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. At the outset, the Court finds that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for the harassing phone calls at home and for "stalking" behavior outside the workplace, summary judgment in favor of the employer is warranted. Under the particular facts of this case, the Court knows of no obligation upon the employer to monitor the activities of its employees outside of the workplace. Indeed, the clear intent of Title VII is to combat discrimination in the workplace. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment",
"sentence": "See also Fred v. Wackenhut Corp., 860 F.Supp. 1401, 1408 (D.Neb.1994) (holding that sex-related statements by a co-worker made to the plaintiff while she was at home and on suspension from work did not amount to improper conduct at the workplace and, therefore, did not constitute actionable sexual harassment), aff'd, 53 F.3d 335 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 190, 133 L.Bd.2d 126 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.\"",
"sentence": "See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (holding that Title VII was designed to assure equality of employment opportunities); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that “an employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the workplace which significantly and adversely affects an employee.”) (emphasis added)."
} | 11,575,069 | b |
. Although the 2012 district court did not expressly rely on the Revised PSR in calculating the drug quantity, we may affirm that court's quantity finding "on any ground supported in the record." The fact that the original sentencing court likewise did not adopt the Revised PSR is not problematic either. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "551 F.3d 1205, 1217",
"parenthetical": "\"If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant....\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) (resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR); see also United States v. Hooks, 551 F.3d 1205, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (\"If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant....”); United States v. Valentine, 694 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir.2012) (resentencing court may examine “the trial transcript, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the portions of the presentence report that the defendant admitted to or the sentencing court adopted” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 F.3d 764, 768",
"parenthetical": "resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) (resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR); see also United States v. Hooks, 551 F.3d 1205, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (\"If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant....”); United States v. Valentine, 694 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir.2012) (resentencing court may examine “the trial transcript, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the portions of the presentence report that the defendant admitted to or the sentencing court adopted” (emphasis added))."
} | 4,324,084 | b |
. Although the 2012 district court did not expressly rely on the Revised PSR in calculating the drug quantity, we may affirm that court's quantity finding "on any ground supported in the record." The fact that the original sentencing court likewise did not adopt the Revised PSR is not problematic either. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "694 F.3d 665, 670",
"parenthetical": "resentencing court may examine \"the trial transcript, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the portions of the presentence report that the defendant admitted to or the sentencing court adopted\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) (resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR); see also United States v. Hooks, 551 F.3d 1205, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (\"If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant....”); United States v. Valentine, 694 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir.2012) (resentencing court may examine “the trial transcript, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the portions of the presentence report that the defendant admitted to or the sentencing court adopted” (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "639 F.3d 764, 768",
"parenthetical": "resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR",
"sentence": "See United States v. Duncan, 639 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir.2011) (resentencing court entitled to rely on PSR that defendant failed to object to at original sentencing despite fact that original sentencing court did not adopt PSR); see also United States v. Hooks, 551 F.3d 1205, 1217 (10th Cir.2009) (\"If a defendant fails to specifically object to a fact in the PSR, the fact is deemed admitted by the defendant....”); United States v. Valentine, 694 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir.2012) (resentencing court may examine “the trial transcript, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the portions of the presentence report that the defendant admitted to or the sentencing court adopted” (emphasis added))."
} | 4,324,084 | b |
The provision mentions a specific, discrete beneficiary group within the statutory text -- the FQHCs. It is "phrased in terms of the persons benefitted." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 190, 201-02",
"parenthetical": "finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. SS 1396r-6, stating that \"each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid ..., remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279, 287, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (language stating that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records” was not rights-creating because the “focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents”); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir.2004) (finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, stating that “each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid ..., remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 U.S. 279, 279, 287",
"parenthetical": "language stating that \"[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records\" was not rights-creating because the \"focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279, 287, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (language stating that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records” was not rights-creating because the “focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents”); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir.2004) (finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, stating that “each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid ..., remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period”)."
} | 9,034,169 | b |
The provision mentions a specific, discrete beneficiary group within the statutory text -- the FQHCs. It is "phrased in terms of the persons benefitted." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "362 F.3d 190, 201-02",
"parenthetical": "finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. SS 1396r-6, stating that \"each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid ..., remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279, 287, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (language stating that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records” was not rights-creating because the “focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents”); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir.2004) (finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, stating that “each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid ..., remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "language stating that \"[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records\" was not rights-creating because the \"focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279, 287, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (language stating that “[n]o funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records” was not rights-creating because the “focus is two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents”); see also Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d Cir.2004) (finding rights-creating language in provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, stating that “each State plan approved under this subchapter must provide that each family which was receiving [AFDC] in at least 3 of the'6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family becomes ineligible for such aid ..., remain eligible for assistance under the plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period”)."
} | 9,034,169 | b |
Farah contends the Supreme Court did not intend for DeLanney to preclude a fraud cause of action simply because the plaintiff seeks to recover expectancy damages. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "847 S.W.2d 294, 294, 298",
"parenthetical": "negli gent misrepresentation consists of misrepresentation of existing fact rather than promise of future conduct",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. AmWest Sav. Ass’n, 825 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) (attempt to recover benefit of the bargain does not transform a fraud into a breach of contract); but see Airborne Freight Corp. v. C.R. Lee Enter., Inc., 847 S.W.2d 289, 296 n. 4 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied) (disapproving statement in Matthews that, because fraud is a quasi-contractual action, law does not preclude recovery of expectancy damages). ' Regardless of the damages sought, we conclude Farah’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action in the underlying suit were based upon the breach of a promise and therefore contractual in nature. See Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int’l, 823 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex.1992) (law imposes duty to refrain from fraudulently inducing a person to enter a contract, but the failure to perform the terms of a contract is a breach of contract); Airborne Freight, 847 S.W.2d at 294, 298 (negli gent misrepresentation consists of misrepresentation of existing fact rather than promise of future conduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 S.W.2d 552, 554",
"parenthetical": "attempt to recover benefit of the bargain does not transform a fraud into a breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. AmWest Sav. Ass’n, 825 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) (attempt to recover benefit of the bargain does not transform a fraud into a breach of contract); but see Airborne Freight Corp. v. C.R. Lee Enter., Inc., 847 S.W.2d 289, 296 n. 4 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied) (disapproving statement in Matthews that, because fraud is a quasi-contractual action, law does not preclude recovery of expectancy damages). ' Regardless of the damages sought, we conclude Farah’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action in the underlying suit were based upon the breach of a promise and therefore contractual in nature. See Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int’l, 823 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex.1992) (law imposes duty to refrain from fraudulently inducing a person to enter a contract, but the failure to perform the terms of a contract is a breach of contract); Airborne Freight, 847 S.W.2d at 294, 298 (negli gent misrepresentation consists of misrepresentation of existing fact rather than promise of future conduct)."
} | 10,017,768 | b |
. In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "148 U.S. 197, 207",
"parenthetical": "indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence\" of obstructing justice is an \"evil intent\" to obstruct justice",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant \"was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 871, 876",
"parenthetical": "holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant \"was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted))."
} | 4,032,208 | a |
. In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence\" of obstructing justice is an \"evil intent\" to obstruct justice",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant \"was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 871, 876",
"parenthetical": "holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant \"was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted))."
} | 4,032,208 | a |
. In the context of federal obstruction of justice crimes, courts have defined the specific intent element broadly. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "491 F.3d 871, 876",
"parenthetical": "holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. SS 1513(b",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant \"was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence\" of obstructing justice is an \"evil intent\" to obstruct justice",
"sentence": "See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (indicating that the intent to take a wrongful act that will have the \"natural and probable consequence” of obstructing justice is an “evil intent” to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999) (indicating that the elements of an obstruction-of-justice offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 are satisfied where the defendants had acted to prevent collection of their tax debt, and knew that “the natural and probable effect” of their actions would be to interfere with IRS proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gallimore, 491 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the only intent necessary to convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) for retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant \"was an intent to retaliate” (internal quotation marks omitted))."
} | 4,032,208 | b |
In this way Bradshaw effectively granted the Bank the power, in the case of HBP's default, to prefer other creditors over the government. While we agree with the district judge that when the Bank iroze HBP's accounts Bradshaw lacked the power to pay the taxes absent the Bank's approval, this lack of power was the direct result of the Agreement which Bradshaw had negotiated and entered into on behalf of HBP. At the time the Agreement was executed in May 1985, it is clear that Bradshaw was a responsible person under SS 6672. Bradshaw could not cease to be a responsible person simply by ceding to the Bank the right to exert financial control over HBP. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 305, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under SS 6672\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under § 6672”); cf. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir.1989) (“[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others”); Charlton, 2 F.3d at 240 (“[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "876 F.2d 485, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "\"[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under § 6672”); cf. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir.1989) (“[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others”); Charlton, 2 F.3d at 240 (“[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability”)."
} | 11,647,769 | a |
In this way Bradshaw effectively granted the Bank the power, in the case of HBP's default, to prefer other creditors over the government. While we agree with the district judge that when the Bank iroze HBP's accounts Bradshaw lacked the power to pay the taxes absent the Bank's approval, this lack of power was the direct result of the Agreement which Bradshaw had negotiated and entered into on behalf of HBP. At the time the Agreement was executed in May 1985, it is clear that Bradshaw was a responsible person under SS 6672. Bradshaw could not cease to be a responsible person simply by ceding to the Bank the right to exert financial control over HBP. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 305, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under SS 6672\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under § 6672”); cf. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir.1989) (“[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others”); Charlton, 2 F.3d at 240 (“[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 240, 240",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability\"",
"sentence": "See Rykoff v. United States, 40 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.1994) (“the fact that a bank exercises significant control over payments to creditors does not necessarily absolve the corporate officer of liability under § 6672”); cf. Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491-92 (5th Cir.1989) (“[o]ne does not cease to be a responsible person merely by delegating that responsibility to others”); Charlton, 2 F.3d at 240 (“[t]he delegation of disbursal authority does not relieve the delegator of liability”)."
} | 11,647,769 | a |
Because the Court found that the VRS faced no immediate harm due to uncertainty about the status of that agency's legal representation; because temporary injunctions should be granted only in emergency circumstances; and because injunctions should only be entered against high elected officials with great circumspection, the Court found issuance of the requested temporary injunction inap propriate. With the assurance of Mr. McFarlane that the Governor could obtain counsel by the date of the expedited hearing and that the obtained counsel would be ready to proceed by that date, the Court declined to issue the temporary injunction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 Va. 182, 184",
"parenthetical": "\"A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.\"",
"sentence": "See, Virginia Ry. v. Eckols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. 1082, 1083 (1915) (“A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.”); see also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991) (in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit’s adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the likelihood of harm to parties with or without the requested injunction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit's adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the likelihood of harm to parties with or without the requested injunction",
"sentence": "See, Virginia Ry. v. Eckols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. 1082, 1083 (1915) (“A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.”); see also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991) (in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit’s adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the likelihood of harm to parties with or without the requested injunction)."
} | 3,933,587 | a |
Because the Court found that the VRS faced no immediate harm due to uncertainty about the status of that agency's legal representation; because temporary injunctions should be granted only in emergency circumstances; and because injunctions should only be entered against high elected officials with great circumspection, the Court found issuance of the requested temporary injunction inap propriate. With the assurance of Mr. McFarlane that the Governor could obtain counsel by the date of the expedited hearing and that the obtained counsel would be ready to proceed by that date, the Court declined to issue the temporary injunction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 S.E. 1082, 1083",
"parenthetical": "\"A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.\"",
"sentence": "See, Virginia Ry. v. Eckols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. 1082, 1083 (1915) (“A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.”); see also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991) (in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit’s adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the likelihood of harm to parties with or without the requested injunction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "926 F.2d 353, 359",
"parenthetical": "in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit's adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the likelihood of harm to parties with or without the requested injunction",
"sentence": "See, Virginia Ry. v. Eckols, 117 Va. 182, 184, 83 S.E. 1082, 1083 (1915) (“A mandatory injunction will not be granted upon a preliminary hearing except in cases of strong and imperious necessity, where the right to the injunction is clear.”); see also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 1991) (in a case arising in West Virginia, the court affirms the circuit’s adoption of a hardship-balancing test for preliminary injunctions, involving not only the likelihood of success and the public interest, but looking primarily to the likelihood of harm to parties with or without the requested injunction)."
} | 3,933,587 | a |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 1184, 1192",
"parenthetical": "\"Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is 'comprehensive and pervasive.' \"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 1184, 1192",
"parenthetical": "\"Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is 'comprehensive and pervasive.' \"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "448 U.S. 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "448 U.S. 148, 148",
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "490 U.S. 177, 177",
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | 12,174,328 | b |
The comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme also weighs in favor of a strong federal interest. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state tax was preempted where \"the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.\"",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not \"exercise comprehensive regulatory control\" over on-reservation oil and gas production",
"sentence": "Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2008) (“Federal interests are greatest when the government's regulation of a given sphere is ‘comprehensive and pervasive.’ ”) (internal citation omitted); Bracket, 448 U.S. at 148, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (state tax was preempted where “the federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed.”); cf. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (Bracket balancing weighed against preemption where federal and tribal governments did not “exercise comprehensive regulatory control” over on-reservation oil and gas production)."
} | 12,174,328 | a |
It is clear from these facts that the class action plaintiff voluntarily abandoned or withdrew his claims against DaimlerChrys-ler. Pennsylvania appellate courts have concluded that such a voluntary dismissal or abandonment of a civil claim could support a cause of action under the Dragonetti Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "701 A.2d 242, 247-48",
"parenthetical": "finding that a last-minute voluntary dismissal in the face of imminent defeat constituted a favorable termination for the purposes of a Dragonetti claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Super.1997) (finding that a last-minute voluntary dismissal in the face of imminent defeat constituted a favorable termination for the purposes of a Dragonetti claim); Shaffer, 473 A.2d at 1020-21 (finding favorable termination where plaintiffs counsel knew that the persons on whose behalf he filed a caveat to contest the probate of the decedent’s will had no standing and subsequently agreed voluntarily to the dismissal of those claims); see also Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, No. 95-1331, 1996 WL 50632, at * 3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.l, 1996) (noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1996 WL 50632, at * 3",
"parenthetical": "noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Super.1997) (finding that a last-minute voluntary dismissal in the face of imminent defeat constituted a favorable termination for the purposes of a Dragonetti claim); Shaffer, 473 A.2d at 1020-21 (finding favorable termination where plaintiffs counsel knew that the persons on whose behalf he filed a caveat to contest the probate of the decedent’s will had no standing and subsequently agreed voluntarily to the dismissal of those claims); see also Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, No. 95-1331, 1996 WL 50632, at * 3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.l, 1996) (noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim)."
} | 11,079,510 | a |
It is clear from these facts that the class action plaintiff voluntarily abandoned or withdrew his claims against DaimlerChrys-ler. Pennsylvania appellate courts have concluded that such a voluntary dismissal or abandonment of a civil claim could support a cause of action under the Dragonetti Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1996 WL 50632, at * 3",
"parenthetical": "noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Super.1997) (finding that a last-minute voluntary dismissal in the face of imminent defeat constituted a favorable termination for the purposes of a Dragonetti claim); Shaffer, 473 A.2d at 1020-21 (finding favorable termination where plaintiffs counsel knew that the persons on whose behalf he filed a caveat to contest the probate of the decedent’s will had no standing and subsequently agreed voluntarily to the dismissal of those claims); see also Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, No. 95-1331, 1996 WL 50632, at * 3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.l, 1996) (noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "473 A.2d 1020, 1020-21",
"parenthetical": "finding favorable termination where plaintiffs counsel knew that the persons on whose behalf he filed a caveat to contest the probate of the decedent's will had no standing and subsequently agreed voluntarily to the dismissal of those claims",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 242, 247-48 (Pa.Super.1997) (finding that a last-minute voluntary dismissal in the face of imminent defeat constituted a favorable termination for the purposes of a Dragonetti claim); Shaffer, 473 A.2d at 1020-21 (finding favorable termination where plaintiffs counsel knew that the persons on whose behalf he filed a caveat to contest the probate of the decedent’s will had no standing and subsequently agreed voluntarily to the dismissal of those claims); see also Sports Int’l Ltd. v. Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, No. 95-1331, 1996 WL 50632, at * 3 (E.D.Pa. Feb.l, 1996) (noting instances where Pennsylvania appellate courts had concluded that a voluntary dismissal or settlement of a civil action could support a Dragonetti claim)."
} | 11,079,510 | b |
However, a canine sniff "may impact the determination of whether a search is reasonable if the use of the dog causes a delay." Id. There is no clear-cut rule for determining a reasonably allowable delay pursuant to a traffic stop. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "700 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1045, 1047-48",
"parenthetical": "holding that a two-minute delay beyond the conclusion of a traffic stop, which itself lasted twelve to thirteen minutes, was not unreasonable",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garrett, 139 Fed.Appx. 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that if a dog alerted within five to ten minutes of the initial stop, that would likely be a reasonable amount of time, while fifteen or nineteen might be unreasonable); but see United States v. Richardson, 700 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1045, 1047-48 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that a two-minute delay beyond the conclusion of a traffic stop, which itself lasted twelve to thirteen minutes, was not unreasonable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "139 Fed.Appx. 720, 723",
"parenthetical": "stating that if a dog alerted within five to ten minutes of the initial stop, that would likely be a reasonable amount of time, while fifteen or nineteen might be unreasonable",
"sentence": "See United States v. Garrett, 139 Fed.Appx. 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that if a dog alerted within five to ten minutes of the initial stop, that would likely be a reasonable amount of time, while fifteen or nineteen might be unreasonable); but see United States v. Richardson, 700 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1045, 1047-48 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that a two-minute delay beyond the conclusion of a traffic stop, which itself lasted twelve to thirteen minutes, was not unreasonable)."
} | 12,272,330 | b |
To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "503 F.2d 430, 440-42",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that \"pattern\" as used in SS 1962(b",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument)."
} | 3,801,938 | b |
To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58",
"parenthetical": "finding defendant's argument that SS 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because \"[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions\" of the Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument)."
} | 3,801,938 | a |
To my knowledge, no court has found the Act unconstitutional. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "518 F.2d 352, 364",
"parenthetical": "\"Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. SS 1961, which defines 'racketeering activity' with reference to specific offenses, 'pattern of racketeering activity' with reference to a definite number of acts of 'racketeering activity' within specified time periods, and 'enterprise' and 'person' with standard language of established meaning.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir.1974) (rejecting defendant’s claim that “pattern” as used in § 1962(b) is unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.1976) (“[W]e hold that ‘any person’ of average intelligence, on a clear reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in ‘any enterprise,’ including their own, ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity ....’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1974) (finding defendant’s argument that § 1964 is unconstitutionally vague without merit because “[t]he kinds of activity to which the injunction may be addressed are described with sufficient particularity in ... substantive provisions” of the Act); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.1975) (“Any ambiguity is cured by 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which defines ‘racketeering activity’ with reference to specific offenses, ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ with reference to a definite number of acts of ‘racketeering activity’ within specified time periods, and ‘enterprise’ and ‘person’ with standard language of established meaning.”); see also United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 n. 4 (4th Cir.1980) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the statute is overly broad and vague because all courts which have considered the issue have rejected this argument)."
} | 3,801,938 | b |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "253 Kan. 75, 91",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 Kan. 212, 220-22",
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | 342,014 | a |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "253 Kan. 75, 91",
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | 342,014 | b |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "257 Kan. 212, 220-22",
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | 342,014 | b |
Dighera indicated he understood that he would have certain defenses which he would waive upon entering his guilty plea. He failed to raise the double jeopardy issue in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 91, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (“defendant cannot raise points on appeal which were not presented to the- trial court”); see also State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 220-22, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (Kansas Supreme Court refused to consider voluntariness of plea where defendant failed to raise that argument in his motion to withdraw his plea before the trial court)."
} | 342,014 | a |
Patrolman Bowler testified that Robertson drove up to the main gate of the Dam Neck Base, territory over which the United States Government exercises jurisdiction. That uncontradicted testimony provides a sufficient basis for prosecuting under the Assimilative Crimes Act. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "602 F.2d 639, 641",
"parenthetical": "\"Although defendants are correct in pointing out that the District Judge declined to take judicial notice that the [Blue Ridge] Parkway was so located this court may, and does, take judicial notice of commonly known facts, especially where there is testimony, as here, to the effect that the illegalities took place on the Parkway.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lavender, 602 F.2d 639, 641 (4th Cir.1979) (“Although defendants are correct in pointing out that the District Judge declined to take judicial notice that the [Blue Ridge] Parkway was so located this court may, and does, take judicial notice of commonly known facts, especially where there is testimony, as here, to the effect that the illegalities took place on the Parkway.”); cf. United States v. Johnson, 726 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.1984) (magistrate could take judicial notice of distances involved in alleged transportation of explosive devices because “geographical information is especially appropriate for judicial notice”) (citing Lavender)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "magistrate could take judicial notice of distances involved in alleged transportation of explosive devices because \"geographical information is especially appropriate for judicial notice\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Lavender, 602 F.2d 639, 641 (4th Cir.1979) (“Although defendants are correct in pointing out that the District Judge declined to take judicial notice that the [Blue Ridge] Parkway was so located this court may, and does, take judicial notice of commonly known facts, especially where there is testimony, as here, to the effect that the illegalities took place on the Parkway.”); cf. United States v. Johnson, 726 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.1984) (magistrate could take judicial notice of distances involved in alleged transportation of explosive devices because “geographical information is especially appropriate for judicial notice”) (citing Lavender)."
} | 3,879,364 | a |
The Second Circuit has held that Section 1981 claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 are analyzed under the same standard as Title VII claims. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "609 F.3d 486, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"Both Mr. Ruiz's Title VII Claims and his claims for race and national origin discrimination under Sections 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas ...\"",
"sentence": "Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Both Mr. Ruiz’s Title VII Claims and his claims for race and national origin discrimination under Sections 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas ...”); see also Vargas v. Morgan Stanley, 438 Fed.Appx. 7, 9 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Ruiz); Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir.2004) (“[T]he factors justifying summary judgment dismissing Patterson’s Title VII claim against the municipal defendants for termination of his employment equally support the summary dismissal of his claims for termination brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "375 F.3d 206, 225",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he factors justifying summary judgment dismissing Patterson's Title VII claim against the municipal defendants for termination of his employment equally support the summary dismissal of his claims for termination brought under 42 U.S.C. SSSS 1981 and 1983\"",
"sentence": "Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Both Mr. Ruiz’s Title VII Claims and his claims for race and national origin discrimination under Sections 1981 and 1983 are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas ...”); see also Vargas v. Morgan Stanley, 438 Fed.Appx. 7, 9 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Ruiz); Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir.2004) (“[T]he factors justifying summary judgment dismissing Patterson’s Title VII claim against the municipal defendants for termination of his employment equally support the summary dismissal of his claims for termination brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983”)."
} | 3,996,307 | a |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants' assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding \"[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor\" and noting the headline announced \"policeman threatened mayor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants' assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding \"[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor\" and noting the headline announced \"policeman threatened mayor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "536 N.E.2d 823, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants' assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding \"[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor\" and noting the headline announced \"policeman threatened mayor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants' assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding \"[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor\" and noting the headline announced \"policeman threatened mayor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | 214,306 | b |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants' assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding \"[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor\" and noting the headline announced \"policeman threatened mayor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | 214,306 | a |
Thus, we agree with the trial court that, when considering the article as a whole, it could not reasonably be interpreted as stating false statements with a defamatory meaning of and concerning Boone. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "536 N.E.2d 823, 826",
"parenthetical": "holding newspaper's article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants' assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding \"[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor\" and noting the headline announced \"policeman threatened mayor\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Early v. Toledo Blade, 130 Ohio App.3d 302, 720 N.E.2d 107 (1998) (stating the trial court must read the statements at issue in the context of the entire article to determine whether a reader would interpret them as defamatory and finding a police officer plaintiff had failed to establish a newspaper article regarding police brutality and misconduct was personally defamatory); cf. Sweeney v. Sengstacke Enters., Inc., 180 Ill.App.3d 1044, 129 Ill.Dec. 773, 536 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1989) (holding newspaper’s article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable, whether read alone or in the context of the entire article, the court rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different, innocent meaning, and finding “[t]he entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor” and noting the headline announced “policeman threatened mayor”)."
} | 214,306 | b |
The legislature's purpose in amending the law was to fund the collection of samples and the maintenance and operation of DNA databases, which, the legislature had repeatedly found, were important tools in criminal investigations in excluding individuals who are the subject of investigations or prosecutions, in detecting recidivist acts, and in identifying missing persons and unidentified human remains. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "740 F.3d 1128, 1135",
"parenthetical": "$100 annual registration fee imposed on sex offenders convicted in Wisconsin did not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws because the fee was intended to compensate the state for the expense of maintaining the sex offender registry",
"sentence": "Id. at 251; Commonwealth v. Derk, 895 A.2d 622, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to punish when it enacted law requiring certain defendants to submit DNA sample and pay mandatory fee of $250 because the intent of the law was \"to promote public safety and more effective law enforcement\"); see also Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 2014) ($100 annual registration fee imposed on sex offenders convicted in Wisconsin did not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws because the fee was intended to compensate the state for the expense of maintaining the sex offender registry)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "895 A.2d 622, 627",
"parenthetical": "Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to punish when it enacted law requiring certain defendants to submit DNA sample and pay mandatory fee of $250 because the intent of the law was \"to promote public safety and more effective law enforcement\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 251; Commonwealth v. Derk, 895 A.2d 622, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to punish when it enacted law requiring certain defendants to submit DNA sample and pay mandatory fee of $250 because the intent of the law was \"to promote public safety and more effective law enforcement\"); see also Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 2014) ($100 annual registration fee imposed on sex offenders convicted in Wisconsin did not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws because the fee was intended to compensate the state for the expense of maintaining the sex offender registry)."
} | 4,357,529 | b |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 150, 160",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 150, 160",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | b |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 U.S. 150, 160",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | b |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 172, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"unfair prejudice\" in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged",
"sentence": "See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (holding that the Advisory Committee Notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (holding that “unfair prejudice” in the criminal context refers to the capacity of relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on grounds different than the offense charged)."
} | 9,456,429 | a |
In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 F.3d 120, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is 'too old' to be admissible.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”)."
} | 4,201,490 | a |
In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "441 F.3d 1152, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case's proffered evidence.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "215 F.3d 120, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is 'too old' to be admissible.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”)."
} | 4,201,490 | b |
In fact, "[t]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "441 F.3d 1152, 1159",
"parenthetical": "\"Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case's proffered evidence.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1421 (10th Cir.1997) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir.1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 120 (“[T]here is no per se rule to determine when a prior bad act is ‘too old’ to be admissible.”); see also Cherry, 433 F.3d at 702 n. 4 (“[W]e review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a prior act is stale.”); cf. United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (“Our cases make clear that the degree to which factors such as temporal distance and geographical proximity are important to a determination of the probative value of similar acts will necessarily depend on the unique facts of each case’s proffered evidence.”)."
} | 4,201,490 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney’s fees)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "218 So.2d 59, 61-62",
"parenthetical": "\"By asking for attorney's fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore ... made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court....\"",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59, 61-62 (La.Ct.App.1969) (“By asking for attorney’s fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore ... made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court....”); Forbess v. George Morgan Pontiac Co., 135 So.2d 594, 598 (La.Ct.App.1961) (holding that request for attorney’s fees (and damages to attached property) in a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment — said to be “totally unnecessary to the inquiry of the jurisdiction” — “constituted a submission by defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over it personally by the court”); In re Marriage of Adler, 271 Ill.App.3d 469, 208 Ill.Dec. 31, 34, 648 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1995); Johnson v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 198, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1983) (holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court’s jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney’s fees)."
} | 7,420,312 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney’s fees)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "135 So.2d 594, 598",
"parenthetical": "holding that request for attorney's fees (and damages to attached property",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59, 61-62 (La.Ct.App.1969) (“By asking for attorney’s fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore ... made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court....”); Forbess v. George Morgan Pontiac Co., 135 So.2d 594, 598 (La.Ct.App.1961) (holding that request for attorney’s fees (and damages to attached property) in a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment — said to be “totally unnecessary to the inquiry of the jurisdiction” — “constituted a submission by defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over it personally by the court”); In re Marriage of Adler, 271 Ill.App.3d 469, 208 Ill.Dec. 31, 34, 648 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1995); Johnson v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 198, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1983) (holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court’s jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney’s fees)."
} | 7,420,312 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney’s fees)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court's jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney's fees",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59, 61-62 (La.Ct.App.1969) (“By asking for attorney’s fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore ... made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court....”); Forbess v. George Morgan Pontiac Co., 135 So.2d 594, 598 (La.Ct.App.1961) (holding that request for attorney’s fees (and damages to attached property) in a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment — said to be “totally unnecessary to the inquiry of the jurisdiction” — “constituted a submission by defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over it personally by the court”); In re Marriage of Adler, 271 Ill.App.3d 469, 208 Ill.Dec. 31, 34, 648 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1995); Johnson v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 198, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1983) (holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court’s jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney’s fees)."
} | 7,420,312 | b |
Courts outside Washington State that have considered the question have concluded not only that a request for attorney's fees should be viewed as a request for affirmative relief, but also that a request for attorney's fees waives an objection to in personam jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "662 P.2d 1178, 1182",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court's jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney's fees",
"sentence": "Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 218 So.2d 59, 61-62 (La.Ct.App.1969) (“By asking for attorney’s fees, the defendant did affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore ... made a general appearance, and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court....”); Forbess v. George Morgan Pontiac Co., 135 So.2d 594, 598 (La.Ct.App.1961) (holding that request for attorney’s fees (and damages to attached property) in a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment — said to be “totally unnecessary to the inquiry of the jurisdiction” — “constituted a submission by defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over it personally by the court”); In re Marriage of Adler, 271 Ill.App.3d 469, 208 Ill.Dec. 31, 34, 648 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1995); Johnson v. Johnson, 233 Kan. 198, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1983) (holding that a Texas court had personal jurisdiction over a Kansas resident who, after objecting to the Texas court’s jurisdiction, filed a motion for attorney’s fees)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "238 So.2d 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney's fees",
"sentence": "See Mid-City Inv. Co. v. Young, 238 So.2d 780, 784 (La.Ct.App.1970) (approving view that a pleading was an appearance because it requested attorney’s fees)."
} | 7,420,312 | a |
However, each condition has independent significance. When any one of the four elements of Rule 9011 is violated, the court must impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 956, 960-61",
"parenthetical": "\"where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court's discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.\"",
"sentence": "Stuebben v. Gioioso (In re Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 960-61 (3d Cir.1992) (“where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court’s discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.”) (citing Cinema Svs."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 384, 392",
"parenthetical": "\"An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.' \"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985); Thomas v. Capital Security Svs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.1988); Wise v. Pea Ridge School District No. 109, 675 F.Supp. 1524 (W.D.Ark.1987), aff'd, 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir.1988); In re Powers, 135 B.R. 980, 998 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1991)); accord Mortgage Mart, Inc. v. Rechnitzer (In re Chisum), 847 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir.1988); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 392, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (“An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] ‘shall’ be penalized by ‘an appropriate sanction.’ ”)."
} | 6,512,778 | a |
However, each condition has independent significance. When any one of the four elements of Rule 9011 is violated, the court must impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 956, 960-61",
"parenthetical": "\"where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court's discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.\"",
"sentence": "Stuebben v. Gioioso (In re Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 960-61 (3d Cir.1992) (“where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court’s discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.”) (citing Cinema Svs."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454",
"parenthetical": "\"An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.' \"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985); Thomas v. Capital Security Svs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.1988); Wise v. Pea Ridge School District No. 109, 675 F.Supp. 1524 (W.D.Ark.1987), aff'd, 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir.1988); In re Powers, 135 B.R. 980, 998 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1991)); accord Mortgage Mart, Inc. v. Rechnitzer (In re Chisum), 847 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir.1988); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 392, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (“An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] ‘shall’ be penalized by ‘an appropriate sanction.’ ”)."
} | 6,512,778 | a |
However, each condition has independent significance. When any one of the four elements of Rule 9011 is violated, the court must impose sanctions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "979 F.2d 956, 960-61",
"parenthetical": "\"where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court's discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.\"",
"sentence": "Stuebben v. Gioioso (In re Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 960-61 (3d Cir.1992) (“where the court finds a violation of Rule 9011, the court must apply a sanction.... The court’s discretion lies not in its conclusion to sanction but in its determination of what sanction to apply.”) (citing Cinema Svs."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] 'shall' be penalized by 'an appropriate sanction.' \"",
"sentence": "Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1985); Thomas v. Capital Security Svs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir.1988); Wise v. Pea Ridge School District No. 109, 675 F.Supp. 1524 (W.D.Ark.1987), aff'd, 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir.1988); In re Powers, 135 B.R. 980, 998 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1991)); accord Mortgage Mart, Inc. v. Rechnitzer (In re Chisum), 847 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir.1988); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 392, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (“An attorney who signs the paper [in violation of Rule 9011] ‘shall’ be penalized by ‘an appropriate sanction.’ ”)."
} | 6,512,778 | a |
Other circuits have expressed concern that an attenuated connection between a private defendant and the state risks federalizing large areas of state tort law. The Third Circuit warned that not requiring state action would create a federal cause of action "whenever a white man strikes a black in a barroom brawl." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "839 F.Supp. 1014, 1019",
"parenthetical": "pre-Phillip case following Mahone because \"[extending the 'equal benefit' clause to private conduct would have the effect of federalizing all racially-motivated state-law torts that im plicate 'the security of persons and property' \"",
"sentence": "See also Chapman, 319 F.3d at 842 (Suh-rheinrich, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority’s interpretation, the equal benefit clause conceivably can be applied to every garden-variety state tort law claim where the parties are of different races.”); Spencer v. Casavilla, 839 F.Supp. 1014, 1019 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (pre-Phillip case following Mahone because “[extending the ‘equal benefit’ clause to private conduct would have the effect of federalizing all racially-motivated state-law torts that im plicate ‘the security of persons and property’ ”), affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part, 44 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.1994)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "564 F.2d 1018, 1029",
"parenthetical": "in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action",
"sentence": "Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3rd Cir.1977) (in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action)."
} | 1,461,646 | b |
Other circuits have expressed concern that an attenuated connection between a private defendant and the state risks federalizing large areas of state tort law. The Third Circuit warned that not requiring state action would create a federal cause of action "whenever a white man strikes a black in a barroom brawl." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "pre-Phillip case following Mahone because \"[extending the 'equal benefit' clause to private conduct would have the effect of federalizing all racially-motivated state-law torts that im plicate 'the security of persons and property' \"",
"sentence": "See also Chapman, 319 F.3d at 842 (Suh-rheinrich, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority’s interpretation, the equal benefit clause conceivably can be applied to every garden-variety state tort law claim where the parties are of different races.”); Spencer v. Casavilla, 839 F.Supp. 1014, 1019 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (pre-Phillip case following Mahone because “[extending the ‘equal benefit’ clause to private conduct would have the effect of federalizing all racially-motivated state-law torts that im plicate ‘the security of persons and property’ ”), affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part, 44 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.1994)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "564 F.2d 1018, 1029",
"parenthetical": "in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action",
"sentence": "Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029 (3rd Cir.1977) (in dicta suggesting that the equal benefit clause requires state action)."
} | 1,461,646 | b |
Instead, the facts in this case resemble those in State v. Riemer and Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Mauro, cases in which takings claims survived a plea to the jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "921 S.W.2d 282, 282",
"parenthetical": "holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundation's property",
"sentence": "See State v. Riemer, 94 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (holding that allegations that State’s lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation); see also Kenedy Mem’l Found., 921 S.W.2d at 282 (holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundation’s property)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 S.W.3d 103, 109",
"parenthetical": "holding that allegations that State's lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation",
"sentence": "See State v. Riemer, 94 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (holding that allegations that State’s lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation); see also Kenedy Mem’l Found., 921 S.W.2d at 282 (holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundation’s property)."
} | 8,398,788 | b |
Courts generally look at a number of factors in making this determination. In Hener, the court considered the time when each group began their labors, the duration of each groups' tangible salvaging activity, the comparative skill and quality of the competing groups, the salvors' investments in capital and labor, and the likelihood of success of each of the parties. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "836 F.Supp. 1107, 1107",
"parenthetical": "relying extensively on the MDM Salvage factors, and considering plaintiffs \"near-term ability to salvage the wreck,\" his historical research, his capital investments into the salvage operation, and his still and video photography of the site",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 836 F.Supp. at 1107 (relying extensively on the MDM Salvage factors, and considering plaintiffs “near-term ability to salvage the wreck,” his historical research, his capital investments into the salvage operation, and his still and video photography of the site); BROTHER JONATHAN, 883 F.Supp. at 1363 (requiring the salvor in possession to describe its archaeological preservation activities when applying for an extension of time of its exclusive salvage rights); 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 16-7, at 346 (2d ed. 1994) (submitting that the law of salvage, state and federal statutes, and international conventions “should be interpreted as requiring both a salvor and a finder of historic shipwreck to use proper archaeological techniques to preserve the scientific, historic, and archaeological integrity and provenance of the wreck”); cf. Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 468 (emphasizing that “the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved” is an important consideration in granting a salvage award)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 468, 468",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that \"the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved\" is an important consideration in granting a salvage award",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 836 F.Supp. at 1107 (relying extensively on the MDM Salvage factors, and considering plaintiffs “near-term ability to salvage the wreck,” his historical research, his capital investments into the salvage operation, and his still and video photography of the site); BROTHER JONATHAN, 883 F.Supp. at 1363 (requiring the salvor in possession to describe its archaeological preservation activities when applying for an extension of time of its exclusive salvage rights); 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 16-7, at 346 (2d ed. 1994) (submitting that the law of salvage, state and federal statutes, and international conventions “should be interpreted as requiring both a salvor and a finder of historic shipwreck to use proper archaeological techniques to preserve the scientific, historic, and archaeological integrity and provenance of the wreck”); cf. Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 468 (emphasizing that “the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved” is an important consideration in granting a salvage award)."
} | 7,782,815 | a |
Courts generally look at a number of factors in making this determination. In Hener, the court considered the time when each group began their labors, the duration of each groups' tangible salvaging activity, the comparative skill and quality of the competing groups, the salvors' investments in capital and labor, and the likelihood of success of each of the parties. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.Supp. 1363, 1363",
"parenthetical": "requiring the salvor in possession to describe its archaeological preservation activities when applying for an extension of time of its exclusive salvage rights",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 836 F.Supp. at 1107 (relying extensively on the MDM Salvage factors, and considering plaintiffs “near-term ability to salvage the wreck,” his historical research, his capital investments into the salvage operation, and his still and video photography of the site); BROTHER JONATHAN, 883 F.Supp. at 1363 (requiring the salvor in possession to describe its archaeological preservation activities when applying for an extension of time of its exclusive salvage rights); 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 16-7, at 346 (2d ed. 1994) (submitting that the law of salvage, state and federal statutes, and international conventions “should be interpreted as requiring both a salvor and a finder of historic shipwreck to use proper archaeological techniques to preserve the scientific, historic, and archaeological integrity and provenance of the wreck”); cf. Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 468 (emphasizing that “the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved” is an important consideration in granting a salvage award)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "974 F.2d 468, 468",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing that \"the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved\" is an important consideration in granting a salvage award",
"sentence": "Id.; see also ANDREA DORIA, 836 F.Supp. at 1107 (relying extensively on the MDM Salvage factors, and considering plaintiffs “near-term ability to salvage the wreck,” his historical research, his capital investments into the salvage operation, and his still and video photography of the site); BROTHER JONATHAN, 883 F.Supp. at 1363 (requiring the salvor in possession to describe its archaeological preservation activities when applying for an extension of time of its exclusive salvage rights); 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 16-7, at 346 (2d ed. 1994) (submitting that the law of salvage, state and federal statutes, and international conventions “should be interpreted as requiring both a salvor and a finder of historic shipwreck to use proper archaeological techniques to preserve the scientific, historic, and archaeological integrity and provenance of the wreck”); cf. Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 468 (emphasizing that “the degree to which salvors worked to proteet the historical and archaeological value of the wreck and items salved” is an important consideration in granting a salvage award)."
} | 7,782,815 | a |
This continuing duty of district courts to consult the Guidelines is statutory. Although the Court in Booker excised the mandatory aspects of the Guidelines in 18 U.S.C. SSSS 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), it left the remainder of the Sentencing Reform Act intact to "function[] independently." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is still operative, and requires district courts to take the applicable Guidelines range into consideration when sentencing, along with other sentencing factors enumerated by Congress. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65(‘Without the ‘mandatory’ provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” (citing § 3553(a))); Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1085-86(addressing district court’s procedural error in calculating defendant’s base offense level because “the base offense level ... remains the starting point for determining the applicable guideline range for an offense” even in the discretionary Guidelines system); see also United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005) (“The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under § 3553(a).”); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir.2005) (“This consultation requirement [in § 3553(a) that survives Booker], at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines. ..."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 764, 764-65",
"parenthetical": "'Without the 'mandatory' provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.\" (citing SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is still operative, and requires district courts to take the applicable Guidelines range into consideration when sentencing, along with other sentencing factors enumerated by Congress. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65(‘Without the ‘mandatory’ provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” (citing § 3553(a))); Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1085-86(addressing district court’s procedural error in calculating defendant’s base offense level because “the base offense level ... remains the starting point for determining the applicable guideline range for an offense” even in the discretionary Guidelines system); see also United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005) (“The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under § 3553(a).”); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir.2005) (“This consultation requirement [in § 3553(a) that survives Booker], at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines. ..."
} | 881,153 | b |
This continuing duty of district courts to consult the Guidelines is statutory. Although the Court in Booker excised the mandatory aspects of the Guidelines in 18 U.S.C. SSSS 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), it left the remainder of the Sentencing Reform Act intact to "function[] independently." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 1085, 1085-86",
"parenthetical": "addressing district court's procedural error in calculating defendant's base offense level because \"the base offense level ... remains the starting point for determining the applicable guideline range for an offense\" even in the discretionary Guidelines system",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is still operative, and requires district courts to take the applicable Guidelines range into consideration when sentencing, along with other sentencing factors enumerated by Congress. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65(‘Without the ‘mandatory’ provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” (citing § 3553(a))); Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1085-86(addressing district court’s procedural error in calculating defendant’s base offense level because “the base offense level ... remains the starting point for determining the applicable guideline range for an offense” even in the discretionary Guidelines system); see also United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005) (“The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under § 3553(a).”); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir.2005) (“This consultation requirement [in § 3553(a) that survives Booker], at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines. ..."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under SS 3553(a",
"sentence": "Id. at 764. This means that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is still operative, and requires district courts to take the applicable Guidelines range into consideration when sentencing, along with other sentencing factors enumerated by Congress. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65(‘Without the ‘mandatory’ provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.” (citing § 3553(a))); Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1085-86(addressing district court’s procedural error in calculating defendant’s base offense level because “the base offense level ... remains the starting point for determining the applicable guideline range for an offense” even in the discretionary Guidelines system); see also United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005) (“The appropriate guidelines range, though now calculated under an advisory system, remains the critical starting point for the imposition of a sentence under § 3553(a).”); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (11th Cir.2005) (“This consultation requirement [in § 3553(a) that survives Booker], at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines. ..."
} | 881,153 | a |
This is not an either-or proposition. The fact that some states, like Ohio, delegate the administration of public assistance programs to counties or municipalities should not mean that those states are free of all statutory obligations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 F.Supp.2d 79, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"It would be plainly unreasonable to permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.\"",
"sentence": "See New York, 255 F.Supp.2d at 79 (“It would be plainly unreasonable to permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.”); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that New York could not avoid its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act by delegating authority to localities to deliver federally funded services)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "331 F.3d 261, 286",
"parenthetical": "holding that New York could not avoid its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act by delegating authority to localities to deliver federally funded services",
"sentence": "See New York, 255 F.Supp.2d at 79 (“It would be plainly unreasonable to permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.”); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that New York could not avoid its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act by delegating authority to localities to deliver federally funded services)."
} | 3,859,067 | a |
With regard to this aspect of her testimony, there is "simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Untested hypotheses, even if plausible, are insufficient to satisfy Rule 702. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "620 F.3d 665, 670",
"parenthetical": "explaining that a \"working hypothesis\" is not \"admissible scientific knowledge\"",
"sentence": "Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.2002) (“The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort.”); see Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir.2010) (explaining that a “working hypothesis” is not “admissible scientific knowledge”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "295 F.3d 1194, 1202",
"parenthetical": "\"The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort.\"",
"sentence": "Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.2002) (“The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort.”); see Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir.2010) (explaining that a “working hypothesis” is not “admissible scientific knowledge”)."
} | 4,163,072 | b |
We begin our analysis with Rod-man's claim that the court erred by not invalidating the 2007 Will in its entirety since Turpin "neither read nor did anyone read to him, the portions of the will which made Aristide Jude a beneficiary" and "was not aware that Aristide Jude was listed as a beneficiary in his will." There is language in a number of probate cases that appears to support appellant's argument that the entire 2007 Will should be invalidated because Turpin did not know the will's entire contents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Md. 466, 486",
"parenthetical": "\"Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. 18 (citing Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 979 P.2d 39, 51-52 (1999), for the proposition that “[ajlthough there is a strong presumption that an able-bodied testator or testatrix knew the contents of his or her will, a will may be denied probate if he or she was ignorant of its contents”); Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 486 (Md.1879) (“Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.”); Estate of Gillespie, 183 Ariz. 282, 903 P.2d 590, 592 (1995) (en banc) (“Where the testator lacks knowledge as to the entire contents of the will or is misled as to the nature of the instrument as a whole,” however, “then it is undoubtedly correct that the instrument is inoperative.” (internal citations omitted) (citing 1 Page on the Law of Wills § 5.8, at 176-77 (1960))); see also Estate of Mendoza, 76 Nev. 396, 356 P.2d 13, 16 (1960) (“It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. 18 (citing Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 979 P.2d 39, 51-52 (1999), for the proposition that “[ajlthough there is a strong presumption that an able-bodied testator or testatrix knew the contents of his or her will, a will may be denied probate if he or she was ignorant of its contents”); Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 486 (Md.1879) (“Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.”); Estate of Gillespie, 183 Ariz. 282, 903 P.2d 590, 592 (1995) (en banc) (“Where the testator lacks knowledge as to the entire contents of the will or is misled as to the nature of the instrument as a whole,” however, “then it is undoubtedly correct that the instrument is inoperative.” (internal citations omitted) (citing 1 Page on the Law of Wills § 5.8, at 176-77 (1960))); see also Estate of Mendoza, 76 Nev. 396, 356 P.2d 13, 16 (1960) (“It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.”)."
} | 7,282,623 | a |
We begin our analysis with Rod-man's claim that the court erred by not invalidating the 2007 Will in its entirety since Turpin "neither read nor did anyone read to him, the portions of the will which made Aristide Jude a beneficiary" and "was not aware that Aristide Jude was listed as a beneficiary in his will." There is language in a number of probate cases that appears to support appellant's argument that the entire 2007 Will should be invalidated because Turpin did not know the will's entire contents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 Md. 466, 486",
"parenthetical": "\"Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. 18 (citing Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 979 P.2d 39, 51-52 (1999), for the proposition that “[ajlthough there is a strong presumption that an able-bodied testator or testatrix knew the contents of his or her will, a will may be denied probate if he or she was ignorant of its contents”); Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 486 (Md.1879) (“Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.”); Estate of Gillespie, 183 Ariz. 282, 903 P.2d 590, 592 (1995) (en banc) (“Where the testator lacks knowledge as to the entire contents of the will or is misled as to the nature of the instrument as a whole,” however, “then it is undoubtedly correct that the instrument is inoperative.” (internal citations omitted) (citing 1 Page on the Law of Wills § 5.8, at 176-77 (1960))); see also Estate of Mendoza, 76 Nev. 396, 356 P.2d 13, 16 (1960) (“It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 P.2d 13, 16",
"parenthetical": "\"It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d at 697 n. 18 (citing Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 979 P.2d 39, 51-52 (1999), for the proposition that “[ajlthough there is a strong presumption that an able-bodied testator or testatrix knew the contents of his or her will, a will may be denied probate if he or she was ignorant of its contents”); Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 486 (Md.1879) (“Knowledge of its contents is, of course, essential to the validity of every will.”); Estate of Gillespie, 183 Ariz. 282, 903 P.2d 590, 592 (1995) (en banc) (“Where the testator lacks knowledge as to the entire contents of the will or is misled as to the nature of the instrument as a whole,” however, “then it is undoubtedly correct that the instrument is inoperative.” (internal citations omitted) (citing 1 Page on the Law of Wills § 5.8, at 176-77 (1960))); see also Estate of Mendoza, 76 Nev. 396, 356 P.2d 13, 16 (1960) (“It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.”)."
} | 7,282,623 | a |
Since the statute is derogatory of the traditional powers of the Court to administer a class action, it should be construed strictly and consistent with its plain meaning. The Order sought to be appealed is not prohibited by the statute, and must therefore be within the Court's discretion to make. No evidence of an abuse of discretion is cited. In any case, this type of discretionary decision is generally inappropriate for appellate review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38",
"parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion.\"",
"sentence": "See Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (“Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion.”) (citations omitted); see also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir.1963) (per curiam) (“[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b) to ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’ ”) In Koehler our Court of Appeals observed that:"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "313 F.2d 431, 434",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b",
"sentence": "See Herold v. Braun, 671 F.Supp. 936, 937-38 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (“Ordinarily a district court should refuse to certify matters... that lie within its discretion.”) (citations omitted); see also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir.1963) (per curiam) (“[T]o permit appellate review of this kind of discretionary discovery order, merely an intermediate step in these complex eases, would thwart rather than effectuate the purpose of 1292(b) to ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.’ ”) In Koehler our Court of Appeals observed that:"
} | 348,798 | a |
Unfortunately, many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant or even boorish behavior at work and endure criticism from their bosses. The Seventh Circuit has held that being addressed in a loud and unprofessional tone during one or two meetings does not satisfy the requirement that the offensive conduct be severe and pervasive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 526, 533, 537",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims\" and holding that a supervisor's conduct, though \"inappropriate and unprofessional,\" was not \"so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that “relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)(remarking that Title VII is not a code of “general civility”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "524 U.S. 775, 788",
"parenthetical": "remarking that Title VII is not a code of \"general civility\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that “relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)(remarking that Title VII is not a code of “general civility”)."
} | 4,324,340 | a |
Unfortunately, many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant or even boorish behavior at work and endure criticism from their bosses. The Seventh Circuit has held that being addressed in a loud and unprofessional tone during one or two meetings does not satisfy the requirement that the offensive conduct be severe and pervasive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remarking that Title VII is not a code of \"general civility\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that “relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)(remarking that Title VII is not a code of “general civility”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 526, 533, 537",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims\" and holding that a supervisor's conduct, though \"inappropriate and unprofessional,\" was not \"so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that “relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)(remarking that Title VII is not a code of “general civility”)."
} | 4,324,340 | b |
Unfortunately, many employees have to put up with some amount of rude, arrogant or even boorish behavior at work and endure criticism from their bosses. The Seventh Circuit has held that being addressed in a loud and unprofessional tone during one or two meetings does not satisfy the requirement that the offensive conduct be severe and pervasive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 526, 533, 537",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims\" and holding that a supervisor's conduct, though \"inappropriate and unprofessional,\" was not \"so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that “relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)(remarking that Title VII is not a code of “general civility”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remarking that Title VII is not a code of \"general civility\"",
"sentence": "See e.g., Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir.2005)); Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533, 537 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that “relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claims” and holding that a supervisor’s conduct, though “inappropriate and unprofessional,” was not “so serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII”); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)(remarking that Title VII is not a code of “general civility”)."
} | 4,324,340 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 U.S. 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 707, 717-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 U.S. 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "401 U.S. 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 707, 717-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | a |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 707, 717-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | b |
Rather, the two issues are distinct: Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be inadmissible, but they are not necessarily involuntary. That is, although the prosecution cannot use such statements in its casein-chief, the statements may nevertheless be admissible for impeachment purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (\"The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.\"); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (\"Any statements obtained during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of [Miranda] may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the State's case in chief.\" (emphasis added))."
} | 6,930,173 | a |
In this case, Sears was indicted for kidnapping Ms. Wilbur and inflicting bodily injury upon her by striking her with brass knuckles, and stabbing her to death with a knife. There is no basis for Sears' contention that the stabbing could not constitute part of the bodily injury in the kidnapping charge. As a matter of law, bodily injury does not have to be inflicted at the same moment as the initial abduction. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "261 Ga. 720, 720",
"parenthetical": "victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 250 (477 SE2d 562) (1996) (holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "267 Ga. 249, 250",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 250 (477 SE2d 562) (1996) (holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary)."
} | 74,804 | a |
In this case, Sears was indicted for kidnapping Ms. Wilbur and inflicting bodily injury upon her by striking her with brass knuckles, and stabbing her to death with a knife. There is no basis for Sears' contention that the stabbing could not constitute part of the bodily injury in the kidnapping charge. As a matter of law, bodily injury does not have to be inflicted at the same moment as the initial abduction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "267 Ga. 249, 250",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 250 (477 SE2d 562) (1996) (holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "238 Ga. 701, 701-702",
"parenthetical": "victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another",
"sentence": "Potts, 261 Ga. at 720 (victim seized in one county and bodily injury inflicted in another). See also Pryor, 238 Ga. at 701-702; cf. Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 250 (477 SE2d 562) (1996) (holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary, despite its technical completion, when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary)."
} | 74,804 | b |
. Defendants argue that plaintiff's allegation of breach of duty amounts to a negligence claim that is insufficient under CUTPA. (Dkt. #45, at 9-10). Connecticut case law admittedly is unclear as to whether negligence is sufficient to constitute a CUTPA violation on its own. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "243 Conn. 17, 34",
"parenthetical": "\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"); see also Williams Ford, at 590 & n. 25, 657 A.2d 212 (the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"); see also Williams Ford, at 590 & n. 25, 657 A.2d 212 (the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation)."
} | 11,615,134 | a |
. Defendants argue that plaintiff's allegation of breach of duty amounts to a negligence claim that is insufficient under CUTPA. (Dkt. #45, at 9-10). Connecticut case law admittedly is unclear as to whether negligence is sufficient to constitute a CUTPA violation on its own. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"); see also Williams Ford, at 590 & n. 25, 657 A.2d 212 (the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation",
"sentence": "See Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997)(\"we do not decide whether negligence alone is sufficient to support a CUTPA claim\"); see also Williams Ford, at 590 & n. 25, 657 A.2d 212 (the court declined to decide whether negligence of the defendant alone, unaccompanied by contributory negligence of plaintiff, will establish a CUTPA violation)."
} | 11,615,134 | a |
Plaintiff Rosemarie Howell also refers to Brian Howell as her husband in an e-mail, which was included in the filings submitted to the court, asking for Brian Howell's pension information. This court has held that a spouse is considered immediate family when considering the ability of a pro se litigant to represent the spouse. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "81 Fed.Cl. 234, 234",
"parenthetical": "defining \"immediate family members\" as a person's parents, spouse, children, and siblings",
"sentence": "See Kogan v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 707, 708-09 (2012) (referring to an order granting defendant’s wife, who is not an attorney, the ability to represent defendant pursuant to RCFC 83.1(a)(3)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 720 (10th ed. 2014) (defining immediate family as including a person’s spouse); Chief War Eagle Family Ass’n & Treaty of 1837 & 1917 Reinstatement v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 234, 234 (2007) (defining “immediate family members” as a person’s parents, spouse, children, and siblings) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (8th ed. 2004))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 Fed.Cl. 707, 708-09",
"parenthetical": "referring to an order granting defendant's wife, who is not an attorney, the ability to represent defendant pursuant to RCFC 83.1(a)(3",
"sentence": "See Kogan v. United States, 107 Fed.Cl. 707, 708-09 (2012) (referring to an order granting defendant’s wife, who is not an attorney, the ability to represent defendant pursuant to RCFC 83.1(a)(3)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 720 (10th ed. 2014) (defining immediate family as including a person’s spouse); Chief War Eagle Family Ass’n & Treaty of 1837 & 1917 Reinstatement v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 234, 234 (2007) (defining “immediate family members” as a person’s parents, spouse, children, and siblings) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (8th ed. 2004))."
} | 4,340,282 | b |
To the extent that the majority appears to believe that someone who testifies in an otherwise protected hearing is, ipso facto, immunized from the consequences of any self-incriminating admissions made during his testimony, I disagree. There is a clear and legally recognized distinction between the mere act of testifying on one hand and, on the other hand, making admissions while testifying that provide independent grounds for discipline. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: \"Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.\"",
"sentence": "See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2381 n. 5, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in \"virtually every\" such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext",
"sentence": "See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2381 n. 5, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”)."
} | 4,158,220 | b |
To the extent that the majority appears to believe that someone who testifies in an otherwise protected hearing is, ipso facto, immunized from the consequences of any self-incriminating admissions made during his testimony, I disagree. There is a clear and legally recognized distinction between the mere act of testifying on one hand and, on the other hand, making admissions while testifying that provide independent grounds for discipline. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in \"virtually every\" such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext",
"sentence": "See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2381 n. 5, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: \"Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.\"",
"sentence": "See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (11th Cir.1997) (concluding that an employee who testified in a protected Title VII case and admitted sexual harassment could be fired and that in “virtually every” such case the employer would be entitled to summary judgment, absent direct evidence of retaliation or pretext); cf. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2381 n. 5, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (noting in a First Amendment retaliation case: “Of course ... wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”)."
} | 4,158,220 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist's letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was \"untimely\" as well as unreasonable",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.3d 454, 465",
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were \"manifestations of a disability\" until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | 5,863,860 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138",
"parenthetical": "finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist's letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was \"untimely\" as well as unreasonable",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | 5,863,860 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.3d 454, 465",
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were \"manifestations of a disability\" until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 891, 894",
"parenthetical": "finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that \"she knew would mandate her discharge\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | 5,863,860 | b |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "181 F.3d 891, 894",
"parenthetical": "finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that \"she knew would mandate her discharge\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | 5,863,860 | a |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "669 F.3d 454, 465",
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were \"manifestations of a disability\" until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the \"danger\" of \"permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | 5,863,860 | b |
For two years, he had not had the capacity to handle a product his company was marketing. When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be "too little, too late." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting medical student's claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the \"danger\" of \"permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability\"",
"sentence": "Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n. 9; see also Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir.2004) (per curiam) (finding that plaintiffs presentation of therapist’s letter requesting leave of absence after plaintiff threatened supervisor with violence was “untimely” as well as unreasonable); Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir.1999) (finding accommodation request untimely when employee made request only after committing two rule violations that “she knew would mandate her discharge”); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 17 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997) (noting, in context of ADA retaliation claim, the “danger” of “permit[ting] an employee already on notice of performance problems to seek shelter in a belated claim of disability”); cf. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir.2012) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his mental illness, in part because student did not allege that his behavioral problems were “manifestations of a disability” until after disciplinary board had recommended his dismissal); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 796 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting medical student’s claim that school failed to reasonably accommodate his learning disability, in part because student never requested alternative testing method until he had failed exam three times and faced expulsion)."
} | 5,863,860 | b |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 467, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 467, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | b |
Subsets and Splits