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The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
We have interpreted the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c), relating to delays involving the gathering of material evidence, and concluded that such time is not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "254 Kan. 669, 672",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994) (stating that “delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Kan. 180, 185-86",
"parenthetical": "stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c",
"sentence": "(Emphasis added.); see State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 185-86, 509 P.2d 1125 (1973) (stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c), making a total delay of 191 days not to be counted against the State)."
} | 9,103,817 | a |
We have interpreted the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c), relating to delays involving the gathering of material evidence, and concluded that such time is not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c",
"sentence": "(Emphasis added.); see State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 185-86, 509 P.2d 1125 (1973) (stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c), making a total delay of 191 days not to be counted against the State)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "254 Kan. 669, 672",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994) (stating that “delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.”)"
} | 9,103,817 | b |
We have interpreted the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c), relating to delays involving the gathering of material evidence, and concluded that such time is not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Kan. 180, 185-86",
"parenthetical": "stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c",
"sentence": "(Emphasis added.); see State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 185-86, 509 P.2d 1125 (1973) (stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c), making a total delay of 191 days not to be counted against the State)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994) (stating that “delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.”)"
} | 9,103,817 | b |
We have interpreted the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3402(3)(c), relating to delays involving the gathering of material evidence, and concluded that such time is not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c",
"sentence": "(Emphasis added.); see State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 185-86, 509 P.2d 1125 (1973) (stating that where 257 days had elapsed between arraignment and trial, 135 days were the result of the application or fault of the defendant and 56 days were permissible extensions of time granted to the State under the provisions of K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 22-3402(3)(c), making a total delay of 191 days not to be counted against the State)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 672, 867 P.2d 366 (1994) (stating that “delays which are the result of the application or fault of the accused, or extended, by 22-3402(3)(c) to allow the prosecution to obtain material evidence, are not counted in computing the statutory speedy trial period.”)"
} | 9,103,817 | b |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "193 W.Va. 475, 482",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute's language does not direct otherwise\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 W.Va. 237, 250",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "193 W.Va. 475, 482",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute's language does not direct otherwise\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 S.E.2d 152, 159",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute's language does not direct otherwise\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 W.Va. 237, 250",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "457 S.E.2d 152, 159",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute's language does not direct otherwise\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | b |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 W.Va. 567, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related\" and \"consistent with business necessity\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 W.Va. 237, 250",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "191 W.Va. 567, 573-74",
"parenthetical": "altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related\" and \"consistent with business necessity\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | b |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 W.Va. 237, 250",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66",
"parenthetical": "altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related\" and \"consistent with business necessity\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | b |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66",
"parenthetical": "altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related\" and \"consistent with business necessity\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "188 W.Va. 144, 153-55",
"parenthetical": "defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621, et seq.",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 W.Va. 237, 250",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "188 W.Va. 144, 153-55",
"parenthetical": "defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621, et seq.",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | a |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 W.Va. 237, 250",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558",
"parenthetical": "defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621, et seq.",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | b |
[t]his Court has consistently looked to federal discrimination law dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1994) when interpreting provisions of our state's human rights statutes. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute\"",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558",
"parenthetical": "defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 621, et seq.",
"sentence": "Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 482, 457 S.E.2d 152, 159 (1995) (noting that \"cases brought under the West Virginia Human Rights Act are governed by the same analytical framework and structures developed under Title VII, at least where our statute’s language does not direct otherwise”); West Virginia University v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 573-74, 447 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1994) (altering disparate impact test previously established based on 1991 amendments to Title VII which shifted burden of production and persuasion to employer to prove that particular employment practice or policy is \"job related” and \"consistent with business necessity”); Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Auth., 188 W.Va. 144, 153-55, 423 S.E.2d 547, 556-558 (1992) (defining elements of constructive discharge cases by adopting majority view of federal decisions decided under both Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.); Frank's Shoe Store v. Human Rights Commission, 179 W.Va. 53, 58-59, 365 S.E.2d 251, 256-57 (1986) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII and United States Supreme Court decision interpreting that amendment as basis for holding that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under West Virginia Human Rights Act); see also Paxton v. Crabtree, 184 W.Va. 237, 250, 400 S.E.2d 245, 258 n. 26 (1990) (observing that “we have adopted federal precedent when we believed it was compatible with our human rights statute”)."
} | 11,112,692 | b |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 322, 322-23",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner's use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 419, 436",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | a |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 322, 322-23",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner's use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | b |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 322, 322-23",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner's use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | a |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner's use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 419, 436",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | a |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner's use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | b |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner's use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | a |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 419, 436",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 124, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | b |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 124, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | b |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "438 U.S. 124, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | a |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 419, 436",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | a |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | b |
The United States may not make proprietary use of the water denied to Casitas by the ESA, nor may it divert Casitas' use rights to a third party. Rather, the limitation imposed on the total quantity of water available for Casitas' use is directly correlated to the quantity of water needed to remain in the Ventura River's hydrologic cycle to preserve the endangered Southern California steelhead under a public program to promote the common good. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a true physical \"occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A 'taking' may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.\"",
"sentence": "See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322-23, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (distinguishing between government invasion or acquisition of property, which constitutes a physical taking, and government interference with a private owner’s use of her property, which constitutes a regulatory taking if, after a complex factual assessment, a court determines it goes too far); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (“A ‘taking’ may more 'readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (concluding that a true physical “occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion”)."
} | 3,824,507 | b |
. In fact, a number of courts have applied SS 43(a) to claims brought by an estate or assignees of a deceased celebrity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376",
"parenthetical": "concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants' belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants' use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys' fees on SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | 1,626,298 | a |
. In fact, a number of courts have applied SS 43(a) to claims brought by an estate or assignees of a deceased celebrity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants' belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants' use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys' fees on SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "464 F.Supp. 426, 433",
"parenthetical": "assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | 1,626,298 | b |
. In fact, a number of courts have applied SS 43(a) to claims brought by an estate or assignees of a deceased celebrity. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants' belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants' use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys' fees on SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "690 F.Supp. 281, 288",
"parenthetical": "noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever's survivors' SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | 1,626,298 | b |
. In fact, a number of courts have applied SS 43(a) to claims brought by an estate or assignees of a deceased celebrity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "880 F.Supp. 153, 166",
"parenthetical": "referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants' belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants' use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys' fees on SS 43(a",
"sentence": "See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1376 (D.NJ.1981) (concluding facts supporting finding of likelihood of success regarding likelihood of confusion also supported § 43(a) claims brought by Elvis Presley’s estate); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (assuming without comment that estate and assignees of Agatha Christie could bring § 43(a) claim but dismissing the false endorsement claim because there was no likelihood of confusion); Cheever v. Academy Chicago, Ltd., 690 F.Supp. 281, 288 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (noting no apparent impediment to author John Cheever’s survivors’ § 43(a) claims and commenting that potential financial motive would not undermine claim based on literary reputation of deceased); Museum Boutique Intercontinental, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F.Supp. 153, 166 (referring to unpublished related case involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims brought by Picasso heirs and estate); but see Robles v. Deutsch Advertising, Inc., 1997 WL 266976 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (affirming discovery order denying access to defendants' financial information because defendants’ belief that plaintiff-actor was deceased or had signed away his rights to film meant defendants’ use of film clips was not in bad faith or done with malice that would support award of profits and attorneys’ fees on § 43(a) false endorsement claim)."
} | 1,626,298 | a |
Christopher therefore had an opportunity to address the deficiencies in his evidence, whether by filing an amended response seven days before the hearing or requesting leave to file an amended response less than seven days before the hearing. As in Carpenter, the rules provided Christopher with a remedy before the summary judgment hearing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "157 S.W.3d 442, 442",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"nothing in this record suggests that before summary judgment was granted,\" pro se litigant realized her mistake",
"sentence": "Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (stating that Crad-dock’s purpose — “to alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available” — does not apply “when our rules provide the defaulting party a remedy.”); see also Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442 (observing that “nothing in this record suggests that before summary judgment was granted,” pro se litigant realized her mistake)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "98 S.W.3d 686, 686",
"parenthetical": "stating that Crad-dock's purpose -- \"to alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available\" -- does not apply \"when our rules provide the defaulting party a remedy.\"",
"sentence": "Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (stating that Crad-dock’s purpose — “to alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available” — does not apply “when our rules provide the defaulting party a remedy.”); see also Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 442 (observing that “nothing in this record suggests that before summary judgment was granted,” pro se litigant realized her mistake)."
} | 7,086,809 | b |
The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. SS 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, is "only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." Therefore, to satisfy jurisdictional requirements of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a constitutional provision, federal statute, independent contractual relationship, and/or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 1371, 1384",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.\"",
"sentence": "See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.”); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“Because the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "386 F.3d 1091, 1094",
"parenthetical": "\"[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.\"",
"sentence": "See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“[Jjurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act.”); see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“Because the Tucker Act itself does not provide a substantive cause of action, ... a plaintiff must find elsewhere a money-mandating source upon which to base a suit.”)."
} | 1,614,829 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 N.E.2d 520, 522",
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 N.E.2d 520, 522",
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 N.E.2d 520, 522",
"parenthetical": "characterizing waste disposal as an issue that \"certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county's] citizens\" and is therefore subject to its police powers",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291",
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291",
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291",
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 330, 344",
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two New York counties' ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because \"[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function\" (alteration in original",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | a |
Courts have consistently held that waste disposal is subject to regulation by municipalities pursuant to their police powers. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "66 F.3d 1272, 1275",
"parenthetical": "\"For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting \"a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste\"",
"sentence": "See Riley v. Monroe Cnty., 43 N.Y.2d 144, 400 N.Y.S.2d 801, 371 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1977) (characterizing waste disposal as an issue that “certainly affects the health and welfare of [the county’s] citizens” and is therefore subject to its police powers); Jamaica Recycling Corp. v. City of N.Y., 12 Misc.3d 276, 816 N.Y.S.2d 282, 291 (Sup.Ct.2006) (collecting “a long line of cases which hold that, in the exercise of their police powers, municipalities may regulate the disposal of solid waste”), aff'd, 38 A.D.3d 398, 832 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2007); cf. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344, 127 S.Ct. 1786, 167 L.Ed.2d 655 (2007) (holding that two New York counties’ ordinances governing the flow of solid waste does not violate the Commerce Clause, in part because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 (2d Cir.1995) (“For ninety years, it has been settled law that garbage collection and disposal is a core function of local government in the United States.”)."
} | 4,337,823 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "781 F.2d 777, 782",
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "781 F.2d 777, 782",
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "781 F.2d 777, 782",
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "781 F.2d 777, 782",
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | a |
Were this a case of the Crucifixion standing alone, the inquiry would end here. There is abundant case law holding unconstitutional the prominent display of a cross without any detracting features. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (holding, impermissible the prominent display of a cross on a public building); see also Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir.1985) (the presence of a Latin cross in a city logo violates the establishment clause), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2890, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); cf. Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2619, 110 L.Ed.2d 640 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a city display of a menorah standing alone during Chanukah)."
} | 4,080,418 | b |
The record contains substantial evidence tying both defendants to the house and to the marijuana found inside the house. Although we have stated the test in various ways, an error admitting evidence is harmless if there is sufficient independent evidence that establishes the defendants' guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 323, 328",
"parenthetical": "although prejudicial effect of officer's opinion substantially outweighed probative value and therefore was error to admit opinion under Rule 403, \"error was harmless ... because there was other reliable identification testimony identifying Henderson as the robber\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shannon, 137 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.1998) (error was harmless where “government produced overwhelming evidence against Shannon independent of Eck’s letter”) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); see also United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir.1995) (although prejudicial effect of officer’s opinion substantially outweighed probative value and therefore was error to admit opinion under Rule 403, “error was harmless ... because there was other reliable identification testimony identifying Henderson as the robber”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "137 F.3d 1112, 1119",
"parenthetical": "error was harmless where \"government produced overwhelming evidence against Shannon independent of Eck's letter\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Shannon, 137 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.1998) (error was harmless where “government produced overwhelming evidence against Shannon independent of Eck’s letter”) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc); see also United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir.1995) (although prejudicial effect of officer’s opinion substantially outweighed probative value and therefore was error to admit opinion under Rule 403, “error was harmless ... because there was other reliable identification testimony identifying Henderson as the robber”)."
} | 5,749,236 | b |
Subsets and Splits