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The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 731, 734",
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | b |
In the absence of an agreement with the government, the Does would have neither a false history nor an expectation of governmental aid. If the government owed the Does any duty at all, the source of that duty must be the alleged contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 647, 647",
"parenthetical": "finding claim contractually based where \"[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract\"",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647 (finding claim contractually based where “[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract”); see also Up State Federal Credit Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the parties’ dispute was contractual in nature and subject to the Tucker Act because, had the parties not entered into the contract, the plaintiff would have no claim against the government); Kielczynski, 128 F.Supp.2d at 160 (rejecting a former covert employee’s argument that the source of his rights was the due process clause and finding instead that his cause of action was ultimately based on his contract with the CIA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "198 F.3d 372, 377",
"parenthetical": "finding that the parties' dispute was contractual in nature and subject to the Tucker Act because, had the parties not entered into the contract, the plaintiff would have no claim against the government",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647 (finding claim contractually based where “[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract”); see also Up State Federal Credit Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the parties’ dispute was contractual in nature and subject to the Tucker Act because, had the parties not entered into the contract, the plaintiff would have no claim against the government); Kielczynski, 128 F.Supp.2d at 160 (rejecting a former covert employee’s argument that the source of his rights was the due process clause and finding instead that his cause of action was ultimately based on his contract with the CIA)."
} | 9,131,193 | a |
In the absence of an agreement with the government, the Does would have neither a false history nor an expectation of governmental aid. If the government owed the Does any duty at all, the source of that duty must be the alleged contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "136 F.3d 647, 647",
"parenthetical": "finding claim contractually based where \"[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract\"",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647 (finding claim contractually based where “[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract”); see also Up State Federal Credit Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the parties’ dispute was contractual in nature and subject to the Tucker Act because, had the parties not entered into the contract, the plaintiff would have no claim against the government); Kielczynski, 128 F.Supp.2d at 160 (rejecting a former covert employee’s argument that the source of his rights was the due process clause and finding instead that his cause of action was ultimately based on his contract with the CIA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 F.Supp.2d 160, 160",
"parenthetical": "rejecting a former covert employee's argument that the source of his rights was the due process clause and finding instead that his cause of action was ultimately based on his contract with the CIA",
"sentence": "Tucson Airport Auth., 136 F.3d at 647 (finding claim contractually based where “[the] duty, if it exists, derives from the contract”); see also Up State Federal Credit Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the parties’ dispute was contractual in nature and subject to the Tucker Act because, had the parties not entered into the contract, the plaintiff would have no claim against the government); Kielczynski, 128 F.Supp.2d at 160 (rejecting a former covert employee’s argument that the source of his rights was the due process clause and finding instead that his cause of action was ultimately based on his contract with the CIA)."
} | 9,131,193 | a |
Most of Count I can be disposed of summarily. AJi's complaint indicates that she has suffered discrimination on the basis of several protected characteristics, but she pursues only Title VII race discrimination in her brief. Her failure to support the remaining claims with legal argument or authority waives them. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "975 F.2d 1336, 1341",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff waived disparate impact claim alleged in complaint because she did not fulfill her \"minimal responsibility of identifying the applicable law and arguing why the facts ... fit into the parameters of that law.\"",
"sentence": "See Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir.1992) (plaintiff waived disparate impact claim alleged in complaint because she did not fulfill her “minimal responsibility of identifying the applicable law and arguing why the facts ... fit into the parameters of that law.”); see also Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 957 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir.1992) (“[W]e have no obligation to consider an issue that is ... not developed [ ] in a party’s brief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 302, 305",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]e have no obligation to consider an issue that is ... not developed [ ] in a party's brief.\"",
"sentence": "See Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir.1992) (plaintiff waived disparate impact claim alleged in complaint because she did not fulfill her “minimal responsibility of identifying the applicable law and arguing why the facts ... fit into the parameters of that law.”); see also Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 957 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir.1992) (“[W]e have no obligation to consider an issue that is ... not developed [ ] in a party’s brief.”)."
} | 1,286,553 | a |
According to the Manual, "When conducting a search where the offender is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender's assigned area of the residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [a consent form]." Probation and Parole Manual eh. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The officers searched only the common areas of the residence and the one bedroom Cantley had previously identified as his. Ms. Cantley's consent was not needed to search those areas. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n. 89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the ... parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else ... the [warrant-less] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the ... parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possessed” by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 752, 758",
"parenthetical": "rejecting co-defendant's argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer's residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be \"owned, controlled, or possessed\" by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n. 89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the ... parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else ... the [warrant-less] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the ... parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possessed” by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search)."
} | 11,894,423 | a |
According to the Manual, "When conducting a search where the offender is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender's assigned area of the residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [a consent form]." Probation and Parole Manual eh. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The officers searched only the common areas of the residence and the one bedroom Cantley had previously identified as his. Ms. Cantley's consent was not needed to search those areas. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 N.W.2d 482, 491",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n. 89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the ... parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else ... the [warrant-less] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the ... parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possessed” by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 752, 758",
"parenthetical": "rejecting co-defendant's argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer's residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be \"owned, controlled, or possessed\" by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n. 89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the ... parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else ... the [warrant-less] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the ... parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possessed” by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search)."
} | 11,894,423 | a |
According to the Manual, "When conducting a search where the offender is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender's assigned area of the residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [a consent form]." Probation and Parole Manual eh. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The officers searched only the common areas of the residence and the one bedroom Cantley had previously identified as his. Ms. Cantley's consent was not needed to search those areas. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74",
"parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee's apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee's mother may not have consented to the search",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n. 89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the ... parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else ... the [warrant-less] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the ... parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possessed” by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 752, 758",
"parenthetical": "rejecting co-defendant's argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer's residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be \"owned, controlled, or possessed\" by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. West, 185 Wis.2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (1994) (“[T]he parole search may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or parolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even though parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n. 89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the ... parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else ... the [warrant-less] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the ... parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argument that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s residence when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possessed” by probationer in order for item to fall within scope of warrantless search)."
} | 11,894,423 | a |
. The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that “the Code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse.”). Compare Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) (for purposes of section 523(a)(2), an agent’s fraud is not imputed to the principal unless the principal knew or should have known of the fraud)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that “the Code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse.”). Compare Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) (for purposes of section 523(a)(2), an agent’s fraud is not imputed to the principal unless the principal knew or should have known of the fraud)."
} | 4,301,096 | b |
. The Supreme Court has recently reminded bankruptcy courts to follow the statutory text. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that “the Code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse.”). Compare Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) (for purposes of section 523(a)(2), an agent’s fraud is not imputed to the principal unless the principal knew or should have known of the fraud)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.\"",
"sentence": "Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) (“[I]n exercising ... statutory and inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions.”); see also Gannett v. Carp (In re Carp), 340 F.3d 15 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor); see also First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that knowledge of prohibited activities is not necessarily the same as fraudulent intent and that “the Code does not allow attribution of intent from spouse to spouse.”). Compare Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (9th Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) (for purposes of section 523(a)(2), an agent’s fraud is not imputed to the principal unless the principal knew or should have known of the fraud)."
} | 4,301,096 | b |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "869 P.2d 1291, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\"",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "899 P.2d 254, 256",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | 6,934,264 | b |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "899 P.2d 254, 256",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 P.2d 319, 321",
"parenthetical": "noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | 6,934,264 | a |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "869 P.2d 1291, 1291",
"parenthetical": "\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\"",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | 6,934,264 | a |
1 32 Here, all parties seemingly agree, and we concur, that injuries resulting from negligent supervision are not among the tortious injuries for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived under the Act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 P.2d 319, 321",
"parenthetical": "noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act",
"sentence": "Lopez v. Regional Transp. Dist., 899 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo.App.1994) (stating that \"in the absence of specific language . no such waiver may be implied\" under the Act), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 916 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1996); see also Mountain States Tel., 869 P.2d at 1291 (\"The language of the [Act] is clear and unequivocal... . [It] confine[s] the cireumstances in which sovereign immunity may be waived to the exceptions specified within the [Act].\") (emphasis added); Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo.App.1994) (noting that valid waiver under the Act must conform \"to the express requirements\" of the Act)."
} | 6,934,264 | b |
As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue those nonstatutory aggravating factors for which the defendant has been given prior notice, a nonstatutory aggravating factor itself must conform with due process jurisprudence, and a district judge is required to screen out any irrelevant and unduly prejudicial information a prosecutor may try to introduce to the jury in order to prove a nonstatutory aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 989, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power”); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir.1996)(holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "90 F.3d 861, 895",
"parenthetical": "holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power”); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir.1996)(holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)."
} | 11,109,737 | a |
As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue those nonstatutory aggravating factors for which the defendant has been given prior notice, a nonstatutory aggravating factor itself must conform with due process jurisprudence, and a district judge is required to screen out any irrelevant and unduly prejudicial information a prosecutor may try to introduce to the jury in order to prove a nonstatutory aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power”); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir.1996)(holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 989, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power”); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir.1996)(holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)."
} | 11,109,737 | b |
As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, there are at least four limitations on a prosecutor's discretion with respect to nonstatutory aggravating factors. A jury must find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor before it can even consider proposed non-statutory factors, a prosecutor can only argue those nonstatutory aggravating factors for which the defendant has been given prior notice, a nonstatutory aggravating factor itself must conform with due process jurisprudence, and a district judge is required to screen out any irrelevant and unduly prejudicial information a prosecutor may try to introduce to the jury in order to prove a nonstatutory aggravating factor. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power”); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir.1996)(holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "217 F.3d 989, 1003",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"the prosecutor's authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress's legislative power\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1003 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that “the prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative power”); See also United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 895 (4th Cir.1996)(holding that any delegation of legislative authority was permissible, without deciding whether there was in fact any delegation), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414 (1997); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)."
} | 11,109,737 | b |
"[R]egardless of whether the de-clarant is available at trial for cross-examination, a hearsay statement is not ordinarily admissible as substantive evidence." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining the abrogation of the \"Patterson Rule\" that allowed admission of a declarant's out-of-court statement as substantive evidence so long as the declarant was available at trial for cross-examination",
"sentence": "Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 835 n. 1 (Ind.2000) (explaining the abrogation of the “Patterson Rule” that allowed admission of a declarant’s out-of-court statement as substantive evidence so long as the declarant was available at trial for cross-examination); see also Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ind.2001) (summarizing the evolution and problems with the Patterson Rule); Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 652-654 (Ind.1991) (overruling the Patterson Rule and adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) that later became codified as Indiana Rule of Evidence 801(d))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "578 N.E.2d 649, 652-654",
"parenthetical": "overruling the Patterson Rule and adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d",
"sentence": "Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 835 n. 1 (Ind.2000) (explaining the abrogation of the “Patterson Rule” that allowed admission of a declarant’s out-of-court statement as substantive evidence so long as the declarant was available at trial for cross-examination); see also Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ind.2001) (summarizing the evolution and problems with the Patterson Rule); Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649, 652-654 (Ind.1991) (overruling the Patterson Rule and adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) that later became codified as Indiana Rule of Evidence 801(d))."
} | 7,140,643 | a |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 1032, 1049",
"parenthetical": "\"Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 U.S. 143, 145",
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | 3,851,018 | b |
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that engaging in a stop-and-frisk to prevent a crime from occurring is a valid use of police authority. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "363 F.3d 317, 326",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious -- albeit even legal -- activity.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... \"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger____”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .... ”); see also United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir.2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious — albeit even legal — activity.”) (emphasis in original). While this in practice means that officers can detain suspects for conduct that is “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation,” Terry and its progeny permit reasonable stops in order “to resolve the ambiguity.”"
} | 3,851,018 | b |
Without Williams's statement, the defendant was denied a "substantial factual basis for contending to the jury that [a witness] misidentified him." The Commonwealth should have done the same once it had been put on actual notice by defense counsel of the request for specific favorable evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 419, 437",
"parenthetical": "\"the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police\"",
"sentence": "See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 1500, 1504",
"parenthetical": "\"Where . . . there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information,\" prosecution has obligation to search possible sources for such information, including files of another agency",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Where . . . there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information,” prosecution has obligation to search possible sources for such information, including files of another agency)."
} | 2,823,760 | b |
Without Williams's statement, the defendant was denied a "substantial factual basis for contending to the jury that [a witness] misidentified him." The Commonwealth should have done the same once it had been put on actual notice by defense counsel of the request for specific favorable evidence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "966 F.2d 1500, 1504",
"parenthetical": "\"Where . . . there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information,\" prosecution has obligation to search possible sources for such information, including files of another agency",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Where . . . there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information,” prosecution has obligation to search possible sources for such information, including files of another agency)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "396 Mass. 590, 596-599",
"parenthetical": "in some circumstances, prosecutor \"should be required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence\" not in possession of prosecutor or police",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 596-599 (1986) (in some circumstances, prosecutor “should be required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence” not in possession of prosecutor or police)."
} | 2,823,760 | a |
Without Williams's statement, the defendant was denied a "substantial factual basis for contending to the jury that [a witness] misidentified him." The Commonwealth should have done the same once it had been put on actual notice by defense counsel of the request for specific favorable evidence. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "396 Mass. 590, 596-599",
"parenthetical": "in some circumstances, prosecutor \"should be required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence\" not in possession of prosecutor or police",
"sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Donahue, 396 Mass. 590, 596-599 (1986) (in some circumstances, prosecutor “should be required to seek access to material and exculpatory evidence” not in possession of prosecutor or police)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "514 U.S. 419, 437",
"parenthetical": "\"the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police\"",
"sentence": "See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police”)."
} | 2,823,760 | b |
Raul's arguments that Texas law does not allow offset against child support obligations and that the obligations here lack mutuality also fail. Raul did not timely raise these arguments before the bankruptcy court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 413, 424",
"parenthetical": "\"Since this issue was not properly presented to the bankruptcy court, it cannot be raised now for the first time on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Galaz I, 480 Fed.Appx. 790 at 792-94 (holding that Raul had waived his mutuality argument by failing to raise it in the bankruptcy court); see also In re OCA, Inc., 552 F.3d 413, 424 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Since this issue was not properly presented to the bankruptcy court, it cannot be raised now for the first time on appeal.”)- Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in enjoining Raul from enforcing his 2009 Order in state court."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 Fed.Appx. 790, at 792-94",
"parenthetical": "holding that Raul had waived his mutuality argument by failing to raise it in the bankruptcy court",
"sentence": "See Galaz I, 480 Fed.Appx. 790 at 792-94 (holding that Raul had waived his mutuality argument by failing to raise it in the bankruptcy court); see also In re OCA, Inc., 552 F.3d 413, 424 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Since this issue was not properly presented to the bankruptcy court, it cannot be raised now for the first time on appeal.”)- Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in enjoining Raul from enforcing his 2009 Order in state court."
} | 12,272,679 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 385, 395-396",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 385, 395-396",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 385, 395-396",
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because \"the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so''",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 757, 770-771",
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 757, 770-771",
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "384 U.S. 757, 770-771",
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 31, 37-40",
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | b |
. Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so’’); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine)."
} | 12,458,997 | a |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder to a location to avoid memorializing exculpatory statements by Oslund that could cause an inaccurate perception of the recorded conversation. However, this court has held that gaps in an audiotape affect "the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "250 F.3d 596, 602",
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | 6,047,325 | a |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder to a location to avoid memorializing exculpatory statements by Oslund that could cause an inaccurate perception of the recorded conversation. However, this court has held that gaps in an audiotape affect "the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | 6,047,325 | b |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder to a location to avoid memorializing exculpatory statements by Oslund that could cause an inaccurate perception of the recorded conversation. However, this court has held that gaps in an audiotape affect "the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | 6,047,325 | a |
The "gaps" are periods of the recordings when no voices or conversation can be heard, as when the recording occurred in a bar and ambient or background noise is all that is discernable at times. Oslund argues that these "gaps" could show alterations or modifications or reflect times when Russell had moved the recorder to a location to avoid memorializing exculpatory statements by Oslund that could cause an inaccurate perception of the recorded conversation. However, this court has held that gaps in an audiotape affect "the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "84 F.3d 1065, 1065",
"parenthetical": "finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the \"infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Ray, 250 F.3d 596, 602 (8th Cir.2001) (gaps in tape recording were not so substantial as to render entire recording untrustworthy and defendant could argue to jury that he was entrapped by informant into making incriminating statements), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 980, 122 S.Ct. 1459, 152 L.Ed.2d 398 (2002); cf. Webster, 84 F.3d at 1065 (finding court did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape where lens was partially obscured and did not cover all of the actions of those being recorded and the audio was partially unclear because the “infirmities are not so pervasive as to render the tape as a whole untrustworthy”)."
} | 6,047,325 | a |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range would be unchanged, and any potential error was harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 7, 34",
"parenthetical": "bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 31, 40",
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | 4,197,810 | a |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range would be unchanged, and any potential error was harmless. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 7, 34",
"parenthetical": "bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | 4,197,810 | b |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range would be unchanged, and any potential error was harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 138, 143",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because \"any error in the district court's calculation ... was harmless\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "611 F.3d 31, 40",
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | 4,197,810 | a |
No matter what level of review we accord this claim, however, it fails. Battle scored eleven criminal history points, and the subtraction of the one point would not have altered his criminal history category, which applies to defendants with ten to twelve criminal history points. Accordingly, Battle's Guidelines range would be unchanged, and any potential error was harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "358 F.3d 138, 143",
"parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because \"any error in the district court's calculation ... was harmless\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 34 (1st Cir.2010) (bypassing merits of sentencing calculation claim because any error would not impact the Guidelines range); United States v. Caldwell, 358 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was improperly scored an extra criminal history point because “any error in the district court’s calculation ... was harmless”); see also United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010) (applying plain error review to claim that district court erred in calculating criminal history points because defendant argued to the district court only that the criminal history category generally overstated the seriousness of his past); United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 86 n. 1 (1st Cir.2006) (applying plain error review to unpreserved calculation error claim and finding error harmless because any error would not affect the sentencing range)."
} | 4,197,810 | a |
Because the Supreme Court in Till was not concerned with the debtor getting a perceived windfall in the event the prime plus interest rate was lower than the contract rate so that the debtor was permitted to retain a lender's collateral while arguably depriving the creditor of its bargained for interest rate, it would seem that Dvor-kin's concern about that issue with respect to the payment of interest on unsecured claims is neither warranted nor consistent with the statutory scheme found in the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "461 B.R. 244, 244",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole); see also In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. at 244 (agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement); In re Ogle, 261 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn’t persuade this Court.” (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also expressed concern that the contract rate approach violated the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Till, 541 U.S. at 476-77, 124 S.Ct. at 1959-60 (“Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1961, 1961",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original contract\" and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole); see also In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. at 244 (agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement); In re Ogle, 261 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn’t persuade this Court.” (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also expressed concern that the contract rate approach violated the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Till, 541 U.S. at 476-77, 124 S.Ct. at 1959-60 (“Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.”)."
} | 12,269,618 | b |
Because the Supreme Court in Till was not concerned with the debtor getting a perceived windfall in the event the prime plus interest rate was lower than the contract rate so that the debtor was permitted to retain a lender's collateral while arguably depriving the creditor of its bargained for interest rate, it would seem that Dvor-kin's concern about that issue with respect to the payment of interest on unsecured claims is neither warranted nor consistent with the statutory scheme found in the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "261 B.R. 22, 30",
"parenthetical": "\"[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn't persuade this Court.\" (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole); see also In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. at 244 (agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement); In re Ogle, 261 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn’t persuade this Court.” (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also expressed concern that the contract rate approach violated the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Till, 541 U.S. at 476-77, 124 S.Ct. at 1959-60 (“Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1961, 1961",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original contract\" and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole); see also In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. at 244 (agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement); In re Ogle, 261 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn’t persuade this Court.” (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also expressed concern that the contract rate approach violated the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Till, 541 U.S. at 476-77, 124 S.Ct. at 1959-60 (“Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.”)."
} | 12,269,618 | b |
Because the Supreme Court in Till was not concerned with the debtor getting a perceived windfall in the event the prime plus interest rate was lower than the contract rate so that the debtor was permitted to retain a lender's collateral while arguably depriving the creditor of its bargained for interest rate, it would seem that Dvor-kin's concern about that issue with respect to the payment of interest on unsecured claims is neither warranted nor consistent with the statutory scheme found in the Bankruptcy Code. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1961, 1961",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"the now-irrelevant terms of the parties' original contract\" and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole); see also In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. at 244 (agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement); In re Ogle, 261 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn’t persuade this Court.” (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also expressed concern that the contract rate approach violated the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Till, 541 U.S. at 476-77, 124 S.Ct. at 1959-60 (“Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 1959, 1959-60",
"parenthetical": "\"Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 478, 124 S.Ct. at 1961 (discussing “the now-irrelevant terms of the parties’ original contract” and how the coerced loan, presumptive contract rate, and cost of funds approaches improperly focus on making the creditor whole); see also In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. at 244 (agreeing that a debtor should not have to pay senior creditors more than the Bankruptcy Code allows just because of a contractual agreement); In re Ogle, 261 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (“[BJankruptcy by its very nature deprives creditors of the benefit of their agreement with a debtor. Conse quently, such a factor, standing alone, doesn’t persuade this Court.” (quoting In re Country Manor of Kenton, Inc., 254 B.R. at 181)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court also expressed concern that the contract rate approach violated the principle of equal treatment of creditors. Till, 541 U.S. at 476-77, 124 S.Ct. at 1959-60 (“Rather, the court should aim to treat similarly situated creditors similarly.”)."
} | 12,269,618 | a |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 81, 81",
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | 1,753,185 | b |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "432 U.S. 81, 81",
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | 1,753,185 | a |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | 1,753,185 | a |
Weber's substitute might also receive less rest and time off between runs than he or she might otherwise. The mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers as a result of "skipping over" is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee",
"sentence": "See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81, 97 S.Ct. 2264 (the Supreme Court frowned upon a proposed accommodation that affected the possible job preferences of other employees); See also Brener, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982), and Eversley, 843 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that an employer is not required to rearrange its neutral scheduling practices to accommodate an employee)."
} | 1,753,185 | a |
The fact that the trust is not self-settled does not necessarily mean that it is a spendthrift trust. Courts also focus on "the amount of 'dominion and control' exercised by the debtor over the trust property" in deciding whether the plan sets up a spendthrift trust. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 B.R. 22, 25-26",
"parenthetical": "court found spendthrift trust where debtor had no direct control over any aspect of the plan and had very restricted access to the account",
"sentence": "Cf. In re West, 81 B.R. 22, 25-26 (9th Cir. BAP 1987) (court found spendthrift trust where debtor had no direct control over any aspect of the plan and had very restricted access to the account)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "97 B.R. 577, 577",
"parenthetical": "court found no spendthrift trust where employee was integrally involved in the decision-making process of the plan and was not restricted from drawing on the account",
"sentence": "Kaplan, 97 B.R. at 577 (court found no spendthrift trust where employee was integrally involved in the decision-making process of the plan and was not restricted from drawing on the account)."
} | 10,391 | b |
In support of his argument, Neto points to early cases in which the Supreme Court indicated that a Due Process analysis might apply to successive prosecutions in certain cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 877, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding \"for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions contained in Hoag and Ciucci \"",
"sentence": "See also Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding “for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions contained in Hoag and Ciucci ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 U.S. 464, 467-69",
"parenthetical": "stating that there might be \"hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,\" but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 573, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983 (1958) (per curiam) (finding no Due Process violation “upon the record as it stands,” but noting that two of the justices in the majority might have found “fundamental unfairness” if certain evidence suggesting improper prosecutorial motive were included in the record); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467-69, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913 (1958) (stating that there might be “hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,” but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts)."
} | 3,839,887 | b |
In support of his argument, Neto points to early cases in which the Supreme Court indicated that a Due Process analysis might apply to successive prosecutions in certain cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 877, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding \"for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions contained in Hoag and Ciucci \"",
"sentence": "See also Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding “for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions contained in Hoag and Ciucci ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that there might be \"hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,\" but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 573, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983 (1958) (per curiam) (finding no Due Process violation “upon the record as it stands,” but noting that two of the justices in the majority might have found “fundamental unfairness” if certain evidence suggesting improper prosecutorial motive were included in the record); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467-69, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913 (1958) (stating that there might be “hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,” but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts)."
} | 3,839,887 | b |
In support of his argument, Neto points to early cases in which the Supreme Court indicated that a Due Process analysis might apply to successive prosecutions in certain cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that there might be \"hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,\" but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 573, 78 S.Ct. 839, 2 L.Ed.2d 983 (1958) (per curiam) (finding no Due Process violation “upon the record as it stands,” but noting that two of the justices in the majority might have found “fundamental unfairness” if certain evidence suggesting improper prosecutorial motive were included in the record); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467-69, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913 (1958) (stating that there might be “hypothetical situations in which the [Due Process Clause of] the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses,” but ultimately finding no Due Process violations on the facts)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "883 F.2d 877, 881",
"parenthetical": "finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding \"for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions contained in Hoag and Ciucci \"",
"sentence": "See also Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that separate robbery and kidnaping convictions arising out of the same incident satisfied Blockburger test, but remanding “for a consideration of the state court records in light of the due process standards for successive prosecutions contained in Hoag and Ciucci ”)."
} | 3,839,887 | a |
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "\"The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 408 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 U.S. 317, 325",
"parenthetical": "holding the moving party must meet its burden \"by 'showing' -- that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 408 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”)."
} | 702,838 | b |
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the moving party must meet its burden \"by 'showing' -- that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 408 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "\"The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 408 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”)."
} | 702,838 | a |
The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact is on the party moving for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "408 F.3d 1369, 1371",
"parenthetical": "\"The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 408 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the moving party must meet its burden \"by 'showing' -- that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.\"",
"sentence": "See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the [trial court] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., 408 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”)."
} | 702,838 | b |
The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 1480, 1488",
"parenthetical": "finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants' affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions",
"sentence": "See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was “hotly contested” at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and “liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir.1983) (finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants’ affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 So.3d 842, 842",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was \"hotly contested\" at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict",
"sentence": "See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was “hotly contested” at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and “liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir.1983) (finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants’ affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions)."
} | 4,065,352 | b |
The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 1480, 1488",
"parenthetical": "finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants' affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions",
"sentence": "See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was “hotly contested” at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and “liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir.1983) (finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants’ affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "610 So.2d 528, 529",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and \"liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury\"",
"sentence": "See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was “hotly contested” at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and “liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir.1983) (finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants’ affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions)."
} | 4,065,352 | b |
[P 11] Finally, we reject Amile's argument that gratuitous conveyances may be set aside on the basis of a unilateral mistake of fact or law, even in the absence of any inequitable conduct on the part of the grantee. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia and conclude that a deed of gift may not be reformed due to the grantor's unilateral mistake in understanding the legal effect of the deed unless the grantor can demonstrate inequitable conduct on the part of the grantee. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "652 A.2d 1114, 1116",
"parenthetical": "ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988) (ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available); cf. Weeks v. Weeks, 650 A.2d 945, 947 (Me.1994); Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A.2d 59, 60-61 (Me.1993) (grantor’s motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "629 A.2d 59, 60-61",
"parenthetical": "grantor's motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988) (ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available); cf. Weeks v. Weeks, 650 A.2d 945, 947 (Me.1994); Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A.2d 59, 60-61 (Me.1993) (grantor’s motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed)."
} | 11,851,231 | a |
[P 11] Finally, we reject Amile's argument that gratuitous conveyances may be set aside on the basis of a unilateral mistake of fact or law, even in the absence of any inequitable conduct on the part of the grantee. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia and conclude that a deed of gift may not be reformed due to the grantor's unilateral mistake in understanding the legal effect of the deed unless the grantor can demonstrate inequitable conduct on the part of the grantee. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "629 A.2d 59, 60-61",
"parenthetical": "grantor's motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988) (ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available); cf. Weeks v. Weeks, 650 A.2d 945, 947 (Me.1994); Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A.2d 59, 60-61 (Me.1993) (grantor’s motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "543 A.2d 367, 368",
"parenthetical": "ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available",
"sentence": "See also Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Me.1995), Lietz v. Berry, 543 A.2d 367, 368 (Me.1988) (ruling that when only one party misunderstands the effect of a deed, reformation is not available); cf. Weeks v. Weeks, 650 A.2d 945, 947 (Me.1994); Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A.2d 59, 60-61 (Me.1993) (grantor’s motive for transferring property to wife in joint tenancy does not overcome the presumption of a gift to the martial estate created by the deed)."
} | 11,851,231 | b |
. The dissent disagrees with our reading of Dodds and argues that the Arkansas courts have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of uberrimae fidei. Even if we were to agree with the dissent's reading of Dodds, however, Stipcich nonetheless still counsels that we take uberrimae fidei to be the law of Arkansas because there is an absence of an explicit rejection of this "generally recognized rule." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 U.S. 318, 318",
"parenthetical": "\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.\"",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.”); see also Cohen, Friedlander & Martin Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir.1948) (following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.2d 63, 66",
"parenthetical": "following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.”); see also Cohen, Friedlander & Martin Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir.1948) (following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary)."
} | 3,550,767 | a |
. The dissent disagrees with our reading of Dodds and argues that the Arkansas courts have not explicitly adopted the doctrine of uberrimae fidei. Even if we were to agree with the dissent's reading of Dodds, however, Stipcich nonetheless still counsels that we take uberrimae fidei to be the law of Arkansas because there is an absence of an explicit rejection of this "generally recognized rule." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.\"",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.”); see also Cohen, Friedlander & Martin Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir.1948) (following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "166 F.2d 63, 66",
"parenthetical": "following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary",
"sentence": "See Stipcich, 277 U.S. at 318, 48 S.Ct. 512 (\"This generally recognized rule, in the absence of authoritative local decision, we take to be the law of Oregon.”); see also Cohen, Friedlander & Martin Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 166 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir.1948) (following Stipcich and applying the doctrine of uberrimae fidei in the absence of state law to the contrary)."
} | 3,550,767 | a |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 Or.App. 305, 310-11",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | a |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77",
"parenthetical": "granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant \"exposed his penis (which was erect",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "136 Or.App. 305, 310-11",
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | b |
Courts have generally been unwilling to impose IIED liability where, as here, unwanted and/or sexually aggressive, advances transpire between two adults. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9",
"parenthetical": "dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.Supp. 657, 664-66, 676-77 (E.D.Ark.1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on an IIED claim based on alleged sexual misconduct, including that the defendant “exposed his penis (which was erect) and told [the plaintiff] to ‘kiss it’ ”); McClinton v. Sam’s East, Inc., 2012 WL 4483492, *1, *9 (W.D.La. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs IIED claim, despite allegations of sexual harassment by his female supervisor, such as unwanted rubbing, hugging, and sexual comments) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449-50 (5th Cir.2002)); see also Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or.App. 164, 171-72, 12 P.3d 524 (2000) (summarizing the case law surrounding sexually-based IIED claims in Oregon and noting that “[t]he invitation to [engage in] illicit intercourse, insufficient in itself to be actionable, becomes extreme, outrage when it is prolonged and repeated to the point of hounding, and accompanied by advertising”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted); Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or.App. 305, 310-11, 901 P.2d 986, rev. denied, 322 Or. 360, 907 P.2d 247 (1995) (“[i]t is not outrageous in the extreme to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted)."
} | 4,358,607 | a |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 312, 312, 314",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "433 U.S. 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | 3,720,413 | a |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 2808, 2808-09",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 U.S. 312, 312, 314",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | 3,720,413 | b |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 S.Ct. 1077, 1077, 1078",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "433 U.S. 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | 3,720,413 | a |
Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "66 S.Ct. 1077, 1077, 1078",
"parenthetical": "finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as \"subversive\" and \"unfit\" for government service",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "97 S.Ct. 2808, 2808-09",
"parenthetical": "finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports \"cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment\"",
"sentence": "See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as “subversive” and “unfit” for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports “cast no aspersions on appellant’s personal conduct and contained] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment”)."
} | 3,720,413 | a |
However, if, despite its protection, bankruptcy did occur, the debtor's protection and remedy remained under the Bankruptcy Act."). Because the Supreme Court has instructed that SS 1673 does not provide for an exemption in bankruptcy, that statutory provision has no bearing on this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 B.R. 513, 518",
"parenthetical": "\"Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U.S.C. SS 1673\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Frazier, 421 B.R. 513, 518 (S.D.Ill.2009) (“Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1673”); see also In re Riendeau, 293 B.R. 832, 838-39 (D.Vt.2002) (relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor’s claim that § 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 B.R. 832, 838-39",
"parenthetical": "relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor's claim that SS 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Frazier, 421 B.R. 513, 518 (S.D.Ill.2009) (“Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1673”); see also In re Riendeau, 293 B.R. 832, 838-39 (D.Vt.2002) (relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor’s claim that § 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy)."
} | 3,752,445 | a |
However, if, despite its protection, bankruptcy did occur, the debtor's protection and remedy remained under the Bankruptcy Act."). Because the Supreme Court has instructed that SS 1673 does not provide for an exemption in bankruptcy, that statutory provision has no bearing on this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "421 B.R. 513, 518",
"parenthetical": "\"Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U.S.C. SS 1673\"",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Frazier, 421 B.R. 513, 518 (S.D.Ill.2009) (“Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1673”); see also In re Riendeau, 293 B.R. 832, 838-39 (D.Vt. 2002) (relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor’s claim that § 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "293 B.R. 832, 838-39",
"parenthetical": "relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor's claim that SS 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy",
"sentence": "See Smith v. Frazier, 421 B.R. 513, 518 (S.D.Ill.2009) (“Stated simply, once the [debtors] sought bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state and federal property exemption statutes governed their rights and remedies-not the limitation on garnishment of wages contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1673”); see also In re Riendeau, 293 B.R. 832, 838-39 (D.Vt. 2002) (relying on Kokoszka in denying the debtor’s claim that § 1673 provides an exemption in bankruptcy)."
} | 4,058,921 | a |
Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 1210, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact\"",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 372, 386",
"parenthetical": "concluding that officer's conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver)."
} | 4,049,960 | a |
Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 1210, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact\"",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that officer's conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver)."
} | 4,049,960 | a |
Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 F.3d 1210, 1215",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact\"",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that officer's conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver",
"sentence": "See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver)."
} | 4,049,960 | a |
We have jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS 3742(b). Whether the district court had jurisdiction to resentence Diaz-Clark is a legal question subject to plenary review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 1212, 1215",
"parenthetical": "'Whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular case is a question of law subject to plenary review.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sjeklocha, 114 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir.1997) (“The question whether the district court had the authority to resentence the defendant under former Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a legal question subject to plenary review.”); see also United States v. Maduno, 40 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir.1994) (‘Whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular case is a question of law subject to plenary review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1085, 1087",
"parenthetical": "\"The question whether the district court had the authority to resentence the defendant under former Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a",
"sentence": "See United States v. Sjeklocha, 114 F.3d 1085, 1087 (11th Cir.1997) (“The question whether the district court had the authority to resentence the defendant under former Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a legal question subject to plenary review.”); see also United States v. Maduno, 40 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir.1994) (‘Whether a court has jurisdiction over a particular case is a question of law subject to plenary review.”)."
} | 9,420,711 | b |
Where, as here, the scope of a water right is defined by contract, the general provisions of Colorado water law are not necessarily inapplicable, but their application is subject to the terms of the contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3)); see also Estes Park, 677 P.2d at 326-27 (applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) (regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another). Thus, Thornton’s assertions that its proposals will not injure other appropriators and will comply with the statutory provisions addressing replacement and exchange are not relevant to our evaluation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 P.2d 326, 326-27",
"parenthetical": "applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3)); see also Estes Park, 677 P.2d at 326-27 (applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) (regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another). Thus, Thornton’s assertions that its proposals will not injure other appropriators and will comply with the statutory provisions addressing replacement and exchange are not relevant to our evaluation."
} | 10,309,842 | a |
Where, as here, the scope of a water right is defined by contract, the general provisions of Colorado water law are not necessarily inapplicable, but their application is subject to the terms of the contract. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3)); see also Estes Park, 677 P.2d at 326-27 (applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) (regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another). Thus, Thornton’s assertions that its proposals will not injure other appropriators and will comply with the statutory provisions addressing replacement and exchange are not relevant to our evaluation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 Colo. 219, 223",
"parenthetical": "regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3)); see also Estes Park, 677 P.2d at 326-27 (applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) (regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another). Thus, Thornton’s assertions that its proposals will not injure other appropriators and will comply with the statutory provisions addressing replacement and exchange are not relevant to our evaluation."
} | 10,309,842 | a |
Where, as here, the scope of a water right is defined by contract, the general provisions of Colorado water law are not necessarily inapplicable, but their application is subject to the terms of the contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 P.2d 954, 956",
"parenthetical": "regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3)); see also Estes Park, 677 P.2d at 326-27 (applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) (regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another). Thus, Thornton’s assertions that its proposals will not injure other appropriators and will comply with the statutory provisions addressing replacement and exchange are not relevant to our evaluation."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3",
"sentence": "Merrick v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 621 P.2d 952, 955-56 & nn. 3, 4 (Colo.1981) (holding that contract provisions controlled over provisions of plan for augmentation statute, section 37-92-305(3)); see also Estes Park, 677 P.2d at 326-27 (applying contract terms rather than statutory provisions in denying plan for augmentation); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) (regardless of statutory provisions, an appropriator may by contract make its priority inferior to another). Thus, Thornton’s assertions that its proposals will not injure other appropriators and will comply with the statutory provisions addressing replacement and exchange are not relevant to our evaluation."
} | 10,309,842 | b |
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as "trade or commerce" under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether legal or medical, are not covered because those claims address only competence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "118 Wash. 2d 451, 465",
"parenthetical": "adopting \"entrepreneurial\" test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practitioner” are not recognized under state’s consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see also Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law, Court of Appeals concluded that “Washington has recognized that both the practice of law and medicine may give rise to [consumer protection act] claims. . . . These may arise, however, only when the actions at issue are chiefly concerned with ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the ‘competence of and strategy’ employed by the . . . [defendant].” [Citations omitted.]); Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (adopting “entrepreneurial” test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state’s consumer protection act because “[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital’s business, such as billing, were not implicated”), rev. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1040 (1988); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 54 Wash. App. 162, 166-67, 772 P.2d 1027 (relying on Quimby and Jaramillo in holding that negligence claims asserted against hospital did not include entrepreneurial aspect of hospital’s operations, so that claims fell outside reach of state’s consumer protection act), rev. denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 Wash. App. 175, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that relate to \"actual competence of the medical practitioner\" are not recognized under state's consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practitioner” are not recognized under state’s consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see also Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law, Court of Appeals concluded that “Washington has recognized that both the practice of law and medicine may give rise to [consumer protection act] claims. . . . These may arise, however, only when the actions at issue are chiefly concerned with ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the ‘competence of and strategy’ employed by the . . . [defendant].” [Citations omitted.]); Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (adopting “entrepreneurial” test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state’s consumer protection act because “[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital’s business, such as billing, were not implicated”), rev. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1040 (1988); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 54 Wash. App. 162, 166-67, 772 P.2d 1027 (relying on Quimby and Jaramillo in holding that negligence claims asserted against hospital did not include entrepreneurial aspect of hospital’s operations, so that claims fell outside reach of state’s consumer protection act), rev. denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989)."
} | 205,264 | b |
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as "trade or commerce" under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether legal or medical, are not covered because those claims address only competence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 Wash. App. 175, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that relate to \"actual competence of the medical practitioner\" are not recognized under state's consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practitioner” are not recognized under state’s consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see also Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law, Court of Appeals concluded that “Washington has recognized that both the practice of law and medicine may give rise to [consumer protection act] claims. . . . These may arise, however, only when the actions at issue are chiefly concerned with ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the ‘competence of and strategy’ employed by the . . . [defendant].” [Citations omitted.]); Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (adopting “entrepreneurial” test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state’s consumer protection act because “[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital’s business, such as billing, were not implicated”), rev. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1040 (1988); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 54 Wash. App. 162, 166-67, 772 P.2d 1027 (relying on Quimby and Jaramillo in holding that negligence claims asserted against hospital did not include entrepreneurial aspect of hospital’s operations, so that claims fell outside reach of state’s consumer protection act), rev. denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adopting \"entrepreneurial\" test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practitioner” are not recognized under state’s consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see also Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law, Court of Appeals concluded that “Washington has recognized that both the practice of law and medicine may give rise to [consumer protection act] claims. . . . These may arise, however, only when the actions at issue are chiefly concerned with ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the ‘competence of and strategy’ employed by the . . . [defendant].” [Citations omitted.]); Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (adopting “entrepreneurial” test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state’s consumer protection act because “[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital’s business, such as billing, were not implicated”), rev. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1040 (1988); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 54 Wash. App. 162, 166-67, 772 P.2d 1027 (relying on Quimby and Jaramillo in holding that negligence claims asserted against hospital did not include entrepreneurial aspect of hospital’s operations, so that claims fell outside reach of state’s consumer protection act), rev. denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989)."
} | 205,264 | a |
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result with respect to the medical profession. The Washington Court of Appeals has held that although the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the practice of medicine are covered as "trade or commerce" under that state's consumer protection act, violations predicated on negligence or malpractice, whether legal or medical, are not covered because those claims address only competence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 Wash. App. 822, 827",
"parenthetical": "relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state's consumer protection act because \"[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital's business, such as billing, were not implicated\"",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practitioner” are not recognized under state’s consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see also Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law, Court of Appeals concluded that “Washington has recognized that both the practice of law and medicine may give rise to [consumer protection act] claims. . . . These may arise, however, only when the actions at issue are chiefly concerned with ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the ‘competence of and strategy’ employed by the . . . [defendant].” [Citations omitted.]); Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (adopting “entrepreneurial” test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state’s consumer protection act because “[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital’s business, such as billing, were not implicated”), rev. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1040 (1988); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 54 Wash. App. 162, 166-67, 772 P.2d 1027 (relying on Quimby and Jaramillo in holding that negligence claims asserted against hospital did not include entrepreneurial aspect of hospital’s operations, so that claims fell outside reach of state’s consumer protection act), rev. denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 Wash. App. 175, 180",
"parenthetical": "holding that claims that relate to \"actual competence of the medical practitioner\" are not recognized under state's consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient",
"sentence": "See Quimby v. Fine, 45 Wash. App. 175, 180, 724 P.2d 403 (1986) (holding that claims that relate to “actual competence of the medical practitioner” are not recognized under state’s consumer protection act, but claims implicating entrepreneurial aspects of practice of medicine may be sufficient), rev. denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); see also Ikuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306, 312 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law, Court of Appeals concluded that “Washington has recognized that both the practice of law and medicine may give rise to [consumer protection act] claims. . . . These may arise, however, only when the actions at issue are chiefly concerned with ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice, such as the solicitation of business and billing practices, as opposed to claims directed at the ‘competence of and strategy’ employed by the . . . [defendant].” [Citations omitted.]); Eriks v. Denver, 118 Wash. 2d 451, 465, 824 P.2d 1207 (1992) (adopting “entrepreneurial” test from Quimby and applying it in legal malpractice setting); Jaramillo v. Morris, 50 Wash. App. 822, 827, 750 P.2d 1301 (relying on Quimby and holding that negligence claims against hospital were not cognizable under state’s consumer protection act because “[t]he entrepreneurial aspects of the hospital’s business, such as billing, were not implicated”), rev. denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1040 (1988); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 54 Wash. App. 162, 166-67, 772 P.2d 1027 (relying on Quimby and Jaramillo in holding that negligence claims asserted against hospital did not include entrepreneurial aspect of hospital’s operations, so that claims fell outside reach of state’s consumer protection act), rev. denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1005 (1989)."
} | 205,264 | b |
Subsets and Splits