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In addition, the BIA has recognized that there are limitations in considering this .evidence of alleged criminality. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840",
"parenthetical": "\"In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1, 5-7",
"parenthetical": "upholding the BIA's consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner's request for adjustment of status",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | 4,201,798 | b |
In addition, the BIA has recognized that there are limitations in considering this .evidence of alleged criminality. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1, 5-7",
"parenthetical": "upholding the BIA's consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner's request for adjustment of status",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "498 F.3d 94, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | 4,201,798 | a |
In addition, the BIA has recognized that there are limitations in considering this .evidence of alleged criminality. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "769 F.2d 1001, 1005",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of an alien's conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840",
"parenthetical": "\"In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | 4,201,798 | a |
In addition, the BIA has recognized that there are limitations in considering this .evidence of alleged criminality. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "498 F.3d 94, 98",
"parenthetical": "\"[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "769 F.2d 1001, 1005",
"parenthetical": "\"Evidence of an alien's conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Henry v. I.N.S., 74 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir.1996) (upholding the BIA’s consideration of a 1992 arrest for allegedly assaulting a police officer, which the BIA considered but gave little weight, in denying the petitioner’s request for adjustment of status); Paredes-Urrestarazu v. I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e think that the breadth of the section 212(c) [discretionary] inquiry permits the Board to consider evidence of conduct that does not result in a conviction.”); Junkovic v. Moyer, No. 90-3749, 1991 WL 225803, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished) (permitting consideration of “rap sheets” for “the sole purpose of determining whether discretion should be exercised”); Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.1985) (“Evidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.”); see also Shepherd v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 559 Fed.Appx. 837, 840 (11th Cir.2014) (per curiam) (“In deciding whether an alien warrants a favorable exercise of discretion, the BIA may consider evidence of criminal conduct or other unbecoming behavior, regardless of whether that conduct led to or is reflected in a criminal conviction.”); Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (“[PJolice reports and complaints, even if containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of conviction, are appropriately admitted for the purposes of considering an application for discretionary relief.”)."
} | 4,201,798 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving an attorney's fees award in the sum of 28% of the gross common fund recovery. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50",
"parenthetical": "discussing the relevant factors and noting that 25% of common fund is a benchmark award",
"sentence": "See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing the relevant factors and noting that 25% of common fund is a benchmark award); see also Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir.2000) (“We note that the choice of whether to base an attorneys’ fee award on either net or gross recovery should not make a difference so long as the end result is reasonable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 1249, 1258",
"parenthetical": "\"We note that the choice of whether to base an attorneys' fee award on either net or gross recovery should not make a difference so long as the end result is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing the relevant factors and noting that 25% of common fund is a benchmark award); see also Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir.2000) (“We note that the choice of whether to base an attorneys’ fee award on either net or gross recovery should not make a difference so long as the end result is reasonable.”)."
} | 4,148,116 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "494 U.S. 210, 224",
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "494 U.S. 210, 224",
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | b |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "494 U.S. 210, 224",
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | b |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
Since the challenged provisions here include a New Jersey Parole Board policy and sections of the administrative code, they are prison regulations and not statutes adopted through a legislative process. Therefore, Turner v. Safley sets out the appropriate standard for analyzing Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights\"",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors",
"sentence": "See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(Turner applies whenever \"the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights”); see also Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003)(analyzing facial challenges to sections of Mich. Admin. Code under the Turner factors)."
} | 4,170,131 | a |
The former requires Jessie to muster favorable, preponderant evidence of a majority or consensus view as to when a vaccine injury could occur at the earliest; the latter requires Jessie to show that a medically-aeceptable time-frame for the onset of his type of illness includes a twenty-four hour post-vaccination occurrence. That medically-aeceptable time-frame may be established by reliable opinion that does not perfectly match the dominant or consensus view in the medical community. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 1279, 1279",
"parenthetical": "rejecting as too stringent a requirement of \"confirmation of medical plausibility from the medical community and literature\"",
"sentence": "See Althen, 418 F.3d at 1279 (rejecting as too stringent a requirement of “confirmation of medical plausibility from the medical community and literature”); see also Simanski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.3d 1368, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2012) (holding that the petitioner’s expert in that case had created a material issue of fact as to whether an earlier onset of the disease than that generally accepted in the medical literature was “ ‘medically acceptable’” (quoting de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352)). By crafting a heightened standard for Althen prong three, the special master erred as a matter of law."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "671 F.3d 1368, 1384",
"parenthetical": "holding that the petitioner's expert in that case had created a material issue of fact as to whether an earlier onset of the disease than that generally accepted in the medical literature was \" 'medically acceptable'\" (quoting de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352",
"sentence": "See Althen, 418 F.3d at 1279 (rejecting as too stringent a requirement of “confirmation of medical plausibility from the medical community and literature”); see also Simanski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.3d 1368, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2012) (holding that the petitioner’s expert in that case had created a material issue of fact as to whether an earlier onset of the disease than that generally accepted in the medical literature was “ ‘medically acceptable’” (quoting de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352)). By crafting a heightened standard for Althen prong three, the special master erred as a matter of law."
} | 5,762,187 | a |
The former requires Jessie to muster favorable, preponderant evidence of a majority or consensus view as to when a vaccine injury could occur at the earliest; the latter requires Jessie to show that a medically-aeceptable time-frame for the onset of his type of illness includes a twenty-four hour post-vaccination occurrence. That medically-aeceptable time-frame may be established by reliable opinion that does not perfectly match the dominant or consensus view in the medical community. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "539 F.3d 1352, 1352",
"parenthetical": "holding that the petitioner's expert in that case had created a material issue of fact as to whether an earlier onset of the disease than that generally accepted in the medical literature was \" 'medically acceptable'\" (quoting de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352",
"sentence": "See Althen, 418 F.3d at 1279 (rejecting as too stringent a requirement of “confirmation of medical plausibility from the medical community and literature”); see also Simanski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.3d 1368, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2012) (holding that the petitioner’s expert in that case had created a material issue of fact as to whether an earlier onset of the disease than that generally accepted in the medical literature was “ ‘medically acceptable’” (quoting de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352)). By crafting a heightened standard for Althen prong three, the special master erred as a matter of law."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "418 F.3d 1279, 1279",
"parenthetical": "rejecting as too stringent a requirement of \"confirmation of medical plausibility from the medical community and literature\"",
"sentence": "See Althen, 418 F.3d at 1279 (rejecting as too stringent a requirement of “confirmation of medical plausibility from the medical community and literature”); see also Simanski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.3d 1368, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2012) (holding that the petitioner’s expert in that case had created a material issue of fact as to whether an earlier onset of the disease than that generally accepted in the medical literature was “ ‘medically acceptable’” (quoting de Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1352)). By crafting a heightened standard for Althen prong three, the special master erred as a matter of law."
} | 5,762,187 | b |
Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these Sprint Nextel records. Regardless of any subjective expectation (about which we have no evidence), it was unreasonable for Capshaw to assume that information about his cell phone calls could not be made available to the government by the third-party telephone company. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 828, 843",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed",
"sentence": "See id. at 744, 99 S.Ct. at 2582. (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir.2010) (holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 2582, 2582",
"parenthetical": "\"When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 744, 99 S.Ct. at 2582. (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir.2010) (holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed)."
} | 4,355,625 | b |
Norwest Leasing further argues that even if it had not already incurred response costs that it would have standing to seek a declaration adjudicating the parties' rights and responsibilities with respect to the contamination of the property. It argues that declaratory relief is appropriate at this time because it is undisputed that there is pollution on the property which one or more of the parties will be required to remove or otherwise remediate and that the court may properly determine who is responsible for those costs before they are incurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "755 F.2d 645, 650",
"parenthetical": "party could properly seek declaration concerning potential liability for clean up costs and penalties arising from an oil spill that had been cleaned up by government",
"sentence": "See Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F.Supp. 988, 994 (D.Minn.1990) (Gopher Oil I) (allocating responsibility for future costs of investigating and cleaning up a site under CERCLA and MERLA), aff'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir.1992); cf. Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir.1985) (party could properly seek declaration concerning potential liability for clean up costs and penalties arising from an oil spill that had been cleaned up by government). Norwest Financial thus seeks a declaration of its potential liability for pollution at the site before it attempts to foreclose or incur other liability for clean up costs."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "757 F.Supp. 988, 994",
"parenthetical": "allocating responsibility for future costs of investigating and cleaning up a site under CERCLA and MERLA",
"sentence": "See Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F.Supp. 988, 994 (D.Minn.1990) (Gopher Oil I) (allocating responsibility for future costs of investigating and cleaning up a site under CERCLA and MERLA), aff'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir.1992); cf. Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir.1985) (party could properly seek declaration concerning potential liability for clean up costs and penalties arising from an oil spill that had been cleaned up by government). Norwest Financial thus seeks a declaration of its potential liability for pollution at the site before it attempts to foreclose or incur other liability for clean up costs."
} | 11,293,235 | b |
Norwest Leasing further argues that even if it had not already incurred response costs that it would have standing to seek a declaration adjudicating the parties' rights and responsibilities with respect to the contamination of the property. It argues that declaratory relief is appropriate at this time because it is undisputed that there is pollution on the property which one or more of the parties will be required to remove or otherwise remediate and that the court may properly determine who is responsible for those costs before they are incurred. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "755 F.2d 645, 650",
"parenthetical": "party could properly seek declaration concerning potential liability for clean up costs and penalties arising from an oil spill that had been cleaned up by government",
"sentence": "See Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F.Supp. 988, 994 (D.Minn.1990) (Gopher Oil I) (allocating responsibility for future costs of investigating and cleaning up a site under CERCLA and MERLA), aff'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir.1992); cf. Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir.1985) (party could properly seek declaration concerning potential liability for clean up costs and penalties arising from an oil spill that had been cleaned up by government). Norwest Financial thus seeks a declaration of its potential liability for pollution at the site before it attempts to foreclose or incur other liability for clean up costs."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allocating responsibility for future costs of investigating and cleaning up a site under CERCLA and MERLA",
"sentence": "See Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F.Supp. 988, 994 (D.Minn.1990) (Gopher Oil I) (allocating responsibility for future costs of investigating and cleaning up a site under CERCLA and MERLA), aff'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir.1992); cf. Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir.1985) (party could properly seek declaration concerning potential liability for clean up costs and penalties arising from an oil spill that had been cleaned up by government). Norwest Financial thus seeks a declaration of its potential liability for pollution at the site before it attempts to foreclose or incur other liability for clean up costs."
} | 11,293,235 | b |
Even so, these factual allegations do not plausibly give rise to a scenario in which MetLife's conduct was extreme and outrageous. Courts have found that defendants can act unreasonably without acting in an extreme and outrageous manner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "673 N.E.2d 805, 810-11",
"parenthetical": "finding that while defendant's seven phone calls to the plaintiff may have been unreasonable and abusive, they were not extreme and outrageous",
"sentence": "See Gable v. Curtis, 673 N.E.2d 805, 810-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (finding that while defendant’s seven phone calls to the plaintiff may have been unreasonable and abusive, they were not extreme and outrageous)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "717 F.Supp. 1340, 1345",
"parenthetical": "finding that while American Airlines may have \"bizarrely\" and possibly improperly barred plaintiffs from boarding a plane for which they had tickets and allowing a breach of contract claim to go forward, plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed because the airlines' behavior did not exceed all possible bounds of decency",
"sentence": "Cf. Karkomi v. Am. Airlines, 717 F.Supp. 1340, 1345 (N.D.Ill.1989) (finding that while American Airlines may have “bizarrely” and possibly improperly barred plaintiffs from boarding a plane for which they had tickets and allowing a breach of contract claim to go forward, plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed because the airlines’ behavior did not exceed all possible bounds of decency). Therefore, MetLife’s motion to dismiss Linda’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to RULE 12(b)(6) is GRANTED."
} | 5,745,519 | a |
Whether the images fall neatly into the definition of sexual behavior or sexual predisposition is ultimately besides the point because I have the discretion under Rule 26 to balance defendant's need for the images against plaintiffs valid privacy concerns. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "though Rule 26 \"contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (though Rule 26 “contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 890, 890",
"parenthetical": "under Rule 26 it is \"appropriate for the court [to] exercise[e] its discretion ... to undertake some substantive balancing of interests\"",
"sentence": "See Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 890 (under Rule 26 it is “appropriate for the court [to] exercise[e] its discretion ... to undertake some substantive balancing of interests”). See also Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 517 (D.C.Cir.1996) (balancing “the requester’s need for the information from this particular source, its relevance to the litigation at hand ... and the harm which disclosure would cause to the party seeking to protect the information”)."
} | 5,893,340 | b |
Whether the images fall neatly into the definition of sexual behavior or sexual predisposition is ultimately besides the point because I have the discretion under Rule 26 to balance defendant's need for the images against plaintiffs valid privacy concerns. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 890, 890",
"parenthetical": "under Rule 26 it is \"appropriate for the court [to] exercise[e] its discretion ... to undertake some substantive balancing of interests\"",
"sentence": "See Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 890 (under Rule 26 it is “appropriate for the court [to] exercise[e] its discretion ... to undertake some substantive balancing of interests”). See also Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 517 (D.C.Cir.1996) (balancing “the requester’s need for the information from this particular source, its relevance to the litigation at hand ... and the harm which disclosure would cause to the party seeking to protect the information”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "though Rule 26 \"contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (though Rule 26 “contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”)."
} | 5,893,340 | a |
Whether the images fall neatly into the definition of sexual behavior or sexual predisposition is ultimately besides the point because I have the discretion under Rule 26 to balance defendant's need for the images against plaintiffs valid privacy concerns. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "though Rule 26 \"contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (though Rule 26 “contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "809 F.2d 890, 890",
"parenthetical": "under Rule 26 it is \"appropriate for the court [to] exercise[e] its discretion ... to undertake some substantive balancing of interests\"",
"sentence": "See Laxalt, 809 F.2d at 890 (under Rule 26 it is “appropriate for the court [to] exercise[e] its discretion ... to undertake some substantive balancing of interests”). See also Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 517 (D.C.Cir.1996) (balancing “the requester’s need for the information from this particular source, its relevance to the litigation at hand ... and the harm which disclosure would cause to the party seeking to protect the information”)."
} | 5,893,340 | b |
Mr. Vinella's testimony likewise will be excluded to the extent' he concludes that Defendants' conduct breached certain legal or contractual duties, because this testimony reaches beyond merely addressing an ultimate issue, and instead constitutes an inadmissible legal opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "455 F.3d 218, 218",
"parenthetical": "finding that an expert could not testify concerning whether the plaintiff \"complied with legal duties\" under the securities law",
"sentence": "See Berckeley Inv. Grp., 455 F.3d at 218 (finding that an expert could not testify concerning whether the plaintiff “complied with legal duties” under the securities law); see also Wolfe, 881 F.Supp.2d at 661-62 (excluding expert testimony concerning whether the defendant acted negligent on the grounds that such testimony amounted to an impermissible legal opinion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "881 F.Supp.2d 661, 661-62",
"parenthetical": "excluding expert testimony concerning whether the defendant acted negligent on the grounds that such testimony amounted to an impermissible legal opinion",
"sentence": "See Berckeley Inv. Grp., 455 F.3d at 218 (finding that an expert could not testify concerning whether the plaintiff “complied with legal duties” under the securities law); see also Wolfe, 881 F.Supp.2d at 661-62 (excluding expert testimony concerning whether the defendant acted negligent on the grounds that such testimony amounted to an impermissible legal opinion)."
} | 4,363,560 | a |
. In determining whether a deprivation was sufficiently serious, a court must look at the totality of the conditions affecting an inmate. The Supreme Court has indicated that conditions of confinement, "alone, or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "682 F.2d 1237, 1247",
"parenthetical": "restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | 10,520,894 | b |
. In determining whether a deprivation was sufficiently serious, a court must look at the totality of the conditions affecting an inmate. The Supreme Court has indicated that conditions of confinement, "alone, or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "682 F.2d 1237, 1247",
"parenthetical": "restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | 10,520,894 | a |
. In determining whether a deprivation was sufficiently serious, a court must look at the totality of the conditions affecting an inmate. The Supreme Court has indicated that conditions of confinement, "alone, or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "682 F.2d 1237, 1247",
"parenthetical": "restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | 10,520,894 | a |
. In determining whether a deprivation was sufficiently serious, a court must look at the totality of the conditions affecting an inmate. The Supreme Court has indicated that conditions of confinement, "alone, or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "682 F.2d 1237, 1247",
"parenthetical": "restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"",
"sentence": "Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2499 (emphasis added); See Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984) (\"The totality of circumstances relevant to this inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to sentenced inmates.\"); but see contra Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982) (restricting the totality of circumstances approach to specific conditions of confinement). In Young's case, we find that the totality of the conditions of his imprisonment, namely the protection and sanitation afforded to him, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of the Wilson Eighth Amendment analysis."
} | 10,520,894 | b |
The cases cited by the majority do not support the conclusion that appellant's consent to a search of his person necessarily included consent to a search of the bag of socks. As the majority concedes, this issue is one of first impression in Virginia, and even the cases from other jurisdictions upon which the majority relies involved construction "of the term 'person' in the context of [ (1)] searching 'the person' pursuant to a warrant" for that person or (2) searching the belongings of a nonresident visitor pursuant to a warrant for the premises on which the person was found. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "545 F.2d 177, 182-83",
"parenthetical": "noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that \"such personal items as [a] shoulder bag\" or \"a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,\" \"may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "638 F.2d 1111, 1114",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | 977,310 | b |
The cases cited by the majority do not support the conclusion that appellant's consent to a search of his person necessarily included consent to a search of the bag of socks. As the majority concedes, this issue is one of first impression in Virginia, and even the cases from other jurisdictions upon which the majority relies involved construction "of the term 'person' in the context of [ (1)] searching 'the person' pursuant to a warrant" for that person or (2) searching the belongings of a nonresident visitor pursuant to a warrant for the premises on which the person was found. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "833 F.2d 777, 778, 784",
"parenthetical": "applying principle that containers closely associated with one's person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant's backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "638 F.2d 1111, 1114",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | 977,310 | b |
The cases cited by the majority do not support the conclusion that appellant's consent to a search of his person necessarily included consent to a search of the bag of socks. As the majority concedes, this issue is one of first impression in Virginia, and even the cases from other jurisdictions upon which the majority relies involved construction "of the term 'person' in the context of [ (1)] searching 'the person' pursuant to a warrant" for that person or (2) searching the belongings of a nonresident visitor pursuant to a warrant for the premises on which the person was found. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 N.W.2d 218, 220",
"parenthetical": "relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "638 F.2d 1111, 1114",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | 977,310 | b |
The cases cited by the majority do not support the conclusion that appellant's consent to a search of his person necessarily included consent to a search of the bag of socks. As the majority concedes, this issue is one of first impression in Virginia, and even the cases from other jurisdictions upon which the majority relies involved construction "of the term 'person' in the context of [ (1)] searching 'the person' pursuant to a warrant" for that person or (2) searching the belongings of a nonresident visitor pursuant to a warrant for the premises on which the person was found. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "638 F.2d 1111, 1114",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | 977,310 | b |
The cases cited by the majority do not support the conclusion that appellant's consent to a search of his person necessarily included consent to a search of the bag of socks. As the majority concedes, this issue is one of first impression in Virginia, and even the cases from other jurisdictions upon which the majority relies involved construction "of the term 'person' in the context of [ (1)] searching 'the person' pursuant to a warrant" for that person or (2) searching the belongings of a nonresident visitor pursuant to a warrant for the premises on which the person was found. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62",
"parenthetical": "holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "638 F.2d 1111, 1114",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that “a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person”); see also United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182-83 (D.C.Cir.1976) (noting premises warrant did not validate search of shoulder bag in possession of person who arrived on premises after search had begun but that “such personal items as [a] shoulder bag” or “a wallet and paper bag, passed by one occupant of the residence to the other,” “may, in some circumstances, be found to be within the ambit of a premises search warrant”); United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 778, 784 (9th Cir.1987) (applying principle that containers closely associated with one’s person require warrant specifically authorizing their search to invalidate search of backpack carried by defendant, who was leaving house when officers arrived to execute arrest warrant for a third party, where premises warrant police secured after seizing defendant’s backpack did not specifically authorize search of defendant or her backpack); State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn.1996) (relying on Graham to invalidate search of purse taken from person arriving outside residence for which police had premises warrant after search already had commenced); State v. Andrews, 201 Wis.2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210, 215-16, 218 (1996) (relying in part on Graham to hold that police executing premises warrant may not search items “worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant” (footnote omitted)); Hayes v. State, 141 Ga.App. 706, 234 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (1977) (holding search of suitcase found next to man sleeping on couch was unconstitutional where officers had warrant for particular apartment and its occupant and failed, prior to search, to take reasonable steps to determine whether suitcase belonged to occupant named in warrant or to nonresident visitor)."
} | 977,310 | b |
In addition, the chronology also set forth evidence from patent, trademark and copyright registrations indicating that even the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the United States Copyright Office have come to recognize the term as signifying a type of technology in the semiconductor industry. Thus, the overwhelming evidence in this case obviates the need for ST to have conducted a consumer survey. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "802 F.2d 934, at 941",
"parenthetical": "district court's grant of summary judgment on issue of genericness without survey affirmed by appellate court",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Liquid Controls, 802 F.2d 934 at 941 (district court’s grant of summary judgment on issue of genericness without survey affirmed by appellate court); see also Barrios v. American Thermal Instruments, Inc., 712 F.Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.Ohio 1988) (consumer survey not necessary and “dictionaries, newspapers, and other publications may be used to establish that a term is generic”); Suh v. Yang, 987 F.Supp. 783, 791, n. 4 (N.D.Cal.1997) (surveys “de rigeur,” but not required; summary judgment without survey granted); Expoconsul International, Inc., v. A/E Systems, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1237, 1247 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "712 F.Supp. 611, 614",
"parenthetical": "consumer survey not necessary and \"dictionaries, newspapers, and other publications may be used to establish that a term is generic\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Liquid Controls, 802 F.2d 934 at 941 (district court’s grant of summary judgment on issue of genericness without survey affirmed by appellate court); see also Barrios v. American Thermal Instruments, Inc., 712 F.Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.Ohio 1988) (consumer survey not necessary and “dictionaries, newspapers, and other publications may be used to establish that a term is generic”); Suh v. Yang, 987 F.Supp. 783, 791, n. 4 (N.D.Cal.1997) (surveys “de rigeur,” but not required; summary judgment without survey granted); Expoconsul International, Inc., v. A/E Systems, Inc., 755 F.Supp. 1237, 1247 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (same)."
} | 11,388,233 | a |
As a general proposition, where a statement relating to a startling event does not immediately follow that event, there is a strong presumption against admissibility under M.R.E. 803(2). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "25 M.J. 132, 132",
"parenthetical": "statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 1062, 1062",
"parenthetical": "questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | 315,183 | a |
As a general proposition, where a statement relating to a startling event does not immediately follow that event, there is a strong presumption against admissibility under M.R.E. 803(2). | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 1062, 1062",
"parenthetical": "questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 1122, 1126",
"parenthetical": "admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | 315,183 | b |
As a general proposition, where a statement relating to a startling event does not immediately follow that event, there is a strong presumption against admissibility under M.R.E. 803(2). | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 1062, 1062",
"parenthetical": "questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "846 F.2d 947, 947",
"parenthetical": "finding that a four-year old's three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was \"well within the bounds of reasonableness\" for an excited utterance",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | 315,183 | b |
As a general proposition, where a statement relating to a startling event does not immediately follow that event, there is a strong presumption against admissibility under M.R.E. 803(2). | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 1062, 1062",
"parenthetical": "questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "773 F.2d 116, 119-20",
"parenthetical": "holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old's hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | 315,183 | b |
As a general proposition, where a statement relating to a startling event does not immediately follow that event, there is a strong presumption against admissibility under M.R.E. 803(2). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 86, 86",
"parenthetical": "admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 1062, 1062",
"parenthetical": "questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults",
"sentence": "See id. (acknowledging that children may stay excited longer than adults); Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (statement of 16-year-old rape victim held admissible despite at least a 12-hour lapse between the rape and the statement); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.1993)(admitting statements of five-year old though one statement was made two hours after the assault and the other at least 12 hours after the assault); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (finding that a four-year old’s three-hour lapse in reporting an assault was “well within the bounds of reasonableness” for an excited utterance); Gross v. Greer, 773 F.2d 116,119-20 (7th Cir.1985)(holding that a lower court properly admitted a four-year old’s hearsay statement although she made it 12-15 hours after the startling event); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86 (admitting statement of nine-year-old victim as an excited utterance although she made the statement one hour after the assault); but see Thalacker, 198 F.3d at 1062 (questioning the rationale for applying the excited utterance exception differently for children and adults)."
} | 315,183 | a |
Having stated the above, I am satisfied that the State has established the "necessity" for a wiretap, i.e., the State has established that "normal" investigative techniques had failed or were likely to fail or too dangerous to employ. I am also mindful that I must pay "great deference" to Judge Bifferato in this determination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 F.2d 1320, 1330",
"parenthetical": "in wiretap context court gives \"substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge\"",
"sentence": "Jensen v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 105, 111 (1984) (determination of probable cause by issuing Judge “will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a hypertechnical” interpretation) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1330 (7th Cir.1988) quoting United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1985) (in wiretap context court gives “substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge”); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 A.2d 105, 111",
"parenthetical": "determination of probable cause by issuing Judge \"will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a hypertechnical\" interpretation",
"sentence": "Jensen v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 105, 111 (1984) (determination of probable cause by issuing Judge “will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a hypertechnical” interpretation) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1330 (7th Cir.1988) quoting United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1985) (in wiretap context court gives “substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge”); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | 7,356,366 | b |
Having stated the above, I am satisfied that the State has established the "necessity" for a wiretap, i.e., the State has established that "normal" investigative techniques had failed or were likely to fail or too dangerous to employ. I am also mindful that I must pay "great deference" to Judge Bifferato in this determination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "482 A.2d 105, 111",
"parenthetical": "determination of probable cause by issuing Judge \"will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a hypertechnical\" interpretation",
"sentence": "Jensen v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 105, 111 (1984) (determination of probable cause by issuing Judge “will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a hypertechnical” interpretation) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1330 (7th Cir.1988) quoting United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1985) (in wiretap context court gives “substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge”); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in wiretap context court gives \"substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge\"",
"sentence": "Jensen v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 105, 111 (1984) (determination of probable cause by issuing Judge “will be paid great deference by a reviewing court and will not be invalidated by a hypertechnical” interpretation) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1330 (7th Cir.1988) quoting United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1985) (in wiretap context court gives “substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge”); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988)."
} | 7,356,366 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 331, 337",
"parenthetical": "holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "959 F.2d 521, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 287, 294",
"parenthetical": "\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "95 F.3d 331, 337",
"parenthetical": "holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | b |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500",
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "959 F.2d 521, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 287, 294",
"parenthetical": "\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500",
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | b |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "959 F.2d 521, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 287, 294",
"parenthetical": "\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | b |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "959 F.2d 521, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 287, 294",
"parenthetical": "\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "959 F.2d 521, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 287, 294",
"parenthetical": "\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "959 F.2d 521, 533",
"parenthetical": "\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "949 F.Supp. 223, 225",
"parenthetical": "\"When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | b |
The majority of courts, however, require reliance, a requirement that seems eminently sensible. See, e.g., Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "949 F.Supp. 223, 225",
"parenthetical": "\"When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 287, 294",
"parenthetical": "\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance\"",
"sentence": "Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that in the context of mail and wire fraud, a \"plaintiff must have justifiably relied, to his detriment, on the defendant's material misrepresentations”); Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. v. Connecticut, 5 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir.1993) (\"[Plaintiff] cannot maintain a civil RICO claim against these defendants absent evidence that the defendants made misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to [plaintiff] and evidence that [plaintiff] relied on those misrepresentations or omissions to its detriment.”), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2678, 129 L.Ed.2d 812 (1994); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that \"[i]n the context of an alleged RICO predicate act of mail fraud, we have stated that to establish the required causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrepresentations were relied on[]”), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1991) (\"when the alleged predicate act is mail or wire fraud, the plain tiff must have been a target of the scheme to defraud and must have relied to his detriment on misrepresentations made in furtherance of that scheme.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991); Curatola v. Ruvolo, 949 F.Supp. 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“When mail fraud is pled as a RICO predicate act, to establish the required causal connection a plaintiff must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations and injuries caused by that reliance.”); but see Akin v. QL Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1992) (\"Plaintiffs' problems of proof with respect to securities fraud do not necessarily haunt their claim of mail fraud [as a RICO predicate act] since reliance is not an element of mail fraud.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 287, 294 (D.N.J.1993) (\"declining] to read into RICO mail fraud cases a requirement of actual detrimental reasonable reliance”); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 70, at 82 (D.Mass.l998)(same)."
} | 11,682,803 | a |
Furthermore, the district court's error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court's error affects Defendant's substantial rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "963 F.2d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error\" where \"[njothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release [and][t]here was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that “the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error” where “[njothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release [and][t]here was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned”); United States v. Walsh, 733 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir.1984) (finding that the defendant “suffered identifiable prejudice because the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum sentence he was promised he would receive”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "899 F.2d 1526, 1531",
"parenthetical": "holding that court's failure to tell defendant in Rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement, only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 1526, 1531 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that court’s failure to tell defendant in Rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement, only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule)."
} | 3,946,092 | a |
Furthermore, the district court's error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court's error affects Defendant's substantial rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "733 F.2d 31, 34",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant \"suffered identifiable prejudice because the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum sentence he was promised he would receive\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (holding that “the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error” where “[njothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release [and][t]here was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned”); United States v. Walsh, 733 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir.1984) (finding that the defendant “suffered identifiable prejudice because the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum sentence he was promised he would receive”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "899 F.2d 1526, 1531",
"parenthetical": "holding that court's failure to tell defendant in Rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement, only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 1526, 1531 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that court’s failure to tell defendant in Rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement, only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule)."
} | 3,946,092 | a |
Here, Defendant insists that Plaintiffs' marks are merely descriptive, as they are indisputably derived from the Latin word "Rex," meaning "king," and the prefix "el," referring to "electrical" supplies. (See Pls.' Resp. to Separate Stmt, of Undisputed Material Facts P 11.) Specifically, Defendant maintains that, because the meaning which can be ultimately extrapolated from this combination is "King of Electrical Suppliers," the marks are "laudatory." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 923, 927",
"parenthetical": "\"Marks that are laudatory and that describe the alleged qualities or characteristics of a product or service are descriptive marks.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Nett Designs, 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“Laudatory marks that describe the alleged merit of the goods are descriptive because they simply describe the characteristics or quality of the goods in a condensed form.”); see also Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir.1990) (“Marks that are laudatory and that describe the alleged qualities or characteristics of a product or service are descriptive marks.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 F.3d 1339, 1341",
"parenthetical": "\"Laudatory marks that describe the alleged merit of the goods are descriptive because they simply describe the characteristics or quality of the goods in a condensed form.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Nett Designs, 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2001) (“Laudatory marks that describe the alleged merit of the goods are descriptive because they simply describe the characteristics or quality of the goods in a condensed form.”); see also Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir.1990) (“Marks that are laudatory and that describe the alleged qualities or characteristics of a product or service are descriptive marks.”)."
} | 3,715,366 | b |
Addressing the temporal proximity, the plaintiff sent the November 2006 letter two months before Ridgely proposed the plaintiffs termination. Def.'s Reply at 21. This district has varied as to whether two months is sufficient to establish a causal connection. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139",
"parenthetical": "holding that a two month period \"might be enough ... to prove the causation prong\"",
"sentence": "See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that a two month period “might be enough ... to prove the causation prong”); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (stating a two month span “is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes that the plaintiff has established a causal connection."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity",
"sentence": "See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that a two month period “might be enough ... to prove the causation prong”); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (stating a two month span “is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes that the plaintiff has established a causal connection."
} | 3,094,075 | b |
Addressing the temporal proximity, the plaintiff sent the November 2006 letter two months before Ridgely proposed the plaintiffs termination. Def.'s Reply at 21. This district has varied as to whether two months is sufficient to establish a causal connection. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149",
"parenthetical": "stating a two month span \"is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that a two month period “might be enough ... to prove the causation prong”); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (stating a two month span “is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes that the plaintiff has established a causal connection."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity",
"sentence": "See Edwards v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 72, 92 (D.D.C.2006) (concluding that a two-month gap is not sufficient to establish temporal proximity); Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (same); but see Sewell v. Chao, 532 F.Supp.2d 126, 139 (D.D.C.2008) (holding that a two month period “might be enough ... to prove the causation prong”); Buggs v. Powell, 293 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.D.C.2003) (stating a two month span “is sufficiently temporal in proximity to give rise to an inference of discrimination”). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes that the plaintiff has established a causal connection."
} | 3,094,075 | b |
Indeed, when a defendant contacts putative class members for the purpose of altering the status of a pending litigation, such communication is improper without judicial authorization. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "156 F.R.D. 632, 632",
"parenthetical": "noting that defendant's communications affecting a class member's decision to participate in the litigation are improper",
"sentence": "See Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 632 (noting that defendant’s communications affecting a class member’s decision to participate in the litigation are improper); see also In re Sch. Asbestos, 842 F.2d at 682 n. 23 (listing cases where defendants “sought either to affect class members’ decisions to participate in the litigation or to undermine class plaintiffs’ cooperation with or confidence in class counsel”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "listing cases where defendants \"sought either to affect class members' decisions to participate in the litigation or to undermine class plaintiffs' cooperation with or confidence in class counsel\"",
"sentence": "See Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 632 (noting that defendant’s communications affecting a class member’s decision to participate in the litigation are improper); see also In re Sch. Asbestos, 842 F.2d at 682 n. 23 (listing cases where defendants “sought either to affect class members’ decisions to participate in the litigation or to undermine class plaintiffs’ cooperation with or confidence in class counsel”)."
} | 9,013,416 | a |
Some courts have rejected similar claims. The Fourth Circuit held, "This argument ... is not cognizable as a claim of actual innocence." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "657 F.3d 1199, 1199",
"parenthetical": "\"[E]ven if the actual innocence exception were to extend to the noncapital sentencing context ... this exception would not apply to [petitioner's] claim of legal innocence and thus could not excuse his procedural default.\"",
"sentence": "See also McKay, 657 F.3d at 1199 (“[E]ven if the actual innocence exception were to extend to the noncapital sentencing context ... this exception would not apply to [petitioner’s] claim of legal innocence and thus could not excuse his procedural default.”); Berry v. United States, 468 Fed.Appx. 924, 925-26 (11th Cir.2012) (rejecting actual innocence argument in § 2255 petition where petitioner Berry did not claim to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced or innocent of the predicate crimes); Damon v. United States, 2012 WL 6216868, at *8-11, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176484, at *24-30 (D.Me."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "612 F.3d 284, 284",
"parenthetical": "holding that SS 2255 movant claiming his prior conviction for assault was not a \"violent felony\" did not qualify for actual innocence exception",
"sentence": "Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284 (holding that § 2255 movant claiming his prior conviction for assault was not a “violent felony” did not qualify for actual innocence exception)."
} | 3,829,183 | b |
Some courts have rejected similar claims. The Fourth Circuit held, "This argument ... is not cognizable as a claim of actual innocence." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "612 F.3d 284, 284",
"parenthetical": "holding that SS 2255 movant claiming his prior conviction for assault was not a \"violent felony\" did not qualify for actual innocence exception",
"sentence": "Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284 (holding that § 2255 movant claiming his prior conviction for assault was not a “violent felony” did not qualify for actual innocence exception)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 Fed.Appx. 924, 925-26",
"parenthetical": "rejecting actual innocence argument in SS 2255 petition where petitioner Berry did not claim to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced or innocent of the predicate crimes",
"sentence": "See also McKay, 657 F.3d at 1199 (“[E]ven if the actual innocence exception were to extend to the noncapital sentencing context ... this exception would not apply to [petitioner’s] claim of legal innocence and thus could not excuse his procedural default.”); Berry v. United States, 468 Fed.Appx. 924, 925-26 (11th Cir.2012) (rejecting actual innocence argument in § 2255 petition where petitioner Berry did not claim to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced or innocent of the predicate crimes); Damon v. United States, 2012 WL 6216868, at *8-11, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176484, at *24-30 (D.Me."
} | 3,829,183 | a |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the SS 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1074 n. 8 (“the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal”); see also Little, 608 F.2d at 300. Because of this finding, we need not address whether Widgery must meet the cause and prejudice standard outlined in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 415, 415",
"parenthetical": "circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | a |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the SS 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1074 n. 8 (“the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal”); see also Little, 608 F.2d at 300. Because of this finding, we need not address whether Widgery must meet the cause and prejudice standard outlined in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1157, 1160",
"parenthetical": "issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | a |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the SS 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1074 n. 8 (“the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal”); see also Little, 608 F.2d at 300. Because of this finding, we need not address whether Widgery must meet the cause and prejudice standard outlined in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 239, 243-45",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal",
"sentence": "But see Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 243-45 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal)."
} | 1,620,101 | a |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1074, n. 8",
"parenthetical": "\"the SS 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1074 n. 8 (“the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal”); see also Little, 608 F.2d at 300. Because of this finding, we need not address whether Widgery must meet the cause and prejudice standard outlined in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 415, 415",
"parenthetical": "circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | a |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1074, n. 8",
"parenthetical": "\"the SS 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1074 n. 8 (“the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal”); see also Little, 608 F.2d at 300. Because of this finding, we need not address whether Widgery must meet the cause and prejudice standard outlined in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1157, 1160",
"parenthetical": "issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | a |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 239, 243-45",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal",
"sentence": "But see Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 243-45 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 S.Ct. 1074, n. 8",
"parenthetical": "\"the SS 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1074 n. 8 (“the § 2255 court may in a proper case deny relief to a federal prisoner who has deliberately bypassed the orderly federal procedures provided * * * by way of appeal”); see also Little, 608 F.2d at 300. Because of this finding, we need not address whether Widgery must meet the cause and prejudice standard outlined in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)."
} | 1,620,101 | b |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 415, 415",
"parenthetical": "circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "687 F.2d 899, 904",
"parenthetical": "cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | b |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1157, 1160",
"parenthetical": "issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "687 F.2d 899, 904",
"parenthetical": "cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | b |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 239, 243-45",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal",
"sentence": "But see Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 243-45 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "687 F.2d 899, 904",
"parenthetical": "cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | b |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 239, 243-45",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal",
"sentence": "But see Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 243-45 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "746 F.2d 415, 415",
"parenthetical": "circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | b |
The district court found that Widgery deliberately failed to pursue his appeals from the denials of his second and third motions for new trial. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "740 F.2d 239, 243-45",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal",
"sentence": "But see Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 243-45 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting the Norris application of the cause and prejudice standard to a failure to appeal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "745 F.2d 1157, 1160",
"parenthetical": "issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below",
"sentence": "See Morris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir.1982) (cause and prejudice standard is applicable in determining whether an issue not raised on direct appeal can be challenged in a 2255 proceeding); see also Earley, 746 F.2d at 415 (circumstances of case render unnecessary a determination of whether the Frady standard applies if defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir.1984) (issue of whether cause. and prejudice standard should apply if defendant fails to raise issue on direct appeal will not be considered because the government did not raise the issue below)."
} | 1,620,101 | b |
We do not think it necessary to provide an intricate rationalization for the existence of a specific congressional exclusion for certain types of income and the absence of an exclusion for student benefits. We simply note that other cases have held various benefits for which Congress had not provided a specific exclusion, not to be deemed "available income" for purposes of determining eligibility and level of AFDC payments. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.1984); Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984); Riddick v. D’Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1980) (OASDI benefits paid to mother’s representative payee); Turchin v. Butz, 405 F.Supp. 1263 (D.Minn.1976) (Minnesota non-WIN training allowance); Elam v. Hanson, 384 F.Supp. 549 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22); but see Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1981) (veteran’s nonservice-connected VA disability pension); Bosh v. Fahey, 53 N.Y.2d 896, 423 N.E.2d 49, 440 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1981) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.1984); Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984); Riddick v. D’Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1980) (OASDI benefits paid to mother’s representative payee); Turchin v. Butz, 405 F.Supp. 1263 (D.Minn.1976) (Minnesota non-WIN training allowance); Elam v. Hanson, 384 F.Supp. 549 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22); but see Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1981) (veteran’s nonservice-connected VA disability pension); Bosh v. Fahey, 53 N.Y.2d 896, 423 N.E.2d 49, 440 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1981) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22)."
} | 292,613 | b |
We do not think it necessary to provide an intricate rationalization for the existence of a specific congressional exclusion for certain types of income and the absence of an exclusion for student benefits. We simply note that other cases have held various benefits for which Congress had not provided a specific exclusion, not to be deemed "available income" for purposes of determining eligibility and level of AFDC payments. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.1984); Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984); Riddick v. D’Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1980) (OASDI benefits paid to mother’s representative payee); Turchin v. Butz, 405 F.Supp. 1263 (D.Minn.1976) (Minnesota non-WIN training allowance); Elam v. Hanson, 384 F.Supp. 549 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22); but see Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1981) (veteran’s nonservice-connected VA disability pension); Bosh v. Fahey, 53 N.Y.2d 896, 423 N.E.2d 49, 440 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1981) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.1984); Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984); Riddick v. D’Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1980) (OASDI benefits paid to mother’s representative payee); Turchin v. Butz, 405 F.Supp. 1263 (D.Minn.1976) (Minnesota non-WIN training allowance); Elam v. Hanson, 384 F.Supp. 549 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22); but see Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1981) (veteran’s nonservice-connected VA disability pension); Bosh v. Fahey, 53 N.Y.2d 896, 423 N.E.2d 49, 440 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1981) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22)."
} | 292,613 | b |
We do not think it necessary to provide an intricate rationalization for the existence of a specific congressional exclusion for certain types of income and the absence of an exclusion for student benefits. We simply note that other cases have held various benefits for which Congress had not provided a specific exclusion, not to be deemed "available income" for purposes of determining eligibility and level of AFDC payments. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.1984); Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984); Riddick v. D’Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1980) (OASDI benefits paid to mother’s representative payee); Turchin v. Butz, 405 F.Supp. 1263 (D.Minn.1976) (Minnesota non-WIN training allowance); Elam v. Hanson, 384 F.Supp. 549 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22); but see Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1981) (veteran’s nonservice-connected VA disability pension); Bosh v. Fahey, 53 N.Y.2d 896, 423 N.E.2d 49, 440 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1981) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369 (6th Cir.1984); Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984); Riddick v. D’Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1980) (OASDI benefits paid to mother’s representative payee); Turchin v. Butz, 405 F.Supp. 1263 (D.Minn.1976) (Minnesota non-WIN training allowance); Elam v. Hanson, 384 F.Supp. 549 (N.D.Ohio 1974) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22); but see Sturgell v. Creasy, 640 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1981) (veteran’s nonservice-connected VA disability pension); Bosh v. Fahey, 53 N.Y.2d 896, 423 N.E.2d 49, 440 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1981) (OASDI extended student benefits paid to full-time students between ages of 18 and 22)."
} | 292,613 | b |
Substantial evidence supports the agency's conclusion that, even if Coc-Lacan's family constitutes a particular social group, he failed to establish a nexus between the harm he experienced in the past and fears in the future and a protected ground. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 F.3d 1095, 1097",
"parenthetical": "even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that \"persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group” (emphasis in original)); Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (petitioner failed to establish nexus where “the evidence would permit a finding” that he was persecuted on account of his family membership, but did not “compel that finding” (emphasis in original)); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 1007, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"An [applicant's] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\"",
"sentence": "See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group” (emphasis in original)); Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (petitioner failed to establish nexus where “the evidence would permit a finding” that he was persecuted on account of his family membership, but did not “compel that finding” (emphasis in original)); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | 12,409,455 | a |
Substantial evidence supports the agency's conclusion that, even if Coc-Lacan's family constitutes a particular social group, he failed to establish a nexus between the harm he experienced in the past and fears in the future and a protected ground. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 1007, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"An [applicant's] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\"",
"sentence": "See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group” (emphasis in original)); Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (petitioner failed to establish nexus where “the evidence would permit a finding” that he was persecuted on account of his family membership, but did not “compel that finding” (emphasis in original)); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "293 F.3d 1089, 1095",
"parenthetical": "petitioner failed to establish nexus where \"the evidence would permit a finding\" that he was persecuted on account of his family membership, but did not \"compel that finding\" (emphasis in original",
"sentence": "See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group” (emphasis in original)); Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (petitioner failed to establish nexus where “the evidence would permit a finding” that he was persecuted on account of his family membership, but did not “compel that finding” (emphasis in original)); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | 12,409,455 | b |
Permitting parties to contractually eliminate all judicial review of arbitration awards would not only run counter to the text of the FAA, but would also frustrate Congress's attempt to ensure a minimum level of due process for parties to an arbitration. Through SS 10 of the FAA, Congress attempted to preserve due process while still promoting the ultimate goal of speedy dispute resolution. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 U.S. 588, 588",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he three provisions, SSSS 9-11, ... sub-stantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.\"",
"sentence": "See Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 998 (“The[ ] grounds [in § 10] afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.”); see also Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (“[T]he three provisions, §§ 9-11, ... sub-stantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”); Hoefb, 343 F.3d at 64 (“In enacting § 10(a), Congress impressed limited, but critical, safeguards onto this process, ones that respected the importance and flexibility of private dispute resolution mechanisms, but at the same time barred federal courts from confirming awards tainted by partiality, a lack of elementary procedural fairness, corruption, or similar misconduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 F.3d 998, 998",
"parenthetical": "\"The[ ] grounds [in SS 10] afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.\"",
"sentence": "See Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 998 (“The[ ] grounds [in § 10] afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.”); see also Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (“[T]he three provisions, §§ 9-11, ... sub-stantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”); Hoefb, 343 F.3d at 64 (“In enacting § 10(a), Congress impressed limited, but critical, safeguards onto this process, ones that respected the importance and flexibility of private dispute resolution mechanisms, but at the same time barred federal courts from confirming awards tainted by partiality, a lack of elementary procedural fairness, corruption, or similar misconduct.”)."
} | 3,730,989 | b |
Permitting parties to contractually eliminate all judicial review of arbitration awards would not only run counter to the text of the FAA, but would also frustrate Congress's attempt to ensure a minimum level of due process for parties to an arbitration. Through SS 10 of the FAA, Congress attempted to preserve due process while still promoting the ultimate goal of speedy dispute resolution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "341 F.3d 998, 998",
"parenthetical": "\"The[ ] grounds [in SS 10] afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.\"",
"sentence": "See Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 998 (“The[ ] grounds [in § 10] afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.”); see also Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (“[T]he three provisions, §§ 9-11, ... sub-stantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”); Hoefb, 343 F.3d at 64 (“In enacting § 10(a), Congress impressed limited, but critical, safeguards onto this process, ones that respected the importance and flexibility of private dispute resolution mechanisms, but at the same time barred federal courts from confirming awards tainted by partiality, a lack of elementary procedural fairness, corruption, or similar misconduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he three provisions, SSSS 9-11, ... sub-stantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.\"",
"sentence": "See Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 998 (“The[ ] grounds [in § 10] afford an extremely limited review authority, a limitation that is designed to preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into private arbitration procedures.”); see also Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 588, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (“[T]he three provisions, §§ 9-11, ... sub-stantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”); Hoefb, 343 F.3d at 64 (“In enacting § 10(a), Congress impressed limited, but critical, safeguards onto this process, ones that respected the importance and flexibility of private dispute resolution mechanisms, but at the same time barred federal courts from confirming awards tainted by partiality, a lack of elementary procedural fairness, corruption, or similar misconduct.”)."
} | 3,730,989 | a |
Federal courts applying Iowa's choice-of-law principles are in line with Iowa's state courts' decisions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1004",
"parenthetical": "finding under Iowa choice-of-law rules that a claim for a breach of an alleged contract to keep an invention confidential was governed by the law of Nebraska, which barred punitive damages, rather than by the law of Iowa, California, or Nevada, as the defendant was a Nebraska corporation, and negotiations and performance occurred primarily in Nebraska, and negotiations only incidentally began in California and terminated in Nevada",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dethmers Mfg. Co., 23 F.Supp.2d at 1004 (finding under Iowa choice-of-law rules that a claim for a breach of an alleged contract to keep an invention confidential was governed by the law of Nebraska, which barred punitive damages, rather than by the law of Iowa, California, or Nevada, as the defendant was a Nebraska corporation, and negotiations and performance occurred primarily in Nebraska, and negotiations only incidentally began in California and terminated in Nevada); see also Woods Masonry, Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d at 1021 (finding that in applying Iowa’s “most significant relationship” test, even though the underlying accident occurred in Iowa, Arkansas had the most significant relationship because the policy at issue was formed in Arkansas, and the policyholder was domiciled in Arkansas); Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1272 (8th Cir.1982) (finding that although a plane crash occurred in Montana, Nebraska had “the most significant relationship with the transaction in dispute and that Nebraska law should control any interpretation of the [insurance] policy provisions” as the parties entered into the insurance contract in Nebraska, and the insured was a Nebraska corporation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.Supp.2d 1021, 1021",
"parenthetical": "finding that in applying Iowa's \"most significant relationship\" test, even though the underlying accident occurred in Iowa, Arkansas had the most significant relationship because the policy at issue was formed in Arkansas, and the policyholder was domiciled in Arkansas",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dethmers Mfg. Co., 23 F.Supp.2d at 1004 (finding under Iowa choice-of-law rules that a claim for a breach of an alleged contract to keep an invention confidential was governed by the law of Nebraska, which barred punitive damages, rather than by the law of Iowa, California, or Nevada, as the defendant was a Nebraska corporation, and negotiations and performance occurred primarily in Nebraska, and negotiations only incidentally began in California and terminated in Nevada); see also Woods Masonry, Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d at 1021 (finding that in applying Iowa’s “most significant relationship” test, even though the underlying accident occurred in Iowa, Arkansas had the most significant relationship because the policy at issue was formed in Arkansas, and the policyholder was domiciled in Arkansas); Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1272 (8th Cir.1982) (finding that although a plane crash occurred in Montana, Nebraska had “the most significant relationship with the transaction in dispute and that Nebraska law should control any interpretation of the [insurance] policy provisions” as the parties entered into the insurance contract in Nebraska, and the insured was a Nebraska corporation)."
} | 4,051,894 | a |
Federal courts applying Iowa's choice-of-law principles are in line with Iowa's state courts' decisions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1004",
"parenthetical": "finding under Iowa choice-of-law rules that a claim for a breach of an alleged contract to keep an invention confidential was governed by the law of Nebraska, which barred punitive damages, rather than by the law of Iowa, California, or Nevada, as the defendant was a Nebraska corporation, and negotiations and performance occurred primarily in Nebraska, and negotiations only incidentally began in California and terminated in Nevada",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dethmers Mfg. Co., 23 F.Supp.2d at 1004 (finding under Iowa choice-of-law rules that a claim for a breach of an alleged contract to keep an invention confidential was governed by the law of Nebraska, which barred punitive damages, rather than by the law of Iowa, California, or Nevada, as the defendant was a Nebraska corporation, and negotiations and performance occurred primarily in Nebraska, and negotiations only incidentally began in California and terminated in Nevada); see also Woods Masonry, Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d at 1021 (finding that in applying Iowa’s “most significant relationship” test, even though the underlying accident occurred in Iowa, Arkansas had the most significant relationship because the policy at issue was formed in Arkansas, and the policyholder was domiciled in Arkansas); Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1272 (8th Cir.1982) (finding that although a plane crash occurred in Montana, Nebraska had “the most significant relationship with the transaction in dispute and that Nebraska law should control any interpretation of the [insurance] policy provisions” as the parties entered into the insurance contract in Nebraska, and the insured was a Nebraska corporation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "679 F.2d 1264, 1272",
"parenthetical": "finding that although a plane crash occurred in Montana, Nebraska had \"the most significant relationship with the transaction in dispute and that Nebraska law should control any interpretation of the [insurance] policy provisions\" as the parties entered into the insurance contract in Nebraska, and the insured was a Nebraska corporation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dethmers Mfg. Co., 23 F.Supp.2d at 1004 (finding under Iowa choice-of-law rules that a claim for a breach of an alleged contract to keep an invention confidential was governed by the law of Nebraska, which barred punitive damages, rather than by the law of Iowa, California, or Nevada, as the defendant was a Nebraska corporation, and negotiations and performance occurred primarily in Nebraska, and negotiations only incidentally began in California and terminated in Nevada); see also Woods Masonry, Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d at 1021 (finding that in applying Iowa’s “most significant relationship” test, even though the underlying accident occurred in Iowa, Arkansas had the most significant relationship because the policy at issue was formed in Arkansas, and the policyholder was domiciled in Arkansas); Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264, 1272 (8th Cir.1982) (finding that although a plane crash occurred in Montana, Nebraska had “the most significant relationship with the transaction in dispute and that Nebraska law should control any interpretation of the [insurance] policy provisions” as the parties entered into the insurance contract in Nebraska, and the insured was a Nebraska corporation)."
} | 4,051,894 | a |
Accordingly, the trial court erred in factoring in the Father's payment of alimony each month where he failed to make payments. Because of this error, this Court remands to the trial court for a determination of the amount of alimony the Father paid between October 1, 2010, and the entry of final judgment to determine the offset to the Mother's retroactive child support obligation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 So.3d 1194, 1196",
"parenthetical": "retroactive child support calculations erroneous where child support worksheets reflect that former husband paid alimony every month, thereby increasing former wife's income and decreasing former husband's, where former husband had not paid alimony consistently",
"sentence": "See Marlowe v. Marlowe, 123 So.3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (retroactive child support calculations erroneous where child support worksheets reflect that former husband paid alimony every month, thereby increasing former wife’s income and decreasing former husband’s, where former husband had not paid alimony consistently); see also Swor v. Swor, 56 So.3d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (where former husband failed to pay alimony, “it was error to include the sums due for this time period in the calculation that was the basis for the amount of retroactive child support awarded in the final judgment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "56 So.3d 825, 826",
"parenthetical": "where former husband failed to pay alimony, \"it was error to include the sums due for this time period in the calculation that was the basis for the amount of retroactive child support awarded in the final judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Marlowe v. Marlowe, 123 So.3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (retroactive child support calculations erroneous where child support worksheets reflect that former husband paid alimony every month, thereby increasing former wife’s income and decreasing former husband’s, where former husband had not paid alimony consistently); see also Swor v. Swor, 56 So.3d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (where former husband failed to pay alimony, “it was error to include the sums due for this time period in the calculation that was the basis for the amount of retroactive child support awarded in the final judgment”)."
} | 6,880,983 | a |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court's denial of appellant's motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | b |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court's denial of appellant's motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | a |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court's denial of appellant's motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | a |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court's denial of appellant's motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | b |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "611 F.2d 795, 800",
"parenthetical": "consent decree not void even if it violates federal law",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | a |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consent decree not void even if it violates federal law",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | a |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consent decree not void even if it violates federal law",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | a |
Freedom's assertion that the judgment is void is based on the fact that it was signed on Freedom's behalf by a non-attorney. The fact that a non-attorney represented a party in a judicial proceeding does not render the resulting judgment void per se. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "district court's denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consent decree not void even if it violates federal law",
"sentence": "See Alexander, 882 F.2d 421 (district court’s denial of motion to vacate judgment on the basis of fraud (60(b)(3)) not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that appellant’s trial counsel was unlicensed); cf. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir.1985) (although a corporation may not appear pro se, district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial is not reversible error even though appellant corporation was represented at trial by its non-attorney president), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 800 (10th Cir.1979) (consent decree not void even if it violates federal law), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980)."
} | 10,522,215 | a |
In Pennsylvania, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in an insurance contract. As such, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context, permitting an insured to recover compensatory damages for an insurer's failure to act in good faith. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, \"nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....\"",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer's failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | 4,176,956 | b |
In Pennsylvania, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in an insurance contract. As such, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context, permitting an insured to recover compensatory damages for an insurer's failure to act in good faith. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "787 A.2d 376, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, \"nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....\"",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer's failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | 4,176,956 | b |
In Pennsylvania, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in an insurance contract. As such, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context, permitting an insured to recover compensatory damages for an insurer's failure to act in good faith. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, \"nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....\"",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "223 A.2d 8, 11",
"parenthetical": "holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer's failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | 4,176,956 | b |
In Pennsylvania, a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in an insurance contract. As such, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for breach of the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context, permitting an insured to recover compensatory damages for an insurer's failure to act in good faith. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "223 A.2d 8, 11",
"parenthetical": "holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer's failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "787 A.2d 376, 385-86",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, \"nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....\"",
"sentence": "Benevento v. Life USA Hold ing, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (citations omitted); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.1966) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurer’s failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party); Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 664 A.2d 96, 101 (Cappy, J. concurring) (citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957)); see also Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376, 385-86 (Pa.2001) (holding that, in the context a third party case in which the insurer refused to settle a claim on behalf of the insured, “nothing in D Ambrosio bars a party bringing a bad faith action sounding in contract from recovering damages that are otherwise available to parties in contract actions ....”)"
} | 4,176,956 | a |
These facts, which would have sufficed to insulate TG from common-law liability for the acts of TGA, also sufficed to defeat this facet of TGA's workers' compensation immunity defense, for a North Carolina court would not find TGA to have been conducting the business of TG within the meaning of SS 97-9 if it could not hold TG liable for TGA's acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "37 A.D.2d 754, 754",
"parenthetical": "subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers' compensation immunity",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stockholder does not possess corporation's workers' compensation immunity from suit",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | 1,689,792 | b |
These facts, which would have sufficed to insulate TG from common-law liability for the acts of TGA, also sufficed to defeat this facet of TGA's workers' compensation immunity defense, for a North Carolina court would not find TGA to have been conducting the business of TG within the meaning of SS 97-9 if it could not hold TG liable for TGA's acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07",
"parenthetical": "subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers' compensation immunity",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stockholder does not possess corporation's workers' compensation immunity from suit",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | 1,689,792 | b |
These facts, which would have sufficed to insulate TG from common-law liability for the acts of TGA, also sufficed to defeat this facet of TGA's workers' compensation immunity defense, for a North Carolina court would not find TGA to have been conducting the business of TG within the meaning of SS 97-9 if it could not hold TG liable for TGA's acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "37 A.D.2d 754, 754",
"parenthetical": "subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers' compensation immunity",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "152 S.E.2d 117, 122",
"parenthetical": "stockholder does not possess corporation's workers' compensation immunity from suit",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | 1,689,792 | b |
These facts, which would have sufficed to insulate TG from common-law liability for the acts of TGA, also sufficed to defeat this facet of TGA's workers' compensation immunity defense, for a North Carolina court would not find TGA to have been conducting the business of TG within the meaning of SS 97-9 if it could not hold TG liable for TGA's acts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07",
"parenthetical": "subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers' compensation immunity",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "152 S.E.2d 117, 122",
"parenthetical": "stockholder does not possess corporation's workers' compensation immunity from suit",
"sentence": "See Lewis v. Barn- hill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 536, 544 (1966); see also McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162, 152 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1967) (stockholder does not possess corporation’s workers’ compensation immunity from suit); cf. Thomas v. Maigo Corp., 37 A.D.2d 754, 754, 323 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (4th Dep’t 1971) (subsidiary that was distinct legal entity was not employee of parent for purposes of workers’ compensation immunity); Daisernia v. Co-operative G.L.F."
} | 1,689,792 | b |
The existence vel non of a credible threat of prosecution, critical to the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, factors into both branches of the ripeness equation. This is as it should be, for the reasonableness of the fear of enforcement is at the core of both standing and ripeness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 781, 786",
"parenthetical": "\"Our conclusion that a reasonable threat of prosecution exists, for purposes of standing, effectively dispenses with any ripeness problem.\"",
"sentence": "See Adult Video Ass’n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir.1992) (“Our conclusion that a reasonable threat of prosecution exists, for purposes of standing, effectively dispenses with any ripeness problem.”), vacated, 509 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 3028, 125 L.Ed.2d 716 (1993), reinstated in relevant part, 41 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.1994); see also Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1998) (considering ripeness and standing together in respect to a pre-enforcement challenge)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45",
"parenthetical": "considering ripeness and standing together in respect to a pre-enforcement challenge",
"sentence": "See Adult Video Ass’n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir.1992) (“Our conclusion that a reasonable threat of prosecution exists, for purposes of standing, effectively dispenses with any ripeness problem.”), vacated, 509 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 3028, 125 L.Ed.2d 716 (1993), reinstated in relevant part, 41 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.1994); see also Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1998) (considering ripeness and standing together in respect to a pre-enforcement challenge)."
} | 1,753,234 | a |
The existence vel non of a credible threat of prosecution, critical to the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, factors into both branches of the ripeness equation. This is as it should be, for the reasonableness of the fear of enforcement is at the core of both standing and ripeness. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our conclusion that a reasonable threat of prosecution exists, for purposes of standing, effectively dispenses with any ripeness problem.\"",
"sentence": "See Adult Video Ass’n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir.1992) (“Our conclusion that a reasonable threat of prosecution exists, for purposes of standing, effectively dispenses with any ripeness problem.”), vacated, 509 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 3028, 125 L.Ed.2d 716 (1993), reinstated in relevant part, 41 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.1994); see also Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1998) (considering ripeness and standing together in respect to a pre-enforcement challenge)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45",
"parenthetical": "considering ripeness and standing together in respect to a pre-enforcement challenge",
"sentence": "See Adult Video Ass’n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir.1992) (“Our conclusion that a reasonable threat of prosecution exists, for purposes of standing, effectively dispenses with any ripeness problem.”), vacated, 509 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 3028, 125 L.Ed.2d 716 (1993), reinstated in relevant part, 41 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.1994); see also Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1998) (considering ripeness and standing together in respect to a pre-enforcement challenge)."
} | 1,753,234 | a |
Subsets and Splits