"parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.\"",
"sentence": "See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language “on numerous occasions” but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged “constant harassment” but only identified “a few specific discriminatory comments”); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.”)."
} | 4,159,253 | a |
As well, the Plaintiffs assertion that Odom made racial comments every time he visited Brownsville is conclusory and non-specific. Without more, the Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to the severity or pervasiveness of Odom's alleged racially derogatory language. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 495, 501",
"parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.\"",
"sentence": "See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language “on numerous occasions” but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged “constant harassment” but only identified “a few specific discriminatory comments”); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1998 WL 165147, at *1",
"parenthetical": "hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged \"constant harassment\" but only identified \"a few specific discriminatory comments\"",
"sentence": "See Fuelling, 284 Fed.Appx. at 259-60 (granting summary judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged that she was referred to with derogatory language “on numerous occasions” but was only able to identify the speaker on one occasion); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir.1996) (finding no hostile work environment where only two comments were actually discriminatory); Fasone v. Clinton Twp., No. 97-3267, 1998 WL 165147, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 1998) (hostile work environment claim failed where plaintiff alleged “constant harassment” but only identified “a few specific discriminatory comments”); see also Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 552 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Plaintiff] has alleged that she was subject to derogatory sex-based comments on a daily basis, but without specifies it is difficult to adjudge their severity.”)."
} | 4,159,253 | b |
Under general maritime law negligent defendants are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs damages. The United States and Weeks Marine are both at fault for the allision and Contango's damages, and neither is entitled to shift all blame to the other because each owed independent duties to exercise reasonable care to avoid damaging Contango's pipeline, and each could have prevented the allision through the exercise of reasonable care. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing the effect of THE PENNSYLVANIA rule on apportionment of liability",
"sentence": "See Combo Maritime, 615 F.3d at 608-09 (discussing the effect of THE LOUISIANA rule on apportionment of liability); cf. Beene v. Terrebonne Wireline Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 627, 1993 WL 117984, at *2 (5th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (discussing the effect of THE PENNSYLVANIA rule on apportionment of liability); Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.1987) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 608, 608-09",
"parenthetical": "discussing the effect of THE LOUISIANA rule on apportionment of liability",
"sentence": "See Combo Maritime, 615 F.3d at 608-09 (discussing the effect of THE LOUISIANA rule on apportionment of liability); cf. Beene v. Terrebonne Wireline Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 627, 1993 WL 117984, at *2 (5th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (discussing the effect of THE PENNSYLVANIA rule on apportionment of liability); Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.1987) (same)."
} | 4,210,408 | b |
Under general maritime law negligent defendants are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs damages. The United States and Weeks Marine are both at fault for the allision and Contango's damages, and neither is entitled to shift all blame to the other because each owed independent duties to exercise reasonable care to avoid damaging Contango's pipeline, and each could have prevented the allision through the exercise of reasonable care. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "1993 WL 117984, at *2",
"parenthetical": "discussing the effect of THE PENNSYLVANIA rule on apportionment of liability",
"sentence": "See Combo Maritime, 615 F.3d at 608-09 (discussing the effect of THE LOUISIANA rule on apportionment of liability); cf. Beene v. Terrebonne Wireline Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 627, 1993 WL 117984, at *2 (5th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (discussing the effect of THE PENNSYLVANIA rule on apportionment of liability); Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.1987) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 608, 608-09",
"parenthetical": "discussing the effect of THE LOUISIANA rule on apportionment of liability",
"sentence": "See Combo Maritime, 615 F.3d at 608-09 (discussing the effect of THE LOUISIANA rule on apportionment of liability); cf. Beene v. Terrebonne Wireline Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 627, 1993 WL 117984, at *2 (5th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (discussing the effect of THE PENNSYLVANIA rule on apportionment of liability); Sheridan Transp. Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.1987) (same)."
} | 4,210,408 | b |
This interpretation accords with Washington case law. Where our courts have found a parent to be voluntarily unemployed, the parent has been employable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "26 Wn. App. 108, 110-11",
"parenthetical": "where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support",
"sentence": "See also In re Marriage of Curran, 26 Wn. App. 108, 110-11, 611 P.2d 1350 (1980) (where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 Wn. App. 964, 965",
"parenthetical": "where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment",
"sentence": "Lambert v. Lambert, supra (where the obligor quit a paying job to pursue his failing business, the court found him to be voluntarily unemployed); Carstens v. Carstens, 10 Wn. App. 964, 965, 521 P.2d 241 (1974) (where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment)."
} | 1,787,344 | b |
This interpretation accords with Washington case law. Where our courts have found a parent to be voluntarily unemployed, the parent has been employable. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "10 Wn. App. 964, 965",
"parenthetical": "where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment",
"sentence": "Lambert v. Lambert, supra (where the obligor quit a paying job to pursue his failing business, the court found him to be voluntarily unemployed); Carstens v. Carstens, 10 Wn. App. 964, 965, 521 P.2d 241 (1974) (where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support",
"sentence": "See also In re Marriage of Curran, 26 Wn. App. 108, 110-11, 611 P.2d 1350 (1980) (where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support)."
} | 1,787,344 | a |
This interpretation accords with Washington case law. Where our courts have found a parent to be voluntarily unemployed, the parent has been employable. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment",
"sentence": "Lambert v. Lambert, supra (where the obligor quit a paying job to pursue his failing business, the court found him to be voluntarily unemployed); Carstens v. Carstens, 10 Wn. App. 964, 965, 521 P.2d 241 (1974) (where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "26 Wn. App. 108, 110-11",
"parenthetical": "where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support",
"sentence": "See also In re Marriage of Curran, 26 Wn. App. 108, 110-11, 611 P.2d 1350 (1980) (where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support)."
} | 1,787,344 | a |
This interpretation accords with Washington case law. Where our courts have found a parent to be voluntarily unemployed, the parent has been employable. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment",
"sentence": "Lambert v. Lambert, supra (where the obligor quit a paying job to pursue his failing business, the court found him to be voluntarily unemployed); Carstens v. Carstens, 10 Wn. App. 964, 965, 521 P.2d 241 (1974) (where the obligor was qualified to be an accountant but chose not to practice his profession and where he depleted his assets due to his alcoholism, the court found the condition to amount to voluntary unemployment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support",
"sentence": "See also In re Marriage of Curran, 26 Wn. App. 108, 110-11, 611 P.2d 1350 (1980) (where parent held a position yielding a very low salary given his education and business background, the court could consider loans and gifts in setting child support)."
} | 1,787,344 | a |
O'Reilly and Nix-Bey were friends and confidants, as evidenced by testimony from Nix-Bey that even before the two of them became cellmates, they saw each other every day at meals, engaged in numerous social activities together, and worked together on O'Reilly's legal matters. O'Reilly was unaware that he was being recorded and therefore could not have made his statement in order to obtain a benefit from law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "512 U.S. 603, 603",
"parenthetical": "\"Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.\"",
"sentence": "See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (“Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.”); see also Franklin, 415 F.3d at 548 (stating that the lack of such self-interested motives bolsters trustworthiness)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 F.3d 548, 548",
"parenthetical": "stating that the lack of such self-interested motives bolsters trustworthiness",
"sentence": "See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (“Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.”); see also Franklin, 415 F.3d at 548 (stating that the lack of such self-interested motives bolsters trustworthiness)."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
O'Reilly and Nix-Bey were friends and confidants, as evidenced by testimony from Nix-Bey that even before the two of them became cellmates, they saw each other every day at meals, engaged in numerous social activities together, and worked together on O'Reilly's legal matters. O'Reilly was unaware that he was being recorded and therefore could not have made his statement in order to obtain a benefit from law enforcement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.\"",
"sentence": "See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (“Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.”); see also Franklin, 415 F.3d at 548 (stating that the lack of such self-interested motives bolsters trustworthiness)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 F.3d 548, 548",
"parenthetical": "stating that the lack of such self-interested motives bolsters trustworthiness",
"sentence": "See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431 (“Even the confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.”); see also Franklin, 415 F.3d at 548 (stating that the lack of such self-interested motives bolsters trustworthiness)."
} | 5,755,359 | a |
. It is possible that some states permit the corporation or its stockholders to assert an alter ego cause of action to pierce the corporate veil, and thus, that a bankruptcy trustee would be able to enforce the claim on behalf of the debtor corporation under Sections 541 and 704. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "58 B.R. 132, 134-35",
"parenthetical": "apparently interpreting alter ego action to pierce the corporate veil as a suit against the principals for mismanagement, misappropriation of assets, or breach of fiduciary duty",
"sentence": "See In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 743, 783 (Bankr.D.Nev.1985) (although not sole basis of decision, court held that under Nevada alter ego doctrine, the corporation has an equitable interest in assets of the alter ego and thus, the action is one that is property of the estate under Section 541(a)(1)); see also In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 58 B.R. 132, 134-35 (N.D.Ill.1985) (apparently interpreting alter ego action to pierce the corporate veil as a suit against the principals for mismanagement, misappropriation of assets, or breach of fiduciary duty)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "52 B.R. 743, 783",
"parenthetical": "although not sole basis of decision, court held that under Nevada alter ego doctrine, the corporation has an equitable interest in assets of the alter ego and thus, the action is one that is property of the estate under Section 541(a",
"sentence": "See In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 743, 783 (Bankr.D.Nev.1985) (although not sole basis of decision, court held that under Nevada alter ego doctrine, the corporation has an equitable interest in assets of the alter ego and thus, the action is one that is property of the estate under Section 541(a)(1)); see also In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 58 B.R. 132, 134-35 (N.D.Ill.1985) (apparently interpreting alter ego action to pierce the corporate veil as a suit against the principals for mismanagement, misappropriation of assets, or breach of fiduciary duty)."
} | 6,124,927 | b |
But Alen has furnished no evidence that Phelps "consciously disregarded]" those problems. By alerting a supervisor to the request, Phelps fulfilled his duty under the Eighth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 F.3d 938, 941",
"parenthetical": "guard who is aware of inmate's serious medical issue should alert medical staff",
"sentence": "See Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015) (guard who is aware of inmate’s serious medical issue should alert medical staff); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (public employee is not required to go beyond job requirements to aid prisoner); see also Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (officer fulfills duty by referring inmate’s complaint for investigation or taking administrative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 586, 594",
"parenthetical": "officer fulfills duty by referring inmate's complaint for investigation or taking administrative action",
"sentence": "See Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015) (guard who is aware of inmate’s serious medical issue should alert medical staff); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (public employee is not required to go beyond job requirements to aid prisoner); see also Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (officer fulfills duty by referring inmate’s complaint for investigation or taking administrative action)."
} | 12,392,171 | a |
But Alen has furnished no evidence that Phelps "consciously disregarded]" those problems. By alerting a supervisor to the request, Phelps fulfilled his duty under the Eighth Amendment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "555 F.3d 592, 595",
"parenthetical": "public employee is not required to go beyond job requirements to aid prisoner",
"sentence": "See Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015) (guard who is aware of inmate’s serious medical issue should alert medical staff); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (public employee is not required to go beyond job requirements to aid prisoner); see also Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (officer fulfills duty by referring inmate’s complaint for investigation or taking administrative action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.3d 586, 594",
"parenthetical": "officer fulfills duty by referring inmate's complaint for investigation or taking administrative action",
"sentence": "See Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2015) (guard who is aware of inmate’s serious medical issue should alert medical staff); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (public employee is not required to go beyond job requirements to aid prisoner); see also Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (officer fulfills duty by referring inmate’s complaint for investigation or taking administrative action)."
} | 12,392,171 | a |
Although no per se duration exists at which a Terry stop ends and an arrest commences, a 20-minute confinement has been held too lengthy to be appropriately characterized as an investigatory deten tion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 686, 686",
"parenthetical": "overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect's actions contribute to the added delay",
"sentence": "Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay); see also United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required .probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 1284, 1287",
"parenthetical": "holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required .probable cause",
"sentence": "Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay); see also United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required .probable cause)."
} | 3,880,987 | a |
Although no per se duration exists at which a Terry stop ends and an arrest commences, a 20-minute confinement has been held too lengthy to be appropriately characterized as an investigatory deten tion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 1284, 1287",
"parenthetical": "holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required .probable cause",
"sentence": "Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay); see also United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required .probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect's actions contribute to the added delay",
"sentence": "Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (overturning a Court of Appeals decision and ruling that a 20-minute detention was reasonable under Terry because the police acted diligently and a suspect’s actions contribute to the added delay); see also United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required .probable cause)."
} | 3,880,987 | b |
The Court finds that the Any Willing Provider Statute fails the common sense test because it is not specifically directed towards the insurance industry, but, rather, it expressly applies to entities outside the insurance industry, such as employers and Taft-Hartley trusts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 504, 504",
"parenthetical": "holding that Virginia's statute was expressly limited to entities within the insurance industry",
"sentence": "See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40:2202(3)(a)-(b) (West 1987); Hayden, 843 F.Supp. at 1434 (“[although [the statute at issue there] may have a substantial effect on the insurance industry, the law affects other health care plans and agreements even though they are not a part of an insurance contract”); cf. Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 504 (holding that Virginia’s statute was expressly limited to entities within the insurance industry)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "843 F.Supp. 1434, 1434",
"parenthetical": "\"[although [the statute at issue there] may have a substantial effect on the insurance industry, the law affects other health care plans and agreements even though they are not a part of an insurance contract\"",
"sentence": "See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 40:2202(3)(a)-(b) (West 1987); Hayden, 843 F.Supp. at 1434 (“[although [the statute at issue there] may have a substantial effect on the insurance industry, the law affects other health care plans and agreements even though they are not a part of an insurance contract”); cf. Stuart Circle, 995 F.2d at 504 (holding that Virginia’s statute was expressly limited to entities within the insurance industry)."
} | 7,832,944 | b |
P 42 Normally, however, no genuine issue of fact is created by opinions and statements submitted by a party that contradict the party's pleaded allegations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that an expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact, in' part because the \"appellant's own admissions contradict her expert's opinion and admit that the standard of care was not breached and that she was not injured\"",
"sentence": "See Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2014 UT App 219, ¶ 45, 335 P.3d 913 (noting with approval the principle that “[i]n moving for summary judgment, a party may rely on the doctrine of judicial admission by utilizing allegations in the opposing party’s pleadings to eliminate triable issues of material fact” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846; Ramos v. Khawli, 181 Ohio App.3d 176, 908 N.E.2d 495, 509 (2009) (rejecting the argument that an expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact, in' part because the “appellant’s own admissions contradict her expert’s opinion and admit that the standard of care was not breached and that she was not injured”); cf. Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998) (concluding that statements in the claimant’s affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, where the claimant had not adequately explained the contradiction between allegations in his com plaint and - testimony under oath, and the statements in his later-submitted affidavit); Rutherford ex rel. Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin. Co., 2014 UT App 190, ¶ 11 n.6, 333 P.3d 1266 (rejecting an argument as “contradictory to the allegations contained in the [parties’] complaint,” noting that “[a]n admission of fact in a pleading ... is normally conclusive on the party making it” (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2016)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "973 P.2d 956, 973",
"parenthetical": "concluding that statements in the claimant's affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, where the claimant had not adequately explained the contradiction between allegations in his com plaint and - testimony under oath, and the statements in his later-submitted affidavit",
"sentence": "See Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2014 UT App 219, ¶ 45, 335 P.3d 913 (noting with approval the principle that “[i]n moving for summary judgment, a party may rely on the doctrine of judicial admission by utilizing allegations in the opposing party’s pleadings to eliminate triable issues of material fact” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846; Ramos v. Khawli, 181 Ohio App.3d 176, 908 N.E.2d 495, 509 (2009) (rejecting the argument that an expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact, in' part because the “appellant’s own admissions contradict her expert’s opinion and admit that the standard of care was not breached and that she was not injured”); cf. Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998) (concluding that statements in the claimant’s affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, where the claimant had not adequately explained the contradiction between allegations in his com plaint and - testimony under oath, and the statements in his later-submitted affidavit); Rutherford ex rel. Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin. Co., 2014 UT App 190, ¶ 11 n.6, 333 P.3d 1266 (rejecting an argument as “contradictory to the allegations contained in the [parties’] complaint,” noting that “[a]n admission of fact in a pleading ... is normally conclusive on the party making it” (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2016)."
} | 12,345,777 | a |
P 42 Normally, however, no genuine issue of fact is created by opinions and statements submitted by a party that contradict the party's pleaded allegations. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "973 P.2d 956, 973",
"parenthetical": "concluding that statements in the claimant's affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, where the claimant had not adequately explained the contradiction between allegations in his com plaint and - testimony under oath, and the statements in his later-submitted affidavit",
"sentence": "See Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2014 UT App 219, ¶ 45, 335 P.3d 913 (noting with approval the principle that “[i]n moving for summary judgment, a party may rely on the doctrine of judicial admission by utilizing allegations in the opposing party’s pleadings to eliminate triable issues of material fact” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846; Ramos v. Khawli, 181 Ohio App.3d 176, 908 N.E.2d 495, 509 (2009) (rejecting the argument that an expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact, in' part because the “appellant’s own admissions contradict her expert’s opinion and admit that the standard of care was not breached and that she was not injured”); cf. Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998) (concluding that statements in the claimant’s affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, where the claimant had not adequately explained the contradiction between allegations in his com plaint and - testimony under oath, and the statements in his later-submitted affidavit); Rutherford ex rel. Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin. Co., 2014 UT App 190, ¶ 11 n.6, 333 P.3d 1266 (rejecting an argument as “contradictory to the allegations contained in the [parties’] complaint,” noting that “[a]n admission of fact in a pleading ... is normally conclusive on the party making it” (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2016)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "908 N.E.2d 495, 509",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that an expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact, in' part because the \"appellant's own admissions contradict her expert's opinion and admit that the standard of care was not breached and that she was not injured\"",
"sentence": "See Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2014 UT App 219, ¶ 45, 335 P.3d 913 (noting with approval the principle that “[i]n moving for summary judgment, a party may rely on the doctrine of judicial admission by utilizing allegations in the opposing party’s pleadings to eliminate triable issues of material fact” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 2016 UT 10, 368 P.3d 846; Ramos v. Khawli, 181 Ohio App.3d 176, 908 N.E.2d 495, 509 (2009) (rejecting the argument that an expert opinion created a genuine issue of material fact, in' part because the “appellant’s own admissions contradict her expert’s opinion and admit that the standard of care was not breached and that she was not injured”); cf. Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 973 (Utah 1998) (concluding that statements in the claimant’s affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, where the claimant had not adequately explained the contradiction between allegations in his com plaint and - testimony under oath, and the statements in his later-submitted affidavit); Rutherford ex rel. Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin. Co., 2014 UT App 190, ¶ 11 n.6, 333 P.3d 1266 (rejecting an argument as “contradictory to the allegations contained in the [parties’] complaint,” noting that “[a]n admission of fact in a pleading ... is normally conclusive on the party making it” (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2016)."
} | 12,345,777 | b |
Our analysis of the enabling statute and of DOH's implementing regulation does no violence to the time-honored dictum that courts should construe a penal statute strictly. Strict construction, however, does not mean that courts should adopt irrational interpretations that would thwart or impede the underlying purpose of the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "625 A.2d 1350, 1353",
"parenthetical": "\"with respect to penal statutes this court will not interpret a statute literally when to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result or would impede a clear legislative intent\"",
"sentence": "State v. Lusi 625 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I.1993) (“with respect to penal statutes this court will not interpret a statute literally when to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result or would impede a clear legislative intent”); see also State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 111 (R.I.1984) (“[Ple-na! statutes are to be strictly construed, [but] they should not be interpreted in a manner that would thwart a clear legislative intent. * * * [Thus], we will not attribute to the Legislature a meaningless or absurd result.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "476 A.2d 108, 111",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ple-na! statutes are to be strictly construed, [but] they should not be interpreted in a manner that would thwart a clear legislative intent. * * * [Thus], we will not attribute to the Legislature a meaningless or absurd result.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Lusi 625 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I.1993) (“with respect to penal statutes this court will not interpret a statute literally when to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result or would impede a clear legislative intent”); see also State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 111 (R.I.1984) (“[Ple-na! statutes are to be strictly construed, [but] they should not be interpreted in a manner that would thwart a clear legislative intent. * * * [Thus], we will not attribute to the Legislature a meaningless or absurd result.”)."
} | 11,368,659 | a |
Some eases have identified circumstances in which a change in decisional law warrants relief under 60(b)(6). For example, when judgment in a federal diversity case is based on an interpretation of state law later determined to be incorrect in light of a subsequent state court decision, the policy of federalism that guides choice of law may require relief from the erroneous judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 F.2d 720, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 743, 749",
"parenthetical": "\"Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | 7,773,308 | a |
Some eases have identified circumstances in which a change in decisional law warrants relief under 60(b)(6). For example, when judgment in a federal diversity case is based on an interpretation of state law later determined to be incorrect in light of a subsequent state court decision, the policy of federalism that guides choice of law may require relief from the erroneous judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 743, 749",
"parenthetical": "\"Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | 7,773,308 | a |
Some eases have identified circumstances in which a change in decisional law warrants relief under 60(b)(6). For example, when judgment in a federal diversity case is based on an interpretation of state law later determined to be incorrect in light of a subsequent state court decision, the policy of federalism that guides choice of law may require relief from the erroneous judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 743, 749",
"parenthetical": "\"Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | 7,773,308 | a |
Some eases have identified circumstances in which a change in decisional law warrants relief under 60(b)(6). For example, when judgment in a federal diversity case is based on an interpretation of state law later determined to be incorrect in light of a subsequent state court decision, the policy of federalism that guides choice of law may require relief from the erroneous judgment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 743, 749",
"parenthetical": "\"Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir.1975) (“The federal courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than that received in state.”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079, 96 S.Ct. 866, 47 L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); but see Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (“Our role as an Erie court strengthens, rather than undermines, the proposition that a change in decisional law is insufficient to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.”)."
} | 7,773,308 | b |
The SGLIA has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to "bestow upon the service member an absolute right to designate the policy beneficiary." Accordingly, due to the operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state laws interfering with the right to designate the beneficiary under a qualifying policy are federally preempted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 S.Ct. 1943, 1951-52",
"parenthetical": "applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is \"strikingly similar\" to the SGLIA",
"sentence": "Id. at 60, 102 S.Ct. 49 (“[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.”); see also Hillman v. Maretta, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1951-52, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is “strikingly similar” to the SGLIA)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 60, 102 S.Ct. 49 (“[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.”); see also Hillman v. Maretta, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1951-52, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is “strikingly similar” to the SGLIA)."
} | 6,959,605 | b |
The SGLIA has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to "bestow upon the service member an absolute right to designate the policy beneficiary." Accordingly, due to the operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state laws interfering with the right to designate the beneficiary under a qualifying policy are federally preempted. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is \"strikingly similar\" to the SGLIA",
"sentence": "Id. at 60, 102 S.Ct. 49 (“[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.”); see also Hillman v. Maretta, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1951-52, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is “strikingly similar” to the SGLIA)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 60, 102 S.Ct. 49 (“[T]he controlling provisions of the SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law.”); see also Hillman v. Maretta, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1951-52, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013) (applying the analysis in Ridgway to the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 because it is “strikingly similar” to the SGLIA)."
} | 6,959,605 | b |
Plaintiffs challenge these conclusions, noting that there were similar complaints about the Eldridge device. In sum, whether the Eldridge device "embodies" the Tanges device and is superior to it are questions of fact which must be decided by the jury. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "775 F.2d 1107, 1117",
"parenthetical": "in infringement action, determination of whether devices operate in substantially different ways and accomplish similar functions is a question of fact and is inappropriately decided on summary judgment",
"sentence": "See Carbo-Frost, supra, 103 F.2d at 220 (finder of fact must compare and contrast the nature of the different devices); cf. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1985) (in infringement action, determination of whether devices operate in substantially different ways and accomplish similar functions is a question of fact and is inappropriately decided on summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 F.2d 220, 220",
"parenthetical": "finder of fact must compare and contrast the nature of the different devices",
"sentence": "See Carbo-Frost, supra, 103 F.2d at 220 (finder of fact must compare and contrast the nature of the different devices); cf. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1117 (Fed.Cir.1985) (in infringement action, determination of whether devices operate in substantially different ways and accomplish similar functions is a question of fact and is inappropriately decided on summary judgment)."
} | 7,387,352 | b |
NDCC 57-24--29 (emphasis added). This statute clearly places the burden upon the * delinquent taxpayer to prove that all owners did not receive proper notice of the impending tax sale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 N.D. 499, 508",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 N.D. 120, 126",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | 12,083,206 | a |
NDCC 57-24--29 (emphasis added). This statute clearly places the burden upon the * delinquent taxpayer to prove that all owners did not receive proper notice of the impending tax sale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "71 N.D. 499, 508",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 N.W.2d 170, 173",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | 12,083,206 | a |
NDCC 57-24--29 (emphasis added). This statute clearly places the burden upon the * delinquent taxpayer to prove that all owners did not receive proper notice of the impending tax sale. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2 N.W.2d 537, 542",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 N.D. 120, 126",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | 12,083,206 | a |
NDCC 57-24--29 (emphasis added). This statute clearly places the burden upon the * delinquent taxpayer to prove that all owners did not receive proper notice of the impending tax sale. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 N.W.2d 170, 173",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2 N.W.2d 537, 542",
"parenthetical": "\"The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.\"",
"sentence": "See Fish v. France, 71 N.D. 499, 508, 2 N.W.2d 537, 542 (1942) (“The burden ... is upon the plaintiffs to show that the required notice was not given.”); see also Remmich v. Wagner, 77 N.D. 120, 126, 41 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1950) (“[P]rima facie evidence of the certificate must have been overcome before the sale can be set aside.”)- Compare NDCC 57-24-08 (requiring proof of publication of notice of tax sale by affidavit); NDCC 57-27-03 (requiring proof of service of notice of expiration of redemption period)."
} | 12,083,206 | b |
Section 553.212 does not require overtime for employees in fire protection activities who spend their day in exempt activities related to fire protection. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no application of 20% limitation when paramedics are substantially related to fire protection and spend day co-responding with the fire and police departments",
"sentence": "See Schmidt, 929 F.2d at 990 (“[Dispatching] is clearly related to firefighting, and the 20% limitation simply has no application to this case.”); see also Bond, 939 F.2d 285 (no application of 20% limitation when paramedics are substantially related to fire protection and spend day co-responding with the fire and police departments)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "929 F.2d 990, 990",
"parenthetical": "\"[Dispatching] is clearly related to firefighting, and the 20% limitation simply has no application to this case.\"",
"sentence": "See Schmidt, 929 F.2d at 990 (“[Dispatching] is clearly related to firefighting, and the 20% limitation simply has no application to this case.”); see also Bond, 939 F.2d 285 (no application of 20% limitation when paramedics are substantially related to fire protection and spend day co-responding with the fire and police departments)."
} | 7,635,677 | b |
Because Dr. Goldman's report and curriculum vitae demonstrate his knowledge and experience treating patients in circumstances similar to those that form the basis of the allegations in this claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Goldman qualified. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "332 S.W.3d 558, 558",
"parenthetical": "neurologist qualified to provide expert opinion on standard of care or breach thereof by emergency room physician where prospective medical expert had practical knowledge of what is usually and customarily done by practitioners under similar circumstances",
"sentence": "See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.401(a)(2); Rittger, 332 S.W.3d at 558 (neurologist qualified to provide expert opinion on standard of care or breach thereof by emergency room physician where prospective medical expert had practical knowledge of what is usually and customarily done by practitioners under similar circumstances); see also Barber v. Mercer, 303 S.W.3d 786, 795 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (holding anesthesiologist qualified to opine on conduct of surgeon in health care liability claim because anesthesiologist’s report tied his education, training, and experience to the specific alleged breach — the positioning and padding of a patient during surgery, not the conduct of the actual operating techniques); Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 746 (condition involved in claim was stroke, therefore, neurologist qualified as expert although defendants were emergency room physician and cardiologist)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "7 S.W.3d 746, 746",
"parenthetical": "condition involved in claim was stroke, therefore, neurologist qualified as expert although defendants were emergency room physician and cardiologist",
"sentence": "See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.401(a)(2); Rittger, 332 S.W.3d at 558 (neurologist qualified to provide expert opinion on standard of care or breach thereof by emergency room physician where prospective medical expert had practical knowledge of what is usually and customarily done by practitioners under similar circumstances); see also Barber v. Mercer, 303 S.W.3d 786, 795 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (holding anesthesiologist qualified to opine on conduct of surgeon in health care liability claim because anesthesiologist’s report tied his education, training, and experience to the specific alleged breach — the positioning and padding of a patient during surgery, not the conduct of the actual operating techniques); Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 746 (condition involved in claim was stroke, therefore, neurologist qualified as expert although defendants were emergency room physician and cardiologist)."
} | 7,314,504 | a |
This court has held that under certain circumstances, social workers are entitled to absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 826, 830",
"parenthetical": "holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent's name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial",
"sentence": "See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir.1989) (recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions); but see Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent’s name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "732 F.2d 1456, 1458",
"parenthetical": "holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions",
"sentence": "See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir.1989) (recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions); but see Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent’s name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial)."
} | 11,207,837 | b |
This court has held that under certain circumstances, social workers are entitled to absolute immunity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 826, 830",
"parenthetical": "holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent's name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial",
"sentence": "See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir.1989) (recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions); but see Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent’s name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "874 F.2d 374, 377-78",
"parenthetical": "recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions",
"sentence": "See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions); Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir.1989) (recognizing the functional orientation of the absolute immunity doctrine and holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when filing child abuse petitions); but see Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation, or when deciding to enter a parent’s name in a central register of abusers, all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial)."
} | 11,207,837 | b |
Robinson's reliance upon Eastman is misplaced. First, Judge Vanaskie's order postponing the notification requirement pending further order of the Court operated to delay the Government's obligation to provide notice; it did not entirely relieve the Government of this requirement. Additionally, the Court cannot perceive how Robinson or any of the remaining Defendants would have actually been prejudiced by any delay in receiving notification, where it is undisputed that the defendants received notice through the indictments, and where the Government has made available to the defendants and their counsel the results of the intercepted communications as part of the lengthy pretrial discovery that has transpired in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court's inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658 (finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court’s inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations); see also United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1344 & n. 13 (8th Cir.1989) (holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90-day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90-day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658 (finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court’s inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations); see also United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1344 & n. 13 (8th Cir.1989) (holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90-day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice)."
} | 3,868,166 | a |
Robinson's reliance upon Eastman is misplaced. First, Judge Vanaskie's order postponing the notification requirement pending further order of the Court operated to delay the Government's obligation to provide notice; it did not entirely relieve the Government of this requirement. Additionally, the Court cannot perceive how Robinson or any of the remaining Defendants would have actually been prejudiced by any delay in receiving notification, where it is undisputed that the defendants received notice through the indictments, and where the Government has made available to the defendants and their counsel the results of the intercepted communications as part of the lengthy pretrial discovery that has transpired in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court's inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658 (finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court’s inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations); see also United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1344 & n. 13 (8th Cir.1989) (holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90-day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90-day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice",
"sentence": "See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658 (finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court’s inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations); see also United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1344 & n. 13 (8th Cir.1989) (holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90-day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice)."
} | 3,868,166 | a |
We begin our analysis by recognizing that while findings that support claims of "misconduct" generally involve repeated acts, under Florida law, "repeated acts in violation of company policy are not necessary to constitute misconduct" within chapter 443. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "463 So.2d 465, 466",
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in \"clear violation of an express policy\" enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer",
"sentence": "Ford v. Se. Atl. Corp., 588 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company’s policy that “no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in “clear violation of an express policy” enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer); Rosa v. Jefferson’s Stores, Inc., 421 So.2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (affirming denial of unemployment benefits for misconduct where employee allowed her son to use her employee discount card against company policy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 So.2d 1039, 1041",
"parenthetical": "finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company's policy that \"no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system\"",
"sentence": "Ford v. Se. Atl. Corp., 588 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company’s policy that “no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in “clear violation of an express policy” enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer); Rosa v. Jefferson’s Stores, Inc., 421 So.2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (affirming denial of unemployment benefits for misconduct where employee allowed her son to use her employee discount card against company policy)."
} | 7,043,054 | b |
We begin our analysis by recognizing that while findings that support claims of "misconduct" generally involve repeated acts, under Florida law, "repeated acts in violation of company policy are not necessary to constitute misconduct" within chapter 443. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming denial of unemployment benefits for misconduct where employee allowed her son to use her employee discount card against company policy",
"sentence": "Ford v. Se. Atl. Corp., 588 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company’s policy that “no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in “clear violation of an express policy” enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer); Rosa v. Jefferson’s Stores, Inc., 421 So.2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (affirming denial of unemployment benefits for misconduct where employee allowed her son to use her employee discount card against company policy)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "588 So.2d 1039, 1041",
"parenthetical": "finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company's policy that \"no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system\"",
"sentence": "Ford v. Se. Atl. Corp., 588 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding that the appellant directly violated company policy when he failed a drug test in violation of the company’s policy that “no employee can be present at work with drugs or alcohol in his system”); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 463 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (finding that an employer met its burden of establishing misconduct where an employee admitted kissing a coworker in “clear violation of an express policy” enacted to prevent potential sexual harassment actions against the employer); Rosa v. Jefferson’s Stores, Inc., 421 So.2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (affirming denial of unemployment benefits for misconduct where employee allowed her son to use her employee discount card against company policy)."
} | 7,043,054 | b |
The ordinary rule of construction of contingent fee contracts is that, in the absence of an express provision which addresses possible appeal, services rendered by an attorney in upholding a judgment on appeal are within the undertaking under the contingent fee contract. The attorney is not entitled to any additional compensation for such appellate representation, even if the reasonable value of all of the services rendered through the successful, final outcome on appeal exceeds the fee calculated under the contingent fee agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See In re Laughlin, 265 F.2d 377 (D.C.Cir.1959); Salinger v. Mason, 194 F. 882, 114 C.C.A. 300 (8th Cir.1912); Tuttle v. Claflin, 88 F. 122, 31 C.C.A. 419 (2d Cir.1898) (contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court); Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 103, 8 P.2d 845 (1932); Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill.2d 73, 195 N.E.2d 137 (1963); Bounougias v. Peters, 49 Ill.App.2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964); Knight v. DeMarea, 670 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App.1984); Quarture v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa.Super. 356, 14 A.2d 575 (1940); Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., 51 Wash.App. 423, 754 P.2d 120 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreement to defend against challenge to client's entitlement to property, with increase in fee \"contingent upon the result of the trial,\" construed not to include services as appellee's counsel",
"sentence": "But see In re Wise, 172 A.D. 491, 158 N.Y.S. 793 (1916) (agreement to defend against challenge to client’s entitlement to property, with increase in fee “contingent upon the result of the trial,” construed not to include services as appellee’s counsel)."
} | 2,038,842 | a |
The ordinary rule of construction of contingent fee contracts is that, in the absence of an express provision which addresses possible appeal, services rendered by an attorney in upholding a judgment on appeal are within the undertaking under the contingent fee contract. The attorney is not entitled to any additional compensation for such appellate representation, even if the reasonable value of all of the services rendered through the successful, final outcome on appeal exceeds the fee calculated under the contingent fee agreement. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreement to defend against challenge to client's entitlement to property, with increase in fee \"contingent upon the result of the trial,\" construed not to include services as appellee's counsel",
"sentence": "But see In re Wise, 172 A.D. 491, 158 N.Y.S. 793 (1916) (agreement to defend against challenge to client’s entitlement to property, with increase in fee “contingent upon the result of the trial,” construed not to include services as appellee’s counsel)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See In re Laughlin, 265 F.2d 377 (D.C.Cir.1959); Salinger v. Mason, 194 F. 882, 114 C.C.A. 300 (8th Cir.1912); Tuttle v. Claflin, 88 F. 122, 31 C.C.A. 419 (2d Cir.1898) (contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court); Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 103, 8 P.2d 845 (1932); Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill.2d 73, 195 N.E.2d 137 (1963); Bounougias v. Peters, 49 Ill.App.2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964); Knight v. DeMarea, 670 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App.1984); Quarture v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa.Super. 356, 14 A.2d 575 (1940); Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., 51 Wash.App. 423, 754 P.2d 120 (1988)."
} | 2,038,842 | b |
The ordinary rule of construction of contingent fee contracts is that, in the absence of an express provision which addresses possible appeal, services rendered by an attorney in upholding a judgment on appeal are within the undertaking under the contingent fee contract. The attorney is not entitled to any additional compensation for such appellate representation, even if the reasonable value of all of the services rendered through the successful, final outcome on appeal exceeds the fee calculated under the contingent fee agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See In re Laughlin, 265 F.2d 377 (D.C.Cir.1959); Salinger v. Mason, 194 F. 882, 114 C.C.A. 300 (8th Cir.1912); Tuttle v. Claflin, 88 F. 122, 31 C.C.A. 419 (2d Cir.1898) (contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court); Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 103, 8 P.2d 845 (1932); Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill.2d 73, 195 N.E.2d 137 (1963); Bounougias v. Peters, 49 Ill.App.2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964); Knight v. DeMarea, 670 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App.1984); Quarture v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa.Super. 356, 14 A.2d 575 (1940); Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., 51 Wash.App. 423, 754 P.2d 120 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreement to defend against challenge to client's entitlement to property, with increase in fee \"contingent upon the result of the trial,\" construed not to include services as appellee's counsel",
"sentence": "But see In re Wise, 172 A.D. 491, 158 N.Y.S. 793 (1916) (agreement to defend against challenge to client’s entitlement to property, with increase in fee “contingent upon the result of the trial,” construed not to include services as appellee’s counsel)."
} | 2,038,842 | a |
The ordinary rule of construction of contingent fee contracts is that, in the absence of an express provision which addresses possible appeal, services rendered by an attorney in upholding a judgment on appeal are within the undertaking under the contingent fee contract. The attorney is not entitled to any additional compensation for such appellate representation, even if the reasonable value of all of the services rendered through the successful, final outcome on appeal exceeds the fee calculated under the contingent fee agreement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court",
"sentence": "See In re Laughlin, 265 F.2d 377 (D.C.Cir.1959); Salinger v. Mason, 194 F. 882, 114 C.C.A. 300 (8th Cir.1912); Tuttle v. Claflin, 88 F. 122, 31 C.C.A. 419 (2d Cir.1898) (contract for services in case pending on appeal in Second Circuit, with fee contingent on reversal, includes services on post-opinion motions and before United States Supreme Court); Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 103, 8 P.2d 845 (1932); Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill.2d 73, 195 N.E.2d 137 (1963); Bounougias v. Peters, 49 Ill.App.2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964); Knight v. DeMarea, 670 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App.1984); Quarture v. Allegheny County, 141 Pa.Super. 356, 14 A.2d 575 (1940); Ward v. Richards & Rossano, Inc., 51 Wash.App. 423, 754 P.2d 120 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreement to defend against challenge to client's entitlement to property, with increase in fee \"contingent upon the result of the trial,\" construed not to include services as appellee's counsel",
"sentence": "But see In re Wise, 172 A.D. 491, 158 N.Y.S. 793 (1916) (agreement to defend against challenge to client’s entitlement to property, with increase in fee “contingent upon the result of the trial,” construed not to include services as appellee’s counsel)."
} | 2,038,842 | a |
However, under the circumstances of this contested matter, where the Code itself delimits the periods of a debtor's exclusivity generally to 120 days, and 180 days respectively, see 11 U.S.C. SS 1121(b), (c)(3), it would be unfair to demand that the Committees meet a heightened burden. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 B.R. 618, 620",
"parenthetical": "stating that the bankruptcy court has \"the power to vacate a final judgment\" and \"may exercise this power very liberally.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Durkalec, 21 B.R. 618, 620 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982) (stating that the bankruptcy court has “the power to vacate a final judgment” and “may exercise this power very liberally.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "498 U.S. 279, 286",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless 'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S.Ct. 654, 659, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (“Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’ ”)."
} | 377,635 | a |
However, under the circumstances of this contested matter, where the Code itself delimits the periods of a debtor's exclusivity generally to 120 days, and 180 days respectively, see 11 U.S.C. SS 1121(b), (c)(3), it would be unfair to demand that the Committees meet a heightened burden. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 654, 659",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless 'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S.Ct. 654, 659, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (“Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 B.R. 618, 620",
"parenthetical": "stating that the bankruptcy court has \"the power to vacate a final judgment\" and \"may exercise this power very liberally.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Durkalec, 21 B.R. 618, 620 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982) (stating that the bankruptcy court has “the power to vacate a final judgment” and “may exercise this power very liberally.”)."
} | 377,635 | b |
However, under the circumstances of this contested matter, where the Code itself delimits the periods of a debtor's exclusivity generally to 120 days, and 180 days respectively, see 11 U.S.C. SS 1121(b), (c)(3), it would be unfair to demand that the Committees meet a heightened burden. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 B.R. 618, 620",
"parenthetical": "stating that the bankruptcy court has \"the power to vacate a final judgment\" and \"may exercise this power very liberally.\"",
"sentence": "See In re Durkalec, 21 B.R. 618, 620 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982) (stating that the bankruptcy court has “the power to vacate a final judgment” and “may exercise this power very liberally.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless 'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S.Ct. 654, 659, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (“Because the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of. error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants, unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’ ”)."
} | 377,635 | a |
As explained above, however, differences in Plaintiffs' disabilities do not prevent commonality because Plaintiffs' alleged harms are similar. Accommodations inquiries are not, as Defendants assert, unsuited to class actions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 F.3d 868, 868",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs with widely different disabilities who were seeking accommodations in California's parole hearings satisfied commonality because of their shared harms",
"sentence": "See Davis, 275 F.3d at 868 (finding that plaintiffs with widely different disabilities who were seeking accommodations in California’s parole hearings satisfied commonality because of their shared harms); see also Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 345 (N.D.Cal.2008) (finding an argument concerning a need for “mini-trials” in an ADA case unpersuasive because “[t]he essence of defendants’ argument — that in order to prove the existence of the forest the plaintiffs must individually prove the existence of each tree — is anathema to the very notion of a class action”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 F.R.D. 334, 345",
"parenthetical": "finding an argument concerning a need for \"mini-trials\" in an ADA case unpersuasive because \"[t]he essence of defendants' argument -- that in order to prove the existence of the forest the plaintiffs must individually prove the existence of each tree -- is anathema to the very notion of a class action\"",
"sentence": "See Davis, 275 F.3d at 868 (finding that plaintiffs with widely different disabilities who were seeking accommodations in California’s parole hearings satisfied commonality because of their shared harms); see also Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 345 (N.D.Cal.2008) (finding an argument concerning a need for “mini-trials” in an ADA case unpersuasive because “[t]he essence of defendants’ argument — that in order to prove the existence of the forest the plaintiffs must individually prove the existence of each tree — is anathema to the very notion of a class action”)."
} | 4,266,458 | a |
It is specifically noted that, in affirming the result reached by the district court on alternative grounds, this Court has not addressed, and offers no opinion on, the complicated questions of whether a Connecticut probate judge would enjoy absolute immunity for ordering a person to be arrested, as alleged by Collins, or whether a conservator would be immune for requesting such an action by the police. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "737 F.2d 246, 254-55",
"parenthetical": "holding that, while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings, they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a SS 1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony",
"sentence": "See Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, by a 2-1 vote, that an Ohio probate judge was entitled to absolute immunity for filing a criminal complaint); see also Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 932-38 (2d Cir.1997) (discussing the history and application of absolute judicial immunity); cf. San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 254-55 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that, while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings, they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a § 1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, by a 2-1 vote, that an Ohio probate judge was entitled to absolute immunity for filing a criminal complaint",
"sentence": "See Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614 (6th Cir.2004) (holding, by a 2-1 vote, that an Ohio probate judge was entitled to absolute immunity for filing a criminal complaint); see also Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 932-38 (2d Cir.1997) (discussing the history and application of absolute judicial immunity); cf. San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 254-55 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that, while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings, they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a § 1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony)."
} | 4,245,926 | b |
The argument fails because the district court was not required to resolve all aspects of the source of the funds to find that they were drug proceeds for purposes of Guidelines calculations. It needed only to make a preponderance finding that the monies, more likely than not, derived from drug trafficking. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "562 F.3d 433, 447",
"parenthetical": "concluding that preponderance finding was satisfied if fact's existence was \"more likely than not\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d at 175 (using preponderance standard to determine drug quantity based on currency under Guidelines); see also United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 447 (2d Cir.2009) (concluding that preponderance finding was satisfied if fact’s existence was “more likely than not”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "531 F.3d 175, 175",
"parenthetical": "using preponderance standard to determine drug quantity based on currency under Guidelines",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d at 175 (using preponderance standard to determine drug quantity based on currency under Guidelines); see also United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 447 (2d Cir.2009) (concluding that preponderance finding was satisfied if fact’s existence was “more likely than not”)."
} | 3,634,418 | b |
We have affirmed the denial of similar post-trial motions without evidentiary hearings where the court had considered the proffered evidence and found that evidence other than that challenged in the motion sufficiently supported the initial order. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 Vt. 334, 335",
"parenthetical": "court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Vt. 33, 36-37",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | 386,088 | b |
We have affirmed the denial of similar post-trial motions without evidentiary hearings where the court had considered the proffered evidence and found that evidence other than that challenged in the motion sufficiently supported the initial order. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "428 A.2d 1116, 1117",
"parenthetical": "court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 Vt. 33, 36-37",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | 386,088 | b |
We have affirmed the denial of similar post-trial motions without evidentiary hearings where the court had considered the proffered evidence and found that evidence other than that challenged in the motion sufficiently supported the initial order. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "641 A.2d 774, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "139 Vt. 334, 335",
"parenthetical": "court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | 386,088 | a |
We have affirmed the denial of similar post-trial motions without evidentiary hearings where the court had considered the proffered evidence and found that evidence other than that challenged in the motion sufficiently supported the initial order. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "428 A.2d 1116, 1117",
"parenthetical": "court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "641 A.2d 774, 776-77",
"parenthetical": "upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 36-37, 641 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994) (upholding denial of V.R.C.E 60(b) motion based on allegation that child had been manipulated into fabricating stories of abuse); cf. West v. West, 139 Vt. 334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981) (court should hold hearing where Rule 60 motion neither frivolous nor totally lacking in merit). Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding a motion to vacate is within the family court’s discretion."
} | 386,088 | b |
See Second Amended Complaint, P51. With respect to the second element, the Union has alleged that Fucci exercised such control to wrongfully avoid obligations rendered under the arbitration awards and that he did so by dissolving one of the Apollo entities shortly after the final award was issued. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "733 F.Supp. 762, 762",
"parenthetical": "piercing corporate veil to hold individual hable for award confirmed against corporation under the LMRA",
"sentence": "See Directors Guild, 733 F.Supp. at 762 (piercing corporate veil to hold individual hable for award confirmed against corporation under the LMRA); see also Michigan Laborers’ Health Care Fund v. Taddie Const., Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 698, 703 (E.D.Mich.2000) (use of “the corporate form ... to improperly fail to pay fringe benefits” satisfies the element of “wrong”) (interpreting Michigan law)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "119 F.Supp.2d 698, 703",
"parenthetical": "use of \"the corporate form ... to improperly fail to pay fringe benefits\" satisfies the element of \"wrong\"",
"sentence": "See Directors Guild, 733 F.Supp. at 762 (piercing corporate veil to hold individual hable for award confirmed against corporation under the LMRA); see also Michigan Laborers’ Health Care Fund v. Taddie Const., Inc., 119 F.Supp.2d 698, 703 (E.D.Mich.2000) (use of “the corporate form ... to improperly fail to pay fringe benefits” satisfies the element of “wrong”) (interpreting Michigan law)."
} | 9,099,242 | a |
The Board correctly concluded that Sandoval's claim was barred. We conclude that no substantial question regarding the outcome of this petition for review exists; therefore, summary affirmance is appropriate. Furthermore, if Sandoval files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 14, 17",
"parenthetical": "appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | 951,318 | b |
The Board correctly concluded that Sandoval's claim was barred. We conclude that no substantial question regarding the outcome of this petition for review exists; therefore, summary affirmance is appropriate. Furthermore, if Sandoval files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 296, 307-08",
"parenthetical": "28 U.S.C. SS 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is \"little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision\"",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | 951,318 | b |
The Board correctly concluded that Sandoval's claim was barred. We conclude that no substantial question regarding the outcome of this petition for review exists; therefore, summary affirmance is appropriate. Furthermore, if Sandoval files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "28 U.S.C. SS 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is \"little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision\"",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | 951,318 | a |
The Board correctly concluded that Sandoval's claim was barred. We conclude that no substantial question regarding the outcome of this petition for review exists; therefore, summary affirmance is appropriate. Furthermore, if Sandoval files another document with this court and, upon review, it is determined that the arguments are frivolous, this court will consider the imposition of monetary sanctions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 1573, 1575",
"parenthetical": "counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "28 U.S.C. SS 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is \"little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision\"",
"sentence": "See In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir.1988) (counsel sanctioned for filing and maintaining frivolous appeals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those presented and decided in the precedents represented by the lead cases); see also Pillay v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss appeal as frivolous when appeal presents no arguably meritorious issue for consideration); compare Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to dismiss frivolous claim filed in forma pauperis, but there is “little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”)."
} | 951,318 | a |
Nevertheless, it does not appear that Shelton, as a matter of law, sanctions dismissal at the pleading stage for failure to allege a present ability to tender. Indeed, the procedural posture (decided at the summary judgment stage) and language appearing in that case suggest otherwise. In particular, the Shelton court, in upholding the district court's granting of summary judgment, relied on the particular circumstances and evidence presented and noted the trial judge had specifically determined that the plaintiffs were unable to tender the loan proceeds. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "329 F.3d 1173, 1173",
"parenthetical": "noting the lack of evidence of the borrower's capacity to pay back her loan and holding district court had discretion to demand assurance of the borrower's ability to repay loan proceeds to avoid an unnecessary trial on the merits",
"sentence": "See also Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1173 (noting the lack of evidence of the borrower’s capacity to pay back her loan and holding district court had discretion to demand assurance of the borrower’s ability to repay loan proceeds to avoid an unnecessary trial on the merits)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 F.3d 821, 821",
"parenthetical": "explaining \"[although the better practice may have been for the trial judge to set terms for rescission by allowing the [plaintiffs] a time certain to tender the net loan proceeds, it was unnecessary under the facts of this ease\"",
"sentence": "See Shelton, 486 F.3d at 821 (explaining “[although the better practice may have been for the trial judge to set terms for rescission by allowing the [plaintiffs] a time certain to tender the net loan proceeds, it was unnecessary under the facts of this ease”)."
} | 3,578,073 | b |
Although evidence of pending charges and of misdemeanor convictions is not admissible as bearing on credibility generally, such evidence may be relevant to show a prosecution witness's bias, prejudice, or motivation for testifying. However, cross-examination concerning a pending criminal charge is not probative of bias, motivation, or prejudice unless there is some showing of a nexus between the' pending charge and the witness's testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury's mind as to the witness's credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation",
"sentence": "See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972) (trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness’s testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo.App.2001)(“We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.”); see also People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo.App.1990)(counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury’s mind as to the witness’s credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness's testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges",
"sentence": "See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972) (trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness’s testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo.App.2001)(“We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.”); see also People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo.App.1990)(counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury’s mind as to the witness’s credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation)."
} | 8,440,259 | b |
Although evidence of pending charges and of misdemeanor convictions is not admissible as bearing on credibility generally, such evidence may be relevant to show a prosecution witness's bias, prejudice, or motivation for testifying. However, cross-examination concerning a pending criminal charge is not probative of bias, motivation, or prejudice unless there is some showing of a nexus between the' pending charge and the witness's testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness's testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges",
"sentence": "See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972) (trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness’s testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo.App.2001)(“We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.”); see also People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo.App.1990)(counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury’s mind as to the witness’s credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury's mind as to the witness's credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation",
"sentence": "See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972) (trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness’s testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo.App.2001)(“We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.”); see also People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo.App.1990)(counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury’s mind as to the witness’s credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation)."
} | 8,440,259 | a |
Although evidence of pending charges and of misdemeanor convictions is not admissible as bearing on credibility generally, such evidence may be relevant to show a prosecution witness's bias, prejudice, or motivation for testifying. However, cross-examination concerning a pending criminal charge is not probative of bias, motivation, or prejudice unless there is some showing of a nexus between the' pending charge and the witness's testimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury's mind as to the witness's credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation",
"sentence": "See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972) (trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness’s testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo.App.2001)(“We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.”); see also People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo.App.1990)(counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury’s mind as to the witness’s credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 P.3d 663, 670",
"parenthetical": "\"We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.\"",
"sentence": "See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972) (trial court should allow cross-examination where prosecution witness is charged with or threatened with criminal prosecution for other unrelated offenses and witness’s testimony against defendant might be influenced by promise of, hope of, or expectation of immunity or leniency with respect to pending charges); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo.App.2001)(“We fail to discern how another pending ease, not involved in any plea agreement, and the outcome of which was not dependent upon testimony in the instant matter, would be probative of bias, motive, or prejudice. Without such a connection, the witness would not be testifying out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to the outcome of the pending matter.”); see also People v. Vialpando, 804 P.2d 219 (Colo.App.1990)(counsel may not properly propound to a witness questions that can cause a doubt in the jury’s mind as to the witness’s credibility, when there is no reasonable basis in fact for that interrogation)."
} | 8,440,259 | b |
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(f)(2) does not apply to motions for injunctive relief pending appeal of habeas corpus decisions. Upon reaching a similar conclusion regarding stays of removal pending petitions for review, Andreiu determined that it was appropriate to apply the traditional standard for interim injunctive relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "784 F.2d 1354, 1355",
"parenthetical": "applying traditional standard in alien's appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition",
"sentence": "See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (amended order) (applying traditional standard in alien’s appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition); cf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (“the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State’s appeal”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 770, 776",
"parenthetical": "\"the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State's appeal\"",
"sentence": "See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (amended order) (applying traditional standard in alien’s appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition); cf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (“the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State’s appeal”)."
} | 9,413,200 | a |
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(f)(2) does not apply to motions for injunctive relief pending appeal of habeas corpus decisions. Upon reaching a similar conclusion regarding stays of removal pending petitions for review, Andreiu determined that it was appropriate to apply the traditional standard for interim injunctive relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "784 F.2d 1354, 1355",
"parenthetical": "applying traditional standard in alien's appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition",
"sentence": "See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (amended order) (applying traditional standard in alien’s appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition); cf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (“the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State’s appeal”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State's appeal\"",
"sentence": "See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (amended order) (applying traditional standard in alien’s appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition); cf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (“the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State’s appeal”)."
} | 9,413,200 | a |
Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that 8 U.S.C. SS 1252(f)(2) does not apply to motions for injunctive relief pending appeal of habeas corpus decisions. Upon reaching a similar conclusion regarding stays of removal pending petitions for review, Andreiu determined that it was appropriate to apply the traditional standard for interim injunctive relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "784 F.2d 1354, 1355",
"parenthetical": "applying traditional standard in alien's appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition",
"sentence": "See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (amended order) (applying traditional standard in alien’s appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition); cf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (“the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State’s appeal”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State's appeal\"",
"sentence": "See also Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986) (amended order) (applying traditional standard in alien’s appeal from denial of habeas petition challenging extradition); cf. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987) (“the general standards governing stays of civil judgments should also guide courts when they must decide whether to release a habeas petitioner pending the State’s appeal”)."
} | 9,413,200 | a |
It is difficult, on summary judgment, to draw a conclusive inference from this history. On the one hand, USAID's termination of the Project may have been a hasty overreaction to a violation of a relatively minor provision; on the other hand, USAID's attempts to continue the Project with a change of personnel might simply mean that USAID decided that its first priority would be to salvage some of the work to reform the Russian economy, and then deal with its miscreant grantee later. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 934, 939",
"parenthetical": "the question of what constitutes an FCA claim turns on what defendant did, \"not on how the government chooses to process the claim,\" because the \"gravamen of these cases is that the focus is on the conduct of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Harrison, 352 F.3d at 915-17 (rejecting argument that, because government continued to fund contractor after discovering false claims, their falsity cannot have been material); Rule Indus., 878 F.2d at 537 (finding defendant liable under FCA for violating Buy America Act certification even though government kept and was satisfied with product supplied); cf. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 939 (D.C.Cir.1997) (the question of what constitutes an FCA claim turns on what defendant did, “not on how the government chooses to process the claim,” because the “gravamen of these cases is that the focus is on the conduct of the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "352 F.3d 915, 915-17",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that, because government continued to fund contractor after discovering false claims, their falsity cannot have been material",
"sentence": "See Harrison, 352 F.3d at 915-17 (rejecting argument that, because government continued to fund contractor after discovering false claims, their falsity cannot have been material); Rule Indus., 878 F.2d at 537 (finding defendant liable under FCA for violating Buy America Act certification even though government kept and was satisfied with product supplied); cf. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 939 (D.C.Cir.1997) (the question of what constitutes an FCA claim turns on what defendant did, “not on how the government chooses to process the claim,” because the “gravamen of these cases is that the focus is on the conduct of the defendant”)."
} | 9,218,018 | b |
It is difficult, on summary judgment, to draw a conclusive inference from this history. On the one hand, USAID's termination of the Project may have been a hasty overreaction to a violation of a relatively minor provision; on the other hand, USAID's attempts to continue the Project with a change of personnel might simply mean that USAID decided that its first priority would be to salvage some of the work to reform the Russian economy, and then deal with its miscreant grantee later. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "111 F.3d 934, 939",
"parenthetical": "the question of what constitutes an FCA claim turns on what defendant did, \"not on how the government chooses to process the claim,\" because the \"gravamen of these cases is that the focus is on the conduct of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Harrison, 352 F.3d at 915-17 (rejecting argument that, because government continued to fund contractor after discovering false claims, their falsity cannot have been material); Rule Indus., 878 F.2d at 537 (finding defendant liable under FCA for violating Buy America Act certification even though government kept and was satisfied with product supplied); cf. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 939 (D.C.Cir.1997) (the question of what constitutes an FCA claim turns on what defendant did, “not on how the government chooses to process the claim,” because the “gravamen of these cases is that the focus is on the conduct of the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "878 F.2d 537, 537",
"parenthetical": "finding defendant liable under FCA for violating Buy America Act certification even though government kept and was satisfied with product supplied",
"sentence": "See Harrison, 352 F.3d at 915-17 (rejecting argument that, because government continued to fund contractor after discovering false claims, their falsity cannot have been material); Rule Indus., 878 F.2d at 537 (finding defendant liable under FCA for violating Buy America Act certification even though government kept and was satisfied with product supplied); cf. United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 939 (D.C.Cir.1997) (the question of what constitutes an FCA claim turns on what defendant did, “not on how the government chooses to process the claim,” because the “gravamen of these cases is that the focus is on the conduct of the defendant”)."
} | 9,218,018 | b |
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff cannot recover for unjust enrichment when there is a specific contract that governs the relationship between the parties. See Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "665 F.3d 897, 905",
"parenthetical": "affirming grant of summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim because under Illinois law \"when two parties' relationship is governed by contract, they may not bring a claim of unjust enrichment unless the claim falls outside the contract\"",
"sentence": "Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 723 (7th Cir.2011) (applying Illinois law and upholding grant of summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim where a specific contract governed the parties relationship); see also National Production Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 897, 905 (7th Cir.2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim because under Illinois law “when two parties’ relationship is governed by contract, they may not bring a claim of unjust enrichment unless the claim falls outside the contract”);' see also Stevens v. Interactive Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 11 C 2223, 2015 WL 791384, at *16-17 (N.D.Ill."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "629 F.3d 697, 723",
"parenthetical": "applying Illinois law and upholding grant of summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim where a specific contract governed the parties relationship",
"sentence": "Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 723 (7th Cir.2011) (applying Illinois law and upholding grant of summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim where a specific contract governed the parties relationship); see also National Production Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 897, 905 (7th Cir.2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment on an unjust enrichment claim because under Illinois law “when two parties’ relationship is governed by contract, they may not bring a claim of unjust enrichment unless the claim falls outside the contract”);' see also Stevens v. Interactive Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 11 C 2223, 2015 WL 791384, at *16-17 (N.D.Ill."
} | 4,264,956 | b |
Plaintiffs request that the court reconsider the business relationships that existed between the various parties and find that in light of these business relationships, the constructive ordering doctrine "should be applied through the entire communications path of the traffic, not just isolated segments of the path." As the court explained in the summary judgment order, because plaintiffs seek to recover access charges owed pursuant to their tariffs, the relevant question is whether plaintiffs provided each defendant with access services pursuant to their tariffs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "83 F.3d 549, 552",
"parenthetical": "setting out terms of relevant tariff in determining whether defendant was obligated to pay charges under the tariff",
"sentence": "See Advamtel LLC v. AT & T Corp., 118 F.Supp.2d 680, 683 (E.D.Va.2000) (explaining that to recover for amounts charged pursuant to their tariffs, plaintiffs must show that they operated under a valid tariff and that they provided services to the customer pursuant to that tariff); see also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 83 F.3d 549, 552 (2d Cir.1996) (setting out terms of relevant tariff in determining whether defendant was obligated to pay charges under the tariff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "118 F.Supp.2d 680, 683",
"parenthetical": "explaining that to recover for amounts charged pursuant to their tariffs, plaintiffs must show that they operated under a valid tariff and that they provided services to the customer pursuant to that tariff",
"sentence": "See Advamtel LLC v. AT & T Corp., 118 F.Supp.2d 680, 683 (E.D.Va.2000) (explaining that to recover for amounts charged pursuant to their tariffs, plaintiffs must show that they operated under a valid tariff and that they provided services to the customer pursuant to that tariff); see also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 83 F.3d 549, 552 (2d Cir.1996) (setting out terms of relevant tariff in determining whether defendant was obligated to pay charges under the tariff)."
} | 4,002,258 | b |
P 34. To fall under the specific, individual hazard exception, the hazard must, as the name of the exception indicates, be a specific rather than a general danger. In addition, the specific danger must pose the risk of an imminent collision. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing with courts that \"have narrowly construed 'specific, individual hazard' as an 'avoidance of an imminent collision with a specific person or object'\"",
"sentence": "Hightower, 70 P.3d at 847 n.21 (citation omitted) (agreeing with courts that \"have narrowly construed 'specific, individual hazard' as an 'avoidance of an imminent collision with a specific person or object'\"). In keeping with the specificity requirement, a specific, individual hazard is something that is unique and could not have been taken into account by the Secretary when promulgating uniform, national standards."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "844 F. Supp. 1152, 1152-53",
"parenthetical": "determining that a grade crossing without an automatic gate or flashing lights in an area of heavy traffic was not a specific, individual hazard in part because the Secretary took those conditions into consideration",
"sentence": "See Myers, 52 P.3d at 1027; Armstrong, 844 F. Supp. at 1152-53 (determining that a grade crossing without an automatic gate or flashing lights in an area of heavy traffic was not a specific, individual hazard in part because the Secretary took those conditions into consideration)."
} | 4,268,423 | a |
The fact that Newsom was the only person in the SUV where the gun was found underneath his seat supports the conclusion that Newsom had the power to exercise dominion and control over the firearm. But the defendant's mere presence in a car where a gun is found and proximity to a gun are insufficient proof of constructive possession. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "750 F.2d 34, 37",
"parenthetical": "finding insufficient evidence of possession where two guns were found in a waste basket near Beverly, despite the fact that one of the guns carried Beverly's fingerprint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir.1992) (reversing upon a finding of insufficient evidence of possession where a gun was found under the passenger seat in which Blue was riding, despite an officer’s testimony that he saw Blue’s shoulder dip as if he was concealing something under the seat); see also United States v. Beverly, 750 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1984) (finding insufficient evidence of possession where two guns were found in a waste basket near Beverly, despite the fact that one of the guns carried Beverly’s fingerprint)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 106, 108",
"parenthetical": "reversing upon a finding of insufficient evidence of possession where a gun was found under the passenger seat in which Blue was riding, despite an officer's testimony that he saw Blue's shoulder dip as if he was concealing something under the seat",
"sentence": "See United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir.1992) (reversing upon a finding of insufficient evidence of possession where a gun was found under the passenger seat in which Blue was riding, despite an officer’s testimony that he saw Blue’s shoulder dip as if he was concealing something under the seat); see also United States v. Beverly, 750 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1984) (finding insufficient evidence of possession where two guns were found in a waste basket near Beverly, despite the fact that one of the guns carried Beverly’s fingerprint)."
} | 3,330,294 | b |
Second, the defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting the blood test results because the law enforcement officer did not have probable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages before requiring the defendant to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933(l)(a). As the record reflects that the law enforcement officer did not require the defendant to submit to the blood test, but rather the law enforcement officer obtained the blood sample after the defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw, we find that this argument lacks merit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "70 So.3d 642, 648",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Geiss, 70 So.3d 642, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”); see also State v. Murray, 51 So.3d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Kujawa v. State, 405 So.2d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 So.2d 251, 252",
"parenthetical": "holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test",
"sentence": "See State v. Geiss, 70 So.3d 642, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”); see also State v. Murray, 51 So.3d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Kujawa v. State, 405 So.2d 251, 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (holding that the implied consent statutes are irrelevant when the defendant gives actual consent to a blood or breath test)."
} | 6,932,727 | a |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | a |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "daughter's attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter's mother and the mother's husband in moving to dismiss",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | a |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "daughter's attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter's mother and the mother's husband in moving to dismiss",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | a |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | a |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | b |
That testimony was corroborated by the testimony and affidavit of Lieberman, who indicated that Mr. Gonzalez retained his services and that he never met or spoke with Olga Gonzalez during his period of representation. An attorney is not authorized to represent any person without the consent of that person or someone with authority to represent that person. Olga Gonzalez not only never consented to Lieberman's representation, but was never even aware of it. We will not presume that Mr. Gonzalez had the authority to act as Olga's agent in obtaining representation for her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband",
"sentence": "See Gentry v. Hill, 57 N.C.App. 151, 290 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1982) (no presumption arises from mere fact of marriage that one spouse is acting as the agent of another, and an attorney acting on behalf of the husband was not authorized to permit entry of summary judgment against the wife); see also Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App.Div.1983) (where ex-wife entered into agreement with attorney to secure recovery of insurance proceeds, the attorney was not authorized to represent the ex-husband), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984); NRK Management Corp. v. Donahue, 109 Misc.2d 601, 440 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Civ.Ct.1981) (daughter’s attorney was not authorized to represent the daughter’s mother and the mother’s husband in moving to dismiss). Since Lieberman was without authority to act on behalf of Olga Gonzalez, his appearance cannot be deemed a waiver of any objection to the defective service."
} | 7,616,197 | a |
Subsets and Splits