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The record contains substantial evidence tying both defendants to the house and to the marijuana found inside the house. Although we have stated the test in various ways, an error admitting evidence is harmless if there is sufficient independent evidence that establishes the defendants' guilt. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "error was harmless where \"government produced overwhelming evidence against Shannon independent of Eck's letter\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shannon, 137 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.1998) (error was harmless where “government produced overwhelming evidence against Shannon independent of Eck’s letter”) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); see also United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir.1995) (although prejudicial effect of officer’s opinion substantially outweighed probative value and therefore was error to admit opinion under Rule 403, “error was harmless ... because there was other reliable identification testimony identifying Henderson as the robber”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 323, 328",
"parenthetical": "although prejudicial effect of officer's opinion substantially outweighed probative value and therefore was error to admit opinion under Rule 403, \"error was harmless ... because there was other reliable identification testimony identifying Henderson as the robber\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shannon, 137 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.1998) (error was harmless where “government produced overwhelming evidence against Shannon independent of Eck’s letter”) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); see also United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir.1995) (although prejudicial effect of officer’s opinion substantially outweighed probative value and therefore was error to admit opinion under Rule 403, “error was harmless ... because there was other reliable identification testimony identifying Henderson as the robber”)."
} | 5,749,236 | a |
Typically, while denials of motions to dismiss are not deemed final for appellate purposes, the Panel agrees with those courts holding that denial of a request for dismissal regarding the application of the means test should be treated as final ap-pealable orders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 2668727, at *4",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he split among the bankruptcy courts over application of the means test to this issue provides greater support for treating the denial of the Trustee's motion to dismiss for substantial abuse as final.\"",
"sentence": "See Randle v. Neary (In re Randle), 2007 WL 2668727 at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jul.20, 2007) (“[T]he split among the bankruptcy courts over application of the means test to this issue provides greater support for treating the denial of the Trustee’s motion to dismiss for substantial abuse as final.”); Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 646 (D.Minn.2007) (on appeal from bankruptcy court’s order denying the UST’s motion to dismiss under § 707(b)); see also In re Northwood Properties, 509 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2007) (an order is final if it disposes of all issues surrounding a discrete controversy within a larger proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an order is final if it disposes of all issues surrounding a discrete controversy within a larger proceeding",
"sentence": "See Randle v. Neary (In re Randle), 2007 WL 2668727 at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jul.20, 2007) (“[T]he split among the bankruptcy courts over application of the means test to this issue provides greater support for treating the denial of the Trustee’s motion to dismiss for substantial abuse as final.”); Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 646 (D.Minn.2007) (on appeal from bankruptcy court’s order denying the UST’s motion to dismiss under § 707(b)); see also In re Northwood Properties, 509 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2007) (an order is final if it disposes of all issues surrounding a discrete controversy within a larger proceeding)."
} | 3,619,234 | a |
Typically, while denials of motions to dismiss are not deemed final for appellate purposes, the Panel agrees with those courts holding that denial of a request for dismissal regarding the application of the means test should be treated as final ap-pealable orders. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "373 B.R. 645, 646",
"parenthetical": "on appeal from bankruptcy court's order denying the UST's motion to dismiss under SS 707(b",
"sentence": "See Randle v. Neary (In re Randle), 2007 WL 2668727 at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jul.20, 2007) (“[T]he split among the bankruptcy courts over application of the means test to this issue provides greater support for treating the denial of the Trustee’s motion to dismiss for substantial abuse as final.”); Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 646 (D.Minn.2007) (on appeal from bankruptcy court’s order denying the UST’s motion to dismiss under § 707(b)); see also In re Northwood Properties, 509 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2007) (an order is final if it disposes of all issues surrounding a discrete controversy within a larger proceeding)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an order is final if it disposes of all issues surrounding a discrete controversy within a larger proceeding",
"sentence": "See Randle v. Neary (In re Randle), 2007 WL 2668727 at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jul.20, 2007) (“[T]he split among the bankruptcy courts over application of the means test to this issue provides greater support for treating the denial of the Trustee’s motion to dismiss for substantial abuse as final.”); Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 646 (D.Minn.2007) (on appeal from bankruptcy court’s order denying the UST’s motion to dismiss under § 707(b)); see also In re Northwood Properties, 509 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2007) (an order is final if it disposes of all issues surrounding a discrete controversy within a larger proceeding)."
} | 3,619,234 | a |
P 28 Issues are capable of repetition when they could, or are likely to, reoccur in the future. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "140 P.3d 249, 262",
"parenthetical": "finding issue capable of repetition because other students \"could\" make similar claims in the future",
"sentence": "Ofengand, 183 P.3d at 692 (issue capable of repetition because it was “likely” to reoccur); see also Tesmer v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 140 P.3d 249, 262 (Colo. App. 2006) (finding issue capable of repetition because other students “could” make similar claims in the future)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "183 P.3d 692, 692",
"parenthetical": "issue capable of repetition because it was \"likely\" to reoccur",
"sentence": "Ofengand, 183 P.3d at 692 (issue capable of repetition because it was “likely” to reoccur); see also Tesmer v. Colo. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 140 P.3d 249, 262 (Colo. App. 2006) (finding issue capable of repetition because other students “could” make similar claims in the future)."
} | 12,409,430 | b |
Though the contents of the report were hearsay, neither the admission of this report nor the method in which it was used by the IJ affected the fundamental fairness of Kasa's removal proceeding. Though any hearsay document creates doubts as to its trustworthiness, the report confirms its reliability and trustworthiness by specifying the steps taken in the investigation and clarifying that the purpose of the investigation was never made clear to members of the Albanian government. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "325 F.3d 396, 408",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a letter that stated only conclusions of a supposed investigation was inadmissible in a removal proceeding in part because \"the complete dearth of information about the investigator or the investigation undermines the ... letter as not only untrustworthy, but also unhelpful.\"",
"sentence": "See Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding that a letter that stated only conclusions of a supposed investigation was inadmissible in a removal proceeding in part because “the complete dearth of information about the investigator or the investigation undermines the ... letter as not only untrustworthy, but also unhelpful.”); see also Yongo, 355 F.3d at 32 (emphasizing this factor in Ezeagwu-na in reaching a different conclusion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "355 F.3d 32, 32",
"parenthetical": "emphasizing this factor in Ezeagwu-na in reaching a different conclusion",
"sentence": "See Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 408 (3d Cir.2003) (concluding that a letter that stated only conclusions of a supposed investigation was inadmissible in a removal proceeding in part because “the complete dearth of information about the investigator or the investigation undermines the ... letter as not only untrustworthy, but also unhelpful.”); see also Yongo, 355 F.3d at 32 (emphasizing this factor in Ezeagwu-na in reaching a different conclusion)."
} | 809,282 | a |
We find, however, that, taken together as a whole, Alston's actions after he drove by the patrol car were sufficiently suspicious to provide Hixson with the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Alston from walking away from the scene. Hixson's brief detention of Alston was therefore reasonable to allow the officer to confirm or dispel his suspicion and to maintain the status quo during the course of the lawful roadside investigatory stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "14 Va.App. 491, 491-92",
"parenthetical": "holding that a police officer's brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officer's \"significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation,\" particularly when \"events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on [the] passenger\"",
"sentence": "See Hatcher, 14 Va.App. at 491-92, 419 S.E.2d at 259 (holding that a police officer’s brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officer’s “significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation,” particularly when “events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on [the] passenger”); see also United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 698 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain the defendant based, in part, on the defendant’s “quickly” exiting and walking away from his vehicle in a parking lot when the officer, responding to a radio dispatch, arrived at the parking lot and illuminated the defendant’s vehicle with a spotlight)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 682, 698",
"parenthetical": "finding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain the defendant based, in part, on the defendant's \"quickly\" exiting and walking away from his vehicle in a parking lot when the officer, responding to a radio dispatch, arrived at the parking lot and illuminated the defendant's vehicle with a spotlight",
"sentence": "See Hatcher, 14 Va.App. at 491-92, 419 S.E.2d at 259 (holding that a police officer’s brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officer’s “significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation,” particularly when “events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on [the] passenger”); see also United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 698 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain the defendant based, in part, on the defendant’s “quickly” exiting and walking away from his vehicle in a parking lot when the officer, responding to a radio dispatch, arrived at the parking lot and illuminated the defendant’s vehicle with a spotlight)."
} | 737,567 | a |
We find, however, that, taken together as a whole, Alston's actions after he drove by the patrol car were sufficiently suspicious to provide Hixson with the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Alston from walking away from the scene. Hixson's brief detention of Alston was therefore reasonable to allow the officer to confirm or dispel his suspicion and to maintain the status quo during the course of the lawful roadside investigatory stop. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "419 S.E.2d 259, 259",
"parenthetical": "holding that a police officer's brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officer's \"significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation,\" particularly when \"events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on [the] passenger\"",
"sentence": "See Hatcher, 14 Va.App. at 491-92, 419 S.E.2d at 259 (holding that a police officer’s brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officer’s “significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation,” particularly when “events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on [the] passenger”); see also United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 698 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain the defendant based, in part, on the defendant’s “quickly” exiting and walking away from his vehicle in a parking lot when the officer, responding to a radio dispatch, arrived at the parking lot and illuminated the defendant’s vehicle with a spotlight)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "183 F.3d 682, 698",
"parenthetical": "finding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain the defendant based, in part, on the defendant's \"quickly\" exiting and walking away from his vehicle in a parking lot when the officer, responding to a radio dispatch, arrived at the parking lot and illuminated the defendant's vehicle with a spotlight",
"sentence": "See Hatcher, 14 Va.App. at 491-92, 419 S.E.2d at 259 (holding that a police officer’s brief detention of a passenger who walked away from a lawfully stopped vehicle is warranted to promote the officer’s “significant interest in gaining control of and monitoring a potentially hazardous roadside stop in order to conduct his lawful investigation,” particularly when “events subsequent to the lawful traffic stop focus suspicion on [the] passenger”); see also United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 698 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain the defendant based, in part, on the defendant’s “quickly” exiting and walking away from his vehicle in a parking lot when the officer, responding to a radio dispatch, arrived at the parking lot and illuminated the defendant’s vehicle with a spotlight)."
} | 737,567 | a |
The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial based on any of the three reasons put forth by defendant. First, defendant knew of the alleged lawsuit settlement pri- or to trial, and Glenn was not the only witness who could have testified regarding that lawsuit; in fact, the settlement was reached without his involvement. Thus, evidence concerning this lawsuit fails the O'Dell test: the settlement was not newly discovered and Glenn's statement was cumulative in light of defendant's access to other evidence of the settlement. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "930 F.2d 482, 489",
"parenthetical": "\"Where facts alleged in support of [a motion for new trial] ... were known by the defendant at the time of trial, the defendant failed to satisfy the newly discovered evidence requirement of Rule 33.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 489 (6th Cir.1991) (“Where facts alleged in support of [a motion for new trial] ... were known by the defendant at the time of trial, the defendant failed to satisfy the newly discovered evidence requirement of Rule 33.”); United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir.1983) (where defendants have ready access to exculpatory evidence they cannot complain that it was wrongly withheld by the government); cf. O’Dell, 805 F.2d at 641 (noting that “other courts ... have determined that the prosecution is under no duty to produce evidence that is available to a defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 641, 641",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"other courts ... have determined that the prosecution is under no duty to produce evidence that is available to a defendant\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 489 (6th Cir.1991) (“Where facts alleged in support of [a motion for new trial] ... were known by the defendant at the time of trial, the defendant failed to satisfy the newly discovered evidence requirement of Rule 33.”); United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir.1983) (where defendants have ready access to exculpatory evidence they cannot complain that it was wrongly withheld by the government); cf. O’Dell, 805 F.2d at 641 (noting that “other courts ... have determined that the prosecution is under no duty to produce evidence that is available to a defendant”)."
} | 10,514,149 | a |
The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial based on any of the three reasons put forth by defendant. First, defendant knew of the alleged lawsuit settlement pri- or to trial, and Glenn was not the only witness who could have testified regarding that lawsuit; in fact, the settlement was reached without his involvement. Thus, evidence concerning this lawsuit fails the O'Dell test: the settlement was not newly discovered and Glenn's statement was cumulative in light of defendant's access to other evidence of the settlement. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "712 F.2d 115, 122",
"parenthetical": "where defendants have ready access to exculpatory evidence they cannot complain that it was wrongly withheld by the government",
"sentence": "United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 489 (6th Cir.1991) (“Where facts alleged in support of [a motion for new trial] ... were known by the defendant at the time of trial, the defendant failed to satisfy the newly discovered evidence requirement of Rule 33.”); United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir.1983) (where defendants have ready access to exculpatory evidence they cannot complain that it was wrongly withheld by the government); cf. O’Dell, 805 F.2d at 641 (noting that “other courts ... have determined that the prosecution is under no duty to produce evidence that is available to a defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 641, 641",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"other courts ... have determined that the prosecution is under no duty to produce evidence that is available to a defendant\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 489 (6th Cir.1991) (“Where facts alleged in support of [a motion for new trial] ... were known by the defendant at the time of trial, the defendant failed to satisfy the newly discovered evidence requirement of Rule 33.”); United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 115, 122 (5th Cir.1983) (where defendants have ready access to exculpatory evidence they cannot complain that it was wrongly withheld by the government); cf. O’Dell, 805 F.2d at 641 (noting that “other courts ... have determined that the prosecution is under no duty to produce evidence that is available to a defendant”)."
} | 10,514,149 | a |
"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead legal theories." Accordingly, when a plaintiff does plead legal theories, it can later alter those theories. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "772 F.3d 802, 808-09",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed on new summary judgment theory that re-characterized already-alleged facts and did not offer \"any unfair surprise\"",
"sentence": "Vidimos, 99 F.3d at 222; see also Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed on new summary judgment theory that re-characterized already-alleged facts and did not offer “any unfair surprise”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "799 F.3d 729, 743-44",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff did not inappropriately add new claim during summary judgment briefing when factual basis was alleged in complaint",
"sentence": "Id. (“[T]here is no burden on the plaintiff to justify altering its original theory.”); CMFG Life Insurance Co. v. RBS Securities, Inc., 799 F.3d 729, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff did not inappropriately add new claim during summary judgment briefing when factual basis was alleged in complaint); Rabé v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that, after reversal of dismissal on pleadings, district court would have supplemental jurisdiction over claims not articulated, but implicit, in complaint). As a general rule, district courts should not hold plaintiffs to their earlier legal theories unless the changes unfairly harm the defendant or the case’s development—for example, by making it “more costly or difficult” to defend the case, or by causing unreasonable delay."
} | 12,275,429 | b |
"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead legal theories." Accordingly, when a plaintiff does plead legal theories, it can later alter those theories. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "772 F.3d 802, 808-09",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed on new summary judgment theory that re-characterized already-alleged facts and did not offer \"any unfair surprise\"",
"sentence": "Vidimos, 99 F.3d at 222; see also Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed on new summary judgment theory that re-characterized already-alleged facts and did not offer “any unfair surprise”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "636 F.3d 866, 872",
"parenthetical": "noting that, after reversal of dismissal on pleadings, district court would have supplemental jurisdiction over claims not articulated, but implicit, in complaint",
"sentence": "Id. (“[T]here is no burden on the plaintiff to justify altering its original theory.”); CMFG Life Insurance Co. v. RBS Securities, Inc., 799 F.3d 729, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff did not inappropriately add new claim during summary judgment briefing when factual basis was alleged in complaint); Rabé v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that, after reversal of dismissal on pleadings, district court would have supplemental jurisdiction over claims not articulated, but implicit, in complaint). As a general rule, district courts should not hold plaintiffs to their earlier legal theories unless the changes unfairly harm the defendant or the case’s development—for example, by making it “more costly or difficult” to defend the case, or by causing unreasonable delay."
} | 12,275,429 | b |
What matters, however, is the probative value of such offers. This entails an analysis of the timing and circumstances under which they were made. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "196 F.2d 276, 283",
"parenthetical": "finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed \"destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1991 WL 12346, *5",
"parenthetical": "excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | 1,579,705 | a |
What matters, however, is the probative value of such offers. This entails an analysis of the timing and circumstances under which they were made. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "196 F.2d 276, 283",
"parenthetical": "finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed \"destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | 1,579,705 | b |
What matters, however, is the probative value of such offers. This entails an analysis of the timing and circumstances under which they were made. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.2d 61, 68",
"parenthetical": "excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "196 F.2d 276, 283",
"parenthetical": "finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed \"destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | 1,579,705 | b |
What matters, however, is the probative value of such offers. This entails an analysis of the timing and circumstances under which they were made. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "227 F.2d 540, 543",
"parenthetical": "excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer's attention",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "196 F.2d 276, 283",
"parenthetical": "finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed \"destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir.1952) (finding that offer in compromise filed long after taxpayer learned of tax liability and without his having made any payment on the amount owed “destroyed whatever probative value a prompt offer might have had.”); see also United States v. McGill, 1991 WL 12346 *5 (E.D.Pa.) aff'd in part, rev’d in part 964 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1992) (excluding as not probative offer made six years after tax delinquencies arose and just prior to defendant taking bench as a judge); see also Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61, 68 (9th Cir.1954) (excluding evidence of tax protests as not probative on question of good faith where government had already commenced its investigation and audit of taxpayer); and see Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir.1955) (excluding evidence of offer in compromise made 2% years after government brought fraud to tax payer’s attention)"
} | 1,579,705 | b |
(R. 214, Pl.'s Facts, Ex. 6.) Such references fail to demonstrate that the subsidiary is an alter ego or "mere instrumentality" of the parent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 1460, 1460",
"parenthetical": "noting that the district court properly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the descriptions of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary as well as the presence of the parent's logo in subsidiary's promotional literature justified piercing the corporate veil",
"sentence": "See Esmark, 887 F.2d at 757; Joiner, 966 F.Supp. at 1490 (“the parent owns the subsidiary, it can do anything it wants with its subsidiary — the subsidiary has no choice but to obey”); see also Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1460 (noting that the district court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the descriptions of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary as well as the presence of the parent’s logo in subsidiary’s promotional literature justified piercing the corporate veil)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "966 F.Supp. 1490, 1490",
"parenthetical": "\"the parent owns the subsidiary, it can do anything it wants with its subsidiary -- the subsidiary has no choice but to obey\"",
"sentence": "See Esmark, 887 F.2d at 757; Joiner, 966 F.Supp. at 1490 (“the parent owns the subsidiary, it can do anything it wants with its subsidiary — the subsidiary has no choice but to obey”); see also Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1460 (noting that the district court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the descriptions of the relationship between the parent and subsidiary as well as the presence of the parent’s logo in subsidiary’s promotional literature justified piercing the corporate veil)."
} | 5,725,848 | b |
It would appear that the Supreme Court has also determined that fiduciary duties operate both independently from and in conjunction with ERISA's specifically delineated requirements. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"ERISA's rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1074 (“If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.”); see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n. 9,105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (“ERISA’s rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 S.Ct. 1074, 1074",
"parenthetical": "\"If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1074 (“If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.”); see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n. 9,105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (“ERISA’s rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.”)."
} | 11,981,814 | b |
It would appear that the Supreme Court has also determined that fiduciary duties operate both independently from and in conjunction with ERISA's specifically delineated requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 S.Ct. 1074, 1074",
"parenthetical": "\"If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1074 (“If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.”); see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n. 9,105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (“ERISA’s rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"ERISA's rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1074 (“If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.”); see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n. 9,105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (“ERISA’s rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.”)."
} | 11,981,814 | a |
It would appear that the Supreme Court has also determined that fiduciary duties operate both independently from and in conjunction with ERISA's specifically delineated requirements. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "116 S.Ct. 1074, 1074",
"parenthetical": "\"If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1074 (“If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.”); see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n. 9,105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (“ERISA’s rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"ERISA's rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.\"",
"sentence": "See Varity Corp., - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1074 (“If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose.”); see also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569 n. 9,105 S.Ct. 2833, 2839 n. 9, 86 L.Ed.2d 447 (1985) (“ERISA’s rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility apply to all employee benefit plans.”)."
} | 11,981,814 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "643 F.2d 1261, 1273",
"parenthetical": "tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "643 F.2d 1261, 1273",
"parenthetical": "tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "643 F.2d 1261, 1273",
"parenthetical": "tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "643 F.2d 1261, 1273",
"parenthetical": "tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "643 F.2d 1261, 1273",
"parenthetical": "tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "643 F.2d 1261, 1273",
"parenthetical": "tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "601 F.2d 1242, 1250",
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "601 F.2d 1242, 1250",
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "601 F.2d 1242, 1250",
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "601 F.2d 1242, 1250",
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "601 F.2d 1242, 1250",
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "601 F.2d 1242, 1250",
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 1210, 1218",
"parenthetical": "tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | a |
. There are other public contract cases allowing third-party beneficiary actions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company",
"sentence": "Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] ); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir.) (prisoner third-party beneficiary of contract between county and Bureau of Prisons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980, 100 S.Ct. 483, 62 L.Ed.2d 407 (1979); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ala.1976) (house purchaser third-party beneficiary of federal nondiscrimination agreement with real estate agent), modified, 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1979); Zigas v. Superior Court of State of California, 120 Cal.App.3d 827, 174 Cal.Rptr. 806 (Ct.App.1981) (tenants third-party beneficiaries of contract between landlord and HUD), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng’rs, 67 Cal.App.3d 916, 136 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Ct.App.1977) (construction company third-party beneficiary of contract between water district and engineering company); Western Union Telegraph Co. (telegraph company third-party beneficiary of contract between Washington Mass Transit Authority and construction company); but see Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.1981) (tenants not intended beneficiaries of agreement between HUD and housing authority); Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1979) (no third-party beneficiary action based on contract between landlord and HUD); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no third-party beneficiary action based on provision of contract with federal government prohibiting discrimination against handicapped); Martinez v. Socoma Companies, 11 Cal.3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585 (1974) (unemployed persons only incidental beneficiaries of economic revitalization agreement between private companies and the federal government)."
} | 7,600,478 | b |
Put another way, they perceived his legal advocacy as a manifestation of his political beliefs. The fact that this testimony came amidst a discussion of Javed's political affiliations bolsters that conclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "494 F.3d 281, 294",
"parenthetical": "cautioning against \"an impoverished view\" of what constitutes persecution on account of a political opinion",
"sentence": "See Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Political persecution may be grounded on an imputed political opinion, whether or not the opinion is correctly or incorrectly attributed to the alien.”); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 294 (2d Cir.2007) (cautioning against “an impoverished view” of what constitutes persecution on account of a political opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "675 F.3d 9, 18",
"parenthetical": "\"Political persecution may be grounded on an imputed political opinion, whether or not the opinion is correctly or incorrectly attributed to the alien.\"",
"sentence": "See Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Political persecution may be grounded on an imputed political opinion, whether or not the opinion is correctly or incorrectly attributed to the alien.”); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 294 (2d Cir.2007) (cautioning against “an impoverished view” of what constitutes persecution on account of a political opinion)."
} | 3,566,439 | b |
Although section 456.072(6) contains no severability provision, we must determine whether the constitutionally invalid section, which purports to grant the Board the discretion to develop reapplication rules, is severable from the rest of the statute. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "742 So.2d 1276, 1280",
"parenthetical": "\"Severability is a judicial doctrine recognizing the obligation of the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments where it is possible to strike only the unconstitutional portions.\"",
"sentence": "See Dade County v. Keyes, 141 So.2d 819, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (“When a portion of a statute or ordinance is declared invalid the remaining portions thereof which are severable ordinarily should be recognized as valid, and it is the duty of the court to preserve their validity whether or not a severability clause was included.”); see also Ray v. Mortham, 742 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla.1999) (“Severability is a judicial doctrine recognizing the obligation of the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments where it is possible to strike only the unconstitutional portions.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "141 So.2d 819, 821",
"parenthetical": "\"When a portion of a statute or ordinance is declared invalid the remaining portions thereof which are severable ordinarily should be recognized as valid, and it is the duty of the court to preserve their validity whether or not a severability clause was included.\"",
"sentence": "See Dade County v. Keyes, 141 So.2d 819, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (“When a portion of a statute or ordinance is declared invalid the remaining portions thereof which are severable ordinarily should be recognized as valid, and it is the duty of the court to preserve their validity whether or not a severability clause was included.”); see also Ray v. Mortham, 742 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla.1999) (“Severability is a judicial doctrine recognizing the obligation of the judiciary to uphold the constitutionality of legislative enactments where it is possible to strike only the unconstitutional portions.”)."
} | 8,236,746 | b |
Wright's waiver does not meet this standard because the record suggests that at the time he entered into the plea agreement, Wright was not aware that he might be ordered to pay a large restitution payment that possibly exceeds the losses to Amy proximately caused by his conduct. Wright's plea agreement referred to the general restitution provisions of 18 U.S.C. SSSS 3663 and 3663A, which both indisputably include proximate causation as a condition of restitution. Additionally, Wright's plea agreement reserved the right to appeal "any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 262, 271-72",
"parenthetical": "vacating a SS 3663 restitution award for lack of evidence of causation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 271-72 (5th Cir.2000) (vacating a § 3663 restitution award for lack of evidence of causation); see also United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (vacating a § 3663 restitution order, despite an appeal waiver, because the order was not limited to losses caused by the defendant and thus exceeded the statutory maximum)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "71 F.3d 1143, 1146",
"parenthetical": "vacating a SS 3663 restitution order, despite an appeal waiver, because the order was not limited to losses caused by the defendant and thus exceeded the statutory maximum",
"sentence": "See United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 271-72 (5th Cir.2000) (vacating a § 3663 restitution award for lack of evidence of causation); see also United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir.1995) (vacating a § 3663 restitution order, despite an appeal waiver, because the order was not limited to losses caused by the defendant and thus exceeded the statutory maximum)."
} | 4,202,562 | a |
There can be little good faith disagreement that the so-called "notice"-- stating only "[t]his is just for notice purposes as this has been discontinued and there are no allegations" (UF No. 11)-- inadequately complies with the policy's requirements of notice of Wrongful Act(s) Granted, the Summons with Notice alleged breach of contract or fiduciary duty, but provided no information regarding the particular acts which led to the lawsuit being filed, the people who committed the acts and when the underlying acts occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "838 F.Supp. 1125, 1130",
"parenthetical": "holding notice insufficient because it merely recited the language of the policy's notice provision and provided no information regarding \"the types of practices alleged to constitute 'wrongful acts,' the agents, officers, or directors alleged to be involved in wrongdoing, or the time period during which the allegedly wrongful acts took place\"",
"sentence": "See F.D.I.C. v. Caplan, 838 F.Supp. 1125, 1130 (W.D.La.1993) (holding notice insufficient because it merely recited the language of the policy’s notice provision and provided no information regarding “the types of practices alleged to constitute ‘wrongful acts,’ the agents, officers, or directors alleged to be involved in wrongdoing, or the time period during which the allegedly wrongful acts took place”); see also McCullough v. Fid. and Deposit Co., 2 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that insured informing insurer that it had received a cease and desist order was insufficient notice because it did not detail the “particular subsidiary involved, the particular agents, officers, or directors involved, the time period during which the events occurred, the identity of potential claimants, and the specific unsound practices made the basis of the order”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2 F.3d 110, 113",
"parenthetical": "holding that insured informing insurer that it had received a cease and desist order was insufficient notice because it did not detail the \"particular subsidiary involved, the particular agents, officers, or directors involved, the time period during which the events occurred, the identity of potential claimants, and the specific unsound practices made the basis of the order\"",
"sentence": "See F.D.I.C. v. Caplan, 838 F.Supp. 1125, 1130 (W.D.La.1993) (holding notice insufficient because it merely recited the language of the policy’s notice provision and provided no information regarding “the types of practices alleged to constitute ‘wrongful acts,’ the agents, officers, or directors alleged to be involved in wrongdoing, or the time period during which the allegedly wrongful acts took place”); see also McCullough v. Fid. and Deposit Co., 2 F.3d 110, 113 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that insured informing insurer that it had received a cease and desist order was insufficient notice because it did not detail the “particular subsidiary involved, the particular agents, officers, or directors involved, the time period during which the events occurred, the identity of potential claimants, and the specific unsound practices made the basis of the order”)."
} | 4,125,615 | a |
P 17 Rasul's threatening behavior and refusal to cooperate with multiple attorneys can be nothing less than part of a " 'plo/ to delay trial." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "53 F.3d 325, 325",
"parenthetical": "defendant's threats to sue counsel were factors in forfeiture decision",
"sentence": "Cf. McLeod, 53 F.3d at 325 (defendant’s threats to sue counsel were factors in forfeiture decision)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "897 A.2d 766, 766",
"parenthetical": "noting defendant's conduct fell just short of violence and was intended to force his attorney to withdraw",
"sentence": "Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 550; see also Bultron, 897 A.2d at 766 (noting defendant’s conduct fell just short of violence and was intended to force his attorney to withdraw). As we have noted, he accused several attorneys of unsatisfactory representation and filed complaints with the state bar."
} | 5,543,625 | b |
In the court's view, it does not seem reasonable to impute to plaintiff an interpreta tion of the CWA that clearly was in flux at the time the land in question was purchased. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "49 Fed.Cl. 269, 269",
"parenthetical": "reaching the same conclusion as to an individual who had purchased property in 1971, stating that \"[w]hile the Penn Central analysis anticipates reasonably foreseeable developments, it does not require a property owner to be clairvoyant\"",
"sentence": "See Walcek, 49 Fed.Cl. at 269 (reaching the same conclusion as to an individual who had purchased property in 1971, stating that “[w]hile the Penn Central analysis anticipates reasonably foreseeable developments, it does not require a property owner to be clairvoyant”); see also Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1191 (suggesting that the events described above had “radically transformed” the regulatory regime, working an “unforeseen change in the law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "657 F.2d 1191, 1191",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that the events described above had \"radically transformed\" the regulatory regime, working an \"unforeseen change in the law\"",
"sentence": "See Walcek, 49 Fed.Cl. at 269 (reaching the same conclusion as to an individual who had purchased property in 1971, stating that “[w]hile the Penn Central analysis anticipates reasonably foreseeable developments, it does not require a property owner to be clairvoyant”); see also Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1191 (suggesting that the events described above had “radically transformed” the regulatory regime, working an “unforeseen change in the law”)."
} | 8,454,754 | a |
Mistakenly admitted evidence of pri- or crimes or convictions can, in some instances, "imping[e] upon the fundamental fairness of the trial itself." This court, however, as well as other circuits, has found that the improper admission of evidence of prior acts does not rise to the level of constitutional error if the trial judge later instructs the jury to disregard the evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "761 F.2d 1124, 1127",
"parenthetical": "\"This Court has held that such instructions to disregard often cure error.\"",
"sentence": "See Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (10th Cir.1995); Warden v. Wyrick, 770 F.2d 112, 116 (8th Cir.1985); McAffee v. Procunier, 761 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir.1985) (“This Court has held that such instructions to disregard often cure error.”); cf. United States v. Parker, 604 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir.1979) (finding guilty verdict fundamentally unfair where the court improperly admitted evidence of prior conviction with no corrective instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "604 F.2d 1327, 1329",
"parenthetical": "finding guilty verdict fundamentally unfair where the court improperly admitted evidence of prior conviction with no corrective instruction",
"sentence": "See Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (10th Cir.1995); Warden v. Wyrick, 770 F.2d 112, 116 (8th Cir.1985); McAffee v. Procunier, 761 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir.1985) (“This Court has held that such instructions to disregard often cure error.”); cf. United States v. Parker, 604 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir.1979) (finding guilty verdict fundamentally unfair where the court improperly admitted evidence of prior conviction with no corrective instruction)."
} | 11,889,436 | a |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 U.S. 605, 605",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant \"received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Kan. 88, 88-92",
"parenthetical": "concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor's question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Ga. App. 64, 65",
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Kan. 88, 88-92",
"parenthetical": "concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor's question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 Kan. 88, 88-92",
"parenthetical": "concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor's question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 U.S. 605, 605",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant \"received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 Kan. 157, 157",
"parenthetical": "noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 Kan. 157, 157",
"parenthetical": "noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Ga. App. 64, 65",
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | a |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 Kan. 157, 157",
"parenthetical": "noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51",
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 U.S. 605, 605",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant \"received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | a |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Ga. App. 64, 65",
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51",
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51",
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | a |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 U.S. 605, 605",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant \"received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | a |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Ga. App. 64, 65",
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "455 U.S. 605, 605",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant \"received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 Ga. App. 64, 65",
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | b |
Generally, a Miranda/Doyle constitutional argument is defeated by the failure to establish that Miranda warnings have been given, meaning the Doyle protections do not apply. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 88-92 (concluding Doyle violation not. established when prosecutor’s question was unclear regarding whether referring to pre- or post-Miranda silence); Wilkerson, 278 Kan. at 157 (noting record did not establish whether person was in custody or had received Miranda warnings before refusing to talk to investigators); State v. Carter, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1250-51, 57 P.3d 825 (2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 966 (2003) (rejecting allegation of a Doyle violation because defendant failed to refer to any portion of the record indicating he had received Miranda warnings); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605 (distinguishing Doyle because record did not establish defendant “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained silent”); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga. App. 64, 65, 395 S.E.2d 288 (1990) (relying on Fletcher to hold defendant has burden to establish right to remain silent was asserted post-Miranda); Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. App. 2009) (same); State v. McGinnis, 70 N.C. App. 421, 423-24, 320 S.E.2d 297 (1984) (same); State v. Cummings, 779 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Mo. App. 1989) (same); Royal v. State, 761 P.2d 497, 500 (Okla. Crim. 1988) (same); 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.6(a), p. 497 n.47 (3d ed. 2007) (where a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, the defendant “ordinarily bears the burden of showing that Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the State for impeachment purposes”)."
} | 4,365,522 | a |
But, the subject matter' -- military pay and benefits -- at issue in Larionoff and Beckering is an exception to the general rule that service agreements are subject to traditional principles of contract law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "366 U.S. 401, 401",
"parenthetical": "\"common-law rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay\"",
"sentence": "Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554 n. 4 (noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the “unique nature and characteristics of military service”); see also Bell, 366 U.S. at 401, 81 S.Ct. 1230 (“common-law rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the \"unique nature and characteristics of military service\"",
"sentence": "Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554 n. 4 (noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the “unique nature and characteristics of military service”); see also Bell, 366 U.S. at 401, 81 S.Ct. 1230 (“common-law rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay”)."
} | 8,453,221 | b |
But, the subject matter' -- military pay and benefits -- at issue in Larionoff and Beckering is an exception to the general rule that service agreements are subject to traditional principles of contract law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the \"unique nature and characteristics of military service\"",
"sentence": "Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554 n. 4 (noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the “unique nature and characteristics of military service”); see also Bell, 366 U.S. at 401, 81 S.Ct. 1230 (“common-law rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"common-law rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay\"",
"sentence": "Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554 n. 4 (noting that exceptions to the general rule have been carved out for the areas of military pay or benefits due to the “unique nature and characteristics of military service”); see also Bell, 366 U.S. at 401, 81 S.Ct. 1230 (“common-law rules governing private contracts have no place in the area of military pay”)."
} | 8,453,221 | a |
Soto provided the sole and critical eyewitness evidence to support Whitmore's firearm conviction. We are hard-pressed to understand the government's claim that the proposed cross-examination would have "had only marginal evidentiary value," Appellee's Br. at 50, and we cannot ignore the potential impact of such a highly probative attack on Soto's character for truthfulness. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "412 F.2d 64, 64",
"parenthetical": "\"Since virtually the whole of plaintiffs case was based on \"White's testimony,\" court's decision to \"prohibitf ] proper impeachment of plaintiffs key witness\" \"can only be regarded as material and significant\" and \"required\" \"a new trial.\"",
"sentence": "Walker, 412 F.2d at 64 (“Since virtually the whole of plaintiffs case was based on \"White’s testimony,” court’s decision to “prohibitf ] proper impeachment of plaintiffs key witness” “can only be regarded as material and significant” and “required” “a new trial.”); see also Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 518 (noting in Brady context “undisclosed impeachment evidence can be immaterial because of its cumulative nature only if the witness was already impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "80 F.3d 518, 518",
"parenthetical": "noting in Brady context \"undisclosed impeachment evidence can be immaterial because of its cumulative nature only if the witness was already impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence\"",
"sentence": "Walker, 412 F.2d at 64 (“Since virtually the whole of plaintiffs case was based on \"White’s testimony,” court’s decision to “prohibitf ] proper impeachment of plaintiffs key witness” “can only be regarded as material and significant” and “required” “a new trial.”); see also Cuffie, 80 F.3d at 518 (noting in Brady context “undisclosed impeachment evidence can be immaterial because of its cumulative nature only if the witness was already impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence”)."
} | 9,285,361 | a |
The fact that the force used in the present case emanated from a taser, rather than from a more traditional device, is not dispositive. The use of any "unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force," whether arising from a gun, a baton, a taser, or other weapon, precludes an officer from receiving qualified immunity if the subject is unarmed and secured. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 F.3d 442, 449",
"parenthetical": "concluding that use of a taser to \"punish or intimidate\" a pretrial detainee is not objectively reasonable and is contrary to clearly established law",
"sentence": "See Park, 250 F.3d at 852-53 (concluding that an officer’s use of “pepper spray” to subdue an unarmed subject was irresponsible and excessive when the subject was not a threat to the officer or the public, and that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity); see also Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir.2008)(concluding that use of a taser to “punish or intimidate” a pretrial detainee is not objectively reasonable and is contrary to clearly established law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "250 F.3d 852, 852-53",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an officer's use of \"pepper spray\" to subdue an unarmed subject was irresponsible and excessive when the subject was not a threat to the officer or the public, and that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity",
"sentence": "See Park, 250 F.3d at 852-53 (concluding that an officer’s use of “pepper spray” to subdue an unarmed subject was irresponsible and excessive when the subject was not a threat to the officer or the public, and that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity); see also Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 449 (4th Cir.2008)(concluding that use of a taser to “punish or intimidate” a pretrial detainee is not objectively reasonable and is contrary to clearly established law)."
} | 3,558,664 | b |
The evidence does not explain a notice provision in the contract, but rather seeks to change it. As such, the evidence is barred under Arizona's parol evidence rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract",
"sentence": "See also Vecsel Partners, 29 F.3d 637, 1994 WL 315631 * 1 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1994 WL 462117, * 7",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement",
"sentence": "See Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 482 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it contradicts parties’ final agreement); Thurston v. Citizens Utility Co., 1994 WL 462117 * 7 (D.Ariz., June 30, 1994), aff'd, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.1996) (extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement); In re Redpath, 181 B.R. at 980 (parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement)."
} | 11,216,497 | b |
Subsets and Splits