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The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33",
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74",
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63",
"parenthetical": "testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "157 N.J. 570, 570",
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "148 N.J. 389, 389",
"parenthetical": "evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "126 N.J. 112, 130-31",
"parenthetical": "upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State's theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State's theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "47 N.J. 379, 391",
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33",
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74",
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63",
"parenthetical": "testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | 3,561,621 | a |
The balancing of these factors is a delicate task for a trial judge. However, as with all 404(b) evidence, greater leeway is given when the evidence is proffered on the issue of motive, and there must be a "very strong" showing of prejudice to exclude evidence of a defendant's motive. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge",
"sentence": "See also Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 389, 689 A.2d 1351 (evidence of prior jealous episodes by defendant toward his former girlfriend held admissible to show his motive in shooting her male friend); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31, 594 A.2d 232 (1991) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had been convicted of prior murder as necessary to support State’s theory that defendant killed victim to prevent her from causing revocation of his parole); State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 391, 221 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S.Ct. 527, 17 L.Ed.2d 442 (1966) (evidence that victim was going to testify against defendant in a robbery trial admissible to show motive for killing the victim); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 232-33, 704 A.2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A.2d 66 (1998) (defendant’s writings showing hatred of African Americans held admissible to show motive for killing of stranger); State v. Engel, 249 N.J.Super. 336, 372-74, 592 A.2d 572 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A.2d 616 (1991) (prior threats and physical violence admissible to establish motive for murder of former wife); State v. Slocum, 130 N.J.Super. 358, 362-63, 327 A.2d 244 (App.Div.1974) (testimony that victim previously testified against defendant in prior prosecution held admissible to show malice or revenge)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive",
"sentence": "Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A.2d 675 (holding that in a prosecution for lurking, evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive)."
} | 3,561,621 | b |
Augustine argues that the trial court erred in not defining "public place" to the jury. Augustine, however, failed to raise this issue at trial, and the trial court's failure to define the term "public place" did not constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 1053, 1059",
"parenthetical": "\"A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (holding trial court did not err in failing to define “manufacture”); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to define “possession” was not plain error); United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to define “knowingly” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "992 F.2d 896, 910",
"parenthetical": "holding that failure to define \"possession\" was not plain error",
"sentence": "See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (holding trial court did not err in failing to define “manufacture”); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to define “possession” was not plain error); United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to define “knowingly” was not plain error)."
} | 3,576,496 | a |
Augustine argues that the trial court erred in not defining "public place" to the jury. Augustine, however, failed to raise this issue at trial, and the trial court's failure to define the term "public place" did not constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "552 F.3d 1053, 1059",
"parenthetical": "\"A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (holding trial court did not err in failing to define “manufacture”); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to define “possession” was not plain error); United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to define “knowingly” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "918 F.2d 1455, 1460",
"parenthetical": "holding that failure to define \"knowingly\" was not plain error",
"sentence": "See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A [trial] court does not commit plain error by failing to define a word when it is a common word which an average juror can understand and which the average juror could have applied to the facts of [the] case without difficulty.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (holding trial court did not err in failing to define “manufacture”); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 910 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to define “possession” was not plain error); United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to define “knowingly” was not plain error)."
} | 3,576,496 | a |
As solely a question of common sense, it is difficult to comprehend how any sexual assault could be committed for a purpose other than that of the individual. Sexual assault is, by its nature, a crime committed for personal reasons. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "398 A.2d 27, 31",
"parenthetical": "\"The outrageous quality of an employee's [sic] act may well be persuasive in considering whether his motivation was purely personal.\"",
"sentence": "See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 31 (D.C.1979) (“The outrageous quality of an employee’s [sic] act may well be persuasive in considering whether his motivation was purely personal.”) (citations omitted); Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C.Cir.1983) (an intentional tort by its very nature is “willful and thus more readily suggests personal motivation.”); see also Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C.1984) (employer not liable for sexual assault committed by educator against a student because the “assault was in no degree committed to serve the school’s interest but rather appears to have been done solely for the accomplishment of [the employee’s] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "484 A.2d 560, 562",
"parenthetical": "employer not liable for sexual assault committed by educator against a student because the \"assault was in no degree committed to serve the school's interest but rather appears to have been done solely for the accomplishment of [the employee's] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 31 (D.C.1979) (“The outrageous quality of an employee’s [sic] act may well be persuasive in considering whether his motivation was purely personal.”) (citations omitted); Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C.Cir.1983) (an intentional tort by its very nature is “willful and thus more readily suggests personal motivation.”); see also Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C.1984) (employer not liable for sexual assault committed by educator against a student because the “assault was in no degree committed to serve the school’s interest but rather appears to have been done solely for the accomplishment of [the employee’s] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.”)."
} | 3,786,310 | a |
As solely a question of common sense, it is difficult to comprehend how any sexual assault could be committed for a purpose other than that of the individual. Sexual assault is, by its nature, a crime committed for personal reasons. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "484 A.2d 560, 562",
"parenthetical": "employer not liable for sexual assault committed by educator against a student because the \"assault was in no degree committed to serve the school's interest but rather appears to have been done solely for the accomplishment of [the employee's] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.\"",
"sentence": "See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 31 (D.C.1979) (“The outrageous quality of an employee’s [sic] act may well be persuasive in considering whether his motivation was purely personal.”) (citations omitted); Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C.Cir.1983) (an intentional tort by its very nature is “willful and thus more readily suggests personal motivation.”); see also Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C.1984) (employer not liable for sexual assault committed by educator against a student because the “assault was in no degree committed to serve the school’s interest but rather appears to have been done solely for the accomplishment of [the employee’s] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "711 F.2d 211, 215",
"parenthetical": "an intentional tort by its very nature is \"willful and thus more readily suggests personal motivation.\"",
"sentence": "See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 31 (D.C.1979) (“The outrageous quality of an employee’s [sic] act may well be persuasive in considering whether his motivation was purely personal.”) (citations omitted); Jordan v. Medley, 711 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C.Cir.1983) (an intentional tort by its very nature is “willful and thus more readily suggests personal motivation.”); see also Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C.1984) (employer not liable for sexual assault committed by educator against a student because the “assault was in no degree committed to serve the school’s interest but rather appears to have been done solely for the accomplishment of [the employee’s] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.”)."
} | 3,786,310 | b |
The second reason is more compelling. Feres does not bar suits against the government when the injured plaintiff is a civilian. This remains the case even though the injurer is in the military and military discipline is directly involved. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "487 U.S. 392, 401",
"parenthetical": "injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel's negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 785, 788",
"parenthetical": "West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | 7,416,018 | a |
The second reason is more compelling. Feres does not bar suits against the government when the injured plaintiff is a civilian. This remains the case even though the injurer is in the military and military discipline is directly involved. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 785, 788",
"parenthetical": "West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455",
"parenthetical": "injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel's negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | 7,416,018 | b |
The second reason is more compelling. Feres does not bar suits against the government when the injured plaintiff is a civilian. This remains the case even though the injurer is in the military and military discipline is directly involved. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 785, 788",
"parenthetical": "West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel's negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | 7,416,018 | b |
The second reason is more compelling. Feres does not bar suits against the government when the injured plaintiff is a civilian. This remains the case even though the injurer is in the military and military discipline is directly involved. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "875 F.2d 689, 689-95",
"parenthetical": "government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy's negligent supervision of drunken personnel",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 785, 788",
"parenthetical": "West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | 7,416,018 | a |
The second reason is more compelling. Feres does not bar suits against the government when the injured plaintiff is a civilian. This remains the case even though the injurer is in the military and military discipline is directly involved. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "680 F.2d 922, 926",
"parenthetical": "Feres -- though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman -- did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army's alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son's death",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 785, 788",
"parenthetical": "West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence",
"sentence": "See e.g. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 2455, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (injured civilian shot by drunken serviceman could sue government under FTCA for navy personnel’s negligence in knowingly allowing drunken serviceman to leave navy base with rifle); Doggett, 875 F.2d at 689-95 (government may be held liable under the FTCA for injuries sustained by a civilian as a result of Navy’s negligent supervision of drunken personnel); Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1982) (Feres — though it precluded recovery by the estate of a murdered serviceman — did not bar claims by his bereaved parents for the Army’s alleged infliction of emotional distress on them subsequent to their son’s death); but cf. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788, (9th Cir.1978) (West German air force pilot killed while conducting joint training mission with U.S. Air Force barred by Feres from suing United States Government for alleged Air Force negligence)."
} | 7,416,018 | a |
Generally speaking, the right to determine whether a claim will proceed as an admiralty claim (without a jury) or as a common law claim (with a jury) belongs strictly to the plaintiff. That is, if a plaintiff designates his claim as a Rule 9(h) maritime claim, the saving-to-suitors clause does not permit a defendant to trump that designation and demand a jury trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "46 U.S. 461, 461",
"parenthetical": "\"The saving is for the benefit of suitors, plaintiff and defendant, when the plaintiff in a case of concurrent jurisdiction chooses to sue in the common law courts, so giving to himself and the defendant all the advantages which such tribunals can give to suitors in them. It certainly could not have been intended more for the benefit of the defendant than for the plaintiff, which would be the case if he could at his will force the plaintiff into a common law court .... \" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461 (“The saving is for the benefit of suitors, plaintiff and defendant, when the plaintiff in a case of concurrent jurisdiction chooses to sue in the common law courts, so giving to himself and the defendant all the advantages which such tribunals can give to suitors in them. It certainly could not have been intended more for the benefit of the defendant than for the plaintiff, which would be the case if he could at his will force the plaintiff into a common law court .... ” (emphasis added)); see also Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 405 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir.2005) (concluding that defendant had no right to a jury trial even though parties were diverse because plaintiff elected to proceed in admiralty). While this principle governs simple proceedings — e.g., proceedings where the defendant does not assert any counterclaims or implead third parties — -there is some dispute about its application to more complex cases."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 F.3d 257, 259",
"parenthetical": "concluding that defendant had no right to a jury trial even though parties were diverse because plaintiff elected to proceed in admiralty",
"sentence": "See Waring, 46 U.S. at 461 (“The saving is for the benefit of suitors, plaintiff and defendant, when the plaintiff in a case of concurrent jurisdiction chooses to sue in the common law courts, so giving to himself and the defendant all the advantages which such tribunals can give to suitors in them. It certainly could not have been intended more for the benefit of the defendant than for the plaintiff, which would be the case if he could at his will force the plaintiff into a common law court .... ” (emphasis added)); see also Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 405 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir.2005) (concluding that defendant had no right to a jury trial even though parties were diverse because plaintiff elected to proceed in admiralty). While this principle governs simple proceedings — e.g., proceedings where the defendant does not assert any counterclaims or implead third parties — -there is some dispute about its application to more complex cases."
} | 2,921,576 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 1016, 1020",
"parenthetical": "creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | b |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 1016, 1020",
"parenthetical": "creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 1016, 1020",
"parenthetical": "creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 1016, 1020",
"parenthetical": "creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 B.R. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "\"in its broad application\" the automatic stay prevents any \"creation of a lien\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 198, 200-01",
"parenthetical": "even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | b |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 198, 200-01",
"parenthetical": "even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | b |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 198, 200-01",
"parenthetical": "even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | b |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "86 B.R. 198, 200-01",
"parenthetical": "even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 B.R. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "\"in its broad application\" the automatic stay prevents any \"creation of a lien\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "28 B.R. 151, 155",
"parenthetical": "\"any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | b |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "28 B.R. 151, 155",
"parenthetical": "\"any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "28 B.R. 151, 155",
"parenthetical": "\"any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "once automatic stay is in place, \"the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by SS 362\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
Further, even if it were possible to create and perfect a lien without any action by the county, that lien, attaching to the property postpetition, would still violate the automatic stay. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "28 B.R. 151, 155",
"parenthetical": "\"any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "36 B.R. 209, 214",
"parenthetical": "\"in its broad application\" the automatic stay prevents any \"creation of a lien\"",
"sentence": "In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1020 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D. 1988) (creation and perfection of postpetition liens, which became due and owing by operation of law and without affirmative act by county, nevertheless violated automatic stay); In re Ballentine Bros., Inc., 86 B.R. 198, 200-01 (Bkrtcy.D.Neb.1988) (even though statute provided for creation and perfection of tax lien without any action by county, postpetition lien violated provisions of automatic stay); In re Stack Steel & Supply Co., 28 B.R. 151, 155 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wash.1983) (“any lien which is claimed by [the county] to have attached after the filing of the Chapter 11 petition is void”) (emphasis in original); see also H. & H. Beverage Distributors v. Department of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 170 n. 6 (3d Cir.) (once automatic stay is in place, “the creation of any lien, regardless of * * * its purpose is barred by § 362”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209, 214 (Bkrtcy.D.C.1983) (“in its broad application” the automatic stay prevents any “creation of a lien”)."
} | 10,540,196 | a |
As this Court said in regard to J. Peaceful and French Baguette's motion to dismiss, "[t]hough it is always somewhat burdensome to defend a lawsuit away from home, it is not a burden that violates due process in this instance." Dkt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 474, 474",
"parenthetical": "explaining that modern transportation and communications mean it is usually not unfair or too burdensome to require a party to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic activity",
"sentence": "No. 16 at 8. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (explaining that modern transportation and communications mean it is usually not unfair or too burdensome to require a party to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic activity); see also Bd. of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir.2000) (“Easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 1031, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"Easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.\"",
"sentence": "No. 16 at 8. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (explaining that modern transportation and communications mean it is usually not unfair or too burdensome to require a party to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic activity); see also Bd. of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir.2000) (“Easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.”)."
} | 3,605,116 | a |
As this Court said in regard to J. Peaceful and French Baguette's motion to dismiss, "[t]hough it is always somewhat burdensome to defend a lawsuit away from home, it is not a burden that violates due process in this instance." Dkt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that modern transportation and communications mean it is usually not unfair or too burdensome to require a party to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic activity",
"sentence": "No. 16 at 8. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (explaining that modern transportation and communications mean it is usually not unfair or too burdensome to require a party to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic activity); see also Bd. of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir.2000) (“Easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 1031, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"Easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.\"",
"sentence": "No. 16 at 8. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (explaining that modern transportation and communications mean it is usually not unfair or too burdensome to require a party to defend itself in a state where it engages in economic activity); see also Bd. of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir.2000) (“Easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.”)."
} | 3,605,116 | a |
The district court also found that even assuming Visa were a necessary party, it was not indispensable under Rule 19(b). Since we affirm the district court's conclusion that Visa is a not a necessary party, we need not discuss whether the district court properly found that Visa was not an indispensable party. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "299 F.3d 139, 139",
"parenthetical": "\"A party cannot be indispensable unless it is a 'necessary party' under Rule 19(a).\"",
"sentence": "See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Kearney, 212 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir.2000) (“If a party does not qualify as necessary under Rule 19(a), then the court need not decide whether its absence warrants dismissal under Rule 19(b).”); see also Jonesfilm, 299 F.3d at 139 (“A party cannot be indispensable unless it is a ‘necessary party’ under Rule 19(a).”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "212 F.3d 721, 724",
"parenthetical": "\"If a party does not qualify as necessary under Rule 19(a",
"sentence": "See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Kearney, 212 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir.2000) (“If a party does not qualify as necessary under Rule 19(a), then the court need not decide whether its absence warrants dismissal under Rule 19(b).”); see also Jonesfilm, 299 F.3d at 139 (“A party cannot be indispensable unless it is a ‘necessary party’ under Rule 19(a).”)."
} | 6,045,809 | b |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1995 WL 673008, *2",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper's home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "430 F.Supp. 844, 845",
"parenthetical": "stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents' home",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | b |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "430 F.Supp. 844, 845",
"parenthetical": "stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents' home",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "508 So.2d 738, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | a |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36",
"parenthetical": "concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1995 WL 673008, *2",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper's home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | a |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "508 So.2d 738, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36",
"parenthetical": "concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | b |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding daughter, who was watching parents' home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1995 WL 673008, *2",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper's home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | a |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "508 So.2d 738, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding daughter, who was watching parents' home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | b |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1995 WL 673008, *2",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper's home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "812 P.2d 858, 860",
"parenthetical": "holding daughter, who was watching parents' home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | b |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "508 So.2d 738, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "812 P.2d 858, 860",
"parenthetical": "holding daughter, who was watching parents' home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | b |
Such service of process was intended to give notice to the Defendants, and was reasonably calculated to reach them. See, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirke-vold, supra at 324. Our conclusion is supported by decisions from the Minnesota Courts, as well as from those of 'foreign jurisdictions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1995 WL 673008, *2",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper's home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "508 So.2d 738, 738-39",
"parenthetical": "concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein",
"sentence": "Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (stating adult daughter, who was home from college overnight, was residing at her parents’ home); Magazine v. Bedoya, 475 So.2d 1035, 1035-36 (Fla.App.1985) (concluding mother-in-law, who was visiting defendant for six weeks, and who told process server that she lived there, was resid ing there); Sangmeister v. McElnea, supra at 676-77 (holding four-month visitor was residing therein); Plushner v. Mills, supra at 446 (concluding that daughter, who was placed in charge of father’s home in his absence, was residing therein); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 812 P.2d 858, 860 (1991) (holding daughter, who was watching parents’ home, and staying overnight, met the residing requirement); see also, Pineview Overlook, Inc. v. Cooper, No. C2-95-795, 1995 WL 673008 *2 (Minn.App. Nov. 14, 1995) (concluding that the Summons delivered to Cooper’s home, and left with his father-in-law, a visitor staying there for ten days, was reasonably calculated to provide notice); but see, Cleaves v. Funk, 76 F.2d 828, 829-30 (10th Cir.1935) (requiring permanency of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.App.1987) (concluding that girlfriend, who was from another State, and who occasionally visited for few days to a week, was not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.App.1984) (holding that a ten-day visitor was not residing therein)."
} | 11,505,459 | a |
As a threshold issue, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated this Court has jurisdiction to review the Federal Defendants' decisions not to investigate or sanction the Community for its membership determinations. An agency's nonenforcement decision is presumptively not subject to judicial review. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "370 F.2d 529, 531",
"parenthetical": "holding that discretionary action of Secretary of the Interior in ratifying and approving amendments to a tribal constitution and by-laws was not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.1967) (holding that discretionary action of Secretary of the Interior in ratifying and approving amendments to a tribal constitution and by-laws was not subject to judicial review); see also Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 809 F.Supp. 738, 745 (D.S.D. 1992) (explaining that “[n]o authority is cited for the proposition that district courts can review or direct the discretion of the Secre tary in making the decision to approve or disapprove a per capita distribution plan under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(B), and it is the view of the Court that it lacks such power”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "809 F.Supp. 738, 745",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[n]o authority is cited for the proposition that district courts can review or direct the discretion of the Secre tary in making the decision to approve or disapprove a per capita distribution plan under 25 U.S.C. SS 2710(b)(3)(B",
"sentence": "Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.1967) (holding that discretionary action of Secretary of the Interior in ratifying and approving amendments to a tribal constitution and by-laws was not subject to judicial review); see also Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 809 F.Supp. 738, 745 (D.S.D. 1992) (explaining that “[n]o authority is cited for the proposition that district courts can review or direct the discretion of the Secre tary in making the decision to approve or disapprove a per capita distribution plan under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(B), and it is the view of the Court that it lacks such power”)."
} | 7,846,813 | a |
Proof that appellant participated in the murder as an accessory before the fact would also suffice to establish appellant's guilt. Hence, we cannot say, viewing the applicable legal elements of murder in the abstract, that proof of the referenced conspiracy is "required" in this context to prove the charged murder. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "11 Va.App. 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 Va. 200, 200",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, \"proof of the specific intent to kill\" is not \"required\" in a malicious wounding case because Code SS 18.2-51 -- which requires proof that the accused had \"the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU\" -- uses the disjunctive \"or\" in its description of the required intent for that offense",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | 1,167,970 | b |
Proof that appellant participated in the murder as an accessory before the fact would also suffice to establish appellant's guilt. Hence, we cannot say, viewing the applicable legal elements of murder in the abstract, that proof of the referenced conspiracy is "required" in this context to prove the charged murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "261 Va. 200, 200",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, \"proof of the specific intent to kill\" is not \"required\" in a malicious wounding case because Code SS 18.2-51 -- which requires proof that the accused had \"the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU\" -- uses the disjunctive \"or\" in its description of the required intent for that offense",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 S.E.2d 796, 796",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | 1,167,970 | a |
Proof that appellant participated in the murder as an accessory before the fact would also suffice to establish appellant's guilt. Hence, we cannot say, viewing the applicable legal elements of murder in the abstract, that proof of the referenced conspiracy is "required" in this context to prove the charged murder. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "11 Va.App. 653, 653",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "539 S.E.2d 734, 734",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, \"proof of the specific intent to kill\" is not \"required\" in a malicious wounding case because Code SS 18.2-51 -- which requires proof that the accused had \"the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU\" -- uses the disjunctive \"or\" in its description of the required intent for that offense",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | 1,167,970 | b |
Proof that appellant participated in the murder as an accessory before the fact would also suffice to establish appellant's guilt. Hence, we cannot say, viewing the applicable legal elements of murder in the abstract, that proof of the referenced conspiracy is "required" in this context to prove the charged murder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "539 S.E.2d 734, 734",
"parenthetical": "holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, \"proof of the specific intent to kill\" is not \"required\" in a malicious wounding case because Code SS 18.2-51 -- which requires proof that the accused had \"the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU\" -- uses the disjunctive \"or\" in its description of the required intent for that offense",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "400 S.E.2d 796, 796",
"parenthetical": "\"Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.\"",
"sentence": "See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (holding that, in the context of a Bloekburger double jeopardy analysis, “proof of the specific intent to kill” is not “required” in a malicious wounding case because Code § 18.2-51 — which requires proof that the accused had “the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or MU” — uses the disjunctive “or” in its description of the required intent for that offense); cf. Taylor, 11 Va.App. at 653, 400 S.E.2d at 796 (“Even if one offense is committed in [some] cases of the commission of another offense, it is not a necessarily included lesser offense of the other one.”)."
} | 1,167,970 | a |
In Sibley, the private duty nurse was entirely dependent upon the hospital for access to her patients; without the hospital's referral, she had no relationship with any particular patient. Faced with this set of facts, the Sibley court held the interference prohibited under Title VII. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1156, 1156",
"parenthetical": "applying Sibley where denial of staff privileges to a doctor by a hospital may have interfered with a written contract of employment with a professional corporation",
"sentence": "Cf. Pardazi, 838 F.2d at 1156 (applying Sibley where denial of staff privileges to a doctor by a hospital may have interfered with a written contract of employment with a professional corporation)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying Sibley under the same set of facts, except that contract was between a private nurse and the doctors who employed her",
"sentence": "Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1342; see also Christopher, 936 F.2d at 877 n. 3 (applying Sibley under the same set of facts, except that contract was between a private nurse and the doctors who employed her)."
} | 4,404,053 | b |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90",
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | b |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | b |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | a |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | b |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | a |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": "715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06",
"parenthetical": "plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | b |
Honor Society membership, he had no property interest in the integrity of the selection process. | {
"signal": "contra",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "619 F.2d 99, 104",
"parenthetical": "where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed",
"sentence": "Id.; see also Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir.1980) (where plaintiff had no property interest in promotion, court need not examine whether state law procedures were followed); Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (N.D.Cal.1980) (because plaintiff had no property right to zoning permit, he could not claim a denial of due process resulting from misconduct in the hearing for such permit), aff'd, 686 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. Lawrence, Kan., 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-06 (D.Kan.1989) (plaintiff had no property interest in rezoning process where there was no property right to have property rezoned), aff'd, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir.1991)."
} | 7,405,776 | b |
Plaintiff admits that he can work most jobs that do not require "sport type activities". In fact, plaintiff has worked a variety of jobs since he was fired from Autozone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 F.3d 800, 806",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce",
"sentence": "See id. at 226-231. Without some evidence that Garrett is precluded from a broad range of jobs, his impairment does not meet the definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce); See also, Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 513-14 (7th Cir.1998) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fi-bromyalgia failed to show that she was disabled under the ADA); Zimmerman v. General Motors, 959 F.Supp. 1393 (D.Kan.1997) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fibromyalgia was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Aquinas v. Federal Express Corp., 940 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "153 F.3d 512, 513-14",
"parenthetical": "finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fi-bromyalgia failed to show that she was disabled under the ADA",
"sentence": "See id. at 226-231. Without some evidence that Garrett is precluded from a broad range of jobs, his impairment does not meet the definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce); See also, Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 513-14 (7th Cir.1998) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fi-bromyalgia failed to show that she was disabled under the ADA); Zimmerman v. General Motors, 959 F.Supp. 1393 (D.Kan.1997) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fibromyalgia was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Aquinas v. Federal Express Corp., 940 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same)."
} | 624,389 | a |
Plaintiff admits that he can work most jobs that do not require "sport type activities". In fact, plaintiff has worked a variety of jobs since he was fired from Autozone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fibromyalgia was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA",
"sentence": "See id. at 226-231. Without some evidence that Garrett is precluded from a broad range of jobs, his impairment does not meet the definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce); See also, Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 513-14 (7th Cir.1998) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fi-bromyalgia failed to show that she was disabled under the ADA); Zimmerman v. General Motors, 959 F.Supp. 1393 (D.Kan.1997) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fibromyalgia was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Aquinas v. Federal Express Corp., 940 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "117 F.3d 800, 806",
"parenthetical": "holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce",
"sentence": "See id. at 226-231. Without some evidence that Garrett is precluded from a broad range of jobs, his impairment does not meet the definition of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce); See also, Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 513-14 (7th Cir.1998) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fi-bromyalgia failed to show that she was disabled under the ADA); Zimmerman v. General Motors, 959 F.Supp. 1393 (D.Kan.1997) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from fibromyalgia was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Aquinas v. Federal Express Corp., 940 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same)."
} | 624,389 | b |
Although this inquiry may overlap with the separate-products screen under the per se rule, that is not its role here. Because courts applying the rule of reason are free to look at both direct and indirect evidence of efficiencies from a tie, there is no need for a screening device as such; thus the separate-products' inquiry serves merely to classify arrangements as subject to tying law, as opposed to, say, liability for exclusive dealing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 F.Supp.2d 626, 635, 643-44",
"parenthetical": "considering a rule of reason tying claim, after finding a single product under the per se rule",
"sentence": "See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 614, 73 S.Ct. 872 (finding a single product and then turning to a general rule of reason analysis under § 1, though not using the term “tying”); Foster v. Md. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928/931, 933 (D.C.Cir.1978), cited in Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 40, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); see also Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 75 F.Supp.2d 626, 635, 643-44 (S.D.Tex. 1999) (considering a rule of reason tying claim, after finding a single product under the per se rule); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 783 F.Supp. 952, 961 & n. 26 (D.Md.1992), aff'd mem. 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir.1993) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "345 U.S. 614, 614",
"parenthetical": "finding a single product and then turning to a general rule of reason analysis under SS 1, though not using the term \"tying\"",
"sentence": "See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 614, 73 S.Ct. 872 (finding a single product and then turning to a general rule of reason analysis under § 1, though not using the term “tying”); Foster v. Md. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928/931, 933 (D.C.Cir.1978), cited in Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 40, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); see also Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 75 F.Supp.2d 626, 635, 643-44 (S.D.Tex. 1999) (considering a rule of reason tying claim, after finding a single product under the per se rule); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 783 F.Supp. 952, 961 & n. 26 (D.Md.1992), aff'd mem. 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir.1993) (same)."
} | 3,678,251 | b |
Although this inquiry may overlap with the separate-products screen under the per se rule, that is not its role here. Because courts applying the rule of reason are free to look at both direct and indirect evidence of efficiencies from a tie, there is no need for a screening device as such; thus the separate-products' inquiry serves merely to classify arrangements as subject to tying law, as opposed to, say, liability for exclusive dealing. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "75 F.Supp.2d 626, 635, 643-44",
"parenthetical": "considering a rule of reason tying claim, after finding a single product under the per se rule",
"sentence": "See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 614, 73 S.Ct. 872 (finding a single product and then turning to a general rule of reason analysis under § 1, though not using the term “tying”); Foster v. Md. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928/931, 933 (D.C.Cir.1978), cited in Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 40, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); see also Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 75 F.Supp.2d 626, 635, 643-44 (S.D.Tex. 1999) (considering a rule of reason tying claim, after finding a single product under the per se rule); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 783 F.Supp. 952, 961 & n. 26 (D.Md.1992), aff'd mem. 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir.1993) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding a single product and then turning to a general rule of reason analysis under SS 1, though not using the term \"tying\"",
"sentence": "See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 614, 73 S.Ct. 872 (finding a single product and then turning to a general rule of reason analysis under § 1, though not using the term “tying”); Foster v. Md. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928/931, 933 (D.C.Cir.1978), cited in Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 40, 104 S.Ct. 1551 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); see also Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 75 F.Supp.2d 626, 635, 643-44 (S.D.Tex. 1999) (considering a rule of reason tying claim, after finding a single product under the per se rule); Montgomery County Ass’n of Realtors v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 783 F.Supp. 952, 961 & n. 26 (D.Md.1992), aff'd mem. 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir.1993) (same)."
} | 3,678,251 | b |
In arguing for this principle, they assume that the law of nations necessarily provides the substantive standards for evaluating claims brought under the ATCA in situations where the underlying claims involve human rights abuses. While they may well be right that such a principle is implicit in the ATCA, the federal courts have never definitively resolved this choice-of-law question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "886 F.Supp. 180, 180-83",
"parenthetical": "holding that international law provides substantive law for ATCA cases",
"sentence": "Compare Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 180-83 (holding that international law provides substantive law for ATCA cases) with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777, 781-82 (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that, while international law triggers jurisdiction under ATCA, tort laws of forum state might provide substantive causes of action), and In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 978 F.2d at 503 (9th Cir.1992) (approving district court procedure that based jurisdiction on international law but applied tort law of slate where underlying events occurred); see also Filarti-ga, 630 F.2d at 889 (holding that ATCA establishes cause of action for violations of international law but requiring the district court to perform a traditional choice-of-law analysis to determine whether international law, law of forum state, or law of state where events occurred should provide substantive law in such an action). Because our decision regarding the forum non conveniens dismissal is based on other grounds, we need not reach this question."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "630 F.2d 889, 889",
"parenthetical": "holding that ATCA establishes cause of action for violations of international law but requiring the district court to perform a traditional choice-of-law analysis to determine whether international law, law of forum state, or law of state where events occurred should provide substantive law in such an action",
"sentence": "Compare Xuncax, 886 F.Supp. at 180-83 (holding that international law provides substantive law for ATCA cases) with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777, 781-82 (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that, while international law triggers jurisdiction under ATCA, tort laws of forum state might provide substantive causes of action), and In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 978 F.2d at 503 (9th Cir.1992) (approving district court procedure that based jurisdiction on international law but applied tort law of slate where underlying events occurred); see also Filarti-ga, 630 F.2d at 889 (holding that ATCA establishes cause of action for violations of international law but requiring the district court to perform a traditional choice-of-law analysis to determine whether international law, law of forum state, or law of state where events occurred should provide substantive law in such an action). Because our decision regarding the forum non conveniens dismissal is based on other grounds, we need not reach this question."
} | 11,230,877 | a |
"As a general rule, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not ordinarily cognizable on direct appeal. The exception is when the error is apparent on the face of the record, which is rarely the case." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ineffective assistance of counsel apparent on face of record based on failure to request a specific jury instruction",
"sentence": "Desire v. State, 928 So.2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 n. 14 (Fla.2001) (“A claim of ineffectiveness can properly be raised on direct appeal only if the record on its face demonstrates ineffectiveness.”); see, e.g., Aversano v. State, 966 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel apparent on face of record based on failure to request a specific jury instruction)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A claim of ineffectiveness can properly be raised on direct appeal only if the record on its face demonstrates ineffectiveness.\"",
"sentence": "Desire v. State, 928 So.2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 n. 14 (Fla.2001) (“A claim of ineffectiveness can properly be raised on direct appeal only if the record on its face demonstrates ineffectiveness.”); see, e.g., Aversano v. State, 966 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel apparent on face of record based on failure to request a specific jury instruction)."
} | 8,384,318 | b |
"Even if there is sufficient 'interjection' into [California] to satisfy the [purposeful availment prong], the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the [reasonableness prong]." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "303 F.3d 1104, 1114-15",
"parenthetical": "\"There may be circumstances under which the level of purposeful injection into the forum supports a finding of purposeful availment yet still weighs against the reasonableness of jurisdiction ... \"",
"sentence": "Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 (quoting Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1488 (brackets original) (quoting Insurance Company of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.1981)); see also Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2002) (“There may be circumstances under which the level of purposeful injection into the forum supports a finding of purposeful availment yet still weighs against the reasonableness of jurisdiction ... ”); but see Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir.1991) (“In light of the first prong of purposeful availment, analysis of this first factor in the third prong would be redundant. As we have concluded, albeit narrowly, that appellees purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California, there is no need to analyze this first factor separately”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "942 F.2d 617, 623",
"parenthetical": "\"In light of the first prong of purposeful availment, analysis of this first factor in the third prong would be redundant. As we have concluded, albeit narrowly, that appellees purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California, there is no need to analyze this first factor separately\"",
"sentence": "Ziegler, 64 F.3d at 475 (quoting Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1488 (brackets original) (quoting Insurance Company of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir.1981)); see also Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2002) (“There may be circumstances under which the level of purposeful injection into the forum supports a finding of purposeful availment yet still weighs against the reasonableness of jurisdiction ... ”); but see Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir.1991) (“In light of the first prong of purposeful availment, analysis of this first factor in the third prong would be redundant. As we have concluded, albeit narrowly, that appellees purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California, there is no need to analyze this first factor separately”)."
} | 3,803,654 | a |
By 1976, Federal constitutional jurisprudence had long recognized that State laws discriminating on the basis of alienage were "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "403 U.S. 365, 371, 372",
"parenthetical": "\"It has long been settled . . . that the term 'person' in th[e] context [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution] encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside\"",
"sentence": "Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 372 (1971) (“It has long been settled . . . that the term ‘person’ in th[e] context [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution] encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "413 U.S. 634, 642",
"parenthetical": "\"close judicial scrutiny\" applicable to New York statute limiting eligibility for competitive class of civil service positions to citizens",
"sentence": "See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (“close judicial scrutiny” applicable to New York statute limiting eligibility for competitive class of civil service positions to citizens)."
} | 4,271,396 | a |
CATF's failure to obtain an independent appraisal of the equipment prior to sale provides further evidence that the disposition was not commercially reasonable. See U.S.A., Etc. v. Chatlin's Dept. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "452 P.2d 87, 91-92",
"parenthetical": "seller overcame presumption of commercial unreasonableness created by failure of notice by having independent appraisals, attempts to locate prospective purchasers in several states, and testimony that sale was to the highest offer available at'time of sale",
"sentence": "Store, 506 F.Supp. 108, 112 (E.D.Pa.1980), citing, California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.1969) (setting of evaluation figure without independent appraisal has been held to be sufficient to state claim of commercial unreasonableness); Tranchitella, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 244, 592 A.2d 284; Spillers, supra, 65 Ill.Dec. at 563, 441 N.E.2d at 878; see also Weaver v. O’Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 91-92 (n. 17) (Alaska 1969) (seller overcame presumption of commercial unreasonableness created by failure of notice by having independent appraisals, attempts to locate prospective purchasers in several states, and testimony that sale was to the highest offer available at'time of sale)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "506 F.Supp. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "setting of evaluation figure without independent appraisal has been held to be sufficient to state claim of commercial unreasonableness",
"sentence": "Store, 506 F.Supp. 108, 112 (E.D.Pa.1980), citing, California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.1969) (setting of evaluation figure without independent appraisal has been held to be sufficient to state claim of commercial unreasonableness); Tranchitella, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 244, 592 A.2d 284; Spillers, supra, 65 Ill.Dec. at 563, 441 N.E.2d at 878; see also Weaver v. O’Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 91-92 (n. 17) (Alaska 1969) (seller overcame presumption of commercial unreasonableness created by failure of notice by having independent appraisals, attempts to locate prospective purchasers in several states, and testimony that sale was to the highest offer available at'time of sale)."
} | 605,996 | b |
CATF's failure to obtain an independent appraisal of the equipment prior to sale provides further evidence that the disposition was not commercially reasonable. See U.S.A., Etc. v. Chatlin's Dept. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "452 P.2d 87, 91-92",
"parenthetical": "seller overcame presumption of commercial unreasonableness created by failure of notice by having independent appraisals, attempts to locate prospective purchasers in several states, and testimony that sale was to the highest offer available at'time of sale",
"sentence": "Store, 506 F.Supp. 108, 112 (E.D.Pa.1980), citing, California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.1969) (setting of evaluation figure without independent appraisal has been held to be sufficient to state claim of commercial unreasonableness); Tranchitella, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 244, 592 A.2d 284; Spillers, supra, 65 Ill.Dec. at 563, 441 N.E.2d at 878; see also Weaver v. O’Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 91-92 (n. 17) (Alaska 1969) (seller overcame presumption of commercial unreasonableness created by failure of notice by having independent appraisals, attempts to locate prospective purchasers in several states, and testimony that sale was to the highest offer available at'time of sale)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting of evaluation figure without independent appraisal has been held to be sufficient to state claim of commercial unreasonableness",
"sentence": "Store, 506 F.Supp. 108, 112 (E.D.Pa.1980), citing, California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.1969) (setting of evaluation figure without independent appraisal has been held to be sufficient to state claim of commercial unreasonableness); Tranchitella, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 244, 592 A.2d 284; Spillers, supra, 65 Ill.Dec. at 563, 441 N.E.2d at 878; see also Weaver v. O’Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 91-92 (n. 17) (Alaska 1969) (seller overcame presumption of commercial unreasonableness created by failure of notice by having independent appraisals, attempts to locate prospective purchasers in several states, and testimony that sale was to the highest offer available at'time of sale)."
} | 605,996 | b |
Indeed, on multiple occasions, this Court has found an appellate lawyer ineffective for failing to raise or prove that trial counsel was ineffective in his mitigation investigation for the penalty phase of a capital trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291",
"parenthetical": "remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel \"called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones' penalty hearing\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that appellate counsel failed to \"provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation\" where trial counsel had failed to request defendant's complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel's constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | 4,195,190 | b |
Indeed, on multiple occasions, this Court has found an appellate lawyer ineffective for failing to raise or prove that trial counsel was ineffective in his mitigation investigation for the penalty phase of a capital trial. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "950 A.2d 294, 305",
"parenthetical": "finding that appellate counsel failed to \"provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation\" where trial counsel had failed to request defendant's complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel's constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291",
"parenthetical": "remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel \"called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones' penalty hearing\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | 4,195,190 | a |
Indeed, on multiple occasions, this Court has found an appellate lawyer ineffective for failing to raise or prove that trial counsel was ineffective in his mitigation investigation for the penalty phase of a capital trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291",
"parenthetical": "remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel \"called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones' penalty hearing\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | 4,195,190 | b |
Indeed, on multiple occasions, this Court has found an appellate lawyer ineffective for failing to raise or prove that trial counsel was ineffective in his mitigation investigation for the penalty phase of a capital trial. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291",
"parenthetical": "remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel \"called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones' penalty hearing\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "909 A.2d 775, 792",
"parenthetical": "finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294, 305 (2008) (finding that appellate counsel failed to “provid[e] essential support for the claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness in the failure to investigate and present available mitigation” where trial counsel had failed to request defendant’s complete medical records or arrange for mental health examination despite trial counsel’s constructive notice of potential relevance of mental-health issues); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 792 (2006) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel failed to obtain medical, educational, or social-history records, or consult mental-health professional); Ford, 809 A.2d at 331 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (finding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “present[ing] virtually no evidence of mitigating circumstances”); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa.202, 912 A.2d 268, 294-95, 291 (2006) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise ineffectiveness of trial counsel during penalty phase where trial counsel “called no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones’ penalty hearing”); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 596 Pa. 1, 940 A.2d 323 (2005) (per curiam) (remanding for PCRA evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on ineffectiveness of trial counsel in investigation of mitigation evidence)."
} | 4,195,190 | b |
As to the first element, a witness is peculiarly within a party's power to produce if he either: (1) is physically available only to that party; or (2) has such a relationship with one party as to effectively make him unavailable to the opposing party, regardless of actual physical availability. The latter prong is also referred to as "pragmatic unavailability." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 F.2d 59, 64",
"parenthetical": "finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers' \"strong personal interest in the success of the city's defense of their conduct ...\" rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers’ “strong personal interest in the success of the city’s defense of their conduct ...” rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the United States in building its case, as well as his “interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "537 F.2d 926, 926-27",
"parenthetical": "holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the United States in building its case, as well as his \"interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers’ “strong personal interest in the success of the city’s defense of their conduct ...” rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the United States in building its case, as well as his “interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant”)."
} | 3,827,682 | a |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | a |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | b |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | a |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | b |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | b |
Subsets and Splits