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In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | 10,987 | b |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | 10,987 | b |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 270, 271-72",
"parenthetical": "parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | 10,987 | b |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | 10,987 | a |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | 10,987 | b |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | 10,987 | b |
We first reject any suggestion that trial counsel's failure to produce evidence to which counsel alludes in an opening statement constitutes, in and of itself, ineffective assistance of counsel in all cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "406 Mass. 123, 127",
"parenthetical": "defense counsel's \"failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,\" and thus not per se ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 123, 127 (1989) (defense counsel’s “failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,” and thus not per se ineffective assistance)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1994) (not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations), overruled on other grounds, by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)."
} | 993,916 | b |
We first reject any suggestion that trial counsel's failure to produce evidence to which counsel alludes in an opening statement constitutes, in and of itself, ineffective assistance of counsel in all cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1994) (not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations), overruled on other grounds, by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "406 Mass. 123, 127",
"parenthetical": "defense counsel's \"failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,\" and thus not per se ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 123, 127 (1989) (defense counsel’s “failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,” and thus not per se ineffective assistance)."
} | 993,916 | a |
We first reject any suggestion that trial counsel's failure to produce evidence to which counsel alludes in an opening statement constitutes, in and of itself, ineffective assistance of counsel in all cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "406 Mass. 123, 127",
"parenthetical": "defense counsel's \"failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,\" and thus not per se ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 123, 127 (1989) (defense counsel’s “failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,” and thus not per se ineffective assistance)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1994) (not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations), overruled on other grounds, by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)."
} | 993,916 | b |
We first reject any suggestion that trial counsel's failure to produce evidence to which counsel alludes in an opening statement constitutes, in and of itself, ineffective assistance of counsel in all cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "406 Mass. 123, 127",
"parenthetical": "defense counsel's \"failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,\" and thus not per se ineffective assistance",
"sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 123, 127 (1989) (defense counsel’s “failure to call a ballistics expert, as promised, was clearly a decision forced upon him by events over which he had no control,” and thus not per se ineffective assistance)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1994) (not ineffective to fail to present promised evidence if decision motivated by tactical considerations), overruled on other grounds, by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 151 (1997)."
} | 993,916 | b |
But regardless of what Hanover hoped to eventually receive, what it actually received was only a conditional promise to pay ESA money at some point in the future. Section 547, however, requires that the debtor's receipt of money, goods, services, new credit or property release be substantially contemporaneous with the debtor's payment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "485 U.S. 197, 204",
"parenthetical": "discussing \"new value\" exception to absolute priority rule and stating that \"[u]nlike 'money or money's worth,' a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today \"",
"sentence": "See In re Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2004) (explaining that “[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute ‘new value.’”); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (discussing “new value” exception to absolute priority rule and stating that “[u]nlike ‘money or money’s worth,’ a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 B.R. 308, 317",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute 'new value.'\"",
"sentence": "See In re Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2004) (explaining that “[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute ‘new value.’”); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (discussing “new value” exception to absolute priority rule and stating that “[u]nlike ‘money or money’s worth,’ a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today ”)."
} | 4,171,003 | b |
But regardless of what Hanover hoped to eventually receive, what it actually received was only a conditional promise to pay ESA money at some point in the future. Section 547, however, requires that the debtor's receipt of money, goods, services, new credit or property release be substantially contemporaneous with the debtor's payment. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing \"new value\" exception to absolute priority rule and stating that \"[u]nlike 'money or money's worth,' a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today \"",
"sentence": "See In re Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2004) (explaining that “[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute ‘new value.’”); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (discussing “new value” exception to absolute priority rule and stating that “[u]nlike ‘money or money’s worth,’ a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 B.R. 308, 317",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute 'new value.'\"",
"sentence": "See In re Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2004) (explaining that “[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute ‘new value.’”); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (discussing “new value” exception to absolute priority rule and stating that “[u]nlike ‘money or money’s worth,’ a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today ”)."
} | 4,171,003 | b |
But regardless of what Hanover hoped to eventually receive, what it actually received was only a conditional promise to pay ESA money at some point in the future. Section 547, however, requires that the debtor's receipt of money, goods, services, new credit or property release be substantially contemporaneous with the debtor's payment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 B.R. 308, 317",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute 'new value.'\"",
"sentence": "See In re Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2004) (explaining that “[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute ‘new value.’”); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (discussing “new value” exception to absolute priority rule and stating that “[u]nlike ‘money or money’s worth,’ a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today ”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing \"new value\" exception to absolute priority rule and stating that \"[u]nlike 'money or money's worth,' a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today \"",
"sentence": "See In re Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.2004) (explaining that “[a] promise of future services ... does not constitute ‘new value.’”); cf. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204, 108 S.Ct. 963, 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988) (discussing “new value” exception to absolute priority rule and stating that “[u]nlike ‘money or money’s worth,’ a promise of future services cannot be exchanged in any market for something of value to the creditors today ”)."
} | 4,171,003 | a |
Even if the evaluation criteria listed in the RFP were deficient in some unexplained respect, Gunderson has "failed to demonstrate that such error prejudiced [his] proposal in comparison to others, since each proposal received identical treatment." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 887, 894",
"parenthetical": "holding agency's failure to assign specific grade to earthquake risk did not deprive evaluation of proposals of reasonable basis",
"sentence": "King v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 512 P.2d 887, 894 (Alaska 1973) (holding agency’s failure to assign specific grade to earthquake risk did not deprive evaluation of proposals of reasonable basis); see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Bowers Office Prods., Inc., 851 P.2d 56, 59 n. 3 (Alaska 1993) (finding consideration of factors only implicitly included in RFP justified)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding consideration of factors only implicitly included in RFP justified",
"sentence": "King v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 512 P.2d 887, 894 (Alaska 1973) (holding agency’s failure to assign specific grade to earthquake risk did not deprive evaluation of proposals of reasonable basis); see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Bowers Office Prods., Inc., 851 P.2d 56, 59 n. 3 (Alaska 1993) (finding consideration of factors only implicitly included in RFP justified)."
} | 10,320,262 | a |
Courts require a sufficient basis for denial of leave to amend because the purpose of pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is "to facilitate a proper decision on the merits," not to set the stage for "a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 Fed.Appx. 17, 18",
"parenthetical": "noting that the non-movant \"failed to show prejudice from the district court's action in allowing the [movant's] motion to amend\"",
"sentence": "Harris, 126 F.3d at 343. Under Rule 15(a), the nonmovant generally carries the burden in persuading the court to deny leave to amend. Cf. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) (endorsing exceptions to the general rule that the burden of persuasion rests with the non-movant in the Rule 15(a) context); see also Gudavich v. District of Columbia, 22 Fed.Appx. 17, 18 (D.C,Cir.2001) (noting that the non-movant “failed to show prejudice from the district court’s action in allowing the [movant’s] motion to amend”) (unpublished decision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "126 F.3d 343, 343",
"parenthetical": "endorsing exceptions to the general rule that the burden of persuasion rests with the non-movant in the Rule 15(a",
"sentence": "Harris, 126 F.3d at 343. Under Rule 15(a), the nonmovant generally carries the burden in persuading the court to deny leave to amend. Cf. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) (endorsing exceptions to the general rule that the burden of persuasion rests with the non-movant in the Rule 15(a) context); see also Gudavich v. District of Columbia, 22 Fed.Appx. 17, 18 (D.C,Cir.2001) (noting that the non-movant “failed to show prejudice from the district court’s action in allowing the [movant’s] motion to amend”) (unpublished decision)."
} | 4,266,959 | b |
Courts require a sufficient basis for denial of leave to amend because the purpose of pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is "to facilitate a proper decision on the merits," not to set the stage for "a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "22 Fed.Appx. 17, 18",
"parenthetical": "noting that the non-movant \"failed to show prejudice from the district court's action in allowing the [movant's] motion to amend\"",
"sentence": "Harris, 126 F.3d at 343. Under Rule 15(a), the nonmovant generally carries the burden in persuading the court to deny leave to amend. Cf. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) (endorsing exceptions to the general rule that the burden of persuasion rests with the non-movant in the Rule 15(a) context); see also Gudavich v. District of Columbia, 22 Fed.Appx. 17, 18 (D.C,Cir.2001) (noting that the non-movant “failed to show prejudice from the district court’s action in allowing the [movant’s] motion to amend”) (unpublished decision)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "endorsing exceptions to the general rule that the burden of persuasion rests with the non-movant in the Rule 15(a",
"sentence": "Harris, 126 F.3d at 343. Under Rule 15(a), the nonmovant generally carries the burden in persuading the court to deny leave to amend. Cf. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) (endorsing exceptions to the general rule that the burden of persuasion rests with the non-movant in the Rule 15(a) context); see also Gudavich v. District of Columbia, 22 Fed.Appx. 17, 18 (D.C,Cir.2001) (noting that the non-movant “failed to show prejudice from the district court’s action in allowing the [movant’s] motion to amend”) (unpublished decision)."
} | 4,266,959 | b |
The district court held that "the Secretary's refusal to entertain any applications for a permit during the past six years because Congress has precluded its use of funds to investigate or act upon such applications is unquestionably a de facto denial." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "68 F.3d 702, 709",
"parenthetical": "holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges \"need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925(c",
"sentence": "See Bean v. United States, 89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837 (E.D.Tex.2000) (“[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.”); cf. Rice v. United States, Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 709 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges “need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925(c)”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.\"",
"sentence": "See Bean v. United States, 89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837 (E.D.Tex.2000) (“[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.”); cf. Rice v. United States, Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 709 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges “need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925(c)”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”)."
} | 11,199,632 | b |
The district court held that "the Secretary's refusal to entertain any applications for a permit during the past six years because Congress has precluded its use of funds to investigate or act upon such applications is unquestionably a de facto denial." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "428 F.2d 1093, 1099",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.\"",
"sentence": "See Bean v. United States, 89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837 (E.D.Tex.2000) (“[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.”); cf. Rice v. United States, Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 709 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges “need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925(c)”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.\"",
"sentence": "See Bean v. United States, 89 F.Supp.2d 828, 837 (E.D.Tex.2000) (“[T]his Court holds that inaction by the ATF constitutes a defacto denial of an application such that a United States district court may consider a petition for judicial review of the denial.”); cf. Rice v. United States, Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 709 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges “need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925(c)”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1970) (“[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.”)."
} | 11,199,632 | b |
Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, "addressed the issue of whether the government's conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1181-82",
"parenthetical": "surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness's attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness’s departure from the country possible); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were “unavailable” where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "590 F.2d 368, 368",
"parenthetical": "holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not \"unavailable\" under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness's departure from the country possible",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness’s departure from the country possible); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were “unavailable” where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses)."
} | 3,629,657 | a |
Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, "addressed the issue of whether the government's conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "824 F.2d 344, 346-47",
"parenthetical": "both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were \"unavailable\" where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness’s departure from the country possible); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were “unavailable” where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1181-82",
"parenthetical": "surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness's attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness’s departure from the country possible); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were “unavailable” where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses)."
} | 3,629,657 | b |
Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, "addressed the issue of whether the government's conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "973 F.2d 411, 419",
"parenthetical": "noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness’s departure from the country possible); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were “unavailable” where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "36 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1181-82",
"parenthetical": "surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness's attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness’s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial, the witness was not “unavailable” under Rule 804(a)(5) because the government made the witness’s departure from the country possible); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346-47 (5th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (both the defense and the government agreed that the government had not shown that the witnesses were “unavailable” where the government took videotaped depositions of the witnesses, transported them to the border, served them with subpoenas, and notified them that they were to appear at the border on a specified date to be taken to court and serve as witnesses at trial); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that it is not unreasonable for the government to detain alien witnesses)."
} | 3,629,657 | b |
And even when a plaintiff makes this showing, a law enforcement officer may still be entitled to qualified immunity if it would not be apparent to a reasonable officer that he was violating the plaintiffs clearly established rights. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "106 F.3d 1313, 1313",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later",
"sentence": "O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 671-672 (6th Cir.2011) (granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-576 (finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944-45 (6th Cir.2002) (granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained); cf. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313 (denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "652 F.3d 662, 671-672",
"parenthetical": "granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened",
"sentence": "O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 671-672 (6th Cir.2011) (granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-576 (finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944-45 (6th Cir.2002) (granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained); cf. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313 (denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later)."
} | 4,068,781 | b |
And even when a plaintiff makes this showing, a law enforcement officer may still be entitled to qualified immunity if it would not be apparent to a reasonable officer that he was violating the plaintiffs clearly established rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "417 F.3d 575, 575-576",
"parenthetical": "finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries",
"sentence": "O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 671-672 (6th Cir.2011) (granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-576 (finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944-45 (6th Cir.2002) (granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained); cf. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313 (denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "106 F.3d 1313, 1313",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later",
"sentence": "O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 671-672 (6th Cir.2011) (granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-576 (finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944-45 (6th Cir.2002) (granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained); cf. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313 (denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later)."
} | 4,068,781 | a |
And even when a plaintiff makes this showing, a law enforcement officer may still be entitled to qualified immunity if it would not be apparent to a reasonable officer that he was violating the plaintiffs clearly established rights. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "310 F.3d 937, 944-45",
"parenthetical": "granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained",
"sentence": "O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 671-672 (6th Cir.2011) (granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-576 (finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944-45 (6th Cir.2002) (granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained); cf. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313 (denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "106 F.3d 1313, 1313",
"parenthetical": "denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later",
"sentence": "O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 671-672 (6th Cir.2011) (granting qualified immunity because not clear to reasonable officer that failure to loosen handcuffs constituted excessive force where detainee with no obvious physical injury complained of tightness, but did not request handcuffs be loosened); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-576 (finding no excessive force where plaintiff offered no evidence that he told officers handcuffs were too tight and had no obvious physical injuries); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944-45 (6th Cir.2002) (granting qualified immunity because officer immediately removed handcuffs once plaintiff, who had been tightly handcuffed for three hours causing swelling and bruising, complained); cf. Martin, 106 F.3d at 1313 (denying qualified immunity because officers handcuffed plaintiff so tightly his hands became numb and swollen, then failed to respond to his complaints of pain until 35 minutes later)."
} | 4,068,781 | a |
$15 Because the instruction could have affected the outcome of the trial, the trial court's error was not harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial",
"sentence": "See Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2011) (concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial); see also Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1067 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "252 P.3d 1067, 1067",
"parenthetical": "reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction",
"sentence": "See Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2011) (concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial); see also Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1067 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction)."
} | 6,980,669 | a |
$15 Because the instruction could have affected the outcome of the trial, the trial court's error was not harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial",
"sentence": "See Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2011) (concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial); see also Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1067 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "252 P.3d 1067, 1067",
"parenthetical": "reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction",
"sentence": "See Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2011) (concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial); see also Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1067 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction)."
} | 6,980,669 | a |
$15 Because the instruction could have affected the outcome of the trial, the trial court's error was not harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "958 N.E.2d 72, 75",
"parenthetical": "concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial",
"sentence": "See Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2011) (concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial); see also Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1067 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "252 P.3d 1067, 1067",
"parenthetical": "reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction",
"sentence": "See Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2011) (concluding that error in giving sudden emer-geney instruction was not harmless where application of the instruction to the facts presented could have affected the outcome of the trial); see also Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1067 (reversing and remanding for a new trial where trial court erred in giving sudden emergency instruction)."
} | 6,980,669 | a |
Again, even if the ruling admitting this evidence was an abuse of discretion, the admission of this evidence under the "co-conspirator hearsay" exception was also harmless. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 935, 935",
"parenthetical": "\" 'Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.' \"",
"sentence": "See Mack, 343 F.3d at 935 (“ ‘Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.’ ”) (quoting Oleson, 310 F.3d at 1091); see also United States v. Womack, 191 F.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir.1999) (admission of evidence pursuant to the “co-conspirator hearsay” exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion). This is so, because, in light of the entire record, Johnson’s substantial rights were unaffected, and the error did not influence or had at most only a slight influence on the verdicts."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "191 F.3d 879, 883",
"parenthetical": "admission of evidence pursuant to the \"co-conspirator hearsay\" exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Mack, 343 F.3d at 935 (“ ‘Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.’ ”) (quoting Oleson, 310 F.3d at 1091); see also United States v. Womack, 191 F.3d 879, 883 (8th Cir.1999) (admission of evidence pursuant to the “co-conspirator hearsay” exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion). This is so, because, in light of the entire record, Johnson’s substantial rights were unaffected, and the error did not influence or had at most only a slight influence on the verdicts."
} | 884,580 | a |
In order for Umani to defeat defendants' claim for qualified immunity, he must first establish that a constitutional right was violated. Since we have concluded that Umani has failed to allege facts or to provide evidence sufficient to establish that a race-based or class-of-one equal protection violation was committed by the defendants, his conspiracy claim under SS 1985(3) also fails. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "771 F.2d 935, 944",
"parenthetical": "a civil conspiracy under SS 1983 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330 Fed.Appx. 524, 530 (6th Cir.2009)(where plaintiff failed to show an underlying constitutional violation that injured her, plaintiff cannot prevail on her conspiracy claim); Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 Fed.Appx. 96, 103 (6th Cir.2004) (where plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him or committed an equal protection violation, he also failed to prove a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)); cf. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir.1985)(a civil conspiracy under § 1983 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "330 Fed.Appx. 524, 530",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff failed to show an underlying constitutional violation that injured her, plaintiff cannot prevail on her conspiracy claim",
"sentence": "See Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330 Fed.Appx. 524, 530 (6th Cir.2009)(where plaintiff failed to show an underlying constitutional violation that injured her, plaintiff cannot prevail on her conspiracy claim); Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 Fed.Appx. 96, 103 (6th Cir.2004) (where plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him or committed an equal protection violation, he also failed to prove a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)); cf. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir.1985)(a civil conspiracy under § 1983 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the plaintiff)."
} | 3,912,875 | b |
In order for Umani to defeat defendants' claim for qualified immunity, he must first establish that a constitutional right was violated. Since we have concluded that Umani has failed to allege facts or to provide evidence sufficient to establish that a race-based or class-of-one equal protection violation was committed by the defendants, his conspiracy claim under SS 1985(3) also fails. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 Fed.Appx. 96, 103",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him or committed an equal protection violation, he also failed to prove a conspiracy claim under SS 1985(3",
"sentence": "See Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330 Fed.Appx. 524, 530 (6th Cir.2009)(where plaintiff failed to show an underlying constitutional violation that injured her, plaintiff cannot prevail on her conspiracy claim); Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 Fed.Appx. 96, 103 (6th Cir.2004) (where plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him or committed an equal protection violation, he also failed to prove a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)); cf. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir.1985)(a civil conspiracy under § 1983 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the plaintiff)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "771 F.2d 935, 944",
"parenthetical": "a civil conspiracy under SS 1983 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330 Fed.Appx. 524, 530 (6th Cir.2009)(where plaintiff failed to show an underlying constitutional violation that injured her, plaintiff cannot prevail on her conspiracy claim); Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 Fed.Appx. 96, 103 (6th Cir.2004) (where plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him or committed an equal protection violation, he also failed to prove a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)); cf. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir.1985)(a civil conspiracy under § 1983 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the plaintiff)."
} | 3,912,875 | a |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "881 F.2d 454, 464",
"parenthetical": "\"If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | 11,289,488 | a |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | 11,289,488 | b |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | 11,289,488 | a |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | 11,289,488 | a |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 F.2d 1068, 1076",
"parenthetical": "\"After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | 11,289,488 | a |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | 11,289,488 | b |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | 11,289,488 | a |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | 11,289,488 | b |
Plaintiff argues that Hardwick is inapposite because it dealt with a substantive due process analysis whereas his claim is based on the equal protection clause. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, we need not decide how Hardwick affects equal protection claims; we need only note that courts have reached differing conclusions on the issue. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination",
"sentence": "But see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 5 (9th Cir.1992) (reviewing status-based discrimination against homosexuals under an active rational basis review, distinguishing Hard-wick as conduct based discrimination); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indust."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "822 F.2d 97, 103",
"parenthetical": "\"There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.1989) (“If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“There can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.”)."
} | 11,289,488 | b |
We also noted that "the accident took place in an area under the complete control of the commanding officer of the air station." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "615 F.2d 505, 507",
"parenthetical": "medical treatment at a military hospital for an injury incurred from a motorcycle accident off-base is determined to be \"incident to service\" because military medical treatment is a benefit of military status",
"sentence": "See also Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir.1980) (medical treatment at a military hospital for an injury incurred from a motorcycle accident off-base is determined to be “incident to service” because military medical treatment is a benefit of military status); Accord Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1080, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980) (injury occurred at air force sponsored flying club); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 229 (8th Cir.1966) (on-base swimming accident while on active duty); Hass for Use and Benefit of United States v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.1975) (accident occurred while riding horse rented from a military stable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "802 F.2d 1092, 1095",
"parenthetical": "the claim of an active duty member of the armed forces was properly dismissed where the injuries occurred in a canoe rented from the Navy Special Services Center which is under the direct responsibility and control of the commanding officer of the Naval Training Center",
"sentence": "See Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.1986) (the claim of an active duty member of the armed forces was properly dismissed where the injuries occurred in a canoe rented from the Navy Special Services Center which is under the direct responsibility and control of the commanding officer of the Naval Training Center)."
} | 12,026,947 | b |
The trial court further erred in dismissing the entire multi-count petition based solely on Former Husband's inability to establish one of the listed grounds for modification. In actions involving numerous counts, dismissal of the entire case is proper only if the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case as to each of the counts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 So.2d 699, 700",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multi-count complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action",
"sentence": "See Xamnad, Inc. v. Patio Cafe, Inc., 486 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multi-count complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action); see also Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of Pa., 668 So.2d 658, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed the entire multi-count complaint because the plaintiff “failed to establish a prima facie case as to any of [the counts]”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "668 So.2d 658, 658",
"parenthetical": "holding that the trial court properly dismissed the entire multi-count complaint because the plaintiff \"failed to establish a prima facie case as to any of [the counts]\"",
"sentence": "See Xamnad, Inc. v. Patio Cafe, Inc., 486 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multi-count complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action); see also Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of Pa., 668 So.2d 658, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed the entire multi-count complaint because the plaintiff “failed to establish a prima facie case as to any of [the counts]”)."
} | 6,793,607 | a |
It is undisputed that Burd did not preserve the error; accordingly, Burd bears the burden to demonstrate that the error caused him egregious harm, i.e., deprived him of a fair trial or vitally affected a defensive theory. See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "686 S.W.2d 171, 171",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was 'fundamental,' he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he 'has not had a fair and impartial trial' -- in short 'egregious harm.' \"",
"sentence": "Ann. § 36.19 (when reviewing the jury charge on appeal, “the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial”); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (“[I]f no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’ — in short ‘egregious harm.’ ”); see also Woodard v. State, 322 S.W.3d 648, 658 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171-72 (“[W]hen no proper objection is made to jury-charge error at trial, a defendant may obtain a reversal only in those few situations where the error is ‘fundamental’ or is ‘egregious[ly] harmful.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "686 S.W.2d 171, 171-72",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen no proper objection is made to jury-charge error at trial, a defendant may obtain a reversal only in those few situations where the error is 'fundamental' or is 'egregious[ly] harmful.' \"",
"sentence": "Ann. § 36.19 (when reviewing the jury charge on appeal, “the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial”); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (“[I]f no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’ — in short ‘egregious harm.’ ”); see also Woodard v. State, 322 S.W.3d 648, 658 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171-72 (“[W]hen no proper objection is made to jury-charge error at trial, a defendant may obtain a reversal only in those few situations where the error is ‘fundamental’ or is ‘egregious[ly] harmful.’ ”)."
} | 7,091,247 | a |
But Armstrong's defamation claim arises from allegations .that defendants (1) wrongfully terminated his employment; (2) refused to let him return to work; (3) made defamatory remarks about him to the media; and (4) sent out an email threatening to terminate the employment of any WDEQ employees who speak to him. Even assuming that defendants undertook these actions in response to Armstrong's decision to report what he viewed as the illegal permitting of the landfill, Armstrong makes no- effort to explain whether or how defendants were "acting within the scope of their duties in the operation" of the landfill when they allegedly defamed him. SS l-39-108(a) (emphasis added). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "145 P.3d 1274, 1278, 1280",
"parenthetical": "defining term \"operation\" and concluding that SS 1-39-108 \"waives immunity for negligence in keeping the public utility operable or functional\"",
"sentence": "See City of Torrington v. Cottier, 145 P.3d 1274, 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 2006) (defining term “operation” and concluding that § 1-39-108 “waives immunity for negligence in keeping the public utility operable or functional”); see also Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 270 P.3d 644, 646, 648 (Wyo. 2012) (holding that city’s “negligence in determining the legal status of [plaintiffs’] property” wasn’t “negligence in the operation of the storm drain” that city installed on that property because city’s negligence was “unrelated to” actual operation of storm drain)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "270 P.3d 644, 646, 648",
"parenthetical": "holding that city's \"negligence in determining the legal status of [plaintiffs'] property\" wasn't \"negligence in the operation of the storm drain\" that city installed on that property because city's negligence was \"unrelated to\" actual operation of storm drain",
"sentence": "See City of Torrington v. Cottier, 145 P.3d 1274, 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 2006) (defining term “operation” and concluding that § 1-39-108 “waives immunity for negligence in keeping the public utility operable or functional”); see also Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 270 P.3d 644, 646, 648 (Wyo. 2012) (holding that city’s “negligence in determining the legal status of [plaintiffs’] property” wasn’t “negligence in the operation of the storm drain” that city installed on that property because city’s negligence was “unrelated to” actual operation of storm drain)."
} | 12,394,294 | a |
. Pelache's other issues are ancillary to his constitutional issues because they deal with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the enhancement allegations and the trial court's calculation of the enhanced sentence. Therefore, we address Pelache's fifth and sixth issues out of order because they present a threshold question. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "754 S.W.2d 668, 675",
"parenthetical": "providing that the constitutionality of a statute is not to be determined in any case unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised",
"sentence": "See In the Interest of B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex.2003) (noting the prudential principle that we decide constitutional questions only when we cannot resolve issues on nonconstitutional grounds); see also., Turner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (providing that the constitutionality of a statute is not to be determined in any case unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.W.3d 340, 349",
"parenthetical": "noting the prudential principle that we decide constitutional questions only when we cannot resolve issues on nonconstitutional grounds",
"sentence": "See In the Interest of B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex.2003) (noting the prudential principle that we decide constitutional questions only when we cannot resolve issues on nonconstitutional grounds); see also., Turner v. State, 754 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (providing that the constitutionality of a statute is not to be determined in any case unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised)."
} | 7,300,022 | b |
A twenty-five year mandatory minimum for a seemingly minor offense of burglary of $76.00 and a brassiere is extreme. However, no challenge is before us concerning the constitutionality of the punishment. However, there is precedent for finding an Eighth Amendment violation for an unduly harsh penalty imposed pursuant to a three-strikes law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for $100.00",
"sentence": "See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for $100.00)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an effective life sentence of forty-five years for second-degree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del.2003) (holding that an effective life sentence of forty-five years for second-degree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment)."
} | 8,933,265 | b |
A twenty-five year mandatory minimum for a seemingly minor offense of burglary of $76.00 and a brassiere is extreme. However, no challenge is before us concerning the constitutionality of the punishment. However, there is precedent for finding an Eighth Amendment violation for an unduly harsh penalty imposed pursuant to a three-strikes law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for $100.00",
"sentence": "See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for $100.00)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an effective life sentence of forty-five years for second-degree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del.2003) (holding that an effective life sentence of forty-five years for second-degree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment)."
} | 8,933,265 | b |
A twenty-five year mandatory minimum for a seemingly minor offense of burglary of $76.00 and a brassiere is extreme. However, no challenge is before us concerning the constitutionality of the punishment. However, there is precedent for finding an Eighth Amendment violation for an unduly harsh penalty imposed pursuant to a three-strikes law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for $100.00",
"sentence": "See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (holding that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence a defendant to life for a seventh nonviolent felony of writing a bad check for $100.00)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an effective life sentence of forty-five years for second-degree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del.2003) (holding that an effective life sentence of forty-five years for second-degree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment)."
} | 8,933,265 | b |
In addition to not raising the catalyst theory in his opening brief, Mr. Klein further fails to produce evidence necessary to establish his entitlement to fees under the catalyst theory in any of the declarations or exhibits filed with his opening brief. See In re Hansen Natural Corp. Secs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2011 WL 9820198, at *3",
"parenthetical": "\"Local Rule 7-5(b) of the Central District of California specifies that '[t]he evidence upon which the moving party will rely in support of the motion[]' 'shall be served and filed with the notice of the motion.' \"",
"sentence": "Litig., 527 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1150 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (“[T]he Court will not consider evidence presented for the first time in a reply.”); see also Kruszka v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CV 11-01578-RGK FFMx, 2011 WL 9820198, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) (“Local Rule 7-5(b) of the Central District of California specifies that ‘[t]he evidence upon which the moving party will rely in support of the motion[]’ ‘shall be served and filed with the notice of the motion.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "527 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1150",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Court will not consider evidence presented for the first time in a reply.\"",
"sentence": "Litig., 527 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1150 (C.D.Cal. 2007) (“[T]he Court will not consider evidence presented for the first time in a reply.”); see also Kruszka v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CV 11-01578-RGK FFMx, 2011 WL 9820198, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) (“Local Rule 7-5(b) of the Central District of California specifies that ‘[t]he evidence upon which the moving party will rely in support of the motion[]’ ‘shall be served and filed with the notice of the motion.’ ”)."
} | 5,755,704 | b |
In Secretary of State v. Joseph H. The Court reasoned that, as a result of the statute, charities were reluctant to contract with the plaintiff because it charged fees in excess of 25% and that the plaintiffs impetus to challenge the statute was therefore consonant with the charities' First Amendment interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "259 F.3d 996, 1010-11",
"parenthetical": "holding that the owner of an adult entertainment establishment had overbreadth standing to pursue a First Amendment challenge against provisions of an ordinance that required the employees of such establishments to obtain a license because the licensing scheme -- although not directly applicable to the owner -- threatened his business's viability",
"sentence": "Id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (“The activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson’s interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents.”); see also Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the owner of an adult entertainment establishment had overbreadth standing to pursue a First Amendment challenge against provisions of an ordinance that required the employees of such establishments to obtain a license because the licensing scheme — although not directly applicable to the owner — threatened his business’s viability)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson's interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (“The activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson’s interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents.”); see also Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the owner of an adult entertainment establishment had overbreadth standing to pursue a First Amendment challenge against provisions of an ordinance that required the employees of such establishments to obtain a license because the licensing scheme — although not directly applicable to the owner — threatened his business’s viability)."
} | 8,952,379 | b |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "440 U.S. 715, 726",
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 U.S. 301, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "440 U.S. 715, 726",
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "81 S.Ct. 1, 6",
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "440 U.S. 715, 726",
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457",
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 U.S. 301, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457",
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "81 S.Ct. 1, 6",
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457",
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | b |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "364 U.S. 301, 308",
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "81 S.Ct. 1, 6",
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | a |
Plaintiff submits that defendant is bound by New York State's six-year statute of limitations period on mortgage foreclosure actions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA \"unquestionably perform[s] federal functions\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1457, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (discussing priority of liens arising from federal lending programs and determining that the SBA “unquestionably perform[s] federal functions”); see also United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308, 81 S.Ct. 1, 6, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (“the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations”)."
} | 7,406,454 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 502, 511",
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 37, 37",
"parenthetical": "\"Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 37, 37",
"parenthetical": "\"Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 37, 37",
"parenthetical": "\"Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 832, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer's decision.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "43 F.3d 37, 37",
"parenthetical": "\"Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 502, 511",
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 123, 124",
"parenthetical": "affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant \"deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 123, 124",
"parenthetical": "affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant \"deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 123, 124",
"parenthetical": "affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant \"deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "845 F.2d 123, 124",
"parenthetical": "affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant \"deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 832, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer's decision.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | a |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "509 U.S. 502, 511",
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because \"the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because \"the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | a |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because \"the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | b |
The Court is persuaded that the above facts are sufficient to cast doubt on Defendants' claim that Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063",
"parenthetical": "finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because \"the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 832, 836",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer's decision.\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37 (“Circumstances contributing to a permissible inference of discriminatory intent may include ... the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.”); Few v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 845 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff where trial judge found that defendant “deliberately built a file against her in order to be able to terminate her”); Hatcher-Capers v. Haley, 786 F.Supp. 1054, 1063 (D.D.C.1992) (finding plaintiff proved she was victim of unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate treatment on the basis of her race and gender in part because “the reason proffered by the defendant for its failure to promote the plaintiff, namely, a policy of limiting the availability of promotions which was never publicized and not adopted out of financial necessity or budgetary constraints, is a mere pretext for discrimination”); cf. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.”); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (“[W]hen the plaintiffs evidence ... challenges the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, such evidence may serve as well to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was a motivating reason for the employer’s decision.”)."
} | 4,269,108 | a |
The problem is not so much that Officer Chih failed to adequately scrutinize the basis of Ms. Thompson-Wright's knowledge, but rather that he failed to give sufficient weight to her own admission that the basis of her knowledge was either neighborhood rumor or conjecture or an anonymous source whose credibility and reliability were unknown. This court has never held that it should ignore facts that tend to undermine reasonable suspicion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "73 A.3d 138, 147",
"parenthetical": "holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had \"dispelled\" the officer's reasonable suspicion",
"sentence": "See Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297, 301 (D.C. 2016) (\"To determine whether police officers had reasonable suspicion, a court must review the totality of the circumstances present.” (emphasis added)); cf. Ramsey v. United States, 73 A.3d 138, 147 (D.C. 2013) (holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had “dispelled” the officer’s reasonable suspicion)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 A.3d 297, 301",
"parenthetical": "\"To determine whether police officers had reasonable suspicion, a court must review the totality of the circumstances present.\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297, 301 (D.C. 2016) (\"To determine whether police officers had reasonable suspicion, a court must review the totality of the circumstances present.” (emphasis added)); cf. Ramsey v. United States, 73 A.3d 138, 147 (D.C. 2013) (holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had “dispelled” the officer’s reasonable suspicion)."
} | 12,321,576 | b |
As discussed above, Plaintiffs failure to file a motion to dismiss earlier does not constitute conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of sanctions or the awarding of attorney's fees. The Court does find, nonetheless, that Plaintiff should be made to pay Defendants' costs that were reasonably incurred in the defense of this case. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "828 F.Supp. 1444, 1444, 1447-49",
"parenthetical": "The award of legal costs was proper where Plaintiff dismissed with prejudice a RICO claim that had not been sufficiently researched",
"sentence": "See O’Ferral v. Trebol Motors Corp., 45 F.3d 561, 564 (1st Cir.1995) (District court has discretion to award costs beyond those specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920); cf. Burnette, 828 F.Supp. at 1444, 1447-49 (The award of legal costs was proper where Plaintiff dismissed with prejudice a RICO claim that had not been sufficiently researched)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "45 F.3d 561, 564",
"parenthetical": "District court has discretion to award costs beyond those specified in 28 U.S.C. SS 1920",
"sentence": "See O’Ferral v. Trebol Motors Corp., 45 F.3d 561, 564 (1st Cir.1995) (District court has discretion to award costs beyond those specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920); cf. Burnette, 828 F.Supp. at 1444, 1447-49 (The award of legal costs was proper where Plaintiff dismissed with prejudice a RICO claim that had not been sufficiently researched)."
} | 3,463,983 | b |
509 So.2d at 1076-77 (second emphasis added). Thus, the Watkins Court established that when nothing in the record supports the bare allegation that a constitutional violation occurred, a court cannot find plain error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an ambiguous or silent record will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "Cf. Brooks v. State, 929 So.2d 491 (Ala.Crim.App.2005)(holding that an ambiguous or silent record will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a Batson claim could not be addressed on appeal when the record did not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection",
"sentence": "See also White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991) (holding that a Batson claim could not be addressed on appeal when the record did not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection)."
} | 8,317,751 | b |
509 So.2d at 1076-77 (second emphasis added). Thus, the Watkins Court established that when nothing in the record supports the bare allegation that a constitutional violation occurred, a court cannot find plain error. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an ambiguous or silent record will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "Cf. Brooks v. State, 929 So.2d 491 (Ala.Crim.App.2005)(holding that an ambiguous or silent record will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a Batson claim could not be addressed on appeal when the record did not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection",
"sentence": "See also White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991) (holding that a Batson claim could not be addressed on appeal when the record did not even raise the inference of unconstitutional jury selection)."
} | 8,317,751 | b |
The emphasized portion of $ 18-8-208.1(2) has been interpreted as requiring that sentences imposed for attempted escape convictions run consecutive to the sentence for the "underlying felony." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "746 P.2d 1381, 1385",
"parenthetical": "\"General Assembly intended that a defendant must serve a consecutive sentence for' the substantive crime of escape, whether completed or not\"",
"sentence": "People v. Andrews, 871 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Colo.1994); see also People v. Akers, 746 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Colo.App.1987) (\"General Assembly intended that a defendant must serve a consecutive sentence for' the substantive crime of escape, whether completed or not\"); but see People v. Martines, 703 P.2d 619, 620 (Colo.App.1985) (interpreting § 18-8-208.1 as requiring that the sentence imposed for an attempted escape conviction run consecutive to \"the term defendant was serving at the time of the escape\")."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "703 P.2d 619, 620",
"parenthetical": "interpreting SS 18-8-208.1 as requiring that the sentence imposed for an attempted escape conviction run consecutive to \"the term defendant was serving at the time of the escape\"",
"sentence": "People v. Andrews, 871 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Colo.1994); see also People v. Akers, 746 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Colo.App.1987) (\"General Assembly intended that a defendant must serve a consecutive sentence for' the substantive crime of escape, whether completed or not\"); but see People v. Martines, 703 P.2d 619, 620 (Colo.App.1985) (interpreting § 18-8-208.1 as requiring that the sentence imposed for an attempted escape conviction run consecutive to \"the term defendant was serving at the time of the escape\")."
} | 11,179,668 | a |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "370 U.S. 139, 143",
"parenthetical": "in jail setting, \"official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | b |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in jail setting, \"official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | a |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in jail setting, \"official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | b |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "693 F.3d 363, 389-90",
"parenthetical": "holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no \"objectively reasonable expectation of privacy\" in telephone conversations where inmates \"received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded\", and were \"exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | a |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no \"objectively reasonable expectation of privacy\" in telephone conversations where inmates \"received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded\", and were \"exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | b |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no \"objectively reasonable expectation of privacy\" in telephone conversations where inmates \"received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded\", and were \"exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | a |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "588 F.3d 975, 978-79",
"parenthetical": "\"[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy\" in \"jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law'enforcement.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | b |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "300 F.3d 111, 123",
"parenthetical": "holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, \"as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | b |
The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 285, 290-91",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "384 F.3d 38, 44",
"parenthetical": "\"So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and 'he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.'\" (alterations in original",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, “official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day”); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” in telephone conversations where inmates “received a handbook alerting [them] that all telephone calls were recorded”, and were “exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded”); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy” in “jail telephone conversations that he knew were monitored by law’enforcement.”); United States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, ' J., sitting by designation) (“[I]nmates and pretrial detainees who have been [given notice of monitoring of jail-calls] have been deemed to have consented to monitoring.”); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his Fourth Amendment claims related to recordings, “as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[N]o prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls.”); see also United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as a prisoner is provided notice that his communications will be recorded and ‘he is in fact aware of the monitoring program [but] nevertheless uses the telephones, by that use he impliedly consents to be monitored for purposes of Title III.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996)))."
} | 12,273,906 | a |
. Massachusetts also provides for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence when construing an ambiguous contract. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | 4,280,523 | a |
. Massachusetts also provides for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence when construing an ambiguous contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | 4,280,523 | b |
. Massachusetts also provides for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence when construing an ambiguous contract. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | 4,280,523 | a |
. Massachusetts also provides for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence when construing an ambiguous contract. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement",
"sentence": "See Parrish v. Parrish, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 78, 566 N.E.2d 103, 108-09 (1991) (extrinsic evidence pertaining to background and purpose of parties and their understanding of meaning of particular language may be considered in construing ambiguous contract language); see also Haverhill v. George Brox, Inc., 47 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 716 N.E.2d 138 (1999) (when faced with ambiguity in contract, intent of parties is to be discerned from words in question, entire instrument, and circumstances surrounding agreement)."
} | 4,280,523 | a |
"To defraud" has a "common understanding of wronging one in his property rights." Additionally, puffery does not constitute fraud. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 1321, 1330",
"parenthetical": "inherently subjective expressions ill-suited as basis for mail and wire fraud",
"sentence": "United States v. Canty, 499 F.3d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2007) (“puffing” does not give rise to actionable fraud); Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 2003) (dismissing RICO claim because sales puffery did not constitute mail fraud); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1330 (7th Cir.1994) (inherently subjective expressions ill-suited as basis for mail and wire fraud)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "351 F.3d 294, 299",
"parenthetical": "dismissing RICO claim because sales puffery did not constitute mail fraud",
"sentence": "United States v. Canty, 499 F.3d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2007) (“puffing” does not give rise to actionable fraud); Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 2003) (dismissing RICO claim because sales puffery did not constitute mail fraud); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1330 (7th Cir.1994) (inherently subjective expressions ill-suited as basis for mail and wire fraud)."
} | 4,159,376 | b |
The general rule that individual legislators lack standing to sue in their official capacity as congressman or senator follows from the requirement that an injury must be concrete and particularized. An apparent exception to the general rule against legislative standing arises when the legislators are suing on a vote-nullification theory and allege that if their votes had been given effect, those votes would have been sufficient to defeat or enact a specific legisla tive action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 408, 410",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor’s vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs’ votes and the plaintiffs’ votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "307 U.S. 433, 438",
"parenthetical": "holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor's tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor's vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs' votes and the plaintiffs' votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor’s vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs’ votes and the plaintiffs’ votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house)."
} | 12,264,857 | b |
The general rule that individual legislators lack standing to sue in their official capacity as congressman or senator follows from the requirement that an injury must be concrete and particularized. An apparent exception to the general rule against legislative standing arises when the legislators are suing on a vote-nullification theory and allege that if their votes had been given effect, those votes would have been sufficient to defeat or enact a specific legisla tive action. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor's tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor's vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs' votes and the plaintiffs' votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor’s vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs’ votes and the plaintiffs’ votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 408, 410",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor’s vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs’ votes and the plaintiffs’ votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The general rule that individual legislators lack standing to sue in their official capacity as congressman or senator follows from the requirement that an injury must be concrete and particularized. An apparent exception to the general rule against legislative standing arises when the legislators are suing on a vote-nullification theory and allege that if their votes had been given effect, those votes would have been sufficient to defeat or enact a specific legisla tive action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 408, 410",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor’s vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs’ votes and the plaintiffs’ votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor's tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor's vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs' votes and the plaintiffs' votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939) (holding that where forty-member Kansas State Senate had deadlocked twenty-to-twenty in voting on a proposed constitutional amendment, the twenty senators who had voted against the amendment had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, because the lieutenant governor’s vote effectively nullified the plaintiffs’ votes and the plaintiffs’ votes would have been sufficient to prevent ratification of the amendment); see also Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a Michigan House member and a Michigan state senator lacked standing to challenge gaming compacts that were approved by a concurrent-resolution procedure requiring only a majority of votes cast rather than by the ordinary legislative process that would have required a majority of the votes of all members in each house)."
} | 12,264,857 | b |
Taken at face value, these records fail even to prove that Marks' sentences on these convictions ever met the guideline definition of "imprisonment," let alone that he was reincarcerated in 2000 due to a parole revocation. This court and most other circuits hold that sentences served in community treatment centers, halfway houses,, home detention, or other forms of probation are not imprisonment for guideline purposes. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 F.3d 957, 959-60",
"parenthetical": "noting that Guidelines do not elaborate on definition of incarceration but explaining that residence in non-secure community treatment center or- halfway house is not imprisonment for guideline purposes",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Timbrook, 290 F.3d 957, 959-60 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that Guidelines do not elaborate on definition of incarceration but explaining that residence in non-secure community treatment center or- halfway house is not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Phipps, 68 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1995) (home detention not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Gordon, 346 F.3d 135, 138-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 711-14 (11th Cir. 1998) (community treatment center not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161-65 (6th Cir. 1997) (home detention not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (community treatment center not imprisonment for guideline purposes); but see United States v. Rasco, 963 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that confinement in community treatment center after parole revocation was part of original term of imprisonment)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that confinement in community treatment center after parole revocation was part of original term of imprisonment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Timbrook, 290 F.3d 957, 959-60 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that Guidelines do not elaborate on definition of incarceration but explaining that residence in non-secure community treatment center or- halfway house is not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Phipps, 68 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1995) (home detention not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Gordon, 346 F.3d 135, 138-39 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 711-14 (11th Cir. 1998) (community treatment center not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161-65 (6th Cir. 1997) (home detention not imprisonment for guideline purposes); United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (community treatment center not imprisonment for guideline purposes); but see United States v. Rasco, 963 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that confinement in community treatment center after parole revocation was part of original term of imprisonment)."
} | 12,275,823 | a |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 319, 330",
"parenthetical": "\"Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply\"",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "537 U.S. 322, 342",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | 12,269,928 | a |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 319, 330",
"parenthetical": "\"Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply\"",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | 12,269,928 | b |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "366 F.3d 319, 330",
"parenthetical": "\"Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply\"",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | 12,269,928 | a |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 F.3d 271, 271",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "537 U.S. 322, 342",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | 12,269,928 | a |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 F.3d 271, 271",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | 12,269,928 | b |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "162 F.3d 271, 271",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | 12,269,928 | b |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "537 U.S. 322, 342",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only \"raw figures\" that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | 12,269,928 | b |
Subsets and Splits