context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
The SEC says-their-lifetimes, but with no justification beyond the asserted egregiousness of Defendants' conduct. Section 78u(d)(2),-however, is not an all-or-nothing standard] it gives courts the discretion to grant an officer-or-director bar "for such period of time as [the -court] shall determine;" And Patel suggests that lifetime bans may not be warranted. where a fixed-term bar might suffice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "595 F.Supp.2d 45, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "ordering five-year bar despite defendant's knowing and deliberate violations because \"a permanent bar ... is far too draconian a remedy\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 595 F.Supp.2d at 45-46 (ordering five-year bar despite defendant’s knowing and deliberate violations because “a permanent bar ... is far too draconian a remedy”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2012 WL 1849000, at *2",
"parenthetical": "repeat offenders are those who committed securities violations outside of the ones giving rise to the present litigation",
"sentence": "Patel, 61 F.3d at 142, Given the award of a permanent -bar on securities-law, violations and the fact that neither Defendant is a repeat offender, see SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12-1012, 2012 WL 1849000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012) (repeat offenders are those who committed securities violations outside of the ones giving rise to the present litigation), aff'd, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.2013), the Court concludes that, especially given her age, a ten-year bar for Grace and a five-year bar for Saito are sufficient and appropriate."
} | 4,196,025 | b |
The SEC says-their-lifetimes, but with no justification beyond the asserted egregiousness of Defendants' conduct. Section 78u(d)(2),-however, is not an all-or-nothing standard] it gives courts the discretion to grant an officer-or-director bar "for such period of time as [the -court] shall determine;" And Patel suggests that lifetime bans may not be warranted. where a fixed-term bar might suffice. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "repeat offenders are those who committed securities violations outside of the ones giving rise to the present litigation",
"sentence": "Patel, 61 F.3d at 142, Given the award of a permanent -bar on securities-law, violations and the fact that neither Defendant is a repeat offender, see SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12-1012, 2012 WL 1849000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012) (repeat offenders are those who committed securities violations outside of the ones giving rise to the present litigation), aff'd, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.2013), the Court concludes that, especially given her age, a ten-year bar for Grace and a five-year bar for Saito are sufficient and appropriate."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "595 F.Supp.2d 45, 45-46",
"parenthetical": "ordering five-year bar despite defendant's knowing and deliberate violations because \"a permanent bar ... is far too draconian a remedy\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson, 595 F.Supp.2d at 45-46 (ordering five-year bar despite defendant’s knowing and deliberate violations because “a permanent bar ... is far too draconian a remedy”)."
} | 4,196,025 | a |
The discharge exceptions are to be narrowly construed in favor of the debtor since the aim of the Bankruptcy Code is to give the debtor a fresh start. To meet the definition of "embezzlement," there must be proof of the debt- or's fraudulent intent in taking the property. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 110, 111",
"parenthetical": "requiring an intent to defraud for a determination of whether there has been a breach of a fiduciary relationship under SS 523(a",
"sentence": "See Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1173 (6th Cir.1996) (“A creditor proves embezzlement by showing that he entrusted his property to the debtor, the debtor appropriated the property for a use other than that for which it was entrusted, and the circumstances indicate fraud.”); In re Sokol, 170 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994); cf. Coburn Co. v. Nicholas, 956 F.2d 110, 111 (5th Cir.1992) (requiring an intent to defraud for a determination of whether there has been a breach of a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 F.3d 1165, 1173",
"parenthetical": "\"A creditor proves embezzlement by showing that he entrusted his property to the debtor, the debtor appropriated the property for a use other than that for which it was entrusted, and the circumstances indicate fraud.\"",
"sentence": "See Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1173 (6th Cir.1996) (“A creditor proves embezzlement by showing that he entrusted his property to the debtor, the debtor appropriated the property for a use other than that for which it was entrusted, and the circumstances indicate fraud.”); In re Sokol, 170 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994); cf. Coburn Co. v. Nicholas, 956 F.2d 110, 111 (5th Cir.1992) (requiring an intent to defraud for a determination of whether there has been a breach of a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4))."
} | 11,696,093 | b |
Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming aRO issued on November 4, 1976, which held plaintiff liable for crude oil overcharges",
"sentence": "See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (holding the FEA had authority to issue a remedial order in September, 1976, despite plaintiff's contention that FEA had no such power until passage of 42 U.S.C. § 7193 expressly authorized DOE to issue remedial orders); see also Sauder v. Dep't of Energy, 648 F.2d 1341 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1981) (affirming aRO issued on November 4, 1976, which held plaintiff liable for crude oil overcharges)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4",
"parenthetical": "holding the FEA had authority to issue a remedial order in September, 1976, despite plaintiff's contention that FEA had no such power until passage of 42 U.S.C. SS 7193 expressly authorized DOE to issue remedial orders",
"sentence": "See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (holding the FEA had authority to issue a remedial order in September, 1976, despite plaintiff's contention that FEA had no such power until passage of 42 U.S.C. § 7193 expressly authorized DOE to issue remedial orders); see also Sauder v. Dep't of Energy, 648 F.2d 1341 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1981) (affirming aRO issued on November 4, 1976, which held plaintiff liable for crude oil overcharges)."
} | 7,770,831 | b |
Even if late-filed tax documents can sometimes qualify as returns, the BAPCPA definition also demands that a return satisfy "the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law." Both parties to this case, and all courts to consider the issue, agree that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" incorporates the Beard test. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "473 B.R. 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any \"applicable non-bankruptcy law\" at all",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff'd sub nom. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2014) (holding that the Beard test “constituted the ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law1 — pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA — for purposes of determining whether a filing is a ‘return’ under § 523(a)(1)(B)®”); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (applying Beard test “to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a ‘return’ for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i) of § 523(a)(1)(B)”); cf. In re Casano, 473 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2012) (declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any “applicable non-bankruptcy law” at all)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "500 B.R. 1, 8",
"parenthetical": "holding that the Beard test \"constituted the 'applicable nonbankruptcy law1 -- pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA -- for purposes of determining whether a filing is a 'return' under SS 523(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff'd sub nom. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2014) (holding that the Beard test “constituted the ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law1 — pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA — for purposes of determining whether a filing is a ‘return’ under § 523(a)(1)(B)®”); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (applying Beard test “to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a ‘return’ for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i) of § 523(a)(1)(B)”); cf. In re Casano, 473 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2012) (declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any “applicable non-bankruptcy law” at all)."
} | 4,259,964 | b |
Even if late-filed tax documents can sometimes qualify as returns, the BAPCPA definition also demands that a return satisfy "the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law." Both parties to this case, and all courts to consider the issue, agree that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" incorporates the Beard test. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the Beard test \"constituted the 'applicable nonbankruptcy law1 -- pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA -- for purposes of determining whether a filing is a 'return' under SS 523(a",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff'd sub nom. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2014) (holding that the Beard test “constituted the ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law1 — pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA — for purposes of determining whether a filing is a ‘return’ under § 523(a)(1)(B)®”); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (applying Beard test “to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a ‘return’ for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i) of § 523(a)(1)(B)”); cf. In re Casano, 473 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2012) (declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any “applicable non-bankruptcy law” at all)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "473 B.R. 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any \"applicable non-bankruptcy law\" at all",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff'd sub nom. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2014) (holding that the Beard test “constituted the ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law1 — pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA — for purposes of determining whether a filing is a ‘return’ under § 523(a)(1)(B)®”); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (applying Beard test “to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a ‘return’ for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i) of § 523(a)(1)(B)”); cf. In re Casano, 473 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2012) (declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any “applicable non-bankruptcy law” at all)."
} | 4,259,964 | a |
Even if late-filed tax documents can sometimes qualify as returns, the BAPCPA definition also demands that a return satisfy "the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law." Both parties to this case, and all courts to consider the issue, agree that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" incorporates the Beard test. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "473 B.R. 504, 507",
"parenthetical": "declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any \"applicable non-bankruptcy law\" at all",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff'd sub nom. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2014) (holding that the Beard test “constituted the ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law1 — pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA — for purposes of determining whether a filing is a ‘return’ under § 523(a)(1)(B)®”); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (applying Beard test “to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a ‘return’ for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i) of § 523(a)(1)(B)”); cf. In re Casano, 473 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2012) (declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any “applicable non-bankruptcy law” at all)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "498 B.R. 357, 367",
"parenthetical": "applying Beard test \"to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a 'return' for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Martin, 500 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Colo.2013) aff'd sub nom. In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.2014) (holding that the Beard test “constituted the ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law1 — pursuant to the first sentence of the hanging paragraph provided by the BAPC-PA — for purposes of determining whether a filing is a ‘return’ under § 523(a)(1)(B)®”); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 367 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2013) (applying Beard test “to determine whether a late-filed, post-assessment return is, in fact, a ‘return’ for purposes of dischargeability considerations under clause (i) of § 523(a)(1)(B)”); cf. In re Casano, 473 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2012) (declining to apply Beard test because the one-day-late rule meant that late tax filings could never be returns, and therefore declining to apply any “applicable non-bankruptcy law” at all)."
} | 4,259,964 | b |
Without a rule that plaintiff have a live claim at least when the motion to certify is filed, the "case or controversy" requirement would be almost completely eviscerated in the class action context, since almost anybody might be deemed to have standing to move to certify a class. For example, a concerned citizen, with no personal grievance whatsoever against defendant, might file a class action out of empathy for those who were allegedly injured. However, "[t]o permit the certification of a class headed by a 'representative' who did not have a live controversy with the defendant on the day the suit began would be to jettison the last vestiges of the case-or-controversy requirement in class actions." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "434 F.2d 727, 734",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] predicate to appel-lee's right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.\"",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 229, 233",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | 10,517,674 | b |
Without a rule that plaintiff have a live claim at least when the motion to certify is filed, the "case or controversy" requirement would be almost completely eviscerated in the class action context, since almost anybody might be deemed to have standing to move to certify a class. For example, a concerned citizen, with no personal grievance whatsoever against defendant, might file a class action out of empathy for those who were allegedly injured. However, "[t]o permit the certification of a class headed by a 'representative' who did not have a live controversy with the defendant on the day the suit began would be to jettison the last vestiges of the case-or-controversy requirement in class actions." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 229, 233",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] predicate to appel-lee's right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.\"",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | 10,517,674 | a |
Without a rule that plaintiff have a live claim at least when the motion to certify is filed, the "case or controversy" requirement would be almost completely eviscerated in the class action context, since almost anybody might be deemed to have standing to move to certify a class. For example, a concerned citizen, with no personal grievance whatsoever against defendant, might file a class action out of empathy for those who were allegedly injured. However, "[t]o permit the certification of a class headed by a 'representative' who did not have a live controversy with the defendant on the day the suit began would be to jettison the last vestiges of the case-or-controversy requirement in class actions." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 229, 233",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] predicate to appel-lee's right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.\"",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | 10,517,674 | a |
Without a rule that plaintiff have a live claim at least when the motion to certify is filed, the "case or controversy" requirement would be almost completely eviscerated in the class action context, since almost anybody might be deemed to have standing to move to certify a class. For example, a concerned citizen, with no personal grievance whatsoever against defendant, might file a class action out of empathy for those who were allegedly injured. However, "[t]o permit the certification of a class headed by a 'representative' who did not have a live controversy with the defendant on the day the suit began would be to jettison the last vestiges of the case-or-controversy requirement in class actions." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "854 F.2d 229, 233",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] predicate to appel-lee's right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.\"",
"sentence": "Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir.1988) (affirming dismissal of civil rights complaint brought by arrestee who claimed he was detained without a warrant but was arraigned before filing the suit); see also Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971) (“[A] predicate to appel-lee’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in his own right.”); Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1637, 1637 (1981) (“It is axiomatic that an uninjured plaintiff cannot bring suit on behalf of an injured class.”)."
} | 10,517,674 | a |
However, neither, the Supreme Court nor this court has adopted the "continuing seizure" doctrine. Thus, even if we assume that being "subject to the authority of the [court]" constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity because the particularized right alleged -- the right to be free from a "continuing seizure" by virtue of a pending criminal charge -- is not clearly established. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093",
"parenthetical": "\"[Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.\"",
"sentence": "See Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (“[Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”); see also Williams v. Crosby, 43 F.Supp.3d 794, 805 (ND.Ohio 2014) (“Far from being clearly established in September 2012, this point of law [regarding “continuing seizures” and malicious-prosecution claims] was (and remains) expressly unsettled in this Circuit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.Supp.3d 794, 805",
"parenthetical": "\"Far from being clearly established in September 2012, this point of law [regarding \"continuing seizures\" and malicious-prosecution claims] was (and remains) expressly unsettled in this Circuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (“[Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”); see also Williams v. Crosby, 43 F.Supp.3d 794, 805 (ND.Ohio 2014) (“Far from being clearly established in September 2012, this point of law [regarding “continuing seizures” and malicious-prosecution claims] was (and remains) expressly unsettled in this Circuit.”)."
} | 4,313,676 | a |
However, neither, the Supreme Court nor this court has adopted the "continuing seizure" doctrine. Thus, even if we assume that being "subject to the authority of the [court]" constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity because the particularized right alleged -- the right to be free from a "continuing seizure" by virtue of a pending criminal charge -- is not clearly established. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.\"",
"sentence": "See Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (“[Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”); see also Williams v. Crosby, 43 F.Supp.3d 794, 805 (ND.Ohio 2014) (“Far from being clearly established in September 2012, this point of law [regarding “continuing seizures” and malicious-prosecution claims] was (and remains) expressly unsettled in this Circuit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "43 F.Supp.3d 794, 805",
"parenthetical": "\"Far from being clearly established in September 2012, this point of law [regarding \"continuing seizures\" and malicious-prosecution claims] was (and remains) expressly unsettled in this Circuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (“[Existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”); see also Williams v. Crosby, 43 F.Supp.3d 794, 805 (ND.Ohio 2014) (“Far from being clearly established in September 2012, this point of law [regarding “continuing seizures” and malicious-prosecution claims] was (and remains) expressly unsettled in this Circuit.”)."
} | 4,313,676 | a |
Standing alone, a vehicle that hails from a purported known drug source area is, at best, a weak factor in finding suspicion of criminal activity. In this Circuit alone, police testimony has identified an extremely broad range of known "drug source areas." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "collecting cases and noting that law enforcement officers have identified a number of drug supply states and a significant number of the largest cities in the United States as \"drug source cities\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 638 (10th Cir.1998) (identifying the entire West Coast as a drug source area); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir.1997) (Colorado); Wood, 106 F.3d at 947 (California); United States v. Garrett, 47 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1265 (D.Kan.1999) (Texas); see also United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 & n. 3 (8th Cir.1998) (collecting cases and noting that law enforcement officers have identified a number of drug supply states and a significant number of the largest cities in the United States as “drug source cities”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "144 F.3d 632, 638",
"parenthetical": "identifying the entire West Coast as a drug source area",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 638 (10th Cir.1998) (identifying the entire West Coast as a drug source area); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir.1997) (Colorado); Wood, 106 F.3d at 947 (California); United States v. Garrett, 47 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1265 (D.Kan.1999) (Texas); see also United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 & n. 3 (8th Cir.1998) (collecting cases and noting that law enforcement officers have identified a number of drug supply states and a significant number of the largest cities in the United States as “drug source cities”)."
} | 9,467,870 | b |
We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez -- indeed, by any reasonable person -- that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards' meeting would impede the Stewards' efforts to investigate Perez's very serious allegations -- that Lakow was "fixing" races by manipulating race entries -- and, thus, constitute conduct "detrimental to the best interests of racing generally." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "39 F.3d 711, 715",
"parenthetical": "observing that although regulation prohibiting \"improper language\" and \"improper conduct\" might be \"seriously deficient\" as a \"norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,\" the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is \"administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details\"",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.Supp. 792, 793",
"parenthetical": "holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting \"conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing\" was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an \"experienced horseman\" and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | 9,243,649 | b |
We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez -- indeed, by any reasonable person -- that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards' meeting would impede the Stewards' efforts to investigate Perez's very serious allegations -- that Lakow was "fixing" races by manipulating race entries -- and, thus, constitute conduct "detrimental to the best interests of racing generally." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that although regulation prohibiting \"improper language\" and \"improper conduct\" might be \"seriously deficient\" as a \"norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,\" the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is \"administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details\"",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.Supp. 792, 793",
"parenthetical": "holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting \"conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing\" was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an \"experienced horseman\" and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | 9,243,649 | b |
We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez -- indeed, by any reasonable person -- that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards' meeting would impede the Stewards' efforts to investigate Perez's very serious allegations -- that Lakow was "fixing" races by manipulating race entries -- and, thus, constitute conduct "detrimental to the best interests of racing generally." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that although regulation prohibiting \"improper language\" and \"improper conduct\" might be \"seriously deficient\" as a \"norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,\" the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is \"administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details\"",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.Supp. 792, 793",
"parenthetical": "holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting \"conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing\" was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an \"experienced horseman\" and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | 9,243,649 | b |
We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez -- indeed, by any reasonable person -- that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards' meeting would impede the Stewards' efforts to investigate Perez's very serious allegations -- that Lakow was "fixing" races by manipulating race entries -- and, thus, constitute conduct "detrimental to the best interests of racing generally." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 F.Supp. 792, 793",
"parenthetical": "holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting \"conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing\" was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an \"experienced horseman\" and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that although regulation prohibiting \"improper language\" and \"improper conduct\" might be \"seriously deficient\" as a \"norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,\" the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is \"administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details\"",
"sentence": "See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting “conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing” was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an “experienced horseman” and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting “improper language” and “improper conduct” might be “seriously deficient” as a “norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs,” the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is “administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details”), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995)."
} | 9,243,649 | a |
. Accordingly, the United States Court of Federal Claims has relied on other federal court decisions to construe RCFC 23. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "68 Fed.Cl. 492, 494, n. 1",
"parenthetical": "\"Owing to the fact that the language of RCFC 23 and Federal Rule 23 is, in many regards, identical, this opinion relies upon nu merous decisions that have construed the relevant portions of the latter rule.\"",
"sentence": "Haggart v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 523, 529-30 (Fed.Cl.2009) (\"Cases applying [FRCP 23] have been examined and followed in interpreting RCFC 23.”); see also Barnes v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 492, 494, n. 1 (2005) (“Owing to the fact that the language of RCFC 23 and Federal Rule 23 is, in many regards, identical, this opinion relies upon nu merous decisions that have construed the relevant portions of the latter rule.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "89 Fed.Cl. 523, 529-30",
"parenthetical": "\"Cases applying [FRCP 23] have been examined and followed in interpreting RCFC 23.\"",
"sentence": "Haggart v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 523, 529-30 (Fed.Cl.2009) (\"Cases applying [FRCP 23] have been examined and followed in interpreting RCFC 23.”); see also Barnes v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 492, 494, n. 1 (2005) (“Owing to the fact that the language of RCFC 23 and Federal Rule 23 is, in many regards, identical, this opinion relies upon nu merous decisions that have construed the relevant portions of the latter rule.”)."
} | 4,283,404 | b |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278",
"parenthetical": "fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | a |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89",
"parenthetical": "use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | a |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway\"",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | a |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "227 N.W. 544, 545",
"parenthetical": "\"mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway\"",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | b |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278",
"parenthetical": "fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 A.2d 846, 848",
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | b |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 A.2d 846, 848",
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89",
"parenthetical": "use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | a |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 A.2d 846, 848",
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway\"",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | a |
Plaintiffs' other evidence of public use is unavailing. Darlin Brin's testimony that he and neighborhood children played in the roads and that he walked the roads to travel from his house to Charlotte Amalie High School does not establish an easement for vehicular use, which Plaintiffs seek. Similarly, DeLugo's testimony that "anyone trying to beat traffic" would use the hotel's roads and parking lot as a cut-through road does not establish by clear and convincing evidence an intent on the part of BCI or its predecessors to dedicate the entrance and exit roads and middle aisle of the hotel parking lot to the public for a public highway. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 A.2d 846, 848",
"parenthetical": "use of a driveway in commercial area \"by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light\" was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "227 N.W. 544, 545",
"parenthetical": "\"mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway\"",
"sentence": "See Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (Md. 1956) (use of a driveway in commercial area “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner); see also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 S.W.3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (use of parking lot as a cut through is insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Snow v. Murphy, 248 Mich. 659, 227 N.W. 544, 545 (Mich. 1929) (“mere permissive use of a private road by the general public, however long continued, will not make it a public highway”)."
} | 3,661,260 | a |
We have held that an "estate bringing a decedent's SS 1983 claims may seek damages allowable under a state wrongful death statute." Indiana permits recovery for damages caused by an individual's wrongful acts or omissions that led to the decedent's death, including "[reasonable medical expenses, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses.... " Ind.Code SS 34-23-l-2(c). Thus, if the defendants' acts were found to be excessive, the Estate would have been allowed to present evidence of Escobedo's death to demonstrate the full scope of the injuries he sustained and to advance its theory that the defendant commanders proximately caused those injuries. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 F.3d 1041, 1044",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman v. City of Chi, 689 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir.2012) (“[Liability must be resolved before the question of damages is reached.”); see also Herzog v. Vill. of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir.2002) (“[T]he ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits.”); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848 (7th Cir.1999) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has suffered an ‘actual’ present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 F.3d 740, 745-46",
"parenthetical": "\"[Liability must be resolved before the question of damages is reached.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman v. City of Chi, 689 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir.2012) (“[Liability must be resolved before the question of damages is reached.”); see also Herzog v. Vill. of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir.2002) (“[T]he ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits.”); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848 (7th Cir.1999) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has suffered an ‘actual’ present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.”)."
} | 3,646,919 | b |
We have held that an "estate bringing a decedent's SS 1983 claims may seek damages allowable under a state wrongful death statute." Indiana permits recovery for damages caused by an individual's wrongful acts or omissions that led to the decedent's death, including "[reasonable medical expenses, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses.... " Ind.Code SS 34-23-l-2(c). Thus, if the defendants' acts were found to be excessive, the Estate would have been allowed to present evidence of Escobedo's death to demonstrate the full scope of the injuries he sustained and to advance its theory that the defendant commanders proximately caused those injuries. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "196 F.3d 839, 848",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has suffered an 'actual' present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman v. City of Chi, 689 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir.2012) (“[Liability must be resolved before the question of damages is reached.”); see also Herzog v. Vill. of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir.2002) (“[T]he ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits.”); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848 (7th Cir.1999) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has suffered an ‘actual’ present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "689 F.3d 740, 745-46",
"parenthetical": "\"[Liability must be resolved before the question of damages is reached.\"",
"sentence": "See Guzman v. City of Chi, 689 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir.2012) (“[Liability must be resolved before the question of damages is reached.”); see also Herzog v. Vill. of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir.2002) (“[T]he ordinary rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits.”); Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 848 (7th Cir.1999) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate both that he has suffered an ‘actual’ present injury and that there is a causal connection between that injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right caused by a defendant.”)."
} | 3,646,919 | b |
While it is difficult to precisely define what, exactly, may constitute a dangerous condition, the cases that consider small holes, voids, or height deviations in walkways or roadway surfaces generally hold that such defects are not dangerous conditions as defined by the Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 2406096, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.\"",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "390 A.2d 655, 655-56",
"parenthetical": "three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | 4,208,492 | b |
While it is difficult to precisely define what, exactly, may constitute a dangerous condition, the cases that consider small holes, voids, or height deviations in walkways or roadway surfaces generally hold that such defects are not dangerous conditions as defined by the Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2001 WL 1917169, at *2",
"parenthetical": "one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 2406096, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.\"",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | 4,208,492 | a |
While it is difficult to precisely define what, exactly, may constitute a dangerous condition, the cases that consider small holes, voids, or height deviations in walkways or roadway surfaces generally hold that such defects are not dangerous conditions as defined by the Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 2406096, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.\"",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "975 F.Supp. 641, 641",
"parenthetical": "railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | 4,208,492 | b |
While it is difficult to precisely define what, exactly, may constitute a dangerous condition, the cases that consider small holes, voids, or height deviations in walkways or roadway surfaces generally hold that such defects are not dangerous conditions as defined by the Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 2406096, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.\"",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2004 WL 2314819, at *4",
"parenthetical": "nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | 4,208,492 | b |
While it is difficult to precisely define what, exactly, may constitute a dangerous condition, the cases that consider small holes, voids, or height deviations in walkways or roadway surfaces generally hold that such defects are not dangerous conditions as defined by the Tort Claims Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two sidewalk cracks -- one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long -- not a dangerous condition for pedestrians",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2005 WL 2406096, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.\"",
"sentence": "{See, e.g., Polyard, 390 A.2d at 655-56 (three-eighths inch differential in road height not a dangerous condition for vehicular travel); McCarthy, 2001 WL 1917169, at *2 (one and one-half inch horizontal gap and one and one-quarter inch vertical height difference between concrete sidewalk slabs not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Cordy, 975 F.Supp. at 641. (railroad track raised seven-eighths of an inch above roadway surface not a dangerous condition for bicycle riders); Mendelsohn, 2004 WL 2314819, at *4 (nail raised one-quarter inch above boardwalk surface not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); Gohel v. Sherry, No. A-1610-97T1, 1998 WL 34024178 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1998) (two sidewalk cracks — one to two inches wide, one-half inch deep, and five to six inches long — not a dangerous condition for pedestrians); see also, Ciricillo v. United States, 2005 WL 2406096, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[T]he relevant case law includes many examples of minor surface defects that do not constitute dangerous conditions.”))."
} | 4,208,492 | a |
P.), the court held that, although a motion to amend the sentence did not come within the precise language of Temp. Rule 13, it was within the coverage of that rule. In affirming this holding, our supreme court noted that "the provisions of subsection (d) [now Rule 24.4] regarding denial of such a motion by operation of law would also apply." 475 So.2d at 600 n. 1. However, other caselaw appears to support a different conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a motion to reconsider the sentence does not fall within that category of motions that tolls the time for appeal",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 602 So.2d 504 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (a motion to reconsider the sentence does not fall within that category of motions that tolls the time for appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an application for probation does not fall within the purview of Rule 24.4 and, thus, cannot be denied by operation of law",
"sentence": "Cf. Ex parte Rivers, 669 So.2d 239 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (an application for probation does not fall within the purview of Rule 24.4 and, thus, cannot be denied by operation of law)."
} | 9,179,790 | a |
P 9 And, when the Legislature has intended to reclassify other repetitive misdemeanors as felonies, it has specifically done so in the substantive statute. For instance, the shoplifting statute expressly provides that misdemeanor shoplifting is reclassified as a class 6 felony when the defendant shoplifts on three different occasions within a 90-day period. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11",
"parenthetical": "noting assumption \"that the legislature has said what it means\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | 12,309,916 | a |
P 9 And, when the Legislature has intended to reclassify other repetitive misdemeanors as felonies, it has specifically done so in the substantive statute. For instance, the shoplifting statute expressly provides that misdemeanor shoplifting is reclassified as a class 6 felony when the defendant shoplifts on three different occasions within a 90-day period. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting assumption \"that the legislature has said what it means\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | 12,309,916 | a |
P 9 And, when the Legislature has intended to reclassify other repetitive misdemeanors as felonies, it has specifically done so in the substantive statute. For instance, the shoplifting statute expressly provides that misdemeanor shoplifting is reclassified as a class 6 felony when the defendant shoplifts on three different occasions within a 90-day period. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11",
"parenthetical": "noting assumption \"that the legislature has said what it means\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | 12,309,916 | a |
P 9 And, when the Legislature has intended to reclassify other repetitive misdemeanors as felonies, it has specifically done so in the substantive statute. For instance, the shoplifting statute expressly provides that misdemeanor shoplifting is reclassified as a class 6 felony when the defendant shoplifts on three different occasions within a 90-day period. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting assumption \"that the legislature has said what it means\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.\"",
"sentence": "A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(B), - 3601.02(A), (F). The Legislature has not specified a comparable reclassification for misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and we will not rewrite the statute to do so. See Comm. for Preservation of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249-50, ¶ 8, 141 P.3d 422 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing different meanings and consequences to that language.”); see also Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821 (2002) (noting assumption “that the legislature has said what it means”)."
} | 12,309,916 | b |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 Md. 688, 692",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction for a crime that required \"breaking and entering\" also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | a |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction for a crime that required \"breaking and entering\" also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 Md. 688, 692",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | b |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under SS 643B of Article 27",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 Md. 688, 692",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | b |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "291 Md. 688, 692",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under SS 643B of Article 27",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | a |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 A.2d 900, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction for a crime that required \"breaking and entering\" also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | a |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 A.2d 900, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction for a crime that required \"breaking and entering\" also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | a |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under SS 643B of Article 27",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 A.2d 900, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | b |
Contrary to the State's contention and in accord with petitioner's, daytime housebreaking could not possibly be encompassed by the categories of burglary in the first, second, and third degree because a conviction for statutory burglary requires a key element that was not required for a conviction of daytime housebreaking: Whereas burglaries in the first, second, and third degree require that the defendant both break and enter the dwelling or storehouse of another, daytime housebreaking required proof only of "breaking a dwelling house." An entry into the structure has always been required for burglary, but not of daytime housebreaking. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under SS 643B of Article 27",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "436 A.2d 900, 902",
"parenthetical": "finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 291 Md. 688, 692, 436 A.2d 900, 902 (1981) (finding that the crime of breaking and entering a dwelling house could not be a lesser included offense of daytime housebreaking because the former required both a breaking and entering whereas the latter only required a breaking); cf. Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (holding that conviction for a crime that required “breaking and entering” also required the State to prove that defendant had actually entered the premises); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 535 A.2d 485 (1988) (noting that the distinction between daytime housebreaking, which required breaking, and another type of burglary that did not require breaking was significant in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing under § 643B of Article 27)."
} | 586,452 | b |
First, some of these challenges are in the nature of challenges to the expert's conclusions, and therefore not to be considered as bases for exclusion. Second, Defendant's challenges are to the application of the principles, and do not approach the level of altering a reliable methodology to the extent of "skew[ing] the methodology itself'; therefore, these alleged deficiencies would go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "821 A.2d 1097, 1097",
"parenthetical": "even misapplication of product. rule would go to weight, not admissibility",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Whittey, 821 A.2d at 1097 (even misapplication of product. rule would go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996) (criticisms of statistical methods go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Faulkner, 103 S.W.3d 346, 359-60 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (any criticism of particular statistical methods goes to weight only, and is for jury to decide); see also Bonds, 12 F.3d at 564-65 (under Daubert, challenges to statistics and probability results go to weight, not admissibility)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.3d 564, 564-65",
"parenthetical": "under Daubert, challenges to statistics and probability results go to weight, not admissibility",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Whittey, 821 A.2d at 1097 (even misapplication of product. rule would go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996) (criticisms of statistical methods go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Faulkner, 103 S.W.3d 346, 359-60 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (any criticism of particular statistical methods goes to weight only, and is for jury to decide); see also Bonds, 12 F.3d at 564-65 (under Daubert, challenges to statistics and probability results go to weight, not admissibility)."
} | 5,728,267 | a |
First, some of these challenges are in the nature of challenges to the expert's conclusions, and therefore not to be considered as bases for exclusion. Second, Defendant's challenges are to the application of the principles, and do not approach the level of altering a reliable methodology to the extent of "skew[ing] the methodology itself'; therefore, these alleged deficiencies would go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.3d 564, 564-65",
"parenthetical": "under Daubert, challenges to statistics and probability results go to weight, not admissibility",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Whittey, 821 A.2d at 1097 (even misapplication of product. rule would go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996) (criticisms of statistical methods go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Faulkner, 103 S.W.3d 346, 359-60 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (any criticism of particular statistical methods goes to weight only, and is for jury to decide); see also Bonds, 12 F.3d at 564-65 (under Daubert, challenges to statistics and probability results go to weight, not admissibility)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "103 S.W.3d 346, 359-60",
"parenthetical": "any criticism of particular statistical methods goes to weight only, and is for jury to decide",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Whittey, 821 A.2d at 1097 (even misapplication of product. rule would go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996) (criticisms of statistical methods go to weight, not admissibility); State v. Faulkner, 103 S.W.3d 346, 359-60 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (any criticism of particular statistical methods goes to weight only, and is for jury to decide); see also Bonds, 12 F.3d at 564-65 (under Daubert, challenges to statistics and probability results go to weight, not admissibility)."
} | 5,728,267 | b |
At oral argument counsel for debtor asserted that the Bankruptcy Court's finding is speculative. To this claim we need only observe that the Bankruptcy Court drew an entirely fair inference from the record presented it, and that, were there more to Tim Wargo, Jr.'s role in the conduct of the farming of debtor's acreage than that re-fleeted in the record, the burden was debt- or's to elicit the relevant facts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "664 F.2d 184, 186",
"parenthetical": "party filing involuntary petition bears burden of proving entitlement to such relief",
"sentence": "See In re Rott, 73 B.R. 366, 371 (Bankr.D.N.D.1987) (party filing Chapter 12 petition bears burden of proving eligibility); see also Jenkins v. Petitioning Creditor — Ray E. Friedman & Co., 664 F.2d 184, 186 (8th Cir.1981) (party filing involuntary petition bears burden of proving entitlement to such relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "73 B.R. 366, 371",
"parenthetical": "party filing Chapter 12 petition bears burden of proving eligibility",
"sentence": "See In re Rott, 73 B.R. 366, 371 (Bankr.D.N.D.1987) (party filing Chapter 12 petition bears burden of proving eligibility); see also Jenkins v. Petitioning Creditor — Ray E. Friedman & Co., 664 F.2d 184, 186 (8th Cir.1981) (party filing involuntary petition bears burden of proving entitlement to such relief)."
} | 10,537,714 | b |
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to derive an express warranty from Maserati's claim that the Ghibli has "[s]tate of the art engineering," which "inevitably enhances the Ghibli's reliability, for which Maserati is world renowned." (Dkt 17 at 7; see also FAC P 30; SUF at 30.) But Maserati's statements in this regard constitute straightforward examples of "generalized, nonactionable puffery." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2015 WL 151489, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"This order detects nothing 'specific or measurable' about the phrases 'Most Advanced Notebook Ever' or 'State-of-the-Art.' Those representations 'and the four put forth in the complaint constitute non-actionable puf-fery.\"",
"sentence": "Vitt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 469 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal on basis that descriptors such as “durable,” “reliable,” and “high performance” were not actionable); see Marcus v. Apple Inc., No. C 14-03824 WHA, 2015 WL 151489, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2015) (“This order detects nothing ‘specific or measurable’ about the phrases ‘Most Advanced Notebook Ever’ or ‘State-of-the-Art.’ Those representations 'and the four put forth in the complaint constitute non-actionable puf-fery.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "469 Fed.Appx. 605, 607",
"parenthetical": "affirming dismissal on basis that descriptors such as \"durable,\" \"reliable,\" and \"high performance\" were not actionable",
"sentence": "Vitt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 469 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal on basis that descriptors such as “durable,” “reliable,” and “high performance” were not actionable); see Marcus v. Apple Inc., No. C 14-03824 WHA, 2015 WL 151489, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2015) (“This order detects nothing ‘specific or measurable’ about the phrases ‘Most Advanced Notebook Ever’ or ‘State-of-the-Art.’ Those representations 'and the four put forth in the complaint constitute non-actionable puf-fery.”)."
} | 12,271,985 | b |
Mr. McGowan concedes that his arguments are foreclosed by binding circuit and Supreme Court precedent, but raises the issues only to preserve them for further review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.3d 1255, 1259",
"parenthetical": "explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and \"binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and “binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "713 F.3d 627, 635",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court may review Shepard documents \"to determine 'the factual nature' of prior convictions for ACCA purposes, 'including whether they were committed on different occasions'\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a district court may review Shepard documents “to determine ‘the factual nature’ of prior convictions for ACCA purposes, ‘including whether they were committed on different occasions’”) (citations omitted); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant’s prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact “is not an element of the present crime”)."
} | 12,401,949 | b |
Mr. McGowan concedes that his arguments are foreclosed by binding circuit and Supreme Court precedent, but raises the issues only to preserve them for further review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.3d 1255, 1259",
"parenthetical": "explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and \"binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and “binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 224, 226-27",
"parenthetical": "holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant's prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact \"is not an element of the present crime\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a district court may review Shepard documents “to determine ‘the factual nature’ of prior convictions for ACCA purposes, ‘including whether they were committed on different occasions’”) (citations omitted); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant’s prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact “is not an element of the present crime”)."
} | 12,401,949 | b |
Mr. McGowan concedes that his arguments are foreclosed by binding circuit and Supreme Court precedent, but raises the issues only to preserve them for further review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant's prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact \"is not an element of the present crime\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a district court may review Shepard documents “to determine ‘the factual nature’ of prior convictions for ACCA purposes, ‘including whether they were committed on different occasions’”) (citations omitted); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant’s prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact “is not an element of the present crime”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.3d 1255, 1259",
"parenthetical": "explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and \"binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and “binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court”)."
} | 12,401,949 | a |
Mr. McGowan concedes that his arguments are foreclosed by binding circuit and Supreme Court precedent, but raises the issues only to preserve them for further review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant's prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact \"is not an element of the present crime\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a district court may review Shepard documents “to determine ‘the factual nature’ of prior convictions for ACCA purposes, ‘including whether they were committed on different occasions’”) (citations omitted); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (holding that, for sentencing purposes, the government does not need to allege a defendant’s prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact “is not an element of the present crime”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.3d 1255, 1259",
"parenthetical": "explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and \"binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Almendarez-Torres remains good law and “binding until it is overruled by the Supreme Court”)."
} | 12,401,949 | a |
Omnibus Opp'n 15-16.) But while Rule 9(c) allows parties, in pleading conditions precedent to bringing suit, to "allege generally that all conditions precedent have occurred or been performed," Plaintiffs cannot allege something they know to be untrue, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b), and they admit that they have not complied with either the sixty-day pre-suit requirement or the indemnification provisions of SS 6.07. See Sterling Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v. DLJ Mortg. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "2010 WL 3324705, at *4",
"parenthetical": "refusing to credit similar general averments of compliance with a no-action clause in light of plaintiffs' contrary admissions",
"sentence": "Capital, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6904(JFG), 2010 WL 3324705, at *4 (N.D.I11. Aug. 20, 2010) {“Sterling II”) (refusing to credit similar general averments of compliance with a no-action clause in light of plaintiffs’ contrary admissions); see also In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F.Supp.2d 371, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[A] court need not feel constrained to accept as truth conflicting pleadings that make no sense, or that would render a claim incoherent, or that are contradicted [ ] by statements in the complaint itself____”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "151 F.Supp.2d 371, 405",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] court need not feel constrained to accept as truth conflicting pleadings that make no sense, or that would render a claim incoherent, or that are contradicted [ ] by statements in the complaint itself____\"",
"sentence": "Capital, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6904(JFG), 2010 WL 3324705, at *4 (N.D.I11. Aug. 20, 2010) {“Sterling II”) (refusing to credit similar general averments of compliance with a no-action clause in light of plaintiffs’ contrary admissions); see also In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F.Supp.2d 371, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[A] court need not feel constrained to accept as truth conflicting pleadings that make no sense, or that would render a claim incoherent, or that are contradicted [ ] by statements in the complaint itself____”)."
} | 5,763,854 | a |
In contrast to the well-settled rule for criminal cases, as of this date, the Ninth Circuit has not made a clear statement as to the time when jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture case. Several decisions, however, provide guidance on this question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "57 F.3d 873, 874-75",
"parenthetical": "conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 F.3d 1422, 1428",
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | 7,790,576 | b |
In contrast to the well-settled rule for criminal cases, as of this date, the Ninth Circuit has not made a clear statement as to the time when jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture case. Several decisions, however, provide guidance on this question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 F.3d 1422, 1428",
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15",
"parenthetical": "holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | 7,790,576 | a |
In contrast to the well-settled rule for criminal cases, as of this date, the Ninth Circuit has not made a clear statement as to the time when jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture case. Several decisions, however, provide guidance on this question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "61 F.3d 1422, 1428",
"parenthetical": "holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 781, 783",
"parenthetical": "stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | 7,790,576 | a |
In contrast to the well-settled rule for criminal cases, as of this date, the Ninth Circuit has not made a clear statement as to the time when jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture case. Several decisions, however, provide guidance on this question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "57 F.3d 873, 874-75",
"parenthetical": "conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 F.3d 51, 52",
"parenthetical": "jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | 7,790,576 | b |
In contrast to the well-settled rule for criminal cases, as of this date, the Ninth Circuit has not made a clear statement as to the time when jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture case. Several decisions, however, provide guidance on this question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15",
"parenthetical": "holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 F.3d 51, 52",
"parenthetical": "jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | 7,790,576 | b |
In contrast to the well-settled rule for criminal cases, as of this date, the Ninth Circuit has not made a clear statement as to the time when jeopardy attaches in a civil forfeiture case. Several decisions, however, provide guidance on this question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "65 F.3d 781, 783",
"parenthetical": "stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 F.3d 51, 52",
"parenthetical": "jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint",
"sentence": "See United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that conviction did not violate double jeopardy where jury was empaneled and sworn in criminal trial before defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); United States v. Barton, 46 F.3d 51, 52 (9th Cir.1995) (jeopardy attaches no earlier than date on which defendant filed answer to forfeiture complaint); see also United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir.1995) (conviction does not violate double jeopardy where defendant entered guilty plea before entering into settlement agreement in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Wong, 62 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation); United States v. Sanchez-Cobarruvias, 65 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that there must be a degree of finality to the civil proceeding before double jeopardy may be deemed to attach)."
} | 7,790,576 | b |
Yet, when police stopped Moore, he claimed to be traveling from Lawrenceville, Georgia, to visit his grandmother in Marion, North Carolina at approxi mately 1:10 a.m. -- less than twelve hours after the vehicle was rented. The trial court found this circumstance also supported a finding of reasonable suspicion, noting that it would have been very unusual to drive "from Morganton to Lawrenceville and back to Marion to visit a grandmother." This unusual itinerary, coupled with the large sum of cash, and other factors, support the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "209 F.3d 353, 361",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] reasonable officer could conclude that few innocent travelers from New York City are traveling northbound on Interstate 95 in South Carolina at 3:30 a.m. in a vehicle rented in Miami fourteen hours earlier.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 513 (4th Cir.2011) (noting an unusual travel itinerary, “coupled with other compelling suspicious behavior,” supports a finding of reasonable suspicion); cf. United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 361 (4th Cir.2000) (“[A] reasonable officer could conclude that few innocent travelers from New York City are traveling northbound on Interstate 95 in South Carolina at 3:30 a.m. in a vehicle rented in Miami fourteen hours earlier.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "650 F.3d 498, 513",
"parenthetical": "noting an unusual travel itinerary, \"coupled with other compelling suspicious behavior,\" supports a finding of reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "See United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 513 (4th Cir.2011) (noting an unusual travel itinerary, “coupled with other compelling suspicious behavior,” supports a finding of reasonable suspicion); cf. United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 361 (4th Cir.2000) (“[A] reasonable officer could conclude that few innocent travelers from New York City are traveling northbound on Interstate 95 in South Carolina at 3:30 a.m. in a vehicle rented in Miami fourteen hours earlier.”)."
} | 4,187,128 | b |
Subsequent courts have followed the Supreme Court's guidance in Burbank in determining whether local ordinances are preempted under the Federal Aviation Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "village ordinance preventing aircraft from flying over village at less than one thousand feet was unconstitutional",
"sentence": "See United States v. City of Berkeley, 735 F.Supp. 937 (E.D.Mo.1990) (FAA regulations preempt city’s building code); Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner, 711 F.Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (court finds in favor of small airport operators; sections of town ordinance regulating low-flying aircraft, parachute jumping, flight paths, noise, and insurance requirements were preempted); Command Helicopters, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 691 F.Supp. 1148 (N.D.Ill.1988) (court nullifies local ordinance governing loading operations of helicopters); United States v. City of Blue Ash, 487 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.Ohio 1978) (court found that city ordinance restricting noise was preempted by federal law); see also Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.1956) (village ordinance preventing aircraft from flying over village at less than one thousand feet was unconstitutional)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court found that city ordinance restricting noise was preempted by federal law",
"sentence": "See United States v. City of Berkeley, 735 F.Supp. 937 (E.D.Mo.1990) (FAA regulations preempt city’s building code); Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner, 711 F.Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (court finds in favor of small airport operators; sections of town ordinance regulating low-flying aircraft, parachute jumping, flight paths, noise, and insurance requirements were preempted); Command Helicopters, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 691 F.Supp. 1148 (N.D.Ill.1988) (court nullifies local ordinance governing loading operations of helicopters); United States v. City of Blue Ash, 487 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.Ohio 1978) (court found that city ordinance restricting noise was preempted by federal law); see also Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.1956) (village ordinance preventing aircraft from flying over village at less than one thousand feet was unconstitutional)."
} | 1,195,014 | b |
Calculation of the rate for prejudgment interest also "rests firmly within the sound discretion of the trial court." Courts commonly look to state statutory prejudgment interest provisions as guidelines for a reasonable rate. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "100 F.3d 220, 224-25",
"parenthetical": "noting that because \"ERISA is inscrutable on the subject\" of the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest, \"courts have discretion to select an appropriate rate, and they may look to outside sources, including state law, for guidance\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Allison, 289 F.3d at 1244 (holding that “district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the Colorado statutory rate of 8 percent”); cf. Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 224-25 (1st Cir.1996) (noting that because “ERISA is inscrutable on the subject” of the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest, “courts have discretion to select an appropriate rate, and they may look to outside sources, including state law, for guidance”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 F.3d 1244, 1244",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the Colorado statutory rate of 8 percent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Allison, 289 F.3d at 1244 (holding that “district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the Colorado statutory rate of 8 percent”); cf. Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220, 224-25 (1st Cir.1996) (noting that because “ERISA is inscrutable on the subject” of the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest, “courts have discretion to select an appropriate rate, and they may look to outside sources, including state law, for guidance”)."
} | 3,752,087 | b |
But each case will turn on its specific facts. Particularly in the context of small, closely held corporations, a corporate insider may stand to lose more than an outside creditor from a majority shareholder's fraudulent abuse of the corporation's limited liability. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing special dangers and creating protections under Massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation",
"sentence": "Cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-16 (1975) (recognizing special dangers and creating protections under Massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation); but see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del.1993) (declining to judicially create parallel rule under Delaware common law)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81",
"parenthetical": "declining to judicially create parallel rule under Delaware common law",
"sentence": "Cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-16 (1975) (recognizing special dangers and creating protections under Massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation); but see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del.1993) (declining to judicially create parallel rule under Delaware common law)."
} | 3,627,523 | a |
But each case will turn on its specific facts. Particularly in the context of small, closely held corporations, a corporate insider may stand to lose more than an outside creditor from a majority shareholder's fraudulent abuse of the corporation's limited liability. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81",
"parenthetical": "declining to judicially create parallel rule under Delaware common law",
"sentence": "Cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-16 (1975) (recognizing special dangers and creating protections under Massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation); but see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del.1993) (declining to judicially create parallel rule under Delaware common law)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "328 N.E.2d 505, 514-16",
"parenthetical": "recognizing special dangers and creating protections under Massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation",
"sentence": "Cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514-16 (1975) (recognizing special dangers and creating protections under Massachusetts common law for minority shareholders in closely held corporation); but see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del.1993) (declining to judicially create parallel rule under Delaware common law)."
} | 3,627,523 | b |
A review of the authorities offered by both the SEC and the movants reveals that there is disagreement within the courts concerning the application of Section 21(g) to intervention motions. Compare SEC v. Flight Trans. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "171 F.R.D. 1, 4",
"parenthetical": "rejecting Section 21(g) as a bar to non-consensual intervention in certain SEC actions",
"sentence": "Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 950 (8th Cir.1983) (rejecting Section 21(g) as bar to intervention in SEC enforcement actions); SEC v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 171 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. Mar.26, 1997) (rejecting Section 21(g) as a bar to non-consensual intervention in certain SEC actions), with SEC v. Wozniak, No. 92 C 4691, 1993 WL 34702, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.8, 1993) (holding that Section 21(g) operates as “impenetrable wall” to intervention by victim of fraudulent scheme in SEC enforcement action); see also SEC v. Qualified Pensions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-1746-LFO, 1998 WL 29496, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (holding that, as applied to case in which applicants for intervention “are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound ... is squarely before the other court,” Section 21(g) bars intervention; noting that allowing intervention would effectively allow coordination of enforcement action with lawsuit already pending in another jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1998 WL 29496, at *3",
"parenthetical": "holding that, as applied to case in which applicants for intervention \"are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound ... is squarely before the other court,\" Section 21(g",
"sentence": "Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 950 (8th Cir.1983) (rejecting Section 21(g) as bar to intervention in SEC enforcement actions); SEC v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 171 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. Mar.26, 1997) (rejecting Section 21(g) as a bar to non-consensual intervention in certain SEC actions), with SEC v. Wozniak, No. 92 C 4691, 1993 WL 34702, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.8, 1993) (holding that Section 21(g) operates as “impenetrable wall” to intervention by victim of fraudulent scheme in SEC enforcement action); see also SEC v. Qualified Pensions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-1746-LFO, 1998 WL 29496, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (holding that, as applied to case in which applicants for intervention “are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound ... is squarely before the other court,” Section 21(g) bars intervention; noting that allowing intervention would effectively allow coordination of enforcement action with lawsuit already pending in another jurisdiction)."
} | 200,139 | a |
A review of the authorities offered by both the SEC and the movants reveals that there is disagreement within the courts concerning the application of Section 21(g) to intervention motions. Compare SEC v. Flight Trans. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "1993 WL 34702, at *1",
"parenthetical": "holding that Section 21(g) operates as \"impenetrable wall\" to intervention by victim of fraudulent scheme in SEC enforcement action",
"sentence": "Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 950 (8th Cir.1983) (rejecting Section 21(g) as bar to intervention in SEC enforcement actions); SEC v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 171 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. Mar.26, 1997) (rejecting Section 21(g) as a bar to non-consensual intervention in certain SEC actions), with SEC v. Wozniak, No. 92 C 4691, 1993 WL 34702, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.8, 1993) (holding that Section 21(g) operates as “impenetrable wall” to intervention by victim of fraudulent scheme in SEC enforcement action); see also SEC v. Qualified Pensions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-1746-LFO, 1998 WL 29496, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (holding that, as applied to case in which applicants for intervention “are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound ... is squarely before the other court,” Section 21(g) bars intervention; noting that allowing intervention would effectively allow coordination of enforcement action with lawsuit already pending in another jurisdiction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1998 WL 29496, at *3",
"parenthetical": "holding that, as applied to case in which applicants for intervention \"are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound ... is squarely before the other court,\" Section 21(g",
"sentence": "Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 950 (8th Cir.1983) (rejecting Section 21(g) as bar to intervention in SEC enforcement actions); SEC v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 171 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. Mar.26, 1997) (rejecting Section 21(g) as a bar to non-consensual intervention in certain SEC actions), with SEC v. Wozniak, No. 92 C 4691, 1993 WL 34702, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.8, 1993) (holding that Section 21(g) operates as “impenetrable wall” to intervention by victim of fraudulent scheme in SEC enforcement action); see also SEC v. Qualified Pensions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-1746-LFO, 1998 WL 29496, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (holding that, as applied to case in which applicants for intervention “are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound ... is squarely before the other court,” Section 21(g) bars intervention; noting that allowing intervention would effectively allow coordination of enforcement action with lawsuit already pending in another jurisdiction)."
} | 200,139 | a |
This presumption would not apply where a defendant challenges the substantive reasonableness on other grounds. In addition, this presumption of reasonableness would not be applied where the Government appeals that a district court's sentence is substantively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 260, 260-61",
"parenthetical": "applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government's cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ahu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61 (applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 165, 178 L.Ed.2d 41 (2010), (apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ahu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61 (applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 165, 178 L.Ed.2d 41 (2010), (apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment)."
} | 3,747,572 | a |
This presumption would not apply where a defendant challenges the substantive reasonableness on other grounds. In addition, this presumption of reasonableness would not be applied where the Government appeals that a district court's sentence is substantively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 260, 260-61",
"parenthetical": "applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government's cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ahu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61 (applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 165, 178 L.Ed.2d 41 (2010), (apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ahu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61 (applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 165, 178 L.Ed.2d 41 (2010), (apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment)."
} | 3,747,572 | a |
This presumption would not apply where a defendant challenges the substantive reasonableness on other grounds. In addition, this presumption of reasonableness would not be applied where the Government appeals that a district court's sentence is substantively unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ahu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61 (applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 165, 178 L.Ed.2d 41 (2010), (apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 F.3d 260, 260-61",
"parenthetical": "applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government's cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ahu Ali, 528 F.3d at 260-61 (applying the usual Gall analysis when considering the Government’s cross-appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 165, 178 L.Ed.2d 41 (2010), (apply ing no presumption when considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence of probation when the Guidelines included a term of imprisonment)."
} | 3,747,572 | b |
Kennedy has cited no authority for this proposition. To the contrary, the law in South Carolina allows the context of the words themselves and the circumstances under which the words are spoken to be considered in determining whether there is a defamatoiy meaning and whether it is actionable per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding under South Carolina law, where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime, the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime",
"sentence": "Store, 178 S.C. 278, 182 S.E. 889 (1935); Turner v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 S.C. 253, 163 S.E. 796 (1932); see Sandifer v. Electrolux Corp., 172 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.1949) (holding under South Carolina law, where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime, the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime). Therefore, we dismiss Kennedy’s arguments in .that regard as unsupported by the law of defamation in this State."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "222 S.C. 226, 235",
"parenthetical": "holding that when considered in light of circumstances, employer's statement that employee was \"short\" was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime, namely theft",
"sentence": "Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 222 S.C. 226, 235, 72 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1952) (holding that when considered in light of circumstances, employer’s statement that employee was \"short” was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime, namely theft); Lily v. Belk’s Dept."
} | 214,287 | b |
Kennedy has cited no authority for this proposition. To the contrary, the law in South Carolina allows the context of the words themselves and the circumstances under which the words are spoken to be considered in determining whether there is a defamatoiy meaning and whether it is actionable per se. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 S.E.2d 453, 455",
"parenthetical": "holding that when considered in light of circumstances, employer's statement that employee was \"short\" was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime, namely theft",
"sentence": "Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 222 S.C. 226, 235, 72 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1952) (holding that when considered in light of circumstances, employer’s statement that employee was \"short” was clearly defamatory and actionable per se because it alleged the commission of a crime, namely theft); Lily v. Belk’s Dept."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding under South Carolina law, where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime, the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime",
"sentence": "Store, 178 S.C. 278, 182 S.E. 889 (1935); Turner v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 S.C. 253, 163 S.E. 796 (1932); see Sandifer v. Electrolux Corp., 172 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.1949) (holding under South Carolina law, where words themselves do not impute the commission of a crime, the juiy may consider surrounding circumstances to determine whether statement was defamatory because it charged the commission of a crime). Therefore, we dismiss Kennedy’s arguments in .that regard as unsupported by the law of defamation in this State."
} | 214,287 | a |
This aspect of Rubright may seem to be in tension with several cases holding that legal fathers whose biological paternity is disestablished should normally be granted only prospective relief from their child support obligations. But the tension is more apparent than real: Any potential overlap in child support obligations between a newly-established biological father and a former legal father may be remedied through reimbursement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 P.2d 1298, 1299",
"parenthetical": "\"A parent's duty of support encompasses a duty to reimburse other persons who provide the support the parent owes.\"",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. Matthews, 739 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Alaska 1987) (\"A parent's duty of support encompasses a duty to reimburse other persons who provide the support the parent owes.”) (superceded by rule in other respects)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "553 So.2d 847, 854-55",
"parenthetical": "recognizing the concept of \"dual paternity\" in which a child born into a marriage with a non-biological father retains a legal parent/child relationship based on presumptive fatherhood for purposes of legitimacy and inheritance, while becoming the child of a newly-established biological father for purposes of child support",
"sentence": "Cf. Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854-55 (La.1989) (recognizing the concept of “dual paternity” in which a child born into a marriage with a non-biological father retains a legal parent/child relationship based on presumptive fatherhood for purposes of legitimacy and inheritance, while becoming the child of a newly-established biological father for purposes of child support)."
} | 11,583,201 | a |
This aspect of Rubright may seem to be in tension with several cases holding that legal fathers whose biological paternity is disestablished should normally be granted only prospective relief from their child support obligations. But the tension is more apparent than real: Any potential overlap in child support obligations between a newly-established biological father and a former legal father may be remedied through reimbursement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "739 P.2d 1298, 1299",
"parenthetical": "\"A parent's duty of support encompasses a duty to reimburse other persons who provide the support the parent owes.\"",
"sentence": "See Matthews v. Matthews, 739 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Alaska 1987) (\"A parent's duty of support encompasses a duty to reimburse other persons who provide the support the parent owes.”) (superceded by rule in other respects)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "946 P.2d 446, 450",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that \"child support arrearages are imposable by law from the date of a child's birth\"",
"sentence": "See also Flanigin v. State, CSED, 946 P.2d 446, 450 (Alaska 1997) (recognizing that \"child support arrearages are imposable by law from the date of a child’s birth”)."
} | 11,583,201 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "412 U.S. 247, 247",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "93 S.Ct. 2058, 2058",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "152 N.J. 86, 103",
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 L.Ed.2d 874, 874",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that consent searches are not \"inherently coercive\" when they \"occur on a person's own familiar territory\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had \"complete freedom to come and go as he pleased\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "161 N.J. 515, 615",
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | a |
The choices are not so stark for the person who, in the familiar surroundings of his home, can send the police away without fear of immediate repercussions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it \"was not inherently intimidating\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "378 F.3d 584, 589",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"a man's home is his castle,\" and that \"police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest\"",
"sentence": "See Schneckloth, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058, 36 L.Ed.2d at 874 (suggesting that consent searches are not “inherently coercive” when they “occur on a person’s own familiar territory”); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.2004) (stating that “a man’s home is his castle,” and that “police may be kept out or invited in as informally as any other guest”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1155, 125 S.Ct. 1298, 161 L.Ed.2d 121 (2005); cf. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 615, 737 A.2d 55 (1999) (stating that, because questioning of defendant took place in his home, it “was not inherently intimidating”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed.2d 89 (2001); State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103, 703 A.2d 901 (1997) (noting that, during interview of defendant in his home, he had “complete freedom to come and go as he pleased”). In limiting the reach of our holding in Carty, we recognized the distinct disadvantage of the motorist detained at the side of the road and the history of abuse of the consent search in the context of motor vehicle stops."
} | 3,762,445 | b |
Subsets and Splits