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In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 U.S. 218, 236",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "94 S.Ct. 467, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | a |
In fact, a probable cause determination to support his arrest had already been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, though the dispatcher gave Officer Poulter incorrect information. Because there was probable cause to arrest Schwarz, Officer Poulter's pat-down search was a valid search incident to the arrest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441",
"parenthetical": "\"Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.\"",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement",
"sentence": "See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (a search incident to an arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant requirement); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973) (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the [arrestee] or that he did not himself suspect that [the arrestee] was armed.”)."
} | 882,734 | b |
No. 103-158, at 33 (1993) (noting that USERRA "would restructure, clarify, and improve " the VRRA (emphasis added)). Among other improvements, if an employer engaged in willful discrimination, USERRA permitted a plaintiff to seek liquidated damages, a form of relief unavailable under the VRRA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844",
"parenthetical": "holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury",
"sentence": "See Maher v. City of Chi., 463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844 (N.D.Ill.2006) (holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury); cf. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are “suits at common law” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that claims under the VRRA are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "999 F.2d 1101, 1109",
"parenthetical": "holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are \"suits at common law\" for purposes of the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial",
"sentence": "See Maher v. City of Chi., 463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844 (N.D.Ill.2006) (holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury); cf. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are “suits at common law” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that claims under the VRRA are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial)."
} | 4,048,269 | a |
No. 103-158, at 33 (1993) (noting that USERRA "would restructure, clarify, and improve " the VRRA (emphasis added)). Among other improvements, if an employer engaged in willful discrimination, USERRA permitted a plaintiff to seek liquidated damages, a form of relief unavailable under the VRRA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 1000, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims under the VRRA are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial",
"sentence": "See Maher v. City of Chi., 463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844 (N.D.Ill.2006) (holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury); cf. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are “suits at common law” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that claims under the VRRA are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844",
"parenthetical": "holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury",
"sentence": "See Maher v. City of Chi., 463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844 (N.D.Ill.2006) (holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury); cf. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are “suits at common law” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that claims under the VRRA are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial)."
} | 4,048,269 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "325 S.C. 25, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 S.C. 55, 63",
"parenthetical": "finding officers' statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant's apartment were not hearsay",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 S.C. 55, 63",
"parenthetical": "finding officers' statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant's apartment were not hearsay",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94",
"parenthetical": "finding officers' statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant's apartment were not hearsay",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "325 S.C. 25, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | 452,275 | a |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94",
"parenthetical": "finding officers' statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant's apartment were not hearsay",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | 452,275 | a |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "325 S.C. 25, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "352 S.C. 552, 558",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "352 S.C. 552, 558",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "325 S.C. 25, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | 452,275 | a |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 S.E.2d 77, 81",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 S.C. 63, 63",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "325 S.C. 25, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | 452,275 | a |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 S.C. 63, 63",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "325 S.C. 25, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "451 S.E.2d 894, 894",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | 452,275 | b |
Second, this testimony was in response to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why Lieutenant Weston did not perform a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene. Lieutenant Weston's testimony was offered to explain this part of his investigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "451 S.E.2d 894, 894",
"parenthetical": "\" '[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.' \" (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894",
"sentence": "See State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994) (finding officers’ statements explaining why they began their surveillance of defendant’s apartment were not hearsay); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 558, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.2003) (“ ‘[A]n out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken.’ ” (quoting Brown, 317 S.C. at 63, 451 S.E.2d at 894)). Furthermore, Lieutenant Weston did not testify to any specific statements that identified Weaver."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89",
"parenthetical": "holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant",
"sentence": "Cf. German v. State, 325 S.C. 25, 27-28, 478 S.E.2d 687, 688-89 (1996) (holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant). Because this testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it."
} | 452,275 | a |
Taken as a whole, the instructions and jury forms were not misleading. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 Ariz. 471, 471",
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ariz.App. 423, 425",
"parenthetical": "although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | 255,169 | a |
Taken as a whole, the instructions and jury forms were not misleading. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 Ariz. 471, 471",
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "549 P.2d 203, 205",
"parenthetical": "although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | 255,169 | a |
Taken as a whole, the instructions and jury forms were not misleading. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "433 P.2d 21, 21",
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ariz.App. 423, 425",
"parenthetical": "although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | 255,169 | a |
Taken as a whole, the instructions and jury forms were not misleading. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "433 P.2d 21, 21",
"parenthetical": "finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "549 P.2d 203, 205",
"parenthetical": "although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions",
"sentence": "See Garcia, 102 Ariz. at 471, 433 P.2d at 21 (finding no prejudicial error in the submission of the jury forms because the jury received correct instructions); cf. State v. Neal, 26 Ariz.App. 423, 425, 549 P.2d 203, 205 (1976) (although the trial court violated the criminal rule requiring it to confer with the parties and inform them of the form of verdict it intends to use, no prejudicial error occurred because the jury received correct instructions)."
} | 255,169 | a |
This assertion is further supported by the fact that according to published opinions a Virginia court has never dismissed a claim of negligent hiring because of preclusion by a respondeat superior claim. In fact, Virginia courts have allowed both of these claims to go forward in the same action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing trial court's entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | 9,219,337 | b |
This assertion is further supported by the fact that according to published opinions a Virginia court has never dismissed a claim of negligent hiring because of preclusion by a respondeat superior claim. In fact, Virginia courts have allowed both of these claims to go forward in the same action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing trial court's entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | 9,219,337 | b |
This assertion is further supported by the fact that according to published opinions a Virginia court has never dismissed a claim of negligent hiring because of preclusion by a respondeat superior claim. In fact, Virginia courts have allowed both of these claims to go forward in the same action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing trial court's entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | 9,219,337 | a |
This assertion is further supported by the fact that according to published opinions a Virginia court has never dismissed a claim of negligent hiring because of preclusion by a respondeat superior claim. In fact, Virginia courts have allowed both of these claims to go forward in the same action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing trial court's entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention",
"sentence": "See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 112 S.E. 628 (1922) (allowing theories of respondeat superior and negligent training to go to a jury verdict); See also Majorana v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000) (discussing trial court’s entry of summary judgment on claims of liability under respondeat superior and claims of negligence under negligent hiring and retention)."
} | 9,219,337 | a |
In such circumstances the appropriate step is to remand the case for further proceedings (including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary) so that the district court can determine the merits of Newell's claims in the first instance. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "571 F.2d 314, 314",
"parenthetical": "finding due process violation where state made witnesses unavailable to testify and remanding for district court to determine whether their unavailability was prejudicial to defendant",
"sentence": "See Rice v. Bowen, 264 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir.2001) (“Because the district court’s conclusion with respect to timeliness had the effect of cutting off further development of the record and issues there ... the proper step is to remand the case to that court for further proceedings.”); see also Lockett, 571 F.2d at 314 (finding due process violation where state made witnesses unavailable to testify and remanding for district court to determine whether their unavailability was prejudicial to defendant). We note that § 2254(e)(2), which circumscribes a federal court’s ability to hold an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner has “failed” to develop the factual record in state court, does not apply here because Newell’s claims went undeveloped through no fault of his own."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 698, 702",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the district court's conclusion with respect to timeliness had the effect of cutting off further development of the record and issues there ... the proper step is to remand the case to that court for further proceedings.\"",
"sentence": "See Rice v. Bowen, 264 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir.2001) (“Because the district court’s conclusion with respect to timeliness had the effect of cutting off further development of the record and issues there ... the proper step is to remand the case to that court for further proceedings.”); see also Lockett, 571 F.2d at 314 (finding due process violation where state made witnesses unavailable to testify and remanding for district court to determine whether their unavailability was prejudicial to defendant). We note that § 2254(e)(2), which circumscribes a federal court’s ability to hold an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner has “failed” to develop the factual record in state court, does not apply here because Newell’s claims went undeveloped through no fault of his own."
} | 9,511,964 | b |
Here, on the other hand, nothing in the specifications distinguishes the claimed "member" from prior art based on its shape or number of components. And the specifications do not even imply that "all embodiments" of the claimed exercise machine must use a single-component, straight-bar member or else tout the advantages of using that particular structure. In short, Life Fitness cannot use the intrinsic evidence's silence to narrow the ordinary meaning of an unambiguous claim term. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "175 F.3d 992, 992",
"parenthetical": "\"[M]ere inferences drawn from the description of an embodiment of the invention cannot serve to limit claim terms.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 992, 50 USPQ2d at 1612 (“[M]ere inferences drawn from the description of an embodiment of the invention cannot serve to limit claim terms.”); Kegel, 127 F.3d at 1427, 44 USPQ2d at 1127 (‘Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning.”); see also Wang Labs., 197 F.3d at 1384, 53 USPQ2d at 1165-66 (limiting term “frame” to the character-based system in the specification when (among other things) the prosecution history distinguished the claimed invention from prior art based on that system)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "197 F.3d 1384, 1384",
"parenthetical": "limiting term \"frame\" to the character-based system in the specification when (among other things",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 992, 50 USPQ2d at 1612 (“[M]ere inferences drawn from the description of an embodiment of the invention cannot serve to limit claim terms.”); Kegel, 127 F.3d at 1427, 44 USPQ2d at 1127 (‘Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning.”); see also Wang Labs., 197 F.3d at 1384, 53 USPQ2d at 1165-66 (limiting term “frame” to the character-based system in the specification when (among other things) the prosecution history distinguished the claimed invention from prior art based on that system)."
} | 9,441,924 | a |
Here, on the other hand, nothing in the specifications distinguishes the claimed "member" from prior art based on its shape or number of components. And the specifications do not even imply that "all embodiments" of the claimed exercise machine must use a single-component, straight-bar member or else tout the advantages of using that particular structure. In short, Life Fitness cannot use the intrinsic evidence's silence to narrow the ordinary meaning of an unambiguous claim term. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "197 F.3d 1384, 1384",
"parenthetical": "limiting term \"frame\" to the character-based system in the specification when (among other things",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 992, 50 USPQ2d at 1612 (“[M]ere inferences drawn from the description of an embodiment of the invention cannot serve to limit claim terms.”); Kegel, 127 F.3d at 1427, 44 USPQ2d at 1127 (‘Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning.”); see also Wang Labs., 197 F.3d at 1384, 53 USPQ2d at 1165-66 (limiting term “frame” to the character-based system in the specification when (among other things) the prosecution history distinguished the claimed invention from prior art based on that system)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "127 F.3d 1427, 1427",
"parenthetical": "'Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 992, 50 USPQ2d at 1612 (“[M]ere inferences drawn from the description of an embodiment of the invention cannot serve to limit claim terms.”); Kegel, 127 F.3d at 1427, 44 USPQ2d at 1127 (‘Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning.”); see also Wang Labs., 197 F.3d at 1384, 53 USPQ2d at 1165-66 (limiting term “frame” to the character-based system in the specification when (among other things) the prosecution history distinguished the claimed invention from prior art based on that system)."
} | 9,441,924 | b |
As I have analyzed his statement of financial condition, he has funds available to him that he can use to discharge his restitution obligations. Furthermore, "ERISA's anti-alienation clause does not apply to pension funds that have already been distributed to the beneficiary." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "89 F.3d 1322, 1322",
"parenthetical": "restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset",
"sentence": "Jackson, 229 F.3d at 1225. Pension funds, once distributed, are subject to restitution orders and are not protected by ERISA. Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.2000) (“this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”); Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762, at *3-*5 (restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments — lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings — did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment); cf. Lampien, 89 F.3d at 1322 (restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary\"",
"sentence": "Jackson, 229 F.3d at 1225. Pension funds, once distributed, are subject to restitution orders and are not protected by ERISA. Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.2000) (“this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”); Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762, at *3-*5 (restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments — lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings — did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment); cf. Lampien, 89 F.3d at 1322 (restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset)."
} | 9,242,313 | b |
As I have analyzed his statement of financial condition, he has funds available to him that he can use to discharge his restitution obligations. Furthermore, "ERISA's anti-alienation clause does not apply to pension funds that have already been distributed to the beneficiary." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "89 F.3d 1322, 1322",
"parenthetical": "restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset",
"sentence": "Jackson, 229 F.3d at 1225. Pension funds, once distributed, are subject to restitution orders and are not protected by ERISA. Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.2000) (“this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”); Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762, at *3-*5 (restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments — lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings — did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment); cf. Lampien, 89 F.3d at 1322 (restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 197, 203",
"parenthetical": "\"this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary\"",
"sentence": "Jackson, 229 F.3d at 1225. Pension funds, once distributed, are subject to restitution orders and are not protected by ERISA. Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.2000) (“this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”); Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762, at *3-*5 (restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments — lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings — did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment); cf. Lampien, 89 F.3d at 1322 (restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset)."
} | 9,242,313 | b |
As I have analyzed his statement of financial condition, he has funds available to him that he can use to discharge his restitution obligations. Furthermore, "ERISA's anti-alienation clause does not apply to pension funds that have already been distributed to the beneficiary." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2003 WL 21222546, *2",
"parenthetical": "restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments -- lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings -- did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment",
"sentence": "Jackson, 229 F.3d at 1225. Pension funds, once distributed, are subject to restitution orders and are not protected by ERISA. Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.2000) (“this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”); Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762, at *3-*5 (restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments — lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings — did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment); cf. Lampien, 89 F.3d at 1322 (restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "89 F.3d 1322, 1322",
"parenthetical": "restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset",
"sentence": "Jackson, 229 F.3d at 1225. Pension funds, once distributed, are subject to restitution orders and are not protected by ERISA. Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir.2000) (“this statutory scheme protects benefits only while they are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”); Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762, at *3-*5 (restitution order valid, since the schedule of required payments — lump sum of $60,000 plus 10% of gross monthly earnings — did not specify source of funds to be paid in restitution, or direct liquidation of specific assets, and because defendant had other potential sources of payment); cf. Lampien, 89 F.3d at 1322 (restitution order vacated because it required sale of a single specific asset)."
} | 9,242,313 | a |
The express assertion of the right to remain silent has been analyzed somewhat differently from silence itself, at least in the context of prearrest, pre-Miranda silence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "386 Mass. 54, 62",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]n general impeachment of a defendant with the fact of his [pre-Miranda,] pre-arrest silence should be approached with caution, and, whenever it is undertaken, it should be prefaced by a proper demonstration that it was 'natural' to expect the defendant to speak in the circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Sazama, 339 Mass. at 157-159; Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. at 532-533; Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 62 (1982) (“[i]n general impeachment of a defendant with the fact of his [pre-Miranda,] pre-arrest silence should be approached with caution, and, whenever it is undertaken, it should be prefaced by a proper demonstration that it was ‘natural’ to expect the defendant to speak in the circumstances”); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 116-117, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "impeachment of defendant with prearrest, pre-Miranda silence not found to violate Federal Constitution",
"sentence": "See also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (impeachment of defendant with prearrest, pre-Miranda silence not found to violate Federal Constitution)."
} | 4,085,406 | a |
Evidence was presented at trial that Teems assumed the risks of car surfing as implied by her conduct. When a person voluntarily undertakes an obviously dangerous activity, that person can be said to have assumed the risks necessarily attendant to that activity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "214 Ga. App. 540, 541",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] person cannot undertake to do what obviously is a dangerous thing. . . without assuming the risks incident thereto and without himself being guilty of such lack of due care for his own safety as to bar him from recovery.\"",
"sentence": "See Roberts v. Carter, 214 Ga. App. 540, 541 (448 SE2d 239) (1994) (“[A] person cannot undertake to do what obviously is a dangerous thing. . . without assuming the risks incident thereto and without himself being guilty of such lack of due care for his own safety as to bar him from recovery.”) (citations and punctuation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 Ga. App. 11, 13-14",
"parenthetical": "jury question existed over whether employee assumed the risk of injury when he rode on the fender of a moving tractor driven by his employer",
"sentence": "See also Stone v. Cook, 190 Ga. App. 11, 13-14 (1) (378 SE2d 142) (1989) (jury question existed over whether employee assumed the risk of injury when he rode on the fender of a moving tractor driven by his employer)."
} | 12,124,352 | a |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 626, 635",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.2d 1191, 1221",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government's failure to produce original 302's did not violate the Confrontation Clause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | a |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "697 F.2d 170, 174-75",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 626, 635",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | b |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.2d 1191, 1221",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government's failure to produce original 302's did not violate the Confrontation Clause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | b |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "697 F.2d 170, 174-75",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | b |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.2d 1191, 1221",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government's failure to produce original 302's did not violate the Confrontation Clause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | a |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "697 F.2d 170, 174-75",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | b |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.2d 1191, 1221",
"parenthetical": "holding that the government's failure to produce original 302's did not violate the Confrontation Clause",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | b |
Second, Muhammad had no legal basis to compel the Government to produce Agent Gandolfo's original interview notes that were subsequently incorporated into the FBI 302. A defendant is not entitled to an agent's notes if the agent's report contains all that was in the original notes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent's handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "697 F.2d 170, 174-75",
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed",
"sentence": "See United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1978) (holding that the government did not violate the Jenks Act by failing to produce an agent’s handwritten notes, which were discarded after being typed into a summary), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1221 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the government’s failure to produce original 302’s did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174-75 (7th Cir.1982) (holding that the defendant’s right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed)."
} | 224,154 | a |
It is the disputed portion of the premises which could not be searched in the absence of "joint access or control for most purposes" over them by Ms. Bakker. Mr. Kelley's privacy interest in his bedroom is not diminished by the fact that Ms. Bakker had access to other areas of the apartment; similarly, the police may not search a bedroom merely because other areas of the apartment may lawfully be searched. Precedent makes clear that Ms. Bakker could validly consent to a warrant-less search of Mr. Kelley's bedroom only if she had "joint access and control for most purposes" over the bedroom itself. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "503 F.2d 1288, 1288",
"parenthetical": "holding consent invalid when a housemate had unlimited access to the common areas of the apartment but only limited access to her housemate's bedroom",
"sentence": "See Cunningham, 352 F.2d at 4-5 (noting that the validity of consent is analyzed according to the particular area to be searched and the extent of the housemate’s access to that particular area); see also Heisman, 503 F.2d at 1288 (holding consent invalid when a housemate had unlimited access to the common areas of the apartment but only limited access to her housemate’s bedroom)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "352 F.2d 4, 4-5",
"parenthetical": "noting that the validity of consent is analyzed according to the particular area to be searched and the extent of the housemate's access to that particular area",
"sentence": "See Cunningham, 352 F.2d at 4-5 (noting that the validity of consent is analyzed according to the particular area to be searched and the extent of the housemate’s access to that particular area); see also Heisman, 503 F.2d at 1288 (holding consent invalid when a housemate had unlimited access to the common areas of the apartment but only limited access to her housemate’s bedroom)."
} | 10,518,894 | b |
Here, for the purposes of the jurisdictional inquiry, the tort "occurred" on navigable waters because the negligence "took effect" while the Burkes' vessel was docked at a port on navigable waters, even though the negligent act itself -- the installation of the davit -- took place elsewhere. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "919 F.Supp. 1234, 1238",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he locality test is met despite the fact that the allegedly defective ... repair of the boat occurred on land.\"",
"sentence": "See Mink v. Genmar Industries, Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1994) (pleasure boat’s alleged design defect “could not have manifested itself, and the injury could not have occurred until the vessel was actually operated as a vessel in navigation. Thus, logically, the tort is a maritime tort.”); see also Bodnar v. Hi-Lex Corp., 919 F.Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“[T]he locality test is met despite the fact that the allegedly defective ... repair of the boat occurred on land.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "29 F.3d 1543, 1546",
"parenthetical": "pleasure boat's alleged design defect \"could not have manifested itself, and the injury could not have occurred until the vessel was actually operated as a vessel in navigation. Thus, logically, the tort is a maritime tort.\"",
"sentence": "See Mink v. Genmar Industries, Inc., 29 F.3d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1994) (pleasure boat’s alleged design defect “could not have manifested itself, and the injury could not have occurred until the vessel was actually operated as a vessel in navigation. Thus, logically, the tort is a maritime tort.”); see also Bodnar v. Hi-Lex Corp., 919 F.Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“[T]he locality test is met despite the fact that the allegedly defective ... repair of the boat occurred on land.”)."
} | 2,584,757 | b |
In Cohen v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., plaintiff alleged that when she refinanced her home she was charged the initial, basic rate for title insurance, rather than the lower refinance rate, three years after she first purchased title insurance for that home. Judge Sanchez reasoned that "[t]he Legislature knows how to make a remedy exclusive," but, by using the word "may," the Act '"signaled [a] discretionary rather than [a] mandatory act." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "276 F.3d 160, 168",
"parenthetical": "stating that Legislature had not added exclusivity language since the ruling in Pekular",
"sentence": "Id. at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36689 at *9; see Pekular v. Eich, 355 Pa.Super. 276, 513 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986) (holding that UIPA does not give Commission exclusive power to adjudicate deceptive act claims); see also Highmark, Inc., v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir.2001) (stating that Legislature had not added exclusivity language since the ruling in Pekular)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that UIPA does not give Commission exclusive power to adjudicate deceptive act claims",
"sentence": "Id. at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36689 at *9; see Pekular v. Eich, 355 Pa.Super. 276, 513 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986) (holding that UIPA does not give Commission exclusive power to adjudicate deceptive act claims); see also Highmark, Inc., v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir.2001) (stating that Legislature had not added exclusivity language since the ruling in Pekular)."
} | 4,062,401 | b |
In Cohen v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., plaintiff alleged that when she refinanced her home she was charged the initial, basic rate for title insurance, rather than the lower refinance rate, three years after she first purchased title insurance for that home. Judge Sanchez reasoned that "[t]he Legislature knows how to make a remedy exclusive," but, by using the word "may," the Act '"signaled [a] discretionary rather than [a] mandatory act." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "276 F.3d 160, 168",
"parenthetical": "stating that Legislature had not added exclusivity language since the ruling in Pekular",
"sentence": "Id. at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36689 at *9; see Pekular v. Eich, 355 Pa.Super. 276, 513 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986) (holding that UIPA does not give Commission exclusive power to adjudicate deceptive act claims); see also Highmark, Inc., v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir.2001) (stating that Legislature had not added exclusivity language since the ruling in Pekular)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 427, 430",
"parenthetical": "holding that UIPA does not give Commission exclusive power to adjudicate deceptive act claims",
"sentence": "Id. at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36689 at *9; see Pekular v. Eich, 355 Pa.Super. 276, 513 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa.Super.Ct.1986) (holding that UIPA does not give Commission exclusive power to adjudicate deceptive act claims); see also Highmark, Inc., v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 168 (3d Cir.2001) (stating that Legislature had not added exclusivity language since the ruling in Pekular)."
} | 4,062,401 | b |
Even if Lash's testimony were admissible, her conclusion was unsupported: Lash conceded at deposition that she did not purport to opine on the cause of Harriman's injuries. The district court was thus free to disregard that aspect of her testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "409 F.3d 12, 25-26",
"parenthetical": "\"A nisi prius court need not give weight to opinion evidence that is unsupported by an adequate foundation.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 25-26 (1st Cir.2005) (“A nisi prius court need not give weight to opinion evidence that is unsupported by an adequate foundation.”); see also Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir.1994) (recognizing that “tenuous assertions strung together by strands of speculation and surmise” cannot defeat summary judgment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 576, 583",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"tenuous assertions strung together by strands of speculation and surmise\" cannot defeat summary judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 25-26 (1st Cir.2005) (“A nisi prius court need not give weight to opinion evidence that is unsupported by an adequate foundation.”); see also Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir.1994) (recognizing that “tenuous assertions strung together by strands of speculation and surmise” cannot defeat summary judgment)."
} | 6,052,094 | a |
Given that judges are not only generally held to higher standards than lawyers, but, when acting in their official capacities, are performing official government functions, it is likely, when a judge is charged with the obstruction of the administration of justice due to the contents of a judicial opinion, that an even lower standard than a "substantial likelihood" of obstruction may apply. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 S. Ct. 2351, 2351",
"parenthetical": "\"a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "427 F. Supp. 1239, 1239",
"parenthetical": "\"The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge's right of free speech.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”)."
} | 3,577,472 | b |
Given that judges are not only generally held to higher standards than lawyers, but, when acting in their official capacities, are performing official government functions, it is likely, when a judge is charged with the obstruction of the administration of justice due to the contents of a judicial opinion, that an even lower standard than a "substantial likelihood" of obstruction may apply. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "131 S. Ct. 2351, 2351",
"parenthetical": "\"a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "542 P.2d 684, 684",
"parenthetical": "\"For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Halleck, 427 F. Supp. at 1239 (“The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration in the District of Columbia, reflects the limits on a judge’s right of free speech.”) (footnote omitted); Rome, 542 P.2d at 684 (“For a judge the right to speak freely is circumscribed by the code of judicial conduct, just as that of the lawyer is subject to the code of professional responsibility, and first amendment rights do not exempt a judge from discipline for proven judicial misconduct.”); cf. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2351 (“a legislator has no right to use official powers for expressive purposes”)."
} | 3,577,472 | b |
See M21-1MR, pt. However, this argument was not presented below, and Mr. Johnson fails to demonstrate the clear evidence of irregularity that is necessary to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to the actions of Government officials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 1343, 1347",
"parenthetical": "\"The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.\"",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "580 F.3d 1288, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician's qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board's reliance upon that physician's opinion.\"",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | 6,053,074 | a |
See M21-1MR, pt. However, this argument was not presented below, and Mr. Johnson fails to demonstrate the clear evidence of irregularity that is necessary to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to the actions of Government officials. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "21 Vet.App. 545, 552",
"parenthetical": "Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 1343, 1347",
"parenthetical": "\"The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.\"",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | 6,053,074 | b |
See M21-1MR, pt. However, this argument was not presented below, and Mr. Johnson fails to demonstrate the clear evidence of irregularity that is necessary to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to the actions of Government officials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 1337, 1340",
"parenthetical": "\"The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.\"",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "580 F.3d 1288, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician's qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board's reliance upon that physician's opinion.\"",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | 6,053,074 | a |
See M21-1MR, pt. However, this argument was not presented below, and Mr. Johnson fails to demonstrate the clear evidence of irregularity that is necessary to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to the actions of Government officials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 F.3d 1337, 1340",
"parenthetical": "\"The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.\"",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "21 Vet.App. 545, 552",
"parenthetical": "Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record",
"sentence": "See Miley v. Principi, 366 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The presumption of regularity provides that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that public officers have properly discharged their official duties.”); Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“The [presumption of regularity] doctrine thus allows courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”); cf. Rizzo v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2009) (“Absent some challenge to the expertise of a VA expert ... [there is] no statutory or other requirement that VA must present affirmative evidence of a physician’s qualifications in every case as a precondition for the Board’s reliance upon that physician’s opinion.”); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board must address only those issues raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record)."
} | 6,053,074 | a |
. The Ninth Circuit has since switched sides. Presently, only the Eighth Circuit, which decided Barr, disagrees with the Seventh. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 F.3d 104, 108",
"parenthetical": "stating that six of the seven circuits that have addressed the issue have held that SS 5861(d",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reyna, 130 F.3d 104, 108 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that six of the seven circuits that have addressed the issue have held that § 5861(d) requires proof that the defendant knows the characteristics of his sawed-off shotgun that bring it within the Act, with the 8th Circuit the only outlier); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that “the government was required to present sufficient evidence that [the defendant] knew the firearm had a barrel length of less than eighteen inches”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "446 F.3d 1122, 1129",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"the government was required to present sufficient evidence that [the defendant] knew the firearm had a barrel length of less than eighteen inches\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reyna, 130 F.3d 104, 108 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that six of the seven circuits that have addressed the issue have held that § 5861(d) requires proof that the defendant knows the characteristics of his sawed-off shotgun that bring it within the Act, with the 8th Circuit the only outlier); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that “the government was required to present sufficient evidence that [the defendant] knew the firearm had a barrel length of less than eighteen inches”)."
} | 5,656,977 | a |
With these principles in mind, it seems to me the majority reads too much into Winter. In doing so, they take the minority position among circuits to have considered the issue. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "802 F.3d 558, 569-71",
"parenthetical": "applying sliding scale test for a stay pending appeal post-Winter",
"sentence": "See Alliance for the Wild Rock ies, 682 F.3d at 1134-35 (holding that a “serious questions” version of the sliding scale approach to preliminary injunctions survives Winter); Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35-38 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); see also Revel AC, Inc. v. IDEA Boardwalk LLC, 802 F.3d 558, 569-71 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying sliding scale test for a stay pending appeal post-Winter)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "682 F.3d 1134, 1134-35",
"parenthetical": "holding that a \"serious questions\" version of the sliding scale approach to preliminary injunctions survives Winter",
"sentence": "See Alliance for the Wild Rock ies, 682 F.3d at 1134-35 (holding that a “serious questions” version of the sliding scale approach to preliminary injunctions survives Winter); Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35-38 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); see also Revel AC, Inc. v. IDEA Boardwalk LLC, 802 F.3d 558, 569-71 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying sliding scale test for a stay pending appeal post-Winter)."
} | 12,177,691 | b |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "286 Md. 530, 535",
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "320 Md. 150, 175-76",
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | 192,023 | b |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "320 Md. 150, 175-76",
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | 192,023 | b |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "286 Md. 530, 535",
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | 192,023 | b |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | 192,023 | a |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "286 Md. 530, 535",
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | 192,023 | a |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | 192,023 | b |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "286 Md. 530, 535",
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | 192,023 | b |
"But this did not have the effect of nullifying the 1986 paternity judgment, which declared John to be the father; furthermore, it did not vest paternity in Randy. In regard to paternity and as to the parental relationship between John and the child, the name change was meaningless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents",
"sentence": "See also Stancill v. Stancill, 286 Md. 530, 535, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979) (a court may not be handcuffed in the exercise of its duty to act in the best interests of a child by any agreement between the parents)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship",
"sentence": "See Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 175-76, 577 A.2d 14 (1990) (a court has no authority to terminate a parental relationship other than through a decree of adoption or guardianship). Even if it was the mother’s intent to terminate John’s child support payments by changing her child’s name, the result would be no different. In Stambaugh v. Child Support Admin., 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991), we made clear that one parent may not waive his or her child’s right to support from the other parent."
} | 192,023 | b |
The BIA relied on both forms of notice, and did not state that either would have been individually adequate. If we were to find that either form of notice were problematic or deficient, agency law principles might require that the case be remanded to the BIA to determine whether the remaining notice was adequate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 194, 196",
"parenthetical": "stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency",
"sentence": "SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency); cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters “that statutes place primarily in agency hands”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "537 U.S. 12, 16",
"parenthetical": "requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters \"that statutes place primarily in agency hands\"",
"sentence": "SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency); cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters “that statutes place primarily in agency hands”)."
} | 3,857,644 | a |
The BIA relied on both forms of notice, and did not state that either would have been individually adequate. If we were to find that either form of notice were problematic or deficient, agency law principles might require that the case be remanded to the BIA to determine whether the remaining notice was adequate. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters \"that statutes place primarily in agency hands\"",
"sentence": "SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency); cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters “that statutes place primarily in agency hands”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 194, 196",
"parenthetical": "stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency",
"sentence": "SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency); cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters “that statutes place primarily in agency hands”)."
} | 3,857,644 | b |
The BIA relied on both forms of notice, and did not state that either would have been individually adequate. If we were to find that either form of notice were problematic or deficient, agency law principles might require that the case be remanded to the BIA to determine whether the remaining notice was adequate. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 194, 196",
"parenthetical": "stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency",
"sentence": "SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency); cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters “that statutes place primarily in agency hands”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters \"that statutes place primarily in agency hands\"",
"sentence": "SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (stating federal courts will not affirm agency decisions based on reasoning not considered by the agency); cf. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (requiring remand for agency determination in first instance of matters “that statutes place primarily in agency hands”)."
} | 3,857,644 | a |
The District Court's categorical denial of tolling is also incompatible with Delaware's apparent intent to encourage SS 220 actions as a way to allow stockholders to resolve disputes with the aid of a streamlined books and records proceeding. See Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, CIV. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2017 WL 239364, at *3",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"Section 220 proceedings are supposed to be streamlined and summary\"",
"sentence": "A. No. 7455, 2017 WL 239364, at *3 (Del. Jan. 18, 2017) (noting that “Section 220 proceedings are supposed to be streamlined and summary”); see also King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011) (noting that “Delaware courts have strongly encouraged stockholder-plaintiffs to utilize Section 220”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 A.3d 1140, 1145",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"Delaware courts have strongly encouraged stockholder-plaintiffs to utilize Section 220\"",
"sentence": "A. No. 7455, 2017 WL 239364, at *3 (Del. Jan. 18, 2017) (noting that “Section 220 proceedings are supposed to be streamlined and summary”); see also King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Del. 2011) (noting that “Delaware courts have strongly encouraged stockholder-plaintiffs to utilize Section 220”)."
} | 12,276,155 | a |
At the charge conference, Faucette's and Schadler's only objection to this question was that the answers should have been separate for each of them. They did not complain that the instruction's measure of damages was improper or otherwise object to the instruction. Therefore, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the language in the charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "240 S.W.3d 864, 868",
"parenthetical": "holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court",
"sentence": "Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000) (holding, when no objection is made to jury issue, sufficiency of the evidence is measured against charge given by court rather than some other unidentified law); Kroger Co. v. Brown, 267 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court); Tribble & Stephens Co. v. Consolidated Services, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied) (holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure),"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "12 S.W.3d 31, 55",
"parenthetical": "holding, when no objection is made to jury issue, sufficiency of the evidence is measured against charge given by court rather than some other unidentified law",
"sentence": "Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000) (holding, when no objection is made to jury issue, sufficiency of the evidence is measured against charge given by court rather than some other unidentified law); Kroger Co. v. Brown, 267 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court); Tribble & Stephens Co. v. Consolidated Services, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied) (holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure),"
} | 7,323,992 | b |
The Court is cognizant of its statutory duty to take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. Based on the particular facts of this case, we cannot hold that the error was harmless because the Board has not yet adjudicated Mrs. Reliford's accrued benefits claim against the proper factual background. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 1255, 1263",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding.\"",
"sentence": "See Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“Harmless error is fully applicable to veterans’ claims cases, subject to the same principles that apply generally to harmless error analysis in other civil and administrative cases.”) (citing Sanders, 556 U.S. at 406, 129 S.Ct. 1696); Wagner v. United States, 365 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“Where the effect of an error on the outcome of a proceeding is unquantifiable, however, we will not speculate as to what the outcome might have been had the error not occurred.”); Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 488, 498 (2010) (per curiam) (“[T]he assessment of prejudice generally is case specific, demonstrated by the appellant and based on the record.”); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“[A]ppellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "365 F.3d 1358, 1365",
"parenthetical": "\"Where the effect of an error on the outcome of a proceeding is unquantifiable, however, we will not speculate as to what the outcome might have been had the error not occurred.\"",
"sentence": "See Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“Harmless error is fully applicable to veterans’ claims cases, subject to the same principles that apply generally to harmless error analysis in other civil and administrative cases.”) (citing Sanders, 556 U.S. at 406, 129 S.Ct. 1696); Wagner v. United States, 365 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“Where the effect of an error on the outcome of a proceeding is unquantifiable, however, we will not speculate as to what the outcome might have been had the error not occurred.”); Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 488, 498 (2010) (per curiam) (“[T]he assessment of prejudice generally is case specific, demonstrated by the appellant and based on the record.”); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (“[A]ppellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding.”)."
} | 4,046,606 | b |
Several courts have held that a police officer's use of ethnic slurs, when coupled with use of excessive force, is sufficient to state an IIED claim. Indeed, at least one court has held that even in the absence of excessive force, allegations that a police officer uses ethnic slurs against arrestees suffice to state an IIED claim. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "221 F.3d 883, 890",
"parenthetical": "holding that motorist's allegation that racial epithet was used against him, coupled with officers' justifiable use of force, did not state IIED claim",
"sentence": "But see Watkins v. City of Southfield, 221 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Michigan law) (holding that motorist’s allegation that racial epithet was used against him, coupled with officers’ justifiable use of force, did not state IIED claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "598 N.W.2d 657, 660-61, 663",
"parenthetical": "upholding jury verdict on IIED claim in favor of arrestees where officers used justifiable force but also used racial epithet and disparaging names",
"sentence": "See Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 660-61, 663 (Minn.1999) (upholding jury verdict on IIED claim in favor of arrestees where officers used justifiable force but also used racial epithet and disparaging names)."
} | 11,181,124 | b |
We cannot create a Bivens remedy if there are "indications that congressional action has not been inadvertent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "487 U.S. 423, 423",
"parenthetical": "\"[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.\"",
"sentence": "See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (“[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); Kotarski, 866 F.2d at 312 (“[s]o long as Congress’ failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.”); cf. Bricker, 22 F.3d at 875 (failed bills “may suggest that Congress’s inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 875, 875",
"parenthetical": "failed bills \"may suggest that Congress's inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.\"",
"sentence": "See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (“[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); Kotarski, 866 F.2d at 312 (“[s]o long as Congress’ failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.”); cf. Bricker, 22 F.3d at 875 (failed bills “may suggest that Congress’s inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.”)."
} | 336,500 | a |
We cannot create a Bivens remedy if there are "indications that congressional action has not been inadvertent." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 875, 875",
"parenthetical": "failed bills \"may suggest that Congress's inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.\"",
"sentence": "See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (“[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); Kotarski, 866 F.2d at 312 (“[s]o long as Congress’ failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.”); cf. Bricker, 22 F.3d at 875 (failed bills “may suggest that Congress’s inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "108 S.Ct. 2468, 2468",
"parenthetical": "\"[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.\"",
"sentence": "See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (“[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); Kotarski, 866 F.2d at 312 (“[s]o long as Congress’ failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.”); cf. Bricker, 22 F.3d at 875 (failed bills “may suggest that Congress’s inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.”)."
} | 336,500 | b |
We cannot create a Bivens remedy if there are "indications that congressional action has not been inadvertent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 312, 312",
"parenthetical": "\"[s]o long as Congress' failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.\"",
"sentence": "See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (“[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); Kotarski, 866 F.2d at 312 (“[s]o long as Congress’ failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.”); cf. Bricker, 22 F.3d at 875 (failed bills “may suggest that Congress’s inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "22 F.3d 875, 875",
"parenthetical": "failed bills \"may suggest that Congress's inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.\"",
"sentence": "See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2468 (“[w]hen the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.”); Kotarski, 866 F.2d at 312 (“[s]o long as Congress’ failure to provide money damages, or other significant relief, has not been inadvertent, courts should defer to its judgment.”); cf. Bricker, 22 F.3d at 875 (failed bills “may suggest that Congress’s inaction, whatever its reasons, was not wholly inadvertent.”)."
} | 336,500 | a |
The appellate court agreed that unresolved factual questions existed with regard to the existence of an emergency and the question of whether intoxication vitiated the consent requirement. Moreover, the amicus brief directs our attention to several cases that hold that alcohol intoxication can legally impair a patient's capacity to refuse medical treatment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "525 A.2d 926, 929",
"parenthetical": "intoxication may be grounds for diminished-capacity defense such that an assailant cannot form specific intent necessary to commit murder",
"sentence": "See Blackman v. Rifkin, 759 P.2d 54, 58 (Colo.App.1988) (intoxication coupled with head trauma permits emergency-room physicians to restrain patient and imply consent necessary to treat medical condition); Grannum, 70 Wash.2d at 307, 422 P.2d at 814; cf. State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I.1987) (intoxication may be grounds for diminished-capacity defense such that an assailant cannot form specific intent necessary to commit murder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "759 P.2d 54, 58",
"parenthetical": "intoxication coupled with head trauma permits emergency-room physicians to restrain patient and imply consent necessary to treat medical condition",
"sentence": "See Blackman v. Rifkin, 759 P.2d 54, 58 (Colo.App.1988) (intoxication coupled with head trauma permits emergency-room physicians to restrain patient and imply consent necessary to treat medical condition); Grannum, 70 Wash.2d at 307, 422 P.2d at 814; cf. State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I.1987) (intoxication may be grounds for diminished-capacity defense such that an assailant cannot form specific intent necessary to commit murder)."
} | 7,357,189 | b |
We further note that our decision in Stephens v. State, also relying on the overreaching-by-the-State rationale, did not permit the State to rely on a defendant's unsuccessful request for a lesser-included-offense instruction on murder in rejecting the State's claim that double-jeopardy principles did not prevent it from prosecuting the defendant for murder after an appellate court had decided that the evidence was insufficient to support the aggravating element of the defendant's conviction for capital murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 S.W.2d 812, 817-18",
"parenthetical": "rejecting State's claim that \"since it did not oppose [the defendant's] request for a lesser included offense instruction, that it should not be penalized for the trial court's failure to include the lesser offense in the charge to the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 817-18 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (rejecting State’s claim that “since it did not oppose [the defendant’s] request for a lesser included offense instruction, that it should not be penalized for the trial court’s failure to include the lesser offense in the charge to the jury”); see also Ex Parte Feryl John Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 519-20 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (distinguishing Stephens on basis that this Court in Stephens was “careful to point out repeatedly ... that at the original trial, the State had chosen not to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of rape. In other words, the State had, at the first trial, failed to pursue the lesser included offense charge after jeopardy had attached to it and was, therefore, forever barred from prosemtvng it again.”) (emphasis in original). In Stephens, the State was not permitted to rely on the defendant’s unsuccessful request for a lesser-included-offense instruction to make this instruction “applicable to the case.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "850 S.W.2d 513, 519-20",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Stephens on basis that this Court in Stephens was \"careful to point out repeatedly ... that at the original trial, the State had chosen not to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of rape. In other words, the State had, at the first trial, failed to pursue the lesser included offense charge after jeopardy had attached to it and was, therefore, forever barred from prosemtvng it again.\"",
"sentence": "See Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 817-18 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (rejecting State’s claim that “since it did not oppose [the defendant’s] request for a lesser included offense instruction, that it should not be penalized for the trial court’s failure to include the lesser offense in the charge to the jury”); see also Ex Parte Feryl John Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 519-20 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (distinguishing Stephens on basis that this Court in Stephens was “careful to point out repeatedly ... that at the original trial, the State had chosen not to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of rape. In other words, the State had, at the first trial, failed to pursue the lesser included offense charge after jeopardy had attached to it and was, therefore, forever barred from prosemtvng it again.”) (emphasis in original). In Stephens, the State was not permitted to rely on the defendant’s unsuccessful request for a lesser-included-offense instruction to make this instruction “applicable to the case.”"
} | 7,327,999 | a |
An enactment also may be regarded as "remedial in nature" if its object is to correct existing law, "to redress existing grievances[,] and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "273 Md. 195, 208",
"parenthetical": "holding \"remedial in nature\" the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965",
"sentence": "State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737 (1974)(holding “remedial in nature” the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965). As such, remedial statutes “are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "237 Md. 171, 171",
"parenthetical": "holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.",
"sentence": "Id.; Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951 (1995); see also Janda, 237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d 228 (holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.)."
} | 211,959 | a |
An enactment also may be regarded as "remedial in nature" if its object is to correct existing law, "to redress existing grievances[,] and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "273 Md. 195, 208",
"parenthetical": "holding \"remedial in nature\" the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965",
"sentence": "State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737 (1974)(holding “remedial in nature” the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965). As such, remedial statutes “are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.",
"sentence": "Id.; Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951 (1995); see also Janda, 237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d 228 (holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.)."
} | 211,959 | a |
An enactment also may be regarded as "remedial in nature" if its object is to correct existing law, "to redress existing grievances[,] and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "237 Md. 171, 171",
"parenthetical": "holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.",
"sentence": "Id.; Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951 (1995); see also Janda, 237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d 228 (holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"remedial in nature\" the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965",
"sentence": "State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737 (1974)(holding “remedial in nature” the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965). As such, remedial statutes “are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief.”"
} | 211,959 | b |
An enactment also may be regarded as "remedial in nature" if its object is to correct existing law, "to redress existing grievances[,] and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.",
"sentence": "Id.; Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951 (1995); see also Janda, 237 Md. at 171, 205 A.2d 228 (holding that statute would be applied retroactively when to do so would better effect the remedial intentions of the Legislature in enacting it.)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding \"remedial in nature\" the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965",
"sentence": "State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737 (1974)(holding “remedial in nature” the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act of 1965). As such, remedial statutes “are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief.”"
} | 211,959 | b |
[Citation.] Modem courts, however, have permitted conversion claims against intangible interests such as checks and customer lists. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | 5,758,301 | b |
[Citation.] Modem courts, however, have permitted conversion claims against intangible interests such as checks and customer lists. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | 5,758,301 | a |
[Citation.] Modem courts, however, have permitted conversion claims against intangible interests such as checks and customer lists. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | 5,758,301 | a |
[Citation.] Modem courts, however, have permitted conversion claims against intangible interests such as checks and customer lists. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing",
"sentence": "Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein, [supra,] 125 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 179 . . . ; Palm Springs-La Quinta Dev. Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 46 Cal.App.2d 234 [115 P.2d 548] (1941) (conversion of index cards with information on potential customers, including their financial standing); see Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468] (1996) (leaving open question whether confidential codes to gain computer access could be converted because trespass to personal property claim existed); see generally Kremen v. Cohen, [supra,] 337 E3d [at p.] 1030 . . . (noting modem rejection of hard line between tangible and intangible property and holding plaintiff could state conversion claim as to internet domain name). [][]... [][] Although there is no clear authority, the Court concludes that [the] Plaintiffs may state a conversion claim based upon the misappropriation of their Private Payment Information, which was then used to make allegedly unauthorized debits from their financial accounts."
} | 5,758,301 | b |
P 28 After our Supreme Court's announcement, this Court carved out a very limited exception to the general rule set forth in Grant, to address the specific situation where an appellant will not be able to challenge, in a collateral proceeding, her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because of the short duration of her sentence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years' probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (2003) (declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years’ probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal due to shortness of appellant's sentence",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728 (2003) (reviewing claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal due to shortness of appellant’s sentence); Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, — Pa. -, 832 A.2d 435 (2003) (making exception to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant’s sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition)."
} | 9,300,005 | b |
P 28 After our Supreme Court's announcement, this Court carved out a very limited exception to the general rule set forth in Grant, to address the specific situation where an appellant will not be able to challenge, in a collateral proceeding, her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because of the short duration of her sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "making exception to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant's sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728 (2003) (reviewing claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal due to shortness of appellant’s sentence); Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, — Pa. -, 832 A.2d 435 (2003) (making exception to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant’s sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years' probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (2003) (declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years’ probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition)."
} | 9,300,005 | a |
P 28 After our Supreme Court's announcement, this Court carved out a very limited exception to the general rule set forth in Grant, to address the specific situation where an appellant will not be able to challenge, in a collateral proceeding, her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because of the short duration of her sentence. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years' probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition",
"sentence": "But see Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (2003) (declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years’ probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "making exception to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant's sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Duda, 831 A.2d 728 (2003) (reviewing claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal due to shortness of appellant’s sentence); Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, — Pa. -, 832 A.2d 435 (2003) (making exception to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant’s sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition)."
} | 9,300,005 | b |
Rather, the primary remedy sought by the named Plaintiffs is purely monetary, as is confirmed by the deposition testimony of Christian, wherein she definitively states that her primary interest in this case is recouping her expenses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "211 F.R.D. 573, 599-600",
"parenthetical": "finding the compensatory damages requested by the named plaintiffs more than \"incidental\" when they had to be \"assessed based on the individual circumstances of the class representative's work history and personal injury\" and therefore would require \"individualized analysis of each class member's circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See Avritt, 615 F.3d at 1035-36 (affirming the district court’s denial of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when the primary remedy sought by the plaintiffs was monetary, not injunctive relief); see also Clayborne v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 599-600 (D.Neb.2002) (finding the compensatory damages requested by the named plaintiffs more than “incidental” when they had to be “assessed based on the individual circumstances of the class representative’s work history and personal injury” and therefore would require “individualized analysis of each class member’s circumstances”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 1035, 1035-36",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's denial of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when the primary remedy sought by the plaintiffs was monetary, not injunctive relief",
"sentence": "See Avritt, 615 F.3d at 1035-36 (affirming the district court’s denial of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when the primary remedy sought by the plaintiffs was monetary, not injunctive relief); see also Clayborne v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 599-600 (D.Neb.2002) (finding the compensatory damages requested by the named plaintiffs more than “incidental” when they had to be “assessed based on the individual circumstances of the class representative’s work history and personal injury” and therefore would require “individualized analysis of each class member’s circumstances”)."
} | 4,279,910 | b |
In support of his argument that this statutory entitlement vests the claimant with the rights of procedural due process commonly associated with requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, including cross-examination, Wallace points to decisions of other courts of appeals that have held that reliance on post-hearing physicians' reports was improper. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.2d 145, 147",
"parenthetical": "ALJ's use of post-hearing report both violated claimant's due process rights and exceeded Secretary's statutory authority under section 405(b",
"sentence": "See Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.1976) (claimant’s right under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) to decision based on evidence adduced at hearing was not satisfied where Appeals Council partially based its decision on post-hearing evidence, notwithstanding claimant’s opportunity to submit additional evidence or written comments); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 950 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam) (AU’s “substantial reliance” on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1984) (same); see also Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing report both violated claimant’s due process rights and exceeded Secretary’s statutory authority under section 405(b)(1)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.1981) (citing with approval both Gullo and Lonzollo); cf. Dorman v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.1980) (where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 649, 950",
"parenthetical": "AU's \"substantial reliance\" on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process",
"sentence": "See Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.1976) (claimant’s right under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) to decision based on evidence adduced at hearing was not satisfied where Appeals Council partially based its decision on post-hearing evidence, notwithstanding claimant’s opportunity to submit additional evidence or written comments); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 950 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam) (AU’s “substantial reliance” on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1984) (same); see also Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing report both violated claimant’s due process rights and exceeded Secretary’s statutory authority under section 405(b)(1)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.1981) (citing with approval both Gullo and Lonzollo); cf. Dorman v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.1980) (where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing)."
} | 10,525,078 | b |
In support of his argument that this statutory entitlement vests the claimant with the rights of procedural due process commonly associated with requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, including cross-examination, Wallace points to decisions of other courts of appeals that have held that reliance on post-hearing physicians' reports was improper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "609 F.2d 649, 950",
"parenthetical": "AU's \"substantial reliance\" on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process",
"sentence": "See Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.1976) (claimant’s right under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) to decision based on evidence adduced at hearing was not satisfied where Appeals Council partially based its decision on post-hearing evidence, notwithstanding claimant’s opportunity to submit additional evidence or written comments); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 950 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam) (AU’s “substantial reliance” on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1984) (same); see also Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing report both violated claimant’s due process rights and exceeded Secretary’s statutory authority under section 405(b)(1)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.1981) (citing with approval both Gullo and Lonzollo); cf. Dorman v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.1980) (where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 1035, 1039",
"parenthetical": "where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing",
"sentence": "See Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.1976) (claimant’s right under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) to decision based on evidence adduced at hearing was not satisfied where Appeals Council partially based its decision on post-hearing evidence, notwithstanding claimant’s opportunity to submit additional evidence or written comments); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 950 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam) (AU’s “substantial reliance” on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1984) (same); see also Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing report both violated claimant’s due process rights and exceeded Secretary’s statutory authority under section 405(b)(1)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.1981) (citing with approval both Gullo and Lonzollo); cf. Dorman v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.1980) (where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing)."
} | 10,525,078 | a |
In support of his argument that this statutory entitlement vests the claimant with the rights of procedural due process commonly associated with requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, including cross-examination, Wallace points to decisions of other courts of appeals that have held that reliance on post-hearing physicians' reports was improper. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 1035, 1039",
"parenthetical": "where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing",
"sentence": "See Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.1976) (claimant’s right under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) to decision based on evidence adduced at hearing was not satisfied where Appeals Council partially based its decision on post-hearing evidence, notwithstanding claimant’s opportunity to submit additional evidence or written comments); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 950 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam) (AU’s “substantial reliance” on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1984) (same); see also Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing report both violated claimant’s due process rights and exceeded Secretary’s statutory authority under section 405(b)(1)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.1981) (citing with approval both Gullo and Lonzollo); cf. Dorman v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.1980) (where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.2d 145, 147",
"parenthetical": "ALJ's use of post-hearing report both violated claimant's due process rights and exceeded Secretary's statutory authority under section 405(b",
"sentence": "See Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir.1976) (claimant’s right under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) to decision based on evidence adduced at hearing was not satisfied where Appeals Council partially based its decision on post-hearing evidence, notwithstanding claimant’s opportunity to submit additional evidence or written comments); Gullo v. Califano, 609 F.2d 649, 950 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam) (AU’s “substantial reliance” on post-hearing report without giving claimant an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal denied her due process); Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir.1984) (same); see also Allison v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir.1983) (ALJ’s use of post-hearing report both violated claimant’s due process rights and exceeded Secretary’s statutory authority under section 405(b)(1)); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.1981) (citing with approval both Gullo and Lonzollo); cf. Dorman v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.1980) (where additional evidence in overpayment proceeding became available after the hearing, AU should have reopened the hearing)."
} | 10,525,078 | b |
Such safe return is thus a type of mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, I would hold that, similar to the mitigating circumstances in SS 13-703(G), the safe return of a victim by a kidnapper prior to the kidnapper's arrest is a mitigating circumstance that must be proved by the kidnapper by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47",
"parenthetical": "Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, \"The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant's conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.\"",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 Ariz. 539, 551",
"parenthetical": "a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | 1,528,611 | a |
Such safe return is thus a type of mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, I would hold that, similar to the mitigating circumstances in SS 13-703(G), the safe return of a victim by a kidnapper prior to the kidnapper's arrest is a mitigating circumstance that must be proved by the kidnapper by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47",
"parenthetical": "Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, \"The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant's conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.\"",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "804 P.2d 72, 84",
"parenthetical": "a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | 1,528,611 | a |
Such safe return is thus a type of mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, I would hold that, similar to the mitigating circumstances in SS 13-703(G), the safe return of a victim by a kidnapper prior to the kidnapper's arrest is a mitigating circumstance that must be proved by the kidnapper by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47",
"parenthetical": "Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, \"The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant's conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.\"",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | 1,528,611 | b |
Such safe return is thus a type of mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, I would hold that, similar to the mitigating circumstances in SS 13-703(G), the safe return of a victim by a kidnapper prior to the kidnapper's arrest is a mitigating circumstance that must be proved by the kidnapper by a preponderance of the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47",
"parenthetical": "Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona's, the court stated, \"The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant's conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.\"",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence",
"sentence": "See Loonier v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo. 1989) (Construing a kidnapping statute similar to Arizona’s, the court stated, “The statute defines a single crime, kidnapping, which carries a sentence of 20 years to life but provides for a reduced sentence based upon defendant’s conduct subsequent to the kidnapping____ Therefore, the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence to show that the circumstances exist.”); see also State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990) (a defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence), citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (1980)."
} | 1,528,611 | a |
The hearing officer made this finding after he considered the entire constellation of facts, including the testimony from the District's witnesses and the evidence of its collective actions leading up to Ritzert's noncompliance. The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination that the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "748 P.2d 1286, 1286-87",
"parenthetical": "\"The funetion of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. ...\"",
"sentence": "deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (\"It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who 'is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.'\" (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119)); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286-87 (\"The funetion of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. ...\")."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "688 P.2d 226, 226",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who 'is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.'\" (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119",
"sentence": "deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (\"It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who 'is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.'\" (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119)); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286-87 (\"The funetion of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. ...\")."
} | 6,836,811 | b |
The hearing officer made this finding after he considered the entire constellation of facts, including the testimony from the District's witnesses and the evidence of its collective actions leading up to Ritzert's noncompliance. The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination that the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "627 P.2d 1119, 1119",
"parenthetical": "\"It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who 'is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.'\" (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119",
"sentence": "deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (\"It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who 'is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.'\" (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119)); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286-87 (\"The funetion of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. ...\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "748 P.2d 1286, 1286-87",
"parenthetical": "\"The funetion of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. ...\"",
"sentence": "deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (\"It is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who 'is empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.'\" (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119)); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286-87 (\"The funetion of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts. ...\")."
} | 6,836,811 | a |
XIV. A two and one-half hour detention absent probable cause, accompanied by a search of both their vehicles and personal belongings, conducted in view of # an ever-growing crowd of on-lookers, would undoubtedly deter an average law-abiding citizen from similarly expressing controversial views on the streets of the greater Dayton area. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "203 F.3d 964, 974",
"parenthetical": "loss of business after being removed from a police station's rotating call list sufficient to \"deter the average wrecker service operator\" from similarly criticizing defendant sheriff",
"sentence": "See McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir.2001) (impliedly acknowledging an arrest without probable cause constitutes adverse action of sufficient consequence); cf. Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 974 (6th Cir.2000) (loss of business after being removed from a police station’s rotating call list sufficient to “deter the average wrecker service operator” from similarly criticizing defendant sheriff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "240 F.3d 512, 520",
"parenthetical": "impliedly acknowledging an arrest without probable cause constitutes adverse action of sufficient consequence",
"sentence": "See McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir.2001) (impliedly acknowledging an arrest without probable cause constitutes adverse action of sufficient consequence); cf. Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 974 (6th Cir.2000) (loss of business after being removed from a police station’s rotating call list sufficient to “deter the average wrecker service operator” from similarly criticizing defendant sheriff)."
} | 3,779,263 | b |
Because of such a paramount objective, the First Amendment's protection of religious exercise does not typically extend to violent acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 642, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "326 U.S. 455, 460",
"parenthetical": "\"bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | 4,326,296 | a |
Because of such a paramount objective, the First Amendment's protection of religious exercise does not typically extend to violent acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 642, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | 4,326,296 | a |
Because of such a paramount objective, the First Amendment's protection of religious exercise does not typically extend to violent acts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 642, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | 4,326,296 | a |
Because of such a paramount objective, the First Amendment's protection of religious exercise does not typically extend to violent acts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "133 U.S. 333, 345",
"parenthetical": "\"Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as 'religion.' \"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "47 F.3d 642, 656",
"parenthetical": "\"we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm\"",
"sentence": "See American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 (4th Cir.1995) (“we do not think the Free Exercise Clause shields conduct violating a criminal law that protects people and property from physical harm”); United States v. Mullet, 868 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (S.D.Ohio 2012) (“violence is not a protected form of religious exercise”); see also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946) (“bona fide religious beliefs cannot absolve one from liability under the Federal Kidnapping Act.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (asking rhetorically if “one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,” whether the government could interfere with a human sacrifice)."
} | 4,326,296 | b |
Subsets and Splits