context
stringlengths 58
1.13k
| citation_a
dict | citation_b
dict | case_id
int64 475
12.5M
| label
stringclasses 2
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 F.2d 356, 360",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under SS 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | 11,642,032 | a |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 F.2d 661, 664",
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 F.2d 827, 829",
"parenthetical": "holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a SS 472 conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that one-sided bogus bills with indistinct reverse duplicates of real bills were not counterfeit as a matter of law",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.1963) (holding that one-sided bogus bills with indistinct reverse duplicates of real bills were not counterfeit as a matter of law). Courts have traditionally applied this standard for “similitude” in counterfeiting cases, including § 474 cases."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1463, 1470",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under SS 471",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | 11,642,032 | a |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 F.2d 356, 360",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under SS 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 F.2d 661, 664",
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | 11,642,032 | a |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 F.2d 827, 829",
"parenthetical": "holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a SS 472 conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | 11,642,032 | a |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that one-sided bogus bills with indistinct reverse duplicates of real bills were not counterfeit as a matter of law",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.1963) (holding that one-sided bogus bills with indistinct reverse duplicates of real bills were not counterfeit as a matter of law). Courts have traditionally applied this standard for “similitude” in counterfeiting cases, including § 474 cases."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "806 F.2d 1463, 1470",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under SS 471",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "801 F.2d 356, 360",
"parenthetical": "holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under SS 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 F.2d 661, 664",
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | 11,642,032 | a |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under SS 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | 11,642,032 | a |
(Emphasis added). Harrod argues that "similitude" includes only items that "bear[ ] such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care when dealing with a person supposed to be upright and honest." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "434 F.2d 827, 829",
"parenthetical": "holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a SS 472 conviction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the district judge properly submitted to the jury the question of whether uncut bills were counterfeit under § 471); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant was not entitled to the similitude instruction under § 472 where facts indicated an overt attempt to pass an altered Federal Reserve note); United States v. Chodor, 479 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 254, 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (holding that bogus bills lacking serial numbers and a treasury seal sufficiently resembled real currency under § 474 to submit to the jury the counterfeit issue); United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1970) (holding that one-sided photocopies of bills on pinkish paper did not sufficiently resemble actual currency to justify a § 472 conviction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. SS 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment",
"sentence": "United States v. Lustig, 159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 264 for possession of one-sided copies of bills and various counterfeiting equipment), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853, 67 S.Ct. 1737, 91 L.Ed. 1861 (1947), order vacated on reh’g and cert. granted, 333 U.S. 835, 68 S.Ct. 601, 9 L.Ed. 1119 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S.Ct. 1372, 93 L.Ed. 1819 (1949)."
} | 11,642,032 | b |
It remains unclear, however, exactly what Mr. Watrous asserts as the "personal interest" at stake for the other alleged co-conspirators. Some courts have found that personal bias, by itself, is not the same as having a personal interest. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1999 WL 151702, *2",
"parenthetical": "\"Although the complaint includes an allegation that Rodriguez-Torres wanted to 'get rid of plaintiff, personal bias does not constitute personal interest and is not sufficient to defeat the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 954 F.Supp. 717, 723 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“[P]ersonal bias is not the sort of personal interest that takes a defendant out of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine where, as here, the action complained of arguably served a legitimate interest of Nyack Hospital.”); see also Bond v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, No. 97CV1337, 1999 WL 151702, *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999) (“Although the complaint includes an allegation that Rodriguez-Torres wanted to ‘get rid of plaintiff, personal bias does not constitute personal interest and is not sufficient to defeat the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "954 F.Supp. 717, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]ersonal bias is not the sort of personal interest that takes a defendant out of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine where, as here, the action complained of arguably served a legitimate interest of Nyack Hospital.\"",
"sentence": "See Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 954 F.Supp. 717, 723 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“[P]ersonal bias is not the sort of personal interest that takes a defendant out of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine where, as here, the action complained of arguably served a legitimate interest of Nyack Hospital.”); see also Bond v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, No. 97CV1337, 1999 WL 151702, *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999) (“Although the complaint includes an allegation that Rodriguez-Torres wanted to ‘get rid of plaintiff, personal bias does not constitute personal interest and is not sufficient to defeat the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.”)."
} | 3,811,435 | b |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 373, 373",
"parenthetical": "determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | a |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | a |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 581, 593-94",
"parenthetical": "stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | b |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | b |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | b |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2002 UT 125, ¶ 62",
"parenthetical": "stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | a |
At the time Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, the officers had seen only one knife in a passenger's possession (and not in Baker's possession). While it was the early morning hours, and there were four passengers in the car, nothing in the officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on the part of the passengers; thus, continued detention was impermissible. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "921 P.2d 446, 453",
"parenthetical": "determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime",
"sentence": "See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996) (determining that continued detention of the defendant was impermissible when \"[bly the officers' own testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity beyond [the reason he was initially stopped]\"); cf. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373, 124 S.Ct. 795 (determining that the large amount of money and drugs in the car made it \"reasonable for the officer to infer a common [criminal] enterprise among the three [occupants of the car]\"); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-94, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948) (stating that where police officers have no evidence or information implicating a suspect, \"mere presence\" in the car does not give officers probable cause to believe that a suspect was involved in a crime). According ly, we hold that Baker's detention following the driver's arrest was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence subsequently recovered must be excluded. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 62, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)."
} | 8,378,023 | a |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 1033, 1033",
"parenthetical": "finding no \"suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 112, 112",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | a |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 F.3d 1033, 1033",
"parenthetical": "finding no \"suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | a |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 112, 112",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through \"administrative adjudication process\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | b |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through \"administrative adjudication process\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | b |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1091",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 112, 112",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | a |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "20 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1091",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | b |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 F.Supp. 987, 987",
"parenthetical": "60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency's regulations",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "530 U.S. 112, 112",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | a |
See Pis.' Reply & Opp'n [ECF 41] ("AFRC MSJ Reply") 1, 7. AFRC cites four decisions from courts outside this circuit for the proposition that giving 60-day notice is the sole exhaustion requirement for an ESA claim; it also cites eight additional decisions purportedly holding that the 60-day notice requirements in other environmental citizen suit provisions similarly "override any prudential exhaustion requirement[s]." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 F.Supp. 987, 987",
"parenthetical": "60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency's regulations",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wash. Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1033 (finding no “suggestion] of any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA”); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 48 F.Supp.2d at 1312 & n. 6 (plaintiff suing under ESA citizen suit provision was not required to go through “administrative adjudication process”); Ky. Heartwood, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1091 (stating that “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a mandatory precondition to filing suit for a violation of the ESA” (emphasis added)); Silver, 924 F.Supp. at 987 (60-day notice in ESA citizen suit provision excuses plaintiffs from having to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in agency’s regulations); see also Sims, 530 U.S. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different)."
} | 4,232,278 | a |
Mr. Portlock does not cite any authority for his assertion that the lack of a complete date on the warrant renders it constitutionally infirm, nor has any been located. On the contrary, similar clerical errors and omissions have been held not to affect the validity of a search warrant. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "127 F.2d 529, 530",
"parenthetical": "finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986) (finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as “a minor, technical omission”); Ross v. United States, No. CR. 496150(1)JRTAJB, Civ. 03-1020(JRT), 2003 WL 22076607, at *4 n. 4 (D.Minn. Sep. 2, 2003) (rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27); United States v. Albert, 195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.Mass.2002) (concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely “a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests”); cf. United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 124 (8th Cir.1997) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to suppress which had been based on warrant’s failure to specifically authorize nighttime search; affidavit clearly had contemplated a nighttime search, warrant was presented for signature at issuing judge’s home at 12:30 a.m., and it was thus apparent to the appellate court “that the wording of the concluding paragraph in the warrant was the result of some sort of clerical error”); United States v. Klaia, 127 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir.1942) (finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 864, 866-67",
"parenthetical": "finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as \"a minor, technical omission\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986) (finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as “a minor, technical omission”); Ross v. United States, No. CR. 496150(1)JRTAJB, Civ. 03-1020(JRT), 2003 WL 22076607, at *4 n. 4 (D.Minn. Sep. 2, 2003) (rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27); United States v. Albert, 195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.Mass.2002) (concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely “a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests”); cf. United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 124 (8th Cir.1997) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to suppress which had been based on warrant’s failure to specifically authorize nighttime search; affidavit clearly had contemplated a nighttime search, warrant was presented for signature at issuing judge’s home at 12:30 a.m., and it was thus apparent to the appellate court “that the wording of the concluding paragraph in the warrant was the result of some sort of clerical error”); United States v. Klaia, 127 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir.1942) (finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated)."
} | 9,190,102 | b |
Mr. Portlock does not cite any authority for his assertion that the lack of a complete date on the warrant renders it constitutionally infirm, nor has any been located. On the contrary, similar clerical errors and omissions have been held not to affect the validity of a search warrant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986) (finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as “a minor, technical omission”); Ross v. United States, No. CR. 496150(1)JRTAJB, Civ. 03-1020(JRT), 2003 WL 22076607, at *4 n. 4 (D.Minn. Sep. 2, 2003) (rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27); United States v. Albert, 195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.Mass.2002) (concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely “a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests”); cf. United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 124 (8th Cir.1997) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to suppress which had been based on warrant’s failure to specifically authorize nighttime search; affidavit clearly had contemplated a nighttime search, warrant was presented for signature at issuing judge’s home at 12:30 a.m., and it was thus apparent to the appellate court “that the wording of the concluding paragraph in the warrant was the result of some sort of clerical error”); United States v. Klaia, 127 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir.1942) (finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "127 F.2d 529, 530",
"parenthetical": "finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986) (finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as “a minor, technical omission”); Ross v. United States, No. CR. 496150(1)JRTAJB, Civ. 03-1020(JRT), 2003 WL 22076607, at *4 n. 4 (D.Minn. Sep. 2, 2003) (rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27); United States v. Albert, 195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.Mass.2002) (concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely “a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests”); cf. United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 124 (8th Cir.1997) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to suppress which had been based on warrant’s failure to specifically authorize nighttime search; affidavit clearly had contemplated a nighttime search, warrant was presented for signature at issuing judge’s home at 12:30 a.m., and it was thus apparent to the appellate court “that the wording of the concluding paragraph in the warrant was the result of some sort of clerical error”); United States v. Klaia, 127 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir.1942) (finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
Mr. Portlock does not cite any authority for his assertion that the lack of a complete date on the warrant renders it constitutionally infirm, nor has any been located. On the contrary, similar clerical errors and omissions have been held not to affect the validity of a search warrant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274",
"parenthetical": "concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely \"a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986) (finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as “a minor, technical omission”); Ross v. United States, No. CR. 496150(1)JRTAJB, Civ. 03-1020(JRT), 2003 WL 22076607, at *4 n. 4 (D.Minn. Sep. 2, 2003) (rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27); United States v. Albert, 195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.Mass.2002) (concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely “a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests”); cf. United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 124 (8th Cir.1997) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to suppress which had been based on warrant’s failure to specifically authorize nighttime search; affidavit clearly had contemplated a nighttime search, warrant was presented for signature at issuing judge’s home at 12:30 a.m., and it was thus apparent to the appellate court “that the wording of the concluding paragraph in the warrant was the result of some sort of clerical error”); United States v. Klaia, 127 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir.1942) (finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "127 F.2d 529, 530",
"parenthetical": "finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 866-67 (1st Cir.1986) (finding warrant valid despite omission of address of location to be searched and referring to such as “a minor, technical omission”); Ross v. United States, No. CR. 496150(1)JRTAJB, Civ. 03-1020(JRT), 2003 WL 22076607, at *4 n. 4 (D.Minn. Sep. 2, 2003) (rejecting claim that warrant was invalid where, due to clerical error, warrant reflected that it was issued on August 31 but executed on August 27); United States v. Albert, 195 F.Supp.2d 267, 274 (D.Mass.2002) (concluding that omission from warrant of reference to list of items to be seized was merely “a clerical error that posed no real risk to legitimate privacy interests”); cf. United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 124 (8th Cir.1997) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to suppress which had been based on warrant’s failure to specifically authorize nighttime search; affidavit clearly had contemplated a nighttime search, warrant was presented for signature at issuing judge’s home at 12:30 a.m., and it was thus apparent to the appellate court “that the wording of the concluding paragraph in the warrant was the result of some sort of clerical error”); United States v. Klaia, 127 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir.1942) (finding omission of date from copy of search warrant was trivial and harmless where original was properly dated)."
} | 9,190,102 | a |
This is so even when there is an applicable non-delegable duty under state law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "121 F.3d 1438, 1438-40, 1442",
"parenthetical": "finding, in spite of the government's non-delegable duty to monitor the activities of independent contractors hired to dispose of hazardous waste under Florida law, that the Navy was free to delegate its safety responsibilities in the absence of federal legislation dictating otherwise",
"sentence": "See Andrews, 121 F.3d at 1438-40, 1442 (finding, in spite of the government’s non-delegable duty to monitor the activities of independent contractors hired to dispose of hazardous waste under Florida law, that the Navy was free to delegate its safety responsibilities in the absence of federal legislation dictating otherwise); but see Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1582-84 (11th Cir.1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "711 F.3d 654, 659",
"parenthetical": "holding the FTCA exemption of liability for independent contractors preempts state law where it imposes non-delegable duties",
"sentence": "See also Berrien v. United States, 711 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir.2013) (holding the FTCA exemption of liability for independent contractors preempts state law where it imposes non-delegable duties); accord Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir.2005); Roditis v. United States, 122 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir.1997); Norman v. United States, 111 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir.1997); Hall, 825 F.Supp. at 433 (noting the First Circuit has not recognized state law tort duties as limitations on the United States’ discretion under the FTCA); Berkman v. United States, 957 F.2d 108, 113 (4th Cir.1992)."
} | 4,210,780 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | b |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | b |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent's indictment on felony charges",
"sentence": "But see In re Keeble, 271 Ga. 623 (523 SE2d 563) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent’s indictment on felony charges); In re Smith, 271 Ga. 432 (520 SE2d 903) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68); In re Woodard, 270 Ga. 891 (515 SE2d 147) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68",
"sentence": "See In re Benning, 270 Ga. 135 (508 SE2d 660) (1998) (indefinite suspension until Benning, who had no prior disciplinary history, responds to disciplinary authorities); In re Cole man, 266 Ga. 652 (472 SE2d 841) (1996) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Shearouse, 264 Ga. 497 (448 SE2d 202) (1994) (one-year suspension with conditional reinstatement); In re Carmichael, 258 Ga. 209 (367 SE2d 549) (1988) (90-day suspension and public reprimand for violation of Standards 44 and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent's indictment on felony charges",
"sentence": "But see In re Keeble, 271 Ga. 623 (523 SE2d 563) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent’s indictment on felony charges); In re Smith, 271 Ga. 432 (520 SE2d 903) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68); In re Woodard, 270 Ga. 891 (515 SE2d 147) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent's indictment on felony charges",
"sentence": "But see In re Keeble, 271 Ga. 623 (523 SE2d 563) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent’s indictment on felony charges); In re Smith, 271 Ga. 432 (520 SE2d 903) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68); In re Woodard, 270 Ga. 891 (515 SE2d 147) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | b |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent's indictment on felony charges",
"sentence": "But see In re Keeble, 271 Ga. 623 (523 SE2d 563) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent’s indictment on felony charges); In re Smith, 271 Ga. 432 (520 SE2d 903) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68); In re Woodard, 270 Ga. 891 (515 SE2d 147) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | a |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent's indictment on felony charges",
"sentence": "But see In re Keeble, 271 Ga. 623 (523 SE2d 563) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent’s indictment on felony charges); In re Smith, 271 Ga. 432 (520 SE2d 903) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68); In re Woodard, 270 Ga. 891 (515 SE2d 147) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | b |
While we agree with the special master that Standards 44 and 68 have been violated by respondent and that violation of Standard 44 is punishable by disbarment, we do not believe that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline for the violation in this case. We note that we previously have suspended attorneys from the practice of law for a single violation of Standard 44 and a failure to respond to the disciplinary process. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent's indictment on felony charges",
"sentence": "But see In re Keeble, 271 Ga. 623 (523 SE2d 563) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68, and disbarment rendered moot a second disciplinary action seeking an emergency suspension due to respondent’s indictment on felony charges); In re Smith, 271 Ga. 432 (520 SE2d 903) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 44 and 68); In re Woodard, 270 Ga. 891 (515 SE2d 147) (1999) (disbarred for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68",
"sentence": "See also In the Matter of Voss, 272 Ga. 9 (525 SE2d 89) (2000) (18-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Gardner, 265 Ga. 482 (458 SE2d 355) (1995) (six-month suspension with conditional reinstatement for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68); In re Kendall, 260 Ga. 767 (400 SE2d 13) (1991) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 21, 44, and 68); In re Roberts, 257 Ga. 721 (363 SE2d 256) (1988) (six-month suspension for violation of Standards 22, 44, and 68)."
} | 1,297,336 | b |
. Even had the trial court expressly found a physical and not a regulatory taking had occurred, this would be a conclusion of law subject to our de novo review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 1114, 1122",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment ruling that no regulatory taking occurred subject to de novo review",
"sentence": "See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 212 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 8-9, 129 P.3d 71, 73 (App.2006) (reviewing de novo trial court's summary judgment on issue of taking); see also Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.2005) (summary judgment ruling that no regulatory taking occurred subject to de novo review); City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Tex.App.2008) (whether taking occurred ultimately question of law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 8-9",
"parenthetical": "reviewing de novo trial court's summary judgment on issue of taking",
"sentence": "See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 212 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 8-9, 129 P.3d 71, 73 (App.2006) (reviewing de novo trial court's summary judgment on issue of taking); see also Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.2005) (summary judgment ruling that no regulatory taking occurred subject to de novo review); City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Tex.App.2008) (whether taking occurred ultimately question of law)."
} | 4,056,043 | b |
. Even had the trial court expressly found a physical and not a regulatory taking had occurred, this would be a conclusion of law subject to our de novo review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "395 F.3d 1114, 1122",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment ruling that no regulatory taking occurred subject to de novo review",
"sentence": "See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 212 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 8-9, 129 P.3d 71, 73 (App.2006) (reviewing de novo trial court's summary judgment on issue of taking); see also Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.2005) (summary judgment ruling that no regulatory taking occurred subject to de novo review); City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Tex.App.2008) (whether taking occurred ultimately question of law)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "129 P.3d 71, 73",
"parenthetical": "reviewing de novo trial court's summary judgment on issue of taking",
"sentence": "See Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 212 Ariz. 160, ¶¶ 8-9, 129 P.3d 71, 73 (App.2006) (reviewing de novo trial court's summary judgment on issue of taking); see also Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.2005) (summary judgment ruling that no regulatory taking occurred subject to de novo review); City of Sherman v. Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Tex.App.2008) (whether taking occurred ultimately question of law)."
} | 4,056,043 | b |
Nevertheless, to file a brief after indicating that he would do Moreover, he failed to respond to the Government' dismiss his appeal for such failure. Under these circumstances, the BIA's dismissal of Zhao's appeal was proper. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 F.3d 515, 515-16",
"parenthetical": "finding summary dismissal was proper where appellant failed to file a brief after indicating that he would do so, or to explain the reasons for such failure",
"sentence": "See Rioja, 317 F.3d at 515-16 (finding summary dismissal was proper where appellant failed to file a brief after indicating that he would do so, or to explain the reasons for such failure); Kokar v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 803, 811-13 (7th Cir.2007) (same); see also Singh, 416 F.3d at 1014 (finding that an appellant’s failure to file a brief cannot be attributed to a deficiency in the BIA’s notice procedures when counsel’s actions clearly show that the failure was due to his oversight and error); Toquero v. I.N.S., 956 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that the BIA’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal was justified when counsel was on notice that the failure to file a brief could result in summary dismissal but failed to file a brief or explain such failure)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "416 F.3d 1014, 1014",
"parenthetical": "finding that an appellant's failure to file a brief cannot be attributed to a deficiency in the BIA's notice procedures when counsel's actions clearly show that the failure was due to his oversight and error",
"sentence": "See Rioja, 317 F.3d at 515-16 (finding summary dismissal was proper where appellant failed to file a brief after indicating that he would do so, or to explain the reasons for such failure); Kokar v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 803, 811-13 (7th Cir.2007) (same); see also Singh, 416 F.3d at 1014 (finding that an appellant’s failure to file a brief cannot be attributed to a deficiency in the BIA’s notice procedures when counsel’s actions clearly show that the failure was due to his oversight and error); Toquero v. I.N.S., 956 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that the BIA’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal was justified when counsel was on notice that the failure to file a brief could result in summary dismissal but failed to file a brief or explain such failure)."
} | 2,979,339 | a |
Nevertheless, to file a brief after indicating that he would do Moreover, he failed to respond to the Government' dismiss his appeal for such failure. Under these circumstances, the BIA's dismissal of Zhao's appeal was proper. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "956 F.2d 193, 196-97",
"parenthetical": "finding that the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal was justified when counsel was on notice that the failure to file a brief could result in summary dismissal but failed to file a brief or explain such failure",
"sentence": "See Rioja, 317 F.3d at 515-16 (finding summary dismissal was proper where appellant failed to file a brief after indicating that he would do so, or to explain the reasons for such failure); Kokar v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 803, 811-13 (7th Cir.2007) (same); see also Singh, 416 F.3d at 1014 (finding that an appellant’s failure to file a brief cannot be attributed to a deficiency in the BIA’s notice procedures when counsel’s actions clearly show that the failure was due to his oversight and error); Toquero v. I.N.S., 956 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that the BIA’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal was justified when counsel was on notice that the failure to file a brief could result in summary dismissal but failed to file a brief or explain such failure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "317 F.3d 515, 515-16",
"parenthetical": "finding summary dismissal was proper where appellant failed to file a brief after indicating that he would do so, or to explain the reasons for such failure",
"sentence": "See Rioja, 317 F.3d at 515-16 (finding summary dismissal was proper where appellant failed to file a brief after indicating that he would do so, or to explain the reasons for such failure); Kokar v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 803, 811-13 (7th Cir.2007) (same); see also Singh, 416 F.3d at 1014 (finding that an appellant’s failure to file a brief cannot be attributed to a deficiency in the BIA’s notice procedures when counsel’s actions clearly show that the failure was due to his oversight and error); Toquero v. I.N.S., 956 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that the BIA’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal was justified when counsel was on notice that the failure to file a brief could result in summary dismissal but failed to file a brief or explain such failure)."
} | 2,979,339 | b |
The court further declines to exercise its discretion, which it believes it possesses under Rule 4(m), to extend the time allowed for service of process, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Hammad may be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations from reinsti-tuting his case following its dismissal. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 78, 78",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 4(j) [now Rule 4(m) ] does not ... give the appellant a right to refile without the consequence of time defenses, such as the statute of limitations\"",
"sentence": "See Boley, supra, 123 F.3d at 759 (“The district court, of course, retains discretion to refuse to extend time, even if the statute of limitations has run”); cf. Mendez, 45 F.3d at 78 (“Rule 4(j) [now Rule 4(m) ] does not ... give the appellant a right to refile without the consequence of time defenses, such as the statute of limitations”). Accordingly, Mr. Hammad’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice as provided by Rule 4(m)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "123 F.3d 759, 759",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court, of course, retains discretion to refuse to extend time, even if the statute of limitations has run\"",
"sentence": "See Boley, supra, 123 F.3d at 759 (“The district court, of course, retains discretion to refuse to extend time, even if the statute of limitations has run”); cf. Mendez, 45 F.3d at 78 (“Rule 4(j) [now Rule 4(m) ] does not ... give the appellant a right to refile without the consequence of time defenses, such as the statute of limitations”). Accordingly, Mr. Hammad’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice as provided by Rule 4(m)."
} | 373,446 | b |
I disagree. A governmental officer's claim that a plaintiff is only seeking retrospective damages is not an affirmative defense.-' We have treated claims seeking retrospec-' five damages as being barred by immunity from suit--which implicates courts' subject matter jurisdiction--and dismissing the claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "354 S.W.3d 368, 379",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the Officers sought only retrospective relief, their declaratory judgment claims must be dismissed.\"",
"sentence": "See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 380 (“[Heinrich’s] claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against -the Board members and the mayor in their official capacities may go forward, but we dismiss her retrospective claims against them.”); see also City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex.2011) (“Because the Officers sought only retrospective relief, their declaratory judgment claims must be dismissed.”). Therefore, a request for findings of fact was not necessary in order to preserve the issue."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "284 S.W.3d 380, 380",
"parenthetical": "\"[Heinrich's] claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against -the Board members and the mayor in their official capacities may go forward, but we dismiss her retrospective claims against them.\"",
"sentence": "See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 380 (“[Heinrich’s] claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against -the Board members and the mayor in their official capacities may go forward, but we dismiss her retrospective claims against them.”); see also City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex.2011) (“Because the Officers sought only retrospective relief, their declaratory judgment claims must be dismissed.”). Therefore, a request for findings of fact was not necessary in order to preserve the issue."
} | 12,177,597 | b |
Quade contends that equitable estoppel excuses him from having to personally serve a notice of 61aim on defendants. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Quade did not raise this argument in the district court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "194 F.3d 1045, 1052",
"parenthetical": "\"As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“As a general rule, we will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”). Second, even if we were to consider the merits of equitable estoppel, Quade did not allege conduct on the part of either individual defendant that prevented him from serving them with notice of his claims."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 1170, 1176",
"parenthetical": "equitable estoppel \"focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit\"",
"sentence": "See Gorman v. Pima County, 230 Ariz. 506, 287 P.3d 800, 804-05 (Ct. App. 2012) (elements of equitable estop-pel); see also Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (equitable estoppel “focuses primarily on the actions taken by the defendant in preventing a plaintiff from filing suit”), overruled on other grounds by Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1194-96 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)."
} | 12,404,498 | a |
The AFTE itself publishes within the field of toolmark and firearms identification. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 485967, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that articles submitted to the AFTE Journal are subject to peer review weighs strongly in favor of admission.\"",
"sentence": "See Diaz, 2007 WL 485967, at *8 (“The fact that articles submitted to the AFTE Journal are subject to peer review weighs strongly in favor of admission.”); see also Otero, 849 F.Supp.2d at 433 (noting AFTE Journal’s formal process for the submission of articles); Taylor, 663 F.Supp.2d at 1176 (finding the peer review factor “clearly weighs in favor of admissibility”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "849 F.Supp.2d 433, 433",
"parenthetical": "noting AFTE Journal's formal process for the submission of articles",
"sentence": "See Diaz, 2007 WL 485967, at *8 (“The fact that articles submitted to the AFTE Journal are subject to peer review weighs strongly in favor of admission.”); see also Otero, 849 F.Supp.2d at 433 (noting AFTE Journal’s formal process for the submission of articles); Taylor, 663 F.Supp.2d at 1176 (finding the peer review factor “clearly weighs in favor of admissibility”)."
} | 4,307,440 | a |
The AFTE itself publishes within the field of toolmark and firearms identification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "663 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1176",
"parenthetical": "finding the peer review factor \"clearly weighs in favor of admissibility\"",
"sentence": "See Diaz, 2007 WL 485967, at *8 (“The fact that articles submitted to the AFTE Journal are subject to peer review weighs strongly in favor of admission.”); see also Otero, 849 F.Supp.2d at 433 (noting AFTE Journal’s formal process for the submission of articles); Taylor, 663 F.Supp.2d at 1176 (finding the peer review factor “clearly weighs in favor of admissibility”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 485967, at *8",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that articles submitted to the AFTE Journal are subject to peer review weighs strongly in favor of admission.\"",
"sentence": "See Diaz, 2007 WL 485967, at *8 (“The fact that articles submitted to the AFTE Journal are subject to peer review weighs strongly in favor of admission.”); see also Otero, 849 F.Supp.2d at 433 (noting AFTE Journal’s formal process for the submission of articles); Taylor, 663 F.Supp.2d at 1176 (finding the peer review factor “clearly weighs in favor of admissibility”)."
} | 4,307,440 | b |
MThe court held that "until judgment is rendered in which some disposition is made of the child under Section 211.181, there is no final appealable judgment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 S.W.3d 393, 393-94",
"parenthetical": "appeal dismissed on basis that \"absent an order of disposition concerning [the juvenile], there is no final, appealable judgment or order\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., M.P.R., 381 S.W.3d at 393-94 (appeal dismissed on basis that “absent an order of disposition concerning [the juvenile], there is no final, appealable judgment or order”); In re T.E., 35 S.W.3d 497, 505 (Mo.App.2001) (a finding of jurisdiction that “simply affirmed the ... previous order placing [child] in protective custody pending a disposition hearing,” is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal); Interest of K.S., 856 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo.App.1993) (dismissing appeal where “there was no disposition; hence, no judgment from which an appeal will lie”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the adjudication order was not ap-pealable until the dispositional hearing ... and the judgment thereafter\"",
"sentence": "See also O.J.B., 436 S.W.3d at 730 n. 2 (noting that “the adjudication order was not ap-pealable until the dispositional hearing ... and the judgment thereafter”)."
} | 6,886,104 | a |
MThe court held that "until judgment is rendered in which some disposition is made of the child under Section 211.181, there is no final appealable judgment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 S.W.3d 497, 505",
"parenthetical": "a finding of jurisdiction that \"simply affirmed the ... previous order placing [child] in protective custody pending a disposition hearing,\" is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal",
"sentence": "See, e.g., M.P.R., 381 S.W.3d at 393-94 (appeal dismissed on basis that “absent an order of disposition concerning [the juvenile], there is no final, appealable judgment or order”); In re T.E., 35 S.W.3d 497, 505 (Mo.App.2001) (a finding of jurisdiction that “simply affirmed the ... previous order placing [child] in protective custody pending a disposition hearing,” is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal); Interest of K.S., 856 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo.App.1993) (dismissing appeal where “there was no disposition; hence, no judgment from which an appeal will lie”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the adjudication order was not ap-pealable until the dispositional hearing ... and the judgment thereafter\"",
"sentence": "See also O.J.B., 436 S.W.3d at 730 n. 2 (noting that “the adjudication order was not ap-pealable until the dispositional hearing ... and the judgment thereafter”)."
} | 6,886,104 | a |
Moreover, any diminution in the originals' value is justified because of the importance of excising this information to protect the privacy interests of the victims and intended victims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "154 F.3d 930, 932",
"parenthetical": "upholding partial redaction of Kaczynski's psychiatric and competency reports, because court properly balanced privacy interests versus public right to know",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Kaczynski, 154 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir.1998) (upholding partial redaction of Kaczynski’s psychiatric and competency reports, because court properly balanced privacy interests versus public right to know); cf. Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing privacy interests of survivors under Freedom of Information Act)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 1168, 1173",
"parenthetical": "discussing privacy interests of survivors under Freedom of Information Act",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Kaczynski, 154 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir.1998) (upholding partial redaction of Kaczynski’s psychiatric and competency reports, because court properly balanced privacy interests versus public right to know); cf. Favish v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing privacy interests of survivors under Freedom of Information Act)."
} | 5,750,974 | a |
There is one additional aspect of the fraud analysis that the district court did not address. If the declarant subjectively believes the applicant has a superior right to use the mark, there is no fraud, even if the declarant was mistaken. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "580 F.3d 1246, 1246",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.\"",
"sentence": "See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 (“There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.”). Here, The Florida Priory did not put forth any evidence to establish that Pace — or Plaintiff Order, for that matter — knew or believed that The Ecumenical Order or The Florida Priory had a superior right to the marks at issue. See Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1211; Citibank, 724 F.2d at 1545 (rejecting a defendant’s fraud claim where the plaintiff was the “senior use[r] of th[e] term”); see also Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir.1997) (“[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant ‘believe’ himself to be the owner of the mark.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1051)). Even assuming knowledge of The Ecumenical Order as of 1983, Plaintiff Order’s relevant service mark registrations provide that the marks were first used in commerce in 1926 and 1927."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "119 F.3d 1236, 1241",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant 'believe' himself to be the owner of the mark.\" (quoting 15 U.S.C. SS 1051",
"sentence": "See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 (“There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.”). Here, The Florida Priory did not put forth any evidence to establish that Pace — or Plaintiff Order, for that matter — knew or believed that The Ecumenical Order or The Florida Priory had a superior right to the marks at issue. See Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1211; Citibank, 724 F.2d at 1545 (rejecting a defendant’s fraud claim where the plaintiff was the “senior use[r] of th[e] term”); see also Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir.1997) (“[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant ‘believe’ himself to be the owner of the mark.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1051)). Even assuming knowledge of The Ecumenical Order as of 1983, Plaintiff Order’s relevant service mark registrations provide that the marks were first used in commerce in 1926 and 1927."
} | 3,646,327 | a |
There is one additional aspect of the fraud analysis that the district court did not address. If the declarant subjectively believes the applicant has a superior right to use the mark, there is no fraud, even if the declarant was mistaken. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 F.3d 1211, 1211",
"parenthetical": "\"There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.\"",
"sentence": "See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 (“There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.”). Here, The Florida Priory did not put forth any evidence to establish that Pace — or Plaintiff Order, for that matter — knew or believed that The Ecumenical Order or The Florida Priory had a superior right to the marks at issue. See Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1211; Citibank, 724 F.2d at 1545 (rejecting a defendant’s fraud claim where the plaintiff was the “senior use[r] of th[e] term”); see also Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir.1997) (“[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant ‘believe’ himself to be the owner of the mark.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1051)). Even assuming knowledge of The Ecumenical Order as of 1983, Plaintiff Order’s relevant service mark registrations provide that the marks were first used in commerce in 1926 and 1927."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "119 F.3d 1236, 1241",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant 'believe' himself to be the owner of the mark.\" (quoting 15 U.S.C. SS 1051",
"sentence": "See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 (“There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.”). Here, The Florida Priory did not put forth any evidence to establish that Pace — or Plaintiff Order, for that matter — knew or believed that The Ecumenical Order or The Florida Priory had a superior right to the marks at issue. See Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1211; Citibank, 724 F.2d at 1545 (rejecting a defendant’s fraud claim where the plaintiff was the “senior use[r] of th[e] term”); see also Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir.1997) (“[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant ‘believe’ himself to be the owner of the mark.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1051)). Even assuming knowledge of The Ecumenical Order as of 1983, Plaintiff Order’s relevant service mark registrations provide that the marks were first used in commerce in 1926 and 1927."
} | 3,646,327 | a |
There is one additional aspect of the fraud analysis that the district court did not address. If the declarant subjectively believes the applicant has a superior right to use the mark, there is no fraud, even if the declarant was mistaken. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 1545, 1545",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a defendant's fraud claim where the plaintiff was the \"senior use[r] of th[e] term\"",
"sentence": "See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 (“There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.”). Here, The Florida Priory did not put forth any evidence to establish that Pace — or Plaintiff Order, for that matter — knew or believed that The Ecumenical Order or The Florida Priory had a superior right to the marks at issue. See Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1211; Citibank, 724 F.2d at 1545 (rejecting a defendant’s fraud claim where the plaintiff was the “senior use[r] of th[e] term”); see also Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir.1997) (“[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant ‘believe’ himself to be the owner of the mark.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1051)). Even assuming knowledge of The Ecumenical Order as of 1983, Plaintiff Order’s relevant service mark registrations provide that the marks were first used in commerce in 1926 and 1927."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "119 F.3d 1236, 1241",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant 'believe' himself to be the owner of the mark.\" (quoting 15 U.S.C. SS 1051",
"sentence": "See Bose, 580 F.3d at 1246 (“There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive.”). Here, The Florida Priory did not put forth any evidence to establish that Pace — or Plaintiff Order, for that matter — knew or believed that The Ecumenical Order or The Florida Priory had a superior right to the marks at issue. See Angel Flight, 522 F.3d at 1211; Citibank, 724 F.2d at 1545 (rejecting a defendant’s fraud claim where the plaintiff was the “senior use[r] of th[e] term”); see also Sovereign Order of Saint John v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir.1997) (“[A] valid trademark registration requires only that the registrant ‘believe’ himself to be the owner of the mark.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1051)). Even assuming knowledge of The Ecumenical Order as of 1983, Plaintiff Order’s relevant service mark registrations provide that the marks were first used in commerce in 1926 and 1927."
} | 3,646,327 | a |
If a defendant objects to the declaration of a mistrial, a mistrial must be manifestly necessary for the defendant to be retried or risk violating double jeopardy principles. Manifest necessity analysis generally requires a consideration of whether reasonable alternatives to a mistrial exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "6 L.Ed. 165, 165",
"parenthetical": "noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant's objection \"under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes\"",
"sentence": "Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880, 886 (1974) (“[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.”); see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.\"",
"sentence": "Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880, 886 (1974) (“[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.”); see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes”)."
} | 3,717,707 | b |
If a defendant objects to the declaration of a mistrial, a mistrial must be manifestly necessary for the defendant to be retried or risk violating double jeopardy principles. Manifest necessity analysis generally requires a consideration of whether reasonable alternatives to a mistrial exist. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "6 L.Ed. 165, 165",
"parenthetical": "noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant's objection \"under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes\"",
"sentence": "Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880, 886 (1974) (“[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.”); see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "322 A.2d 880, 886",
"parenthetical": "\"[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.\"",
"sentence": "Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 322 A.2d 880, 886 (1974) (“[R]etrial is barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible and could cure the problem.”); see also United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes”)."
} | 3,717,707 | b |
A district court's "ability to review matters related to military discharges is limited, as military personnel decisions themselves lie outside the court's jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "12 F.Supp. 140, 140",
"parenthetical": "while \"courts do sometimes review the actions of military agencies, the Court's jurisdiction in this area is typically limited to challenges to procedures -- it does not extend to the merits of a promotion decision\"",
"sentence": "See also Reilly, 12 F.Supp. at 140 (while “courts do sometimes review the actions of military agencies, the Court’s jurisdiction in this area is typically limited to challenges to procedures — it does not extend to the merits of a promotion decision”) (emphasis in original). In line with this caselaw, the Court concludes that the BOI acted in a similarly discretionary manner and rendered a recommendation on a non-justiciable personnel decision."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Army decision to discharge and other \"underlying personnel actions\" were \"not reviewable\"",
"sentence": "Burt v. Winter, 503 F.Supp.2d 388, 390 (D.D.C.2007) (citing Piersall v. Winter, 435 F.3d 319, 321-22 (D.C.Cir.2006) (claims for retroactive promotion are non-justiciable)); Reilly v. Sec’y of the Navy, 12 F.Supp.3d 125,140 (D.D.C.2014) (merits of an individual military promotion not jus-ticiable); Caez v. United States, 815 F.Supp.2d 184, 188 n.4 (D.D.C.2011) (Army decision to discharge and other “underlying personnel actions” were “not reviewable”)."
} | 4,265,862 | b |
Moreover, the fact that Nolasco was not present during the transfer of drugs to the officer is of little consequence to this analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "40 Mass.App.Ct. 534, 537",
"parenthetical": "concluding that there is no need for a defendant to be present at the scene of a crime throughout its occurrence",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lafayette, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 534, 537, 665 N.E.2d 1025 (1996) (concluding that there is no need for a defendant to be present at the scene of a crime throughout its occurrence); cf. Commonwealth v. Carmenatty, 37 Mass. App.Ct. 908, 910, 638 N.E.2d 496 (1994) (holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lafayette, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 534, 537, 665 N.E.2d 1025 (1996) (concluding that there is no need for a defendant to be present at the scene of a crime throughout its occurrence); cf. Commonwealth v. Carmenatty, 37 Mass. App.Ct. 908, 910, 638 N.E.2d 496 (1994) (holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing)."
} | 11,544,427 | a |
Moreover, the fact that Nolasco was not present during the transfer of drugs to the officer is of little consequence to this analysis. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that there is no need for a defendant to be present at the scene of a crime throughout its occurrence",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lafayette, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 534, 537, 665 N.E.2d 1025 (1996) (concluding that there is no need for a defendant to be present at the scene of a crime throughout its occurrence); cf. Commonwealth v. Carmenatty, 37 Mass. App.Ct. 908, 910, 638 N.E.2d 496 (1994) (holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Lafayette, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 534, 537, 665 N.E.2d 1025 (1996) (concluding that there is no need for a defendant to be present at the scene of a crime throughout its occurrence); cf. Commonwealth v. Carmenatty, 37 Mass. App.Ct. 908, 910, 638 N.E.2d 496 (1994) (holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing)."
} | 11,544,427 | a |
This evidence of controlled drug purchases on the subject site, a known informant's report of very recent drug activity on the premises, residents' efforts to bar police from the premises earlier on the day of the challenged search, and police observations of cash and drug paraphernalia on site shortly before seeking the challenged warrant easily admits a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found on the premises. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "701 F.3d 64, 74",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"hasty retreat\" into home on sight of police \"manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause\"",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | 3,630,550 | b |
This evidence of controlled drug purchases on the subject site, a known informant's report of very recent drug activity on the premises, residents' efforts to bar police from the premises earlier on the day of the challenged search, and police observations of cash and drug paraphernalia on site shortly before seeking the challenged warrant easily admits a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found on the premises. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "536 F.3d 113, 118",
"parenthetical": "stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during \"circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search\"",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | 3,630,550 | a |
This evidence of controlled drug purchases on the subject site, a known informant's report of very recent drug activity on the premises, residents' efforts to bar police from the premises earlier on the day of the challenged search, and police observations of cash and drug paraphernalia on site shortly before seeking the challenged warrant easily admits a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found on the premises. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 69, 73",
"parenthetical": "recognizing controlled purchases as \"powerful corroborative evidence\" in determining probable cause",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | 3,630,550 | b |
This evidence of controlled drug purchases on the subject site, a known informant's report of very recent drug activity on the premises, residents' efforts to bar police from the premises earlier on the day of the challenged search, and police observations of cash and drug paraphernalia on site shortly before seeking the challenged warrant easily admits a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime" would be found on the premises. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "758 F.2d 834, 838",
"parenthetical": "concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant",
"sentence": "Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that “hasty retreat” into home on sight of police “manifests guilt and may, in appropriate circumstances, transform suspicion into probable cause”); United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (stating that contraband or evidence of crime in plain view during “circumscribed search may be used to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a broader search”); United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing plastic baggies as packaging tools of drug trade); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1993) (recognizing controlled purchases as “powerful corroborative evidence” in determining probable cause); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) (concluding that large amounts of unexplained cash supported probable cause for search warrant); see also United States v. Allebach, 526 F.3d 385, 387 & n. 4 (8th Cir.2008) (holding that torn bag corners and steel wool, which can serve as crack pipe filter, support probable cause)."
} | 3,630,550 | b |
Defendants also fail to specify whether such alleged refill-request forms were part of the six "broadcasts" at issue in Plaintiffs proposed class, or if those forms contained the same language required to be included in the proposed class. Defendants' argument thus again evokes the Seventh Circuit's declination to let defendants "derail legitimate class actions by conjuring up.. .insubstantial defenses unique to the class representative." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2013 WL 66181, at *9",
"parenthetical": "finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2016 WL 25711, at *4-5",
"parenthetical": "finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | 12,420,415 | a |
Defendants also fail to specify whether such alleged refill-request forms were part of the six "broadcasts" at issue in Plaintiffs proposed class, or if those forms contained the same language required to be included in the proposed class. Defendants' argument thus again evokes the Seventh Circuit's declination to let defendants "derail legitimate class actions by conjuring up.. .insubstantial defenses unique to the class representative." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88",
"parenthetical": "certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members -- but not named plaintiff -- was not viable",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2016 WL 25711, at *4-5",
"parenthetical": "finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | 12,420,415 | a |
Defendants also fail to specify whether such alleged refill-request forms were part of the six "broadcasts" at issue in Plaintiffs proposed class, or if those forms contained the same language required to be included in the proposed class. Defendants' argument thus again evokes the Seventh Circuit's declination to let defendants "derail legitimate class actions by conjuring up.. .insubstantial defenses unique to the class representative." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2016 WL 25711, at *4-5",
"parenthetical": "finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.3d 1036, 1042",
"parenthetical": "certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | 12,420,415 | b |
Defendants also fail to specify whether such alleged refill-request forms were part of the six "broadcasts" at issue in Plaintiffs proposed class, or if those forms contained the same language required to be included in the proposed class. Defendants' argument thus again evokes the Seventh Circuit's declination to let defendants "derail legitimate class actions by conjuring up.. .insubstantial defenses unique to the class representative." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2016 WL 25711, at *4-5",
"parenthetical": "finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93",
"parenthetical": "certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication",
"sentence": "CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728; see Savanna Group, Inc. v. Trynex, Inc., 2013 WL 66181, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding commonality and adequacy requirements met where there was no evidence to support consent defense); Hawkins v. Securitas Sec. Serv. USA Inc., 280 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (rejecting objection to adequacy based upon meritless defense); Manno v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 687-88 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (certifying class where asserted defense shared by putative class members — but not named plaintiff — was not viable); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that named plaintiff or putative class members had consented to receiving communication); Silbaugh v. Viking Magazine Serv., 278 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (certifying class where there was no evidence that putative class members had expressly consented to receiving communication); cf. Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., 2016 WL 25711, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (finding adequacy requirement not met where there was sufficient indication that plaintiff expressly consented to receiving communication)."
} | 12,420,415 | b |
It is also well-recognized that, in almost any claim involving motive, a defendant's state of mind is typically established by circumstantial evidence because of the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of motive. In criminal cases, for example, where the burden of proof is considerably higher than in a Bivens suit, this court and others have recognized that "[i]ntent may, and generally must, be proved circumstantially; normally, the natural probable consequences of an act may satisfactorily evidence the state of mind accompanying it." Nor does this court distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal ease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "748 F.2d 361, 362",
"parenthetical": "ruling that \"circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "924 F.2d 298, 303",
"parenthetical": "\"No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt”)."
} | 10,512,997 | b |
It is also well-recognized that, in almost any claim involving motive, a defendant's state of mind is typically established by circumstantial evidence because of the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of motive. In criminal cases, for example, where the burden of proof is considerably higher than in a Bivens suit, this court and others have recognized that "[i]ntent may, and generally must, be proved circumstantially; normally, the natural probable consequences of an act may satisfactorily evidence the state of mind accompanying it." Nor does this court distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal ease. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "748 F.2d 361, 362",
"parenthetical": "ruling that \"circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt”)."
} | 10,512,997 | a |
It is also well-recognized that, in almost any claim involving motive, a defendant's state of mind is typically established by circumstantial evidence because of the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of motive. In criminal cases, for example, where the burden of proof is considerably higher than in a Bivens suit, this court and others have recognized that "[i]ntent may, and generally must, be proved circumstantially; normally, the natural probable consequences of an act may satisfactorily evidence the state of mind accompanying it." Nor does this court distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal ease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "748 F.2d 361, 362",
"parenthetical": "ruling that \"circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt”)."
} | 10,512,997 | b |
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine non-investigatory documents eligible for withholding under Exemption 7(E) that could pass through the Exemption 7 threshold under the district court's interpretation. Thus, were we to deny the application of Exemption 7 to generalized law enforcement documents simply because the government could not link them to enforcement of a specific law, the additional protections that Congress provided to those very documents in Exemption 7(E) would be nullified. Indeed, we have implicitly adopted this approach by analyzing documents under Exemption 7(E) without questioning whether they were "compiled for law enforcement purposes." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "797 F.3d 759, 777-78",
"parenthetical": "upholding the FBI's withholding of documents containing law enforcement techniques for surveillance and credit searches under Exemption 7(E",
"sentence": "See Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the FBI’s withholding of documents containing law enforcement techniques for surveillance and credit searches under Exemption 7(E)); see also ACLU of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F.3d 473, 2018 WL 455857 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2018) (analyzing a FOIA request for law enforcement techniques and guidelines under Exemption 7(E))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing a FOIA request for law enforcement techniques and guidelines under Exemption 7(E",
"sentence": "See Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the FBI’s withholding of documents containing law enforcement techniques for surveillance and credit searches under Exemption 7(E)); see also ACLU of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F.3d 473, 2018 WL 455857 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2018) (analyzing a FOIA request for law enforcement techniques and guidelines under Exemption 7(E))."
} | 12,275,272 | a |
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine non-investigatory documents eligible for withholding under Exemption 7(E) that could pass through the Exemption 7 threshold under the district court's interpretation. Thus, were we to deny the application of Exemption 7 to generalized law enforcement documents simply because the government could not link them to enforcement of a specific law, the additional protections that Congress provided to those very documents in Exemption 7(E) would be nullified. Indeed, we have implicitly adopted this approach by analyzing documents under Exemption 7(E) without questioning whether they were "compiled for law enforcement purposes." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "analyzing a FOIA request for law enforcement techniques and guidelines under Exemption 7(E",
"sentence": "See Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the FBI’s withholding of documents containing law enforcement techniques for surveillance and credit searches under Exemption 7(E)); see also ACLU of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F.3d 473, 2018 WL 455857 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2018) (analyzing a FOIA request for law enforcement techniques and guidelines under Exemption 7(E))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "797 F.3d 759, 777-78",
"parenthetical": "upholding the FBI's withholding of documents containing law enforcement techniques for surveillance and credit searches under Exemption 7(E",
"sentence": "See Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the FBI’s withholding of documents containing law enforcement techniques for surveillance and credit searches under Exemption 7(E)); see also ACLU of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 880 F.3d 473, 2018 WL 455857 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2018) (analyzing a FOIA request for law enforcement techniques and guidelines under Exemption 7(E))."
} | 12,275,272 | b |
To be sure, a true claim of negligent supervision in this case might be a back-door attempt to raise a respondeat superior claim premised on an excepted act, as such claims typically depend on the employment relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "141 F.Supp.2d 626, 629",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Fourth Circuit's pre-Sheridan decisions -- which barred negligent supervision claims premised on intentional acts of government employee -- continue to apply",
"sentence": "Schweizer v. Keating, 150 F.Supp.2d 830, 843 (D.Md. 2001) (“Under Maryland law, liability for negligent supervision has arisen, almost exclusively, in cases involving master-servant relationships.”); see also Lilly v. United States, 141 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (S.D.W.Va.2001) (concluding that Fourth Circuit’s pre-Sheridan decisions — which barred negligent supervision claims premised on intentional acts of government employee — continue to apply). But, contrary to the Government’s characterizations, the complaint in this case offers more than a negligent supervision claim."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "150 F.Supp.2d 830, 843",
"parenthetical": "\"Under Maryland law, liability for negligent supervision has arisen, almost exclusively, in cases involving master-servant relationships.\"",
"sentence": "Schweizer v. Keating, 150 F.Supp.2d 830, 843 (D.Md. 2001) (“Under Maryland law, liability for negligent supervision has arisen, almost exclusively, in cases involving master-servant relationships.”); see also Lilly v. United States, 141 F.Supp.2d 626, 629 (S.D.W.Va.2001) (concluding that Fourth Circuit’s pre-Sheridan decisions — which barred negligent supervision claims premised on intentional acts of government employee — continue to apply). But, contrary to the Government’s characterizations, the complaint in this case offers more than a negligent supervision claim."
} | 4,193,697 | b |
Under these cireumstances, we reject wife's premise that the time for filing the motion for review began to run on the date of mailing of the clarification. To preserve her right to appellate review, wife had to file the motion to review within fifteen days of the date of mailing of the operative order, which here was the November order. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "910 P.2d 85, 88",
"parenthetical": "setting forth the time requirements under the prior rules for magistrates",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Talbott, supra; In re Marriage of McCord, 910 P.2d 85, 88 (Colo.App.1995)(setting forth the time requirements under the prior rules for magistrates); cf. People v. Retallack, 804 P.2d 279, 279-80 (Colo.App.1990)(in a criminal case, a motion filed after entry of the order challenged on appeal did not extend the time for filing notice of appeal with respect to the challenged order)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "804 P.2d 279, 279-80",
"parenthetical": "in a criminal case, a motion filed after entry of the order challenged on appeal did not extend the time for filing notice of appeal with respect to the challenged order",
"sentence": "See In re Marriage of Talbott, supra; In re Marriage of McCord, 910 P.2d 85, 88 (Colo.App.1995)(setting forth the time requirements under the prior rules for magistrates); cf. People v. Retallack, 804 P.2d 279, 279-80 (Colo.App.1990)(in a criminal case, a motion filed after entry of the order challenged on appeal did not extend the time for filing notice of appeal with respect to the challenged order)."
} | 11,391,988 | a |
"Possibility is not enough." Evidence that disability " 'may be due' " to an industrial accident "is not sufficient." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "141 S.E. 134, 134",
"parenthetical": "alleged causal connection between injury to a hand and palsy",
"sentence": "Old Dominion Co. at 337, 141 S.E. at 134 (alleged causal connection between injury to a hand and palsy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alleged causal connection between injury to leg and cardiac arrest",
"sentence": "See also Eccon Company v. Lucas, 221 Va. 786, 273 S.E.2d 797 (1981) (alleged causal connection between injury to leg and cardiac arrest)."
} | 2,074,622 | a |
"Possibility is not enough." Evidence that disability " 'may be due' " to an industrial accident "is not sufficient." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "141 S.E. 134, 134",
"parenthetical": "alleged causal connection between injury to a hand and palsy",
"sentence": "Old Dominion Co. at 337, 141 S.E. at 134 (alleged causal connection between injury to a hand and palsy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "alleged causal connection between injury to leg and cardiac arrest",
"sentence": "See also Eccon Company v. Lucas, 221 Va. 786, 273 S.E.2d 797 (1981) (alleged causal connection between injury to leg and cardiac arrest)."
} | 2,074,622 | a |
The second factor has a bit more heft. A gesture (like a touching of the body) that might appear perfectly innocent to a casual onlooker (scratching oneself or feeling for a wallet, for example), depending on the setting and circumstances, may nonetheless appear suspect to an experienced officer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "548 F.3d 179, 187-188",
"parenthetical": "two men walking single-file behind a third off a sidewalk onto a dark wooded path at night appeared to be readying themselves for potential robbery or drug deal",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 187-188 (2d Cir.2008) (two men walking single-file behind a third off a sidewalk onto a dark wooded path at night appeared to be readying themselves for potential robbery or drug deal)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "534 U.S. 275, 275-276",
"parenthetical": "driver's slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with \"methodical\" waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent",
"sentence": "Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-276, 122 S.Ct. 744 (driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with “methodical” waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent)."
} | 4,011,998 | b |
The second factor has a bit more heft. A gesture (like a touching of the body) that might appear perfectly innocent to a casual onlooker (scratching oneself or feeling for a wallet, for example), depending on the setting and circumstances, may nonetheless appear suspect to an experienced officer. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "534 U.S. 275, 275-276",
"parenthetical": "driver's slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with \"methodical\" waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent",
"sentence": "Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-276, 122 S.Ct. 744 (driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with “methodical” waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "428 F.3d 38, 41",
"parenthetical": "\"It is simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car's console when approached by police, even in a high-crime neighborhood.\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir.2005) (“It is simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car’s console when approached by police, even in a high-crime neighborhood.”)."
} | 4,011,998 | a |
The second factor has a bit more heft. A gesture (like a touching of the body) that might appear perfectly innocent to a casual onlooker (scratching oneself or feeling for a wallet, for example), depending on the setting and circumstances, may nonetheless appear suspect to an experienced officer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "548 F.3d 179, 187-188",
"parenthetical": "two men walking single-file behind a third off a sidewalk onto a dark wooded path at night appeared to be readying themselves for potential robbery or drug deal",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 187-188 (2d Cir.2008) (two men walking single-file behind a third off a sidewalk onto a dark wooded path at night appeared to be readying themselves for potential robbery or drug deal)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "driver's slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with \"methodical\" waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent",
"sentence": "Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-276, 122 S.Ct. 744 (driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with “methodical” waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent)."
} | 4,011,998 | b |
The second factor has a bit more heft. A gesture (like a touching of the body) that might appear perfectly innocent to a casual onlooker (scratching oneself or feeling for a wallet, for example), depending on the setting and circumstances, may nonetheless appear suspect to an experienced officer. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "428 F.3d 38, 41",
"parenthetical": "\"It is simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car's console when approached by police, even in a high-crime neighborhood.\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir.2005) (“It is simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car’s console when approached by police, even in a high-crime neighborhood.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "driver's slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with \"methodical\" waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent",
"sentence": "Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-276, 122 S.Ct. 744 (driver’s slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a law enforcement officer in rural area combined with “methodical” waving to the officer by child passengers raised reasonable suspicion for an experienced border patrol agent)."
} | 4,011,998 | b |
The second factor has a bit more heft. A gesture (like a touching of the body) that might appear perfectly innocent to a casual onlooker (scratching oneself or feeling for a wallet, for example), depending on the setting and circumstances, may nonetheless appear suspect to an experienced officer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "548 F.3d 179, 187-188",
"parenthetical": "two men walking single-file behind a third off a sidewalk onto a dark wooded path at night appeared to be readying themselves for potential robbery or drug deal",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 187-188 (2d Cir.2008) (two men walking single-file behind a third off a sidewalk onto a dark wooded path at night appeared to be readying themselves for potential robbery or drug deal)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "428 F.3d 38, 41",
"parenthetical": "\"It is simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car's console when approached by police, even in a high-crime neighborhood.\"",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir.2005) (“It is simply not reasonable to infer that a driver is armed and dangerous because the officers believe that he appears nervous and reaches toward the car’s console when approached by police, even in a high-crime neighborhood.”)."
} | 4,011,998 | a |
The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence because "there is no evidence that this event is something of the kind that ordinarily doesn't occur in the absence of someone's negligence." Appellant argues that she met that burden here, citing several cases which hold that it is permissible to assume that if an escalator is used properly and an injury occurs, there is "something wrong in either the construction, maintenance, or operation of the escalator." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "child's foot was caught in the escalator as she rode down",
"sentence": "Sá-neme v. J.C. Penney Co., 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248, 250 (1965) (child’s foot was caught in the escalator as she rode down); see also Bell, supra note 3, 483 A.2d at 329 (woman fell after her sandal was caught in the escalator); J.C. Penney Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ky.1954) (small boy’s hand was caught in an escalator). However, these cases are inapposite."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 A.2d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "woman fell after her sandal was caught in the escalator",
"sentence": "Sá-neme v. J.C. Penney Co., 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248, 250 (1965) (child’s foot was caught in the escalator as she rode down); see also Bell, supra note 3, 483 A.2d at 329 (woman fell after her sandal was caught in the escalator); J.C. Penney Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ky.1954) (small boy’s hand was caught in an escalator). However, these cases are inapposite."
} | 7,358,750 | a |
The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence because "there is no evidence that this event is something of the kind that ordinarily doesn't occur in the absence of someone's negligence." Appellant argues that she met that burden here, citing several cases which hold that it is permissible to assume that if an escalator is used properly and an injury occurs, there is "something wrong in either the construction, maintenance, or operation of the escalator." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "404 P.2d 248, 250",
"parenthetical": "child's foot was caught in the escalator as she rode down",
"sentence": "Sá-neme v. J.C. Penney Co., 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248, 250 (1965) (child’s foot was caught in the escalator as she rode down); see also Bell, supra note 3, 483 A.2d at 329 (woman fell after her sandal was caught in the escalator); J.C. Penney Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ky.1954) (small boy’s hand was caught in an escalator). However, these cases are inapposite."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "483 A.2d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "woman fell after her sandal was caught in the escalator",
"sentence": "Sá-neme v. J.C. Penney Co., 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248, 250 (1965) (child’s foot was caught in the escalator as she rode down); see also Bell, supra note 3, 483 A.2d at 329 (woman fell after her sandal was caught in the escalator); J.C. Penney Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Ky.1954) (small boy’s hand was caught in an escalator). However, these cases are inapposite."
} | 7,358,750 | a |
Subsets and Splits