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. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | b |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | b |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | b |
. The Burns Court also suggested that Wiley and Bums could be distinguished on the basis that Wiley involved a merger, which triggered the general state law rule "that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." In Wiley, the Court had noted that the union's argument -- which may well have influenced its specific holding -- was based on principles of corporate consolidation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative\" of the successor's labor law obligations",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship\" are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets\" is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application\"",
"sentence": "Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547-48, 84 S.Ct. 909 (\"The Union relies on § 90 of the N.Y. Stock Corporation Law, ... which provides, among other things, that no 'claim or demand for any cause’ against a constituent corporation shall be extinguished by a consolidation.”). In Howard Johnson, the Court again noted this distinction with approval, Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257, 94 S.Ct. 2236, yet the Court has since downplayed this distinction as determinative of a successor's labor law obligations, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 44 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. 2225, 96 L.Ed.2d 22 (1987) (noting that \"the way in which a successor obtains the predecessor's assets is generally not determinative” of the successor’s labor law obligations); see also Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973) (observing that \"[t]he perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of suc-cessorship” are not confined by the bound aries of state corporation law, and that \"[t]he refusal to adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases of assets” is due to the fact that as long as there is \"continuity in the employing industry, the public policies underlying the doctrine- will be served by its broad application”)."
} | 9,498,258 | a |
After obtaining a search warrant, the officers entered his car and uncovered $1,250,000 worth of cocaine, a digital gram scale, and a gun in Griffin's briefcase. From the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest and Griffin's extreme anxiety, the district court, as trier of fact, was entitled to infer that Griffin knew of the cocaine in his vehicle's cargo space. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "94 F.3d 324, 324-25",
"parenthetical": "jury properly inferred from the defendant's nervousness, lies to police, and contradictory actions that defendant knew of the cocaine's presence",
"sentence": "See Stribling, 94 F.3d at 324-25 (jury properly inferred from the defendant’s nervousness, lies to police, and contradictory actions that defendant knew of the cocaine’s presence); see also Uriostegui-Estrada, 86 F.3d at 89 (fact finder could reasonably believe that drug smuggler would not entrust cargo worth more than $1 million to a stranger unaware of its value)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "86 F.3d 89, 89",
"parenthetical": "fact finder could reasonably believe that drug smuggler would not entrust cargo worth more than $1 million to a stranger unaware of its value",
"sentence": "See Stribling, 94 F.3d at 324-25 (jury properly inferred from the defendant’s nervousness, lies to police, and contradictory actions that defendant knew of the cocaine’s presence); see also Uriostegui-Estrada, 86 F.3d at 89 (fact finder could reasonably believe that drug smuggler would not entrust cargo worth more than $1 million to a stranger unaware of its value)."
} | 1,540,648 | a |
In Wickham Const. Co., the Federal Circuit made a distinction between the recovery of interest "on equity capital" and "interest actually paid on funds borrowed because of the government's delay in payments and used on the delayed contract." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "266 F.3d 1348, 1355",
"parenthetical": "allowing the recovery of the \"increase of financing costs\" caused by a breach of contract",
"sentence": "Wickham Const. Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1582-83 (Fed.Cir.1994) (citing Gevyn Constr. Corp. v. United States, 827 F.2d 752, 754 (Fed.Cir. 1987) (“[28 U.S.C. §] 2516(a) does not bar an interest award as part of an equitable adjustment under a fixed-price contract if the contractor has actually paid interest because of the government’s delay in payment”)); see also Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 266 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2001) (allowing the recovery of the “increase of financing costs” caused by a breach of contract). In an attempt to recover time price differential dollars, Consumers Energy makes two arguments: that it seeks to recover interest on borrowing that it was forced to undertake as a result of DOE’s breach, and/or its request for time price differential dollars could also be characterized as a request to recover Allowance of Funds Used During Construction (“AFUDC”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "827 F.2d 752, 754",
"parenthetical": "\"[28 U.S.C. SS] 2516(a) does not bar an interest award as part of an equitable adjustment under a fixed-price contract if the contractor has actually paid interest because of the government's delay in payment\"",
"sentence": "Wickham Const. Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574, 1582-83 (Fed.Cir.1994) (citing Gevyn Constr. Corp. v. United States, 827 F.2d 752, 754 (Fed.Cir. 1987) (“[28 U.S.C. §] 2516(a) does not bar an interest award as part of an equitable adjustment under a fixed-price contract if the contractor has actually paid interest because of the government’s delay in payment”)); see also Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 266 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2001) (allowing the recovery of the “increase of financing costs” caused by a breach of contract). In an attempt to recover time price differential dollars, Consumers Energy makes two arguments: that it seeks to recover interest on borrowing that it was forced to undertake as a result of DOE’s breach, and/or its request for time price differential dollars could also be characterized as a request to recover Allowance of Funds Used During Construction (“AFUDC”)."
} | 5,882,854 | b |
Further, the room assignment requirement was not de minimis -- it materially and significantly affected the terms and conditions of employment of the housekeepers by increasing the number of rooms they may need to clean on a given day. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 2414720, at *6",
"parenthetical": "holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining",
"sentence": "See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see also EAD Motors E. Air Devices, Inc., 346 NLRB 1060, 1065 (2006) (“[T]he Board has made clear that in order to constitute a unilateral change that violates the Act, an employer’s action must effect a material, substantial, and significant change in terms or conditions of employment.”); Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.1971) (“A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "346 NLRB 1060, 1065",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Board has made clear that in order to constitute a unilateral change that violates the Act, an employer's action must effect a material, substantial, and significant change in terms or conditions of employment.\"",
"sentence": "See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see also EAD Motors E. Air Devices, Inc., 346 NLRB 1060, 1065 (2006) (“[T]he Board has made clear that in order to constitute a unilateral change that violates the Act, an employer’s action must effect a material, substantial, and significant change in terms or conditions of employment.”); Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.1971) (“A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.”)."
} | 3,970,469 | a |
Further, the room assignment requirement was not de minimis -- it materially and significantly affected the terms and conditions of employment of the housekeepers by increasing the number of rooms they may need to clean on a given day. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 2414720, at *6",
"parenthetical": "holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining",
"sentence": "See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see also EAD Motors E. Air Devices, Inc., 346 NLRB 1060, 1065 (2006) (“[T]he Board has made clear that in order to constitute a unilateral change that violates the Act, an employer’s action must effect a material, substantial, and significant change in terms or conditions of employment.”); Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.1971) (“A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "444 F.2d 30, 33",
"parenthetical": "\"A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.\"",
"sentence": "See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see also EAD Motors E. Air Devices, Inc., 346 NLRB 1060, 1065 (2006) (“[T]he Board has made clear that in order to constitute a unilateral change that violates the Act, an employer’s action must effect a material, substantial, and significant change in terms or conditions of employment.”); Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.1971) (“A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.”)."
} | 3,970,469 | a |
First, our decision holds only that Sheriff Arpaio lacks standing to challenge DACA and DAPA, not that those programs are categorically shielded from suit. Indeed, those programs are currently subject to challenge in a number of other circuits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "783 F.3d 244, 252",
"parenthetical": "holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to \"submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state\" or \"produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state\"",
"sentence": "See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to “submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state” or “produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "787 F.3d 747, 747-55",
"parenthetical": "upholding Texas' standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries",
"sentence": "See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to “submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state” or “produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state”)."
} | 6,771,912 | b |
First, our decision holds only that Sheriff Arpaio lacks standing to challenge DACA and DAPA, not that those programs are categorically shielded from suit. Indeed, those programs are currently subject to challenge in a number of other circuits. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "783 F.3d 244, 252",
"parenthetical": "holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to \"submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state\" or \"produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state\"",
"sentence": "See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to “submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state” or “produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution",
"sentence": "See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to “submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state” or “produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state”)."
} | 6,771,912 | b |
First, our decision holds only that Sheriff Arpaio lacks standing to challenge DACA and DAPA, not that those programs are categorically shielded from suit. Indeed, those programs are currently subject to challenge in a number of other circuits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution",
"sentence": "See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to “submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state” or “produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "783 F.3d 244, 252",
"parenthetical": "holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to \"submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state\" or \"produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state\"",
"sentence": "See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas’ standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (holding Mississippi lacked standing to challenge DACA because the state failed to “submit[ ] ... evidence that any DACA eligible immigrants resided in the state” or “produce evidence of costs it would incur if some DACA-approved immigrants came to the state”)."
} | 6,771,912 | a |
Construing Lazo's notice of appeal as a motion for a COA, we determine that a COA is not warranted in this case. Fed. R.App. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that principles developed in SS 2254 cases apply to cases involving SS 2255 motions",
"sentence": "P. 22(b)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (dealing with § 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that principles developed in § 2254 cases apply to cases involving § 2255 motions)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 473, 483",
"parenthetical": "dealing with SS 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA",
"sentence": "P. 22(b)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (dealing with § 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that principles developed in § 2254 cases apply to cases involving § 2255 motions)."
} | 9,383,293 | b |
Construing Lazo's notice of appeal as a motion for a COA, we determine that a COA is not warranted in this case. Fed. R.App. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603",
"parenthetical": "dealing with SS 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA",
"sentence": "P. 22(b)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (dealing with § 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that principles developed in § 2254 cases apply to cases involving § 2255 motions)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that principles developed in SS 2254 cases apply to cases involving SS 2255 motions",
"sentence": "P. 22(b)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (dealing with § 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that principles developed in § 2254 cases apply to cases involving § 2255 motions)."
} | 9,383,293 | a |
Construing Lazo's notice of appeal as a motion for a COA, we determine that a COA is not warranted in this case. Fed. R.App. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "dealing with SS 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA",
"sentence": "P. 22(b)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (dealing with § 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that principles developed in § 2254 cases apply to cases involving § 2255 motions)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that principles developed in SS 2254 cases apply to cases involving SS 2255 motions",
"sentence": "P. 22(b)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (dealing with § 2254 motion and stating that the court of appeals should have treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA); see also Gay v. United States, 816 F.2d 614, 616 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that principles developed in § 2254 cases apply to cases involving § 2255 motions)."
} | 9,383,293 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Yates because Humphrey failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Yates personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1058, 1058",
"parenthetical": "prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "556 U.S. 662, 676",
"parenthetical": "a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | 5,900,823 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Yates because Humphrey failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Yates personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1058, 1058",
"parenthetical": "prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | 5,900,823 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Yates because Humphrey failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Yates personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1058, 1058",
"parenthetical": "prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | 5,900,823 | b |
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Yates because Humphrey failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Yates personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "880 F.2d 1040, 1045",
"parenthetical": "supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he \"participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them\"",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "391 F.3d 1058, 1058",
"parenthetical": "prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health",
"sentence": "See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff must plead that each defendant violated the Constitution through his own individual actions); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”); see also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health)."
} | 5,900,823 | a |
Courts are not at liberty to expand the language chosen by Congress, and the omission here is telling. Thus, while Section 2718(c) saves from the OPA's diminution the ability of the United States or state entities to impose requirements relating to oil discharges, it does not save those powers from the effects of the CWA or any other non-identified federal law. Consistent with this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Ouellette held that a savings clause commencing with "nothing in this section" is by its terms limited to preemption caused by that section alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 89, 106",
"parenthetical": "Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 493, 493",
"parenthetical": "such a clause \"does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | 4,237,083 | b |
Courts are not at liberty to expand the language chosen by Congress, and the omission here is telling. Thus, while Section 2718(c) saves from the OPA's diminution the ability of the United States or state entities to impose requirements relating to oil discharges, it does not save those powers from the effects of the CWA or any other non-identified federal law. Consistent with this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Ouellette held that a savings clause commencing with "nothing in this section" is by its terms limited to preemption caused by that section alone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 493, 493",
"parenthetical": "such a clause \"does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47",
"parenthetical": "Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | 4,237,083 | a |
Courts are not at liberty to expand the language chosen by Congress, and the omission here is telling. Thus, while Section 2718(c) saves from the OPA's diminution the ability of the United States or state entities to impose requirements relating to oil discharges, it does not save those powers from the effects of the CWA or any other non-identified federal law. Consistent with this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Ouellette held that a savings clause commencing with "nothing in this section" is by its terms limited to preemption caused by that section alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "479 U.S. 493, 493",
"parenthetical": "such a clause \"does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | 4,237,083 | b |
Courts are not at liberty to expand the language chosen by Congress, and the omission here is telling. Thus, while Section 2718(c) saves from the OPA's diminution the ability of the United States or state entities to impose requirements relating to oil discharges, it does not save those powers from the effects of the CWA or any other non-identified federal law. Consistent with this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Ouellette held that a savings clause commencing with "nothing in this section" is by its terms limited to preemption caused by that section alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 U.S. 89, 106",
"parenthetical": "Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 812, 812",
"parenthetical": "such a clause \"does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | 4,237,083 | b |
Courts are not at liberty to expand the language chosen by Congress, and the omission here is telling. Thus, while Section 2718(c) saves from the OPA's diminution the ability of the United States or state entities to impose requirements relating to oil discharges, it does not save those powers from the effects of the CWA or any other non-identified federal law. Consistent with this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Ouellette held that a savings clause commencing with "nothing in this section" is by its terms limited to preemption caused by that section alone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 812, 812",
"parenthetical": "such a clause \"does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47",
"parenthetical": "Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | 4,237,083 | a |
Courts are not at liberty to expand the language chosen by Congress, and the omission here is telling. Thus, while Section 2718(c) saves from the OPA's diminution the ability of the United States or state entities to impose requirements relating to oil discharges, it does not save those powers from the effects of the CWA or any other non-identified federal law. Consistent with this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Ouellette held that a savings clause commencing with "nothing in this section" is by its terms limited to preemption caused by that section alone. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 812, 812",
"parenthetical": "such a clause \"does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act\"",
"sentence": "See 479 U.S. at 493, 107 S.Ct. at 812 (such a clause “does not purport to preclude preemption of state law by other provisions of the Act”); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (Section 2718 does not extend to subjects addressed in other Titles of the OPA or other acts)."
} | 4,237,083 | b |
. Although Dr. Barakat was Somogy's treating physician for well over three years and, as a rheumatologist, is a specialist in the diagnosis and treatment of rheumatic diseases, including fibromyalgia, the ALJ does not appear lo have considered these important factors in deciding how much weight to accord her opinion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "529 F.3d 408, 416",
"parenthetical": "ALJ did not err in declining to accord controlling or even substantial weight to opinion of physician who was not a specialist in fibromyalgia",
"sentence": "See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (5); see also Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594 n. 4 (noting that ”[s]pecialized knowledge may be particularly important with respect to a disease such as fibromyalgia that is poorly understood within much of the medical community,” and thus rheumatologists’ opinions were entitled to greater weight than those of other physicians); cf. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 416 (7th Cir.2008) (ALJ did not err in declining to accord controlling or even substantial weight to opinion of physician who was not a specialist in fibromyalgia)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"[s]pecialized knowledge may be particularly important with respect to a disease such as fibromyalgia that is poorly understood within much of the medical community,\" and thus rheumatologists' opinions were entitled to greater weight than those of other physicians",
"sentence": "See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), (5); see also Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594 n. 4 (noting that ”[s]pecialized knowledge may be particularly important with respect to a disease such as fibromyalgia that is poorly understood within much of the medical community,” and thus rheumatologists’ opinions were entitled to greater weight than those of other physicians); cf. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 416 (7th Cir.2008) (ALJ did not err in declining to accord controlling or even substantial weight to opinion of physician who was not a specialist in fibromyalgia)."
} | 3,873,178 | b |
While it may be, as the Commissioner argues, that the opinions of these non-treating sources could constitute substantial evidence in some cases, there is. no basis for this conclusion here, given the absence of opinions from those in the best position to gauge the Child's progress: the physician who diagnosed the Child and prescribed the medication, and the psychiatrist who met with him consistently from the diagnosis onward. It is the treating sources who are the "most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s) and [who] may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations." 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(c)(2). ALJ Shire neither obtained evidence providing this "unique perspective" herself, nor did she advise plaintiff of her right to supplement the record or call the treating doctors as witnesses, as she should have done given her inclination to deny benefits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 108, 114",
"parenthetical": "vacating and remanding \"because the ALJ should have developed a more comprehensive record\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir.2009) (vacating and remanding “because the ALJ should have developed a more comprehensive record”); see also Blash ex rel. D.A.S. v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1278151, at *5 (E.D.N.Y., March 27, 2014) (“The responsibility of an ALJ to fully develop the record is a bedrock principle of Social Security law, and while the ALJ’s decision may ultimately be sustained, it cannot be upheld on the record now before me”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2014 WL 1278151, at *5",
"parenthetical": "\"The responsibility of an ALJ to fully develop the record is a bedrock principle of Social Security law, and while the ALJ's decision may ultimately be sustained, it cannot be upheld on the record now before me\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir.2009) (vacating and remanding “because the ALJ should have developed a more comprehensive record”); see also Blash ex rel. D.A.S. v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1278151, at *5 (E.D.N.Y., March 27, 2014) (“The responsibility of an ALJ to fully develop the record is a bedrock principle of Social Security law, and while the ALJ’s decision may ultimately be sustained, it cannot be upheld on the record now before me”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)."
} | 4,343,255 | a |
Defendant is correct in its assertion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer allow for service of process by mail unless it is allowed by the state where the district court presiding over the action sits or it is allowed in the state where process was served. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice\"",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | 633,459 | b |
Defendant is correct in its assertion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer allow for service of process by mail unless it is allowed by the state where the district court presiding over the action sits or it is allowed in the state where process was served. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "472 S.E.2d 259, 261",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice\"",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | 633,459 | a |
Defendant is correct in its assertion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer allow for service of process by mail unless it is allowed by the state where the district court presiding over the action sits or it is allowed in the state where process was served. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice\"",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | 1,336,340 | b |
Defendant is correct in its assertion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer allow for service of process by mail unless it is allowed by the state where the district court presiding over the action sits or it is allowed in the state where process was served. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "218 F.3d 863, 868",
"parenthetical": "noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "472 S.E.2d 259, 261",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice\"",
"sentence": "See Langley v. Graham, 322 S.C. 428, 472 S.E.2d 259, 261 (App.1996) (noting that “the new federal rules have abolished service by mail, except to the extent permitted by applicable state practice”); see also, Larsen v. Mayo Med. Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that delivery under the federal rules means personally served, not merely mailed)."
} | 1,336,340 | b |
In fact, there is no indication in the record that the jury was charged with an incorrect expression of the law. Since the record does not contain any proposed jury charges and since the record does not reflect that Contractor proffered any proposed charges for the jury, this issue is not preserved. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "315 S.C. 192, 192",
"parenthetical": "\"The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant's request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 214,265 | b |
In fact, there is no indication in the record that the jury was charged with an incorrect expression of the law. Since the record does not contain any proposed jury charges and since the record does not reflect that Contractor proffered any proposed charges for the jury, this issue is not preserved. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant's request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "432 S.E.2d 487, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 214,265 | a |
In fact, there is no indication in the record that the jury was charged with an incorrect expression of the law. Since the record does not contain any proposed jury charges and since the record does not reflect that Contractor proffered any proposed charges for the jury, this issue is not preserved. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant's request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "315 S.C. 192, 192",
"parenthetical": "\"The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 214,265 | a |
In fact, there is no indication in the record that the jury was charged with an incorrect expression of the law. Since the record does not contain any proposed jury charges and since the record does not reflect that Contractor proffered any proposed charges for the jury, this issue is not preserved. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "432 S.E.2d 487, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.\"",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant's request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give",
"sentence": "See Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 533 S.E.2d 341 (Ct.App.2000) (upholding jury charge given by trial judge where record was devoid of appellant’s request for a particular charge or the language of the proposed charge that appellant contended judge refused to give); see also McIntosh, 315 S.C. at 192, 432 S.E.2d at 487 (“The court gave a general charge concerning requests for admissions, which was a correct statement of law. If [defendant] wanted a further charge as to the effect of the amended answers, it was incumbent upon it to specifically proffer such a charge. However, [defendant] failed to proffer an additional charge, either at trial or on appeal.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 214,265 | b |
The record reflects that he was advised of the evidence necessary to substantiate the next-higher disability ratings for each of these claims (see e.g., R. at 226-27, 457-69, 493-500, 503-04, 529-42). Accordingly, even if notice was otherwise inadequate, Mr. Coker was not prejudiced. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 Vet.App. 103, 121",
"parenthetical": "noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial",
"sentence": "See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 121 (2005) (noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial), appeal docketed, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2005); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2); Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Court is required to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 198, 201 (holding that, “[i]n the absence of, demonstrated prejudice,” remand is unnecessary); Barker v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 476, 481 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 F.3d 1369, 1375",
"parenthetical": "Court is required to \"take due account of the rule of prejudicial error\"",
"sentence": "See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 121 (2005) (noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial), appeal docketed, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2005); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2); Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Court is required to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 198, 201 (holding that, “[i]n the absence of, demonstrated prejudice,” remand is unnecessary); Barker v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 476, 481 (same)."
} | 3,000,962 | a |
The record reflects that he was advised of the evidence necessary to substantiate the next-higher disability ratings for each of these claims (see e.g., R. at 226-27, 457-69, 493-500, 503-04, 529-42). Accordingly, even if notice was otherwise inadequate, Mr. Coker was not prejudiced. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 Vet.App. 198, 201",
"parenthetical": "holding that, \"[i]n the absence of, demonstrated prejudice,\" remand is unnecessary",
"sentence": "See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 121 (2005) (noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial), appeal docketed, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2005); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2); Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Court is required to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 198, 201 (holding that, “[i]n the absence of, demonstrated prejudice,” remand is unnecessary); Barker v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 476, 481 (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "19 Vet.App. 103, 121",
"parenthetical": "noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial",
"sentence": "See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 121 (2005) (noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial), appeal docketed, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2005); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2); Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Court is required to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”); Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 198, 201 (holding that, “[i]n the absence of, demonstrated prejudice,” remand is unnecessary); Barker v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 476, 481 (same)."
} | 3,000,962 | b |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 Pa.Super. 500, 500-02",
"parenthetical": "holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | b |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 Pa.Super. 500, 500-02",
"parenthetical": "holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | b |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 1033, 1033-34",
"parenthetical": "holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | b |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 A.2d 1033, 1033-34",
"parenthetical": "holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | b |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | a |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | a |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | a |
If other evidence existed upon which appellant could sustain this theory, that evidence should have been disclosed in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim",
"sentence": "See Roland, supra, 355 Pa.Super. at 500-02, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim, and they did so at their own risk); Brecher v. Cutler, 396 Pa.Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481 (1990) (holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, 567 A.2d 691 (1989) (holding that summary judgment was improperly granted where record did not disclose that the plaintiff would be unable to produce supporting evidence at trial). For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no triable issues of fact as to appellant’s grape theory."
} | 909,404 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the fees from the amount specified in the fee agreement based on the court's assessment of what was reasonable given the risk and complexity involved in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 789, 808",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 F.3d 1211, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | 3,929,067 | a |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the fees from the amount specified in the fee agreement based on the court's assessment of what was reasonable given the risk and complexity involved in this case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 F.3d 1211, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | 3,929,067 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the fees from the amount specified in the fee agreement based on the court's assessment of what was reasonable given the risk and complexity involved in this case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 F.3d 1211, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | 3,929,067 | b |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the fees from the amount specified in the fee agreement based on the court's assessment of what was reasonable given the risk and complexity involved in this case. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "529 F.3d 1211, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.\"",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "586 F.3d 1152, 1152-53",
"parenthetical": "explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees",
"sentence": "See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”)."
} | 3,929,067 | b |
"when the parties have not provided sufficient legal or factual justification for this Court's jurisdiction, this Court is not obligated to embark on its own expedition beyond the parties' arguments in pursuit of a reason to exercise jurisdiction. The burden of establishing the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction falls on the party invoking that jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "784 So.2d 1063, 1065",
"parenthetical": "'Once a party challenges the trial court's jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b",
"sentence": "Ex parte Ray-El, 911 So.2d 1100, 1104 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (placing the burden to “ ‘justify the jurisdiction of this court’ ” on the person bringing a habeas petition as a ‘next friend’ (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990))); cf. Bush v. Laggo Props., L.L.C., 784 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (‘Once a party challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), [Ala."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth the plaintiffs burden of demonstrating standing to bring an action, an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So.2d 288 (Ala.2007) (setting forth the plaintiffs burden of demonstrating standing to bring an action, an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction); ..."
} | 4,136,666 | b |
Officer Sauve knew that fellow officers had discovered cocaine on another passenger, who had identified Chin as the owner. Because Melvin asserted direct personal knowledge of Chin's crime and had himself been caught red-handed, his identification of Chin could be viewed as weightier than a tip from a more distant informant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "617 F.2d 677, 693",
"parenthetical": "an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because \"should he lie to the police,\" he \"risks disfavor with the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 1108, 1115",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime 'need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | 1,875,151 | b |
Officer Sauve knew that fellow officers had discovered cocaine on another passenger, who had identified Chin as the owner. Because Melvin asserted direct personal knowledge of Chin's crime and had himself been caught red-handed, his identification of Chin could be viewed as weightier than a tip from a more distant informant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 1108, 1115",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime 'need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because \"should he lie to the police,\" he \"risks disfavor with the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | 1,875,151 | a |
Officer Sauve knew that fellow officers had discovered cocaine on another passenger, who had identified Chin as the owner. Because Melvin asserted direct personal knowledge of Chin's crime and had himself been caught red-handed, his identification of Chin could be viewed as weightier than a tip from a more distant informant. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because \"should he lie to the police,\" he \"risks disfavor with the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 1108, 1115",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime 'need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | 1,875,151 | b |
Officer Sauve knew that fellow officers had discovered cocaine on another passenger, who had identified Chin as the owner. Because Melvin asserted direct personal knowledge of Chin's crime and had himself been caught red-handed, his identification of Chin could be viewed as weightier than a tip from a more distant informant. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "805 F.2d 1108, 1115",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime 'need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.' \"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because \"should he lie to the police,\" he \"risks disfavor with the prosecution\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Gaviria, 805 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir.1986) (“[A] criminal participant or witness to a crime ‘need not be shown to have been previously reliable before the authorities may rely on his statements.’ ”) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Contreras v. United States, 481 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 1960, 95 L.Ed.2d 531 (1987); see also United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979) (an admitted criminal participant has a strong incentive to tell the truth because “should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”), cert. denied sub nom. Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980)."
} | 1,875,151 | a |
O'Donnell and the cab driver who took Lipscomb home each testified without equivocation before the grand jury about the events of August 28. O'Donnell's testimony directly contradicted the statements by Lipscomb. This testimony, along with the physical evidence found on Lipscomb's person and in his apartment, was more than enough for the grand jury to return a true bill, even if Lipscomb's statement had been played with all inculpatory material deleted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "648 P.2d 1021, 1021",
"parenthetical": "strength of other evidence before grand jury rendered failure to introduce exculpatory material harmless",
"sentence": "See Tookak v. State, 648 P.2d at 1021 (strength of other evidence before grand jury rendered failure to introduce exculpatory material harmless); see also Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981) (if other evidence presented will justify the indictment, use of inadmissible hearsay will not be deemed to vitiate it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if other evidence presented will justify the indictment, use of inadmissible hearsay will not be deemed to vitiate it",
"sentence": "See Tookak v. State, 648 P.2d at 1021 (strength of other evidence before grand jury rendered failure to introduce exculpatory material harmless); see also Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981) (if other evidence presented will justify the indictment, use of inadmissible hearsay will not be deemed to vitiate it)."
} | 10,423,576 | a |
Furthermore, courts have interpreted the language in Rule 15(a) as setting forth a "liberal policy of permitting amendments to ensure the determination of claims on their merits." In furtherance of that principle, this Circuit has acknowledged that, in general, a Rule 15(a) motion should not be evaluated purely on timeliness grounds. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "161 F.3d 342, 342",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"delay by itself is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend\"",
"sentence": "Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d at 342 (explaining that “delay by itself is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend”); see also United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir.1999) (explaining that “ordinarily delay alone is not a basis to deny a motion to amend”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "174 F.3d 333, 337",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"ordinarily delay alone is not a basis to deny a motion to amend\"",
"sentence": "Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d at 342 (explaining that “delay by itself is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend”); see also United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir.1999) (explaining that “ordinarily delay alone is not a basis to deny a motion to amend”)."
} | 1,961,903 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring that the testimony is \"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891",
"parenthetical": "requiring that the testimony is \"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,' which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 N.W.2d 391, 399",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,' which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | b |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring that the testimony is \"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | b |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891",
"parenthetical": "requiring that the testimony is \"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,' which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 N.W.2d 391, 399",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,' which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | b |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring that the testimony is \"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "561 N.E.2d 439, 444",
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | b |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "561 N.E.2d 439, 444",
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891",
"parenthetical": "requiring that the testimony is \"targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "561 N.E.2d 439, 444",
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,' which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | a |
. These safeguards can take the form of prohibiting all expert testimony -- including all "consistent with" testimony -- except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "456 N.W.2d 391, 399",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,' which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "561 N.E.2d 439, 444",
"parenthetical": "\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim's credibility has first been attacked.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim’s credibility has first been attacked.”); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is “targeted to a specific ‘myth’ or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence”); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (holding that \"only those aspects of 'child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,’ which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible”)."
} | 6,912,803 | b |
A classification that adversely affects a fundamental right or is based on a suspect category is constitutional if it passes strict scrutiny in that the classification is "necessary or narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental purpose." Appellant maintains that the use of marijuana is a form of health care affordable to him, and he claims that he has a fundamental right to affordable health care while at the same time he concedes that affordable health care has not been recognized as a fundamental right. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.3d 850, 866",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to allev iate excruciating pain and human suffering\"",
"sentence": "See Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775-76 (7th Cir.1993) (stating that “most federal courts have held that a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of [medical] treatment”); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that “federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to allev iate excruciating pain and human suffering”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "995 F.2d 772, 775-76",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"most federal courts have held that a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of [medical] treatment\"",
"sentence": "See Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775-76 (7th Cir.1993) (stating that “most federal courts have held that a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of [medical] treatment”); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that “federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to allev iate excruciating pain and human suffering”)."
} | 6,968,268 | b |
The facts will only be repeated here where necessary to explain our decision. Under Ohio law, a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith must be based on a fiduciary or other special relationship mutually recognized by the parties to the agreement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "961 F.Supp. 203, 207",
"parenthetical": "Ohio cases finding implied duty turned on the fact that the relationship was an agency",
"sentence": "Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 131 Ohio App.3d 544, 723 N.E.2d 128, 135-6 ( 1998) (where there is no fiduciary or other such special relationship between the parties to the contract, the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing is not justified and a termination based upon legitimate economic interests, such as to increase profits, will not give rise to a claim of bad faith); see also Tanksley & Assoc. v. Willard Indus., Inc., 961 F.Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (Ohio cases finding implied duty turned on the fact that the relationship was an agency). Here, there was no evidence of such a relationship; CDM was merely Complete and Gerry’s independent contractor."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where there is no fiduciary or other such special relationship between the parties to the contract, the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing is not justified and a termination based upon legitimate economic interests, such as to increase profits, will not give rise to a claim of bad faith",
"sentence": "Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 131 Ohio App.3d 544, 723 N.E.2d 128, 135-6 ( 1998) (where there is no fiduciary or other such special relationship between the parties to the contract, the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing is not justified and a termination based upon legitimate economic interests, such as to increase profits, will not give rise to a claim of bad faith); see also Tanksley & Assoc. v. Willard Indus., Inc., 961 F.Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (Ohio cases finding implied duty turned on the fact that the relationship was an agency). Here, there was no evidence of such a relationship; CDM was merely Complete and Gerry’s independent contractor."
} | 1,003,668 | b |
The facts will only be repeated here where necessary to explain our decision. Under Ohio law, a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith must be based on a fiduciary or other special relationship mutually recognized by the parties to the agreement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "961 F.Supp. 203, 207",
"parenthetical": "Ohio cases finding implied duty turned on the fact that the relationship was an agency",
"sentence": "Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 131 Ohio App.3d 544, 723 N.E.2d 128, 135-6 ( 1998) (where there is no fiduciary or other such special relationship between the parties to the contract, the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing is not justified and a termination based upon legitimate economic interests, such as to increase profits, will not give rise to a claim of bad faith); see also Tanksley & Assoc. v. Willard Indus., Inc., 961 F.Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (Ohio cases finding implied duty turned on the fact that the relationship was an agency). Here, there was no evidence of such a relationship; CDM was merely Complete and Gerry’s independent contractor."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "723 N.E.2d 128, 135-6",
"parenthetical": "where there is no fiduciary or other such special relationship between the parties to the contract, the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing is not justified and a termination based upon legitimate economic interests, such as to increase profits, will not give rise to a claim of bad faith",
"sentence": "Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 131 Ohio App.3d 544, 723 N.E.2d 128, 135-6 ( 1998) (where there is no fiduciary or other such special relationship between the parties to the contract, the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing is not justified and a termination based upon legitimate economic interests, such as to increase profits, will not give rise to a claim of bad faith); see also Tanksley & Assoc. v. Willard Indus., Inc., 961 F.Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (Ohio cases finding implied duty turned on the fact that the relationship was an agency). Here, there was no evidence of such a relationship; CDM was merely Complete and Gerry’s independent contractor."
} | 1,003,668 | b |
The only conceivable claim is against Defendant Dr. Ayyaswamy, a psychiatrist who Matthews alleges threatened him when he asked about his criminal case. However, mere threatening language does not amount to a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "973 F.2d 1518, 1524",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing idle threats from threats causing terror of serious injury or imminent death",
"sentence": "See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir.1987) (stating that not every unpleasant experience a prisoner faces, like verbal abuse or harassment, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that mere threats and gestures do not amount to constitutional violations); see also Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1992) (distinguishing idle threats from threats causing terror of serious injury or imminent death)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "832 F.2d 950, 955",
"parenthetical": "stating that not every unpleasant experience a prisoner faces, like verbal abuse or harassment, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment",
"sentence": "See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir.1987) (stating that not every unpleasant experience a prisoner faces, like verbal abuse or harassment, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that mere threats and gestures do not amount to constitutional violations); see also Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1992) (distinguishing idle threats from threats causing terror of serious injury or imminent death)."
} | 4,164,342 | b |
The only conceivable claim is against Defendant Dr. Ayyaswamy, a psychiatrist who Matthews alleges threatened him when he asked about his criminal case. However, mere threatening language does not amount to a constitutional violation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "713 F.2d 143, 146",
"parenthetical": "noting that mere threats and gestures do not amount to constitutional violations",
"sentence": "See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir.1987) (stating that not every unpleasant experience a prisoner faces, like verbal abuse or harassment, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that mere threats and gestures do not amount to constitutional violations); see also Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1992) (distinguishing idle threats from threats causing terror of serious injury or imminent death)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "973 F.2d 1518, 1524",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing idle threats from threats causing terror of serious injury or imminent death",
"sentence": "See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir.1987) (stating that not every unpleasant experience a prisoner faces, like verbal abuse or harassment, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir.1983) (noting that mere threats and gestures do not amount to constitutional violations); see also Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1992) (distinguishing idle threats from threats causing terror of serious injury or imminent death)."
} | 4,164,342 | a |
Section 1367 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy .... " 28 U.S.C. SS 1367(a). Pursuant to subsection (c), however, the Court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction if, among other things, it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. SS 1367(c)(3). In other words, once "the bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction have been extinguished[,] the district court may decline to exercise continuing 'pendent or supplemental jurisdiction over [the] plaintiffs state claims." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Once a federal court dismisses claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims.\"",
"sentence": "Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir.1998) (dismissing without prejudice plaintiffs claims for, inter alia, breach of contract after having entered summary for defendant on plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment claims); see also Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1564 n. 1 (10th Cir.1996) (“Once a federal court dismisses claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "149 F.3d 1228, 1236",
"parenthetical": "dismissing without prejudice plaintiffs claims for, inter alia, breach of contract after having entered summary for defendant on plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment claims",
"sentence": "Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir.1998) (dismissing without prejudice plaintiffs claims for, inter alia, breach of contract after having entered summary for defendant on plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment claims); see also Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1564 n. 1 (10th Cir.1996) (“Once a federal court dismisses claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims.”)."
} | 3,772,061 | b |
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address the ADEA in Darden, we find no reason to deviate from the common-law test for purposes of determining employee status under the ADEA. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96",
"parenthetical": "finding it unnecessary to decide which test to apply in determining whether a claimant is an employee under the ADEA because both the common-law test and the hybrid test focus on the hiring party's control",
"sentence": "See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir.1996) (adopting the common-law test “for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the ADEA” and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the ADEA must be made “in accordance with common law agency principles”); but see Mangram v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 61, 62 (4th Cir.1997) (applying the hybrid test as adopted in previous eases); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1993) (finding it unnecessary to decide which test to apply in determining whether a claimant is an employee under the ADEA because both the common-law test and the hybrid test focus on the hiring party’s control)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 F.3d 625, 631",
"parenthetical": "adopting the common-law test \"for determining who qualifies as an 'employee' under the ADEA\" and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits",
"sentence": "See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir.1996) (adopting the common-law test “for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the ADEA” and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the ADEA must be made “in accordance with common law agency principles”); but see Mangram v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 61, 62 (4th Cir.1997) (applying the hybrid test as adopted in previous eases); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1993) (finding it unnecessary to decide which test to apply in determining whether a claimant is an employee under the ADEA because both the common-law test and the hybrid test focus on the hiring party’s control)."
} | 191,495 | b |
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address the ADEA in Darden, we find no reason to deviate from the common-law test for purposes of determining employee status under the ADEA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "987 F.2d 86, 90",
"parenthetical": "holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the ADEA must be made \"in accordance with common law agency principles\"",
"sentence": "See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir.1996) (adopting the common-law test “for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the ADEA” and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the ADEA must be made “in accordance with common law agency principles”); but see Mangram v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 61, 62 (4th Cir.1997) (applying the hybrid test as adopted in previous eases); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1993) (finding it unnecessary to decide which test to apply in determining whether a claimant is an employee under the ADEA because both the common-law test and the hybrid test focus on the hiring party’s control)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96",
"parenthetical": "finding it unnecessary to decide which test to apply in determining whether a claimant is an employee under the ADEA because both the common-law test and the hybrid test focus on the hiring party's control",
"sentence": "See Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625, 631 (1st Cir.1996) (adopting the common-law test “for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under the ADEA” and disregarding decisions to the contrary in other circuits); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that determination of whether someone is an employee under the ADEA must be made “in accordance with common law agency principles”); but see Mangram v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 61, 62 (4th Cir.1997) (applying the hybrid test as adopted in previous eases); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1993) (finding it unnecessary to decide which test to apply in determining whether a claimant is an employee under the ADEA because both the common-law test and the hybrid test focus on the hiring party’s control)."
} | 191,495 | a |
Second, we note that there is a strong public policy against "factoring transactions" such as the one entered into between Short and Singer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | 2,223,659 | a |
Second, we note that there is a strong public policy against "factoring transactions" such as the one entered into between Short and Singer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | 2,223,659 | a |
Second, we note that there is a strong public policy against "factoring transactions" such as the one entered into between Short and Singer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 P.2d 756, 762",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | 2,223,659 | b |
Second, we note that there is a strong public policy against "factoring transactions" such as the one entered into between Short and Singer. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "311 P.2d 756, 762",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.\"",
"sentence": "See Good v. Good, 79 Idaho 119, 311 P.2d 756, 762 (Idaho 1957) (“[T]he rules of equity must be so applied as to serve the public interest and the public policy of the state.”); see also In re R & P Capital Res., Inc., 2 Misc.3d 220, 772 N.Y.S.2d 461, 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2003) (“[T]hese purchases have not been looked upon favorably by courts or legislatures. In particular, courts have refused to approve factoring transactions where the annuity contract contains a non-assignment clause.”); 144 Cong. Rec. S11499-01, S11500 (1998)."
} | 2,223,659 | b |
However, based on the justifications offered by defendants in the classified documents reviewed by this Court, it cannot conclude that defendants' explanation for its change in policy is a post hoc rationalization. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861",
"parenthetical": "\"National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.\"",
"sentence": "Ziglar v. Abbasi, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (“National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.”); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that application of injunctive-relief standards changes where core concerns of the executive branch are at stake)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.2d 950, 954",
"parenthetical": "noting that application of injunctive-relief standards changes where core concerns of the executive branch are at stake",
"sentence": "Ziglar v. Abbasi, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (“National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.”); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that application of injunctive-relief standards changes where core concerns of the executive branch are at stake)."
} | 12,273,287 | a |
However, based on the justifications offered by defendants in the classified documents reviewed by this Court, it cannot conclude that defendants' explanation for its change in policy is a post hoc rationalization. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.\"",
"sentence": "Ziglar v. Abbasi, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (“National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.”); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that application of injunctive-relief standards changes where core concerns of the executive branch are at stake)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "570 F.2d 950, 954",
"parenthetical": "noting that application of injunctive-relief standards changes where core concerns of the executive branch are at stake",
"sentence": "Ziglar v. Abbasi, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (“National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.”); Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that application of injunctive-relief standards changes where core concerns of the executive branch are at stake)."
} | 12,273,287 | a |
Under defendant's reasoning, inferences of guilt derived from the invocation of a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege are permissible only insofar as they lead to a defendant's acquittal. Such a lopsided rule would contravene the well-settled principle that both the government, as well as the defendant, are entitled to a fair trial. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "830 F.2d 596, 603",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"existing legal precedent defines the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial as a right that inures not only to the sole benefit of a defendant, but rather one that inures equally to the state as the representative of the people.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 603 (6th Cir.1987) (Krupansky, J., concurring) (observing that “existing legal precedent defines the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial as a right that inures not only to the sole benefit of a defendant, but rather one that inures equally to the state as the representative of the people.”); see also United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.1969) (noting “the concept of a fair trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "412 F.2d 661, 666",
"parenthetical": "noting \"the concept of a fair trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 603 (6th Cir.1987) (Krupansky, J., concurring) (observing that “existing legal precedent defines the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial as a right that inures not only to the sole benefit of a defendant, but rather one that inures equally to the state as the representative of the people.”); see also United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.1969) (noting “the concept of a fair trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense”)."
} | 4,123,747 | a |
But the reference was inadvertent in the sense that the pros ecutor was carried away momentarily m a context in which the fact of a prior conviction was common ground among the parties and to which Scala opened the door by calling Barket and seeking to establish that Barket told him not to file tax returns. In any case, the Court finds that the repeated curative instructions were more than adequate to avoid any prejudice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 1099, 1109",
"parenthetical": "no reversal of conviction based on witnesses' allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent “overwhelming probability” of inability to do so) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)); accord United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1109 (2d Cir.1992) (no reversal of conviction based on witnesses’ allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent \"overwhelming probability\" of inability to do so",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent “overwhelming probability” of inability to do so) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)); accord United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1109 (2d Cir.1992) (no reversal of conviction based on witnesses’ allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it)."
} | 4,080,709 | b |
But the reference was inadvertent in the sense that the pros ecutor was carried away momentarily m a context in which the fact of a prior conviction was common ground among the parties and to which Scala opened the door by calling Barket and seeking to establish that Barket told him not to file tax returns. In any case, the Court finds that the repeated curative instructions were more than adequate to avoid any prejudice. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 1099, 1109",
"parenthetical": "no reversal of conviction based on witnesses' allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent “overwhelming probability” of inability to do so) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)); accord United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1109 (2d Cir.1992) (no reversal of conviction based on witnesses’ allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent \"overwhelming probability\" of inability to do so",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent “overwhelming probability” of inability to do so) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)); accord United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1109 (2d Cir.1992) (no reversal of conviction based on witnesses’ allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it)."
} | 4,080,709 | b |
But the reference was inadvertent in the sense that the pros ecutor was carried away momentarily m a context in which the fact of a prior conviction was common ground among the parties and to which Scala opened the door by calling Barket and seeking to establish that Barket told him not to file tax returns. In any case, the Court finds that the repeated curative instructions were more than adequate to avoid any prejudice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent \"overwhelming probability\" of inability to do so",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent “overwhelming probability” of inability to do so) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)); accord United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1109 (2d Cir.1992) (no reversal of conviction based on witnesses’ allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "960 F.2d 1099, 1109",
"parenthetical": "no reversal of conviction based on witnesses' allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence absent “overwhelming probability” of inability to do so) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)); accord United States v. Castano, 999 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1993); see also United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1109 (2d Cir.1992) (no reversal of conviction based on witnesses’ allusions to criminal conduct not charged in the indictment where district court struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it)."
} | 4,080,709 | a |
In securities fraud cases, despite the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) for averments constituting the circumstances of the fraud asserted and the scienter requirement Hochfelder propounded, some courts permitted generalized pleadings or relaxed specificity of the requisite fraudulent intent to survive motions to dismiss, relying for authority on the language of Rule 9(b) itself, which provides that "malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind, may be averred generally". | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "886 F.2d 12, 12",
"parenthetical": "noting that under Rule 9(b) a complaint need only aver intent generally, although it nonetheless must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent",
"sentence": "See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement “simply by saying that scien-ter existed.”); see also Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 12 (noting that under Rule 9(b) a complaint need only aver intent generally, although it nonetheless must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent); Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1070 (“Thus, great specificity was not required with respect to the allegations of knowledge and scienter.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 F.3d 1541, 1547",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement \"simply by saying that scien-ter existed.\"",
"sentence": "See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement “simply by saying that scien-ter existed.”); see also Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 12 (noting that under Rule 9(b) a complaint need only aver intent generally, although it nonetheless must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent); Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1070 (“Thus, great specificity was not required with respect to the allegations of knowledge and scienter.”)"
} | 11,078,204 | b |
In securities fraud cases, despite the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) for averments constituting the circumstances of the fraud asserted and the scienter requirement Hochfelder propounded, some courts permitted generalized pleadings or relaxed specificity of the requisite fraudulent intent to survive motions to dismiss, relying for authority on the language of Rule 9(b) itself, which provides that "malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind, may be averred generally". | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "754 F.2d 1070, 1070",
"parenthetical": "\"Thus, great specificity was not required with respect to the allegations of knowledge and scienter.\"",
"sentence": "See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement “simply by saying that scien-ter existed.”); see also Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 12 (noting that under Rule 9(b) a complaint need only aver intent generally, although it nonetheless must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent); Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1070 (“Thus, great specificity was not required with respect to the allegations of knowledge and scienter.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 F.3d 1541, 1547",
"parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement \"simply by saying that scien-ter existed.\"",
"sentence": "See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement “simply by saying that scien-ter existed.”); see also Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 12 (noting that under Rule 9(b) a complaint need only aver intent generally, although it nonetheless must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent); Goldman, 754 F.2d at 1070 (“Thus, great specificity was not required with respect to the allegations of knowledge and scienter.”)"
} | 11,078,204 | b |
The pleading standard a defendant must meet to demonstrate he is entitled to an Atkins hearing is a low one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding Lousiana standard that a defendant must raise a \"reasonable doubt\" as to their intellectual disability before being entitled to an Atkins hearing consistent with Atkins",
"sentence": "See Brumfield v. Cain, — U.S. -, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015) (finding Lousiana standard that a defendant must raise a “reasonable doubt” as to their intellectual disability before being entitled to an Atkins hearing consistent with Atkins); Simpson, 490 F.3d at 1035. “There is no question the allegations in [Davis’] petition are as adequate as Simpson’s pleading threshold where the petitioner ‘alleged that he is mentally retarded as Atkins defines that condition’ in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing on his mental retardation claim.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 959, 963-64",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's petition \"satisfied the pleading standard of Simpson and Sasser I, by expressly incorporating\" evidence of trouble in school, an IQ score of 70, difficulty with visual motor and expressive and receptive language skills, and diagnoses of ADHD and antisocial personality disorder",
"sentence": "Sasser I, 553 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Simpson, 490 F.3d at 1035); see also Jackson v. Norris, 615 F.3d 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant’s petition “satisfied the pleading standard of Simpson and Sasser I, by expressly incorporating” evidence of trouble in school, an IQ score of 70, difficulty with visual motor and expressive and receptive language skills, and diagnoses of ADHD and antisocial personality disorder)."
} | 12,277,248 | a |
The pleading standard a defendant must meet to demonstrate he is entitled to an Atkins hearing is a low one. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "615 F.3d 959, 963-64",
"parenthetical": "finding that the defendant's petition \"satisfied the pleading standard of Simpson and Sasser I, by expressly incorporating\" evidence of trouble in school, an IQ score of 70, difficulty with visual motor and expressive and receptive language skills, and diagnoses of ADHD and antisocial personality disorder",
"sentence": "Sasser I, 553 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Simpson, 490 F.3d at 1035); see also Jackson v. Norris, 615 F.3d 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant’s petition “satisfied the pleading standard of Simpson and Sasser I, by expressly incorporating” evidence of trouble in school, an IQ score of 70, difficulty with visual motor and expressive and receptive language skills, and diagnoses of ADHD and antisocial personality disorder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding Lousiana standard that a defendant must raise a \"reasonable doubt\" as to their intellectual disability before being entitled to an Atkins hearing consistent with Atkins",
"sentence": "See Brumfield v. Cain, — U.S. -, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015) (finding Lousiana standard that a defendant must raise a “reasonable doubt” as to their intellectual disability before being entitled to an Atkins hearing consistent with Atkins); Simpson, 490 F.3d at 1035. “There is no question the allegations in [Davis’] petition are as adequate as Simpson’s pleading threshold where the petitioner ‘alleged that he is mentally retarded as Atkins defines that condition’ in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing on his mental retardation claim.”"
} | 12,277,248 | b |
If plaintiffs prevail on their theory that RSC was solely liable for the Davidson accident, they cannot, as a matter of law, prove the first element of indemnity, that they discharged a legal obligation owed to the Davidsons. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 204017, at *9",
"parenthetical": "common law indemnity claim \"cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied\"",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "98 Or.App. 195, 198",
"parenthetical": "in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | 4,119,146 | a |
If plaintiffs prevail on their theory that RSC was solely liable for the Davidson accident, they cannot, as a matter of law, prove the first element of indemnity, that they discharged a legal obligation owed to the Davidsons. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 204017, at *9",
"parenthetical": "common law indemnity claim \"cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied\"",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | 4,119,146 | b |
If plaintiffs prevail on their theory that RSC was solely liable for the Davidson accident, they cannot, as a matter of law, prove the first element of indemnity, that they discharged a legal obligation owed to the Davidsons. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party's injuries",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 204017, at *9",
"parenthetical": "common law indemnity claim \"cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied\"",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | 4,119,146 | b |
If plaintiffs prevail on their theory that RSC was solely liable for the Davidson accident, they cannot, as a matter of law, prove the first element of indemnity, that they discharged a legal obligation owed to the Davidsons. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2007 WL 204017, at *9",
"parenthetical": "common law indemnity claim \"cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied\"",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party's injuries",
"sentence": "See Mayorga, 2007 WL 204017 at *9 (common law indemnity claim “cannot be sustained if the [party seeking indemnity] could not have been hable to the [injured] party for the legal obligation satisfied”); see also Irwin Yacht Sales Inc. v. Carver Boat Corp., 98 Or.App. 195, 198, 778 P.2d 982 (1989)(in-demnitee not entitled to indemnity unless it is liable to the injured third party); Smith v. Urich, 151 Or.App. 40, 947 P.2d 1125 (1997)(indemnity claim failed for lack of evidence that plaintiff was negligent or caused third party’s injuries)."
} | 4,119,146 | a |
We do not find Looper has suffered an injury; therefore, we find Looper is not aggrieved. We analogize the order in this case to an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, which is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 S.C. 177, 184",
"parenthetical": "analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 S.C. 568, 569",
"parenthetical": "finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | 4,254,922 | b |
We do not find Looper has suffered an injury; therefore, we find Looper is not aggrieved. We analogize the order in this case to an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, which is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 S.E.2d 677, 680",
"parenthetical": "analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 S.C. 568, 569",
"parenthetical": "finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | 4,254,922 | b |
We do not find Looper has suffered an injury; therefore, we find Looper is not aggrieved. We analogize the order in this case to an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, which is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "405 S.C. 177, 184",
"parenthetical": "analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 S.E.2d 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | 4,254,922 | b |
We do not find Looper has suffered an injury; therefore, we find Looper is not aggrieved. We analogize the order in this case to an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, which is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "747 S.E.2d 677, 680",
"parenthetical": "analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "290 S.E.2d 817, 817",
"parenthetical": "finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory",
"sentence": "See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable)."
} | 4,254,922 | b |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "5 F.3d 583, 585",
"parenthetical": "parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | 10,987 | b |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "710 F.2d 214, 215",
"parenthetical": "state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | 10,987 | a |
In Ray, the court held that that a probation officer was not absolutely immune for damages resulting from an arrest caused by a false parole violator's warrant. Similarly, courts have found that probation officers are not entitled to absolute immunity in investigating and apprehending probation violators. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "815 F.2d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8 (stating in dictum that parole officers not entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as arresting officers)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer",
"sentence": "See also Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.1993) (parole officer received qualified immunity with respect to claim of unreasonable search); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (state probation officer not entitled to absolute immunity for causing mistaken arrest of probationer), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 271-72 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (parole officers entitled to qualified immunity with respect to arrest of parolee), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 751, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983)."
} | 10,987 | a |
Subsets and Splits