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In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only \"raw figures\" that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | 12,269,928 | a |
In order to meet the third prong of a prima facie case, a showing of facts and circumstances raising an inference of discrimination is required, and raw data alone is often not enough. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only \"raw figures\" that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck",
"sentence": "See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulate and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply”); Keel, 162 F.3d at 271 (holding that there was no Batson claim even when the prosecution used nearly seventy percent (70%) of its peremptory strikes to remove potential African American jurors); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 881 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a claim of gender discrimination in use of peremptory strikes when the defendant provided only “raw figures” that eight out of twenty women were peremptorily struck by the government while only two out of twenty-one men were struck)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.\"",
"sentence": "But see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“[T]he statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors.”)."
} | 12,269,928 | a |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "447 U.S. 625, 627",
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 624, 647-48",
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | b |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 624, 647-48",
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | b |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 624, 647-48",
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | b |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "447 U.S. 625, 627",
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | a |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | a |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | a |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "447 U.S. 625, 627",
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | b |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | a |
(Vol. 8 at 1932-33 requesting instructions under OUJI-CR 449, 450 & 451.) The trial court declined the instructions, finding insufficient evidence to support a verdict of second-degree murder. On direct appeal to the OCCA, Welch argued the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to instruct on this lesser included offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict",
"sentence": "See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (while a jury need not be instructed on every lesser-included offense that may be supported, the jury must not be faced with an all (death) or nothing approach); see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) (jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict). The OCCA held that because second degree murder is not a “lesser included offense of first degree malice murder” and the jury had been instructed on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter, “the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.”"
} | 4,201,618 | a |
The statement merely describes the parties' expectations of the purpose of the loan. This statement does not oblige Park Avenue Bank to assure the proper use of the funds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "655 F.2d 743, 746-47",
"parenthetical": "leases clearly manifested bank's obligation to make payments for purchase of broadcasting equipment",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Cont’l Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir.1981) (leases clearly manifested bank’s obligation to make payments for purchase of broadcasting equipment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "880 F.2d 1275, 1275-76",
"parenthetical": "bank record evidencing obligation to provide additional loan was not sufficient to show agreement to fund entire project",
"sentence": "Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d at 1275-76 (bank record evidencing obligation to provide additional loan was not sufficient to show agreement to fund entire project); McCullough, 911 F.2d at 601 (memorandum and letters in bank files referencing alterations to mortgage were insufficient evidence of bank’s obligation to transfer property or oil leases to borrower). The statement of purpose contained in the Note is not an explicit obligation and is not the type of agreement that has been sufficient to prevent operation of the D’Oench Duhme doctrine."
} | 3,816,848 | b |
The statement merely describes the parties' expectations of the purpose of the loan. This statement does not oblige Park Avenue Bank to assure the proper use of the funds. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "655 F.2d 743, 746-47",
"parenthetical": "leases clearly manifested bank's obligation to make payments for purchase of broadcasting equipment",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Cont’l Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir.1981) (leases clearly manifested bank’s obligation to make payments for purchase of broadcasting equipment)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "911 F.2d 601, 601",
"parenthetical": "memorandum and letters in bank files referencing alterations to mortgage were insufficient evidence of bank's obligation to transfer property or oil leases to borrower",
"sentence": "Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d at 1275-76 (bank record evidencing obligation to provide additional loan was not sufficient to show agreement to fund entire project); McCullough, 911 F.2d at 601 (memorandum and letters in bank files referencing alterations to mortgage were insufficient evidence of bank’s obligation to transfer property or oil leases to borrower). The statement of purpose contained in the Note is not an explicit obligation and is not the type of agreement that has been sufficient to prevent operation of the D’Oench Duhme doctrine."
} | 3,816,848 | b |
Some of our sister circuits appear to have recognized an innocent possession defense; however, we can find no case in which a circuit has squarely applied the innocent possession defense to a SS 922(g)(1) charge, where the elements of a justification defense are not present. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declining to address whether the defense was available because defense counsel failed to seek a proper instruction on the innocent possession theory, but noting that its case law did not foreclose such a defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 716 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995) (declining to address whether the defense was available because defense counsel failed to seek a proper instruction on the innocent possession theory, but noting that its case law did not foreclose such a defense); United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.1994) (concluding that although the innocent possession defense presented a “novel issue,” it need not decide the issue because the evidence did not support the defense); cf. United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.1991) (recognizing an “innocent possession defense,” though the defense in that case is more properly considered a “justification defense” as life and limb were arguably at stake)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1198",
"parenthetical": "recognizing an \"innocent possession defense,\" though the defense in that case is more properly considered a \"justification defense\" as life and limb were arguably at stake",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 716 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995) (declining to address whether the defense was available because defense counsel failed to seek a proper instruction on the innocent possession theory, but noting that its case law did not foreclose such a defense); United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.1994) (concluding that although the innocent possession defense presented a “novel issue,” it need not decide the issue because the evidence did not support the defense); cf. United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.1991) (recognizing an “innocent possession defense,” though the defense in that case is more properly considered a “justification defense” as life and limb were arguably at stake)."
} | 3,676,023 | a |
Some of our sister circuits appear to have recognized an innocent possession defense; however, we can find no case in which a circuit has squarely applied the innocent possession defense to a SS 922(g)(1) charge, where the elements of a justification defense are not present. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "16 F.3d 733, 738",
"parenthetical": "concluding that although the innocent possession defense presented a \"novel issue,\" it need not decide the issue because the evidence did not support the defense",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 716 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995) (declining to address whether the defense was available because defense counsel failed to seek a proper instruction on the innocent possession theory, but noting that its case law did not foreclose such a defense); United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.1994) (concluding that although the innocent possession defense presented a “novel issue,” it need not decide the issue because the evidence did not support the defense); cf. United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.1991) (recognizing an “innocent possession defense,” though the defense in that case is more properly considered a “justification defense” as life and limb were arguably at stake)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "923 F.2d 1193, 1198",
"parenthetical": "recognizing an \"innocent possession defense,\" though the defense in that case is more properly considered a \"justification defense\" as life and limb were arguably at stake",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 716 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995) (declining to address whether the defense was available because defense counsel failed to seek a proper instruction on the innocent possession theory, but noting that its case law did not foreclose such a defense); United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.1994) (concluding that although the innocent possession defense presented a “novel issue,” it need not decide the issue because the evidence did not support the defense); cf. United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.1991) (recognizing an “innocent possession defense,” though the defense in that case is more properly considered a “justification defense” as life and limb were arguably at stake)."
} | 3,676,023 | a |
Defendants' argument that they will be unduly prejudiced because of the extensive alleged culpability of some of their co-Defendants, in comparison to the asserted lesser degree of their asserted individual involvements in the alleged conspiracy, does not require granting said Defendants a separate trial because the court must also consider, based on the nature of the expected evidence, the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against the individual co-Defendants at a joint trial. In particular, in addition to the various levels of culpability of the co-defendants, the court must consider the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against each co-defendant separately and equitably. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "851 F.2d 547, 556",
"parenthetical": "severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant \"was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82",
"parenthetical": "if jury can \"collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant's own acts\" and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | 3,636,942 | b |
Defendants' argument that they will be unduly prejudiced because of the extensive alleged culpability of some of their co-Defendants, in comparison to the asserted lesser degree of their asserted individual involvements in the alleged conspiracy, does not require granting said Defendants a separate trial because the court must also consider, based on the nature of the expected evidence, the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against the individual co-Defendants at a joint trial. In particular, in addition to the various levels of culpability of the co-defendants, the court must consider the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against each co-defendant separately and equitably. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "851 F.2d 547, 556",
"parenthetical": "severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant \"was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if jury can \"collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant's own acts\" and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | 3,636,942 | b |
Defendants' argument that they will be unduly prejudiced because of the extensive alleged culpability of some of their co-Defendants, in comparison to the asserted lesser degree of their asserted individual involvements in the alleged conspiracy, does not require granting said Defendants a separate trial because the court must also consider, based on the nature of the expected evidence, the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against the individual co-Defendants at a joint trial. In particular, in addition to the various levels of culpability of the co-defendants, the court must consider the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against each co-defendant separately and equitably. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "851 F.2d 547, 556",
"parenthetical": "severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant \"was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if jury can \"collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant's own acts\" and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | 3,636,942 | b |
Defendants' argument that they will be unduly prejudiced because of the extensive alleged culpability of some of their co-Defendants, in comparison to the asserted lesser degree of their asserted individual involvements in the alleged conspiracy, does not require granting said Defendants a separate trial because the court must also consider, based on the nature of the expected evidence, the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against the individual co-Defendants at a joint trial. In particular, in addition to the various levels of culpability of the co-defendants, the court must consider the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against each co-defendant separately and equitably. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "84 S.Ct. 73, 74",
"parenthetical": "if jury can \"collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant's own acts\" and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "851 F.2d 547, 556",
"parenthetical": "severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant \"was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | 3,636,942 | a |
Defendants' argument that they will be unduly prejudiced because of the extensive alleged culpability of some of their co-Defendants, in comparison to the asserted lesser degree of their asserted individual involvements in the alleged conspiracy, does not require granting said Defendants a separate trial because the court must also consider, based on the nature of the expected evidence, the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against the individual co-Defendants at a joint trial. In particular, in addition to the various levels of culpability of the co-defendants, the court must consider the jury's ability to weigh the evidence against each co-defendant separately and equitably. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "851 F.2d 547, 556",
"parenthetical": "severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant \"was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "if jury can \"collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant's own acts\" and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary",
"sentence": "United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962) (if jury can “collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon the defendant’s own acts” and render a fair verdict as to each defendant, severance is unnecessary), aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836, 84 S.Ct. 73, 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 (1963); see also United States v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 556 (2d Cir. 1988) (severance was denied where evidence regarding each defendant “was adequately straightforward that the jury could consider it without any significant spillover effect.”))."
} | 3,636,942 | b |
The VA's tragic decision to expel Mr. DeJesus "[w]ithout a doubt ... [took] someone who [was] already in crisis and ... compounded] that crisis many fold because ... now that [the VA was] throwing him out of the sanctuary where he [had] been for over a year." (1.140). Thus, the VAMC's multiple breaches and its insistence that Mr. DeJesus be discharged without an evaluation, detainment, or involuntary commitment substantially caused the death of Alejandro DeJesus, Jr., Felicia DeJesus, Mark Faulk, and Aaron Faulk. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "525 Pa. 70, 78",
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital \"prematurely\" discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | 8,932,665 | b |
The VA's tragic decision to expel Mr. DeJesus "[w]ithout a doubt ... [took] someone who [was] already in crisis and ... compounded] that crisis many fold because ... now that [the VA was] throwing him out of the sanctuary where he [had] been for over a year." (1.140). Thus, the VAMC's multiple breaches and its insistence that Mr. DeJesus be discharged without an evaluation, detainment, or involuntary commitment substantially caused the death of Alejandro DeJesus, Jr., Felicia DeJesus, Mark Faulk, and Aaron Faulk. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital \"prematurely\" discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | 8,932,665 | a |
The VA's tragic decision to expel Mr. DeJesus "[w]ithout a doubt ... [took] someone who [was] already in crisis and ... compounded] that crisis many fold because ... now that [the VA was] throwing him out of the sanctuary where he [had] been for over a year." (1.140). Thus, the VAMC's multiple breaches and its insistence that Mr. DeJesus be discharged without an evaluation, detainment, or involuntary commitment substantially caused the death of Alejandro DeJesus, Jr., Felicia DeJesus, Mark Faulk, and Aaron Faulk. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "614 A.2d 226, 232",
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital \"prematurely\" discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "525 Pa. 70, 78",
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | 8,932,665 | a |
The VA's tragic decision to expel Mr. DeJesus "[w]ithout a doubt ... [took] someone who [was] already in crisis and ... compounded] that crisis many fold because ... now that [the VA was] throwing him out of the sanctuary where he [had] been for over a year." (1.140). Thus, the VAMC's multiple breaches and its insistence that Mr. DeJesus be discharged without an evaluation, detainment, or involuntary commitment substantially caused the death of Alejandro DeJesus, Jr., Felicia DeJesus, Mark Faulk, and Aaron Faulk. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "614 A.2d 226, 232",
"parenthetical": "causation established when hospital \"prematurely\" discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge",
"sentence": "See Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 531 Pa. 515, 614 A.2d 226, 232 (1992) (causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge); see also Goryeb v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 525 Pa. 70, 78, 575 A.2d 545 (Pa.1990) (causation established when hospital improperly discharged a mutual patient who shot three people a week after his discharge); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (1977)."
} | 8,932,665 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 87, 117",
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 87, 117",
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "982 F.2d 173, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 87, 117",
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "982 F.2d 173, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "982 F.2d 173, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "25 U.S. 474, 474",
"parenthetical": "\"In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "25 U.S. 474, 474",
"parenthetical": "\"In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "982 F.2d 173, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "25 U.S. 474, 474",
"parenthetical": "\"In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "418 U.S. 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | b |
The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient if its language tracks the statute. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "982 F.2d 173, 176",
"parenthetical": "\"An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.\"",
"sentence": "Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.”); Gooding, 25 U.S. at 474, 25 U.S. 460 (“In general, it may be said, that it is sufficient certainty in ... an indictment to allege the offence in the very terms of the statute.”); cf. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (clarifying that the general rule applies so long as the statutory language provides all the elements of the offense); United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir.1992) (“An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense.”)."
} | 4,249,927 | a |
In our weighing the ordinance in this case and the Supreme Court's reasoning in upholding a similar ordinance, we conclude that the Federal rule does not adequately protect the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts under art. 16. Not surprisingly, other State Supreme Courts have come to the same conclusion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "571 Pa. 375, 394",
"parenthetical": "on remand from United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held Erie ordinance invalid on State constitutional grounds",
"sentence": "See Pap’s A.M. v. Erie, 571 Pa. 375, 394 (2002) (on remand from United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held Erie ordinance invalid on State constitutional grounds)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "54 N.Y.2d 228, 234-236",
"parenthetical": "on remand from United States Supreme Court, court held complete ban on topless dancing in establishments serving alcohol invalid on State constitutional grounds",
"sentence": "See also Mickens v. Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818, 821- 823 (Alaska 1982) (citing Commonwealth v. Sees, supra, court held ordinance prohibiting nude performances violates State Constitution even if not First Amendment); Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 234-236 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982) (on remand from United States Supreme Court, court held complete ban on topless dancing in establishments serving alcohol invalid on State constitutional grounds)."
} | 985,814 | a |
In our weighing the ordinance in this case and the Supreme Court's reasoning in upholding a similar ordinance, we conclude that the Federal rule does not adequately protect the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts under art. 16. Not surprisingly, other State Supreme Courts have come to the same conclusion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "on remand from United States Supreme Court, court held complete ban on topless dancing in establishments serving alcohol invalid on State constitutional grounds",
"sentence": "See also Mickens v. Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818, 821- 823 (Alaska 1982) (citing Commonwealth v. Sees, supra, court held ordinance prohibiting nude performances violates State Constitution even if not First Amendment); Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 234-236 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982) (on remand from United States Supreme Court, court held complete ban on topless dancing in establishments serving alcohol invalid on State constitutional grounds)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "571 Pa. 375, 394",
"parenthetical": "on remand from United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held Erie ordinance invalid on State constitutional grounds",
"sentence": "See Pap’s A.M. v. Erie, 571 Pa. 375, 394 (2002) (on remand from United States Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held Erie ordinance invalid on State constitutional grounds)."
} | 985,814 | b |
But the appropriate question is not whether the prosecutor had probable cause to believe Meza committed battery. When the defendants in a malicious prosecution action are police officers or complaining witnesses rather than prosecutors, the question is whether the defendants themselves had probable cause to believe the offence had been committed at the time they initiated the criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "599 F.3d 617, 626",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that [Principal] Banks had probable cause to sign the criminal complaints for the Stokes' arrest means that defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these supplemental state-law claims.\"",
"sentence": "See Gauger v. Hendle, 352 Ill.Dec. 447, 954 N.E.2d 307, 329 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (“The existence of probable cause in a malicious-prosecution action is determined by looking to what the defendants knew at the time of subscribing a criminal complaint and not at the (earlier) time of arrest.”); see also Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir.2010) (“The fact that [Principal] Banks had probable cause to sign the criminal complaints for the Stokes’ arrest means that defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these supplemental state-law claims.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The existence of probable cause in a malicious-prosecution action is determined by looking to what the defendants knew at the time of subscribing a criminal complaint and not at the (earlier",
"sentence": "See Gauger v. Hendle, 352 Ill.Dec. 447, 954 N.E.2d 307, 329 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (“The existence of probable cause in a malicious-prosecution action is determined by looking to what the defendants knew at the time of subscribing a criminal complaint and not at the (earlier) time of arrest.”); see also Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir.2010) (“The fact that [Principal] Banks had probable cause to sign the criminal complaints for the Stokes’ arrest means that defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these supplemental state-law claims.”)"
} | 4,346,225 | b |
But the appropriate question is not whether the prosecutor had probable cause to believe Meza committed battery. When the defendants in a malicious prosecution action are police officers or complaining witnesses rather than prosecutors, the question is whether the defendants themselves had probable cause to believe the offence had been committed at the time they initiated the criminal proceeding. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "599 F.3d 617, 626",
"parenthetical": "\"The fact that [Principal] Banks had probable cause to sign the criminal complaints for the Stokes' arrest means that defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these supplemental state-law claims.\"",
"sentence": "See Gauger v. Hendle, 352 Ill.Dec. 447, 954 N.E.2d 307, 329 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (“The existence of probable cause in a malicious-prosecution action is determined by looking to what the defendants knew at the time of subscribing a criminal complaint and not at the (earlier) time of arrest.”); see also Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir.2010) (“The fact that [Principal] Banks had probable cause to sign the criminal complaints for the Stokes’ arrest means that defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these supplemental state-law claims.”)"
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "954 N.E.2d 307, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"The existence of probable cause in a malicious-prosecution action is determined by looking to what the defendants knew at the time of subscribing a criminal complaint and not at the (earlier",
"sentence": "See Gauger v. Hendle, 352 Ill.Dec. 447, 954 N.E.2d 307, 329 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (“The existence of probable cause in a malicious-prosecution action is determined by looking to what the defendants knew at the time of subscribing a criminal complaint and not at the (earlier) time of arrest.”); see also Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 599 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir.2010) (“The fact that [Principal] Banks had probable cause to sign the criminal complaints for the Stokes’ arrest means that defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these supplemental state-law claims.”)"
} | 4,346,225 | b |
The fact that Plaintiff decided not to exhaust the available administrative remedies by appealing to the BCNR does not affect the court's jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 1295, 1304",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he failure to seek relief from a correction board ... does not prevent the plaintiff from suing immediately[.]\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[T]he failure to seek relief from a correction board ... does not prevent the plaintiff from suing immediately[.]”); see also Richey v. United States, 322 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“An officer seeking correction of military records may either apply as an initial matter to a Corrections Board, or file suit under the Tucker Act in the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "322 F.3d 1317, 1323",
"parenthetical": "\"An officer seeking correction of military records may either apply as an initial matter to a Corrections Board, or file suit under the Tucker Act in the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.\"",
"sentence": "See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“[T]he failure to seek relief from a correction board ... does not prevent the plaintiff from suing immediately[.]”); see also Richey v. United States, 322 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“An officer seeking correction of military records may either apply as an initial matter to a Corrections Board, or file suit under the Tucker Act in the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.”)."
} | 4,126,810 | a |
Accordingly, on this record, we cannot conclude that the alleged charge error affected the very basis of the case, deprived appellant of a valuable right, vitally affected appellant's defensive theory, or made a case for conviction clearly and significantly more persuasive. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "783 S.W.2d 268, 268",
"parenthetical": "\"Where no defense is presented which would directly affect an assessment of mental culpability, there is no harm in submitting erroneous definitions of 'intentionally' and 'knowingly.' \"",
"sentence": "See Saldivar, 783 S.W.2d at 268 (“Where no defense is presented which would directly affect an assessment of mental culpability, there is no harm in submitting erroneous definitions of ‘intentionally’ and ‘knowingly.’ ”); see also Jones v. State, 229 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (“[T]he intent of Jones in touching B.S.S., while it was part of the State’s required proof, was not a contested issue and consequently Jones could not be egregiously harmed by the definition of the intentional and knowing state of mind.”). We overrule appellant’s first issue."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "229 S.W.3d 489, 494",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he intent of Jones in touching B.S.S., while it was part of the State's required proof, was not a contested issue and consequently Jones could not be egregiously harmed by the definition of the intentional and knowing state of mind.\"",
"sentence": "See Saldivar, 783 S.W.2d at 268 (“Where no defense is presented which would directly affect an assessment of mental culpability, there is no harm in submitting erroneous definitions of ‘intentionally’ and ‘knowingly.’ ”); see also Jones v. State, 229 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (“[T]he intent of Jones in touching B.S.S., while it was part of the State’s required proof, was not a contested issue and consequently Jones could not be egregiously harmed by the definition of the intentional and knowing state of mind.”). We overrule appellant’s first issue."
} | 7,262,752 | a |
Enforcing an agreement, such as this one, that requires the parents to meet and agree after they already have demonstrated their inability to agree exposes the child to further discord and surrounds the child with an atmosphere of hostility and insecurity. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "188 Colo. 423, 428",
"parenthetical": "statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the \"constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child's upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_\"",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | 10,410,704 | b |
Enforcing an agreement, such as this one, that requires the parents to meet and agree after they already have demonstrated their inability to agree exposes the child to further discord and surrounds the child with an atmosphere of hostility and insecurity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "535 P.2d 1122, 1125",
"parenthetical": "statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the \"constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child's upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_\"",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | 10,410,704 | a |
Enforcing an agreement, such as this one, that requires the parents to meet and agree after they already have demonstrated their inability to agree exposes the child to further discord and surrounds the child with an atmosphere of hostility and insecurity. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 A.2d 691, 695",
"parenthetical": "agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "188 Colo. 423, 428",
"parenthetical": "statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the \"constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child's upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_\"",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | 10,410,704 | a |
Enforcing an agreement, such as this one, that requires the parents to meet and agree after they already have demonstrated their inability to agree exposes the child to further discord and surrounds the child with an atmosphere of hostility and insecurity. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "535 P.2d 1122, 1125",
"parenthetical": "statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the \"constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child's upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_\"",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 A.2d 691, 695",
"parenthetical": "agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict",
"sentence": "See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 328 A.2d 691, 695 (1973) (agreement providing for choice of school by noncustodial parent deleted from separation agreement because it would lead to further parental conflict); cf. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 428, 535 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1975) (statute awarding child rearing decisions to custodial parent has rational basis because it will avoid the “constant buffeting of a child between two parents who disagree on the issues of the child’s upbringing, including his education, health care and religious training_”)."
} | 10,410,704 | b |
The amended complaint alleges that the dumping facilitated by Hamden occurred in wetlands and low lying areas, and that it was only after the dumps were closed that residential development began in those areas. One of the key factors underlying decisions that have found an activity to be ultrahazardous is that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged \"that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location\" ",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "149 Conn. 85, 85",
"parenthetical": "stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | 1,025,813 | a |
The amended complaint alleges that the dumping facilitated by Hamden occurred in wetlands and low lying areas, and that it was only after the dumps were closed that residential development began in those areas. One of the key factors underlying decisions that have found an activity to be ultrahazardous is that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged \"that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location\" ",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | 1,025,813 | b |
The amended complaint alleges that the dumping facilitated by Hamden occurred in wetlands and low lying areas, and that it was only after the dumps were closed that residential development began in those areas. One of the key factors underlying decisions that have found an activity to be ultrahazardous is that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "149 Conn. 85, 85",
"parenthetical": "stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged \"that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location\" ",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | 1,025,813 | b |
The amended complaint alleges that the dumping facilitated by Hamden occurred in wetlands and low lying areas, and that it was only after the dumps were closed that residential development began in those areas. One of the key factors underlying decisions that have found an activity to be ultrahazardous is that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged \"that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location\" ",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged",
"sentence": "See, e.g., P.R.I.C.E., Inc. v. Keeney, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, 1998 WL 417591 (Conn.Super., July 10,1998) (granting motion to strike because, inter alia, the plaintiffs failed to alleged “that the activity was conducted in a heavily populated area or otherwise inappropriate location” ); see also Caporale, 149 Conn. at 85, 175 A.2d 561 (stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged)."
} | 1,025,813 | a |
To determine what the applicable filing requirements are, the Court must turn to Arkansas law. In Arkansas, an income tax return "shall be filed as follows: (a) If covering the preceding calendar year, on or before April 15." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "544 U.S. 408, 414-15",
"parenthetical": "concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition \"shall\" be filed within the time limit",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.3d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | 12,415,021 | a |
To determine what the applicable filing requirements are, the Court must turn to Arkansas law. In Arkansas, an income tax return "shall be filed as follows: (a) If covering the preceding calendar year, on or before April 15." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "666 F.3d 932, 932",
"parenthetical": "finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "544 U.S. 408, 414-15",
"parenthetical": "concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition \"shall\" be filed within the time limit",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | 12,415,021 | b |
To determine what the applicable filing requirements are, the Court must turn to Arkansas law. In Arkansas, an income tax return "shall be filed as follows: (a) If covering the preceding calendar year, on or before April 15." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.3d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition \"shall\" be filed within the time limit",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | 12,415,021 | b |
To determine what the applicable filing requirements are, the Court must turn to Arkansas law. In Arkansas, an income tax return "shall be filed as follows: (a) If covering the preceding calendar year, on or before April 15." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "666 F.3d 932, 932",
"parenthetical": "finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition \"shall\" be filed within the time limit",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | 12,415,021 | b |
To determine what the applicable filing requirements are, the Court must turn to Arkansas law. In Arkansas, an income tax return "shall be filed as follows: (a) If covering the preceding calendar year, on or before April 15." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition \"shall\" be filed within the time limit",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "779 F.3d 8, 8",
"parenthetical": "finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | 12,415,021 | a |
To determine what the applicable filing requirements are, the Court must turn to Arkansas law. In Arkansas, an income tax return "shall be filed as follows: (a) If covering the preceding calendar year, on or before April 15." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition \"shall\" be filed within the time limit",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "666 F.3d 932, 932",
"parenthetical": "finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement",
"sentence": "Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-806(a)(2)(A). By including a requirement that a tax return “shall be filed” by a certain date, the state is indicating that timeliness is a condition to filing. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (concluding that timeliness was condition for filing a habeas petition when state rule said the petition “shall” be filed within the time limit); see also In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 8 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Massachusetts timely filing requirement); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1321 (citing cases and finding that filing requirements include filing deadlines); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (finding late-filed return did not comply with Mississippi timely filing requirement)."
} | 12,415,021 | a |
Although the government contends that the district court made individualized determinations for each defendant, this argument overlooks the fact that the court neglected to identify the particular evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing that led it to find Orlando accountable for $449,000. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 916, 925",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court complied with the requirements of SS lB1.3(a",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-41 (6th Cir.2000) (remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court “either summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that it make specific factual findings for each sentencing matter controverted); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 396-97 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1) because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from Monus’s offense was stated in general terms and “did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendant’s specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the [PSR]”); cf. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 925 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the district court complied with the requirements of § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) where it “made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of [the defendant’s] involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy,” noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted, and stated that the testimony was internally consistent)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 528, 540-41",
"parenthetical": "remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court \"either summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,\" thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-41 (6th Cir.2000) (remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court “either summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that it make specific factual findings for each sentencing matter controverted); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 396-97 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1) because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from Monus’s offense was stated in general terms and “did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendant’s specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the [PSR]”); cf. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 925 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the district court complied with the requirements of § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) where it “made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of [the defendant’s] involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy,” noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted, and stated that the testimony was internally consistent)."
} | 9,393,498 | b |
Although the government contends that the district court made individualized determinations for each defendant, this argument overlooks the fact that the court neglected to identify the particular evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing that led it to find Orlando accountable for $449,000. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "128 F.3d 376, 396-97",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-41 (6th Cir.2000) (remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court “either summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that it make specific factual findings for each sentencing matter controverted); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 396-97 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1) because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from Monus’s offense was stated in general terms and “did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendant’s specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the [PSR]”); cf. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 925 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the district court complied with the requirements of § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) where it “made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of [the defendant’s] involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy,” noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted, and stated that the testimony was internally consistent)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 916, 925",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court complied with the requirements of SS lB1.3(a",
"sentence": "See United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-41 (6th Cir.2000) (remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court “either summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,” thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that it make specific factual findings for each sentencing matter controverted); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 396-97 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(1) because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from Monus’s offense was stated in general terms and “did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendant’s specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the [PSR]”); cf. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 925 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the district court complied with the requirements of § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) where it “made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of [the defendant’s] involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy,” noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted, and stated that the testimony was internally consistent)."
} | 9,393,498 | a |
The affidavit claimed the informants were ordinary citizens whose reliability can be presumed; moreover, the tips were corroborated by Officer Cross' observation of the traffic to the residence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "274 N.W.2d 113, 116",
"parenthetical": "warrant may place \"minimal reliance\" on informant's tip even if informant's reliability not shown where there is an independent source",
"sentence": "See State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn.1984) (lack of showing of informant’s reliability is not fatal where the tip is corroborated); see also State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Minn.1978) (warrant may place “minimal reliance” on informant’s tip even if informant’s reliability not shown where there is an independent source)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "355 N.W.2d 286, 291",
"parenthetical": "lack of showing of informant's reliability is not fatal where the tip is corroborated",
"sentence": "See State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn.1984) (lack of showing of informant’s reliability is not fatal where the tip is corroborated); see also State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Minn.1978) (warrant may place “minimal reliance” on informant’s tip even if informant’s reliability not shown where there is an independent source)."
} | 10,658,987 | b |
Wilkins argues, based on an unreported decision of a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, that a failure to incorporate the average weekly wage concept into the temporary partial disability calculation would undermine workers' compensation policy. She notes that the calculation of an employee's average weekly wage includes such compensation as overtime, bonuses, and commissions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "559 S.W.2d 793, 795",
"parenthetical": "stating that the earnings of an employee under this definition \"include anything received by him under the terms of his employment contract from which he realizes economic gain\"",
"sentence": "See P & L Const. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tenn. 1978) (stating that the earnings of an employee under this definition “include anything received by him under the terms of his employment contract from which he realizes economic gain”)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "886 S.W.2d 760, 760",
"parenthetical": "holding that the scope of the \"average weekly wage\" definition is not unlimited and concluding that it excludes \"fringe benefits\"",
"sentence": "But see Pollard, 886 S.W.2d at 760 (holding that the scope of the “average weekly wage” definition is not unlimited and concluding that it excludes “fringe benefits”)."
} | 11,086,932 | a |
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (2010); Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004). Courts have applied this reasoning to conclude that impracticability of negotiations is a fact-sensitive inquiry that "depends upon the circumstances of the case." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "383 B.R. 161, 161-63",
"parenthetical": "examining plain language of statute and rejecting constrained reading of impracticability requirement",
"sentence": "In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 298; In re Valley Health Sys., 383 B.R. at 161-63 (examining plain language of statute and rejecting constrained reading of impracticability requirement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "414 B.R. 713, 713",
"parenthetical": "\"Whether negotiations with creditors is impracticable depends on the circumstances of the case.\"",
"sentence": "See also In re Pierce County, 414 B.R. at 713 (“Whether negotiations with creditors is impracticable depends on the circumstances of the case.”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 298) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
} | 3,802,412 | a |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82",
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 Conn. 614, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents' rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | a |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82",
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents' rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | a |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 Conn. App. 339, 362",
"parenthetical": "after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children's final removal",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82",
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | b |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82",
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children's final removal",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | a |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "268 Conn. 614, 632-33",
"parenthetical": "not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents' rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | a |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents' rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | b |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "63 Conn. App. 339, 362",
"parenthetical": "after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children's final removal",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | a |
In In re Antony B., the trial court's findings that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification were upheld in light of the fact that the respondent rejected many of the services offered to her and did not choose to accept services from the department. Several other cases involving appeals from termination of parental rights judgments have held that the department is not required to continue to provide reasonable efforts to a parent when the parent refuses to participate or engage in any of those efforts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "despite department's repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children's final removal",
"sentence": "See In re Christopher C., 134 Conn. App. 473, 481-82, 39 A.3d 1127 (2012) (despite department’s repeated offers of referrals and assistance so respondent could satisfy specific steps requirements respondent refused to comply); see also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632-33, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) (not unreasonable for department to abandon reunification efforts when it did, given age and needs of the child, time allotted for the respondents’ rehabilitation and time child had spent in foster care); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (after respondents had not benefited from decade of efforts and services, it was not unreasonable for department to decline to pursue reunification as goal after children’s final removal)."
} | 12,415,418 | a |
We recognize that paying damages would, of course, financially affect NSP and could, for that reason, indirectly affect future rates. Damages for negligent actions are generally considered a cost of doing business, similar to the acquisition of materials and supplies or other expenses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "297 Minn. 399, 403",
"parenthetical": "noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "277 Minn. 273, 277",
"parenthetical": "referring to burden on employers under workers' com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as \"a proportionate part of the expense of production\"",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | 8,210,668 | a |
We recognize that paying damages would, of course, financially affect NSP and could, for that reason, indirectly affect future rates. Damages for negligent actions are generally considered a cost of doing business, similar to the acquisition of materials and supplies or other expenses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "152 N.W.2d 356, 359",
"parenthetical": "referring to burden on employers under workers' com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as \"a proportionate part of the expense of production\"",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "297 Minn. 399, 403",
"parenthetical": "noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | 8,210,668 | b |
We recognize that paying damages would, of course, financially affect NSP and could, for that reason, indirectly affect future rates. Damages for negligent actions are generally considered a cost of doing business, similar to the acquisition of materials and supplies or other expenses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 N.W.2d 783, 785",
"parenthetical": "noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "277 Minn. 273, 277",
"parenthetical": "referring to burden on employers under workers' com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as \"a proportionate part of the expense of production\"",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | 8,210,668 | a |
We recognize that paying damages would, of course, financially affect NSP and could, for that reason, indirectly affect future rates. Damages for negligent actions are generally considered a cost of doing business, similar to the acquisition of materials and supplies or other expenses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "152 N.W.2d 356, 359",
"parenthetical": "referring to burden on employers under workers' com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as \"a proportionate part of the expense of production\"",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 N.W.2d 783, 785",
"parenthetical": "noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost",
"sentence": "See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973) (noting that vicarious tort liability is based on notion that companies can absorb this liability as business cost); see also Jones v. Schiek’s Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 277, 152 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1967) (referring to burden on employers under workers’ com pensation statutes to compensate for workplace injuries as “a proportionate part of the expense of production”). When the MPUC determines rates or rate changes, these costs are presumably part of what it accounts for in considering the “financial and economic requirements” of NSP. Minn.Stat. §■ 216B.01."
} | 8,210,668 | b |
The Court will, however, strike them because, as Defendants assert, they are unrelated to the alleged discrimination against Wilson. The statements made by Labon happened in 1998 and 2000 respectively, and there is no allegation that Labon had anything to do with the decision to transfer or to not hire Wilson. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "220 F.3d 752, 759-60",
"parenthetical": "finding district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of racial statements made by co-workers of African-American employee long before his termination, none of whom were responsible for the decision to terminate",
"sentence": "Bailey, 239 F.R.D. at 486. (“vague and unrelated allegations of discrimination made by an individual regarding another employee who had nothing to do with the alleged discrimination against Plaintiff are irrelevant and inadmissible.”); See also Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir.2000) (finding district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of racial statements made by co-workers of African-American employee long before his termination, none of whom were responsible for the decision to terminate)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "239 F.R.D. 486, 486",
"parenthetical": "\"vague and unrelated allegations of discrimination made by an individual regarding another employee who had nothing to do with the alleged discrimination against Plaintiff are irrelevant and inadmissible.\"",
"sentence": "Bailey, 239 F.R.D. at 486. (“vague and unrelated allegations of discrimination made by an individual regarding another employee who had nothing to do with the alleged discrimination against Plaintiff are irrelevant and inadmissible.”); See also Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir.2000) (finding district court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of racial statements made by co-workers of African-American employee long before his termination, none of whom were responsible for the decision to terminate)."
} | 4,182,864 | b |
We will accept Gallas' allegation that Judge Sylvester violated a court "rule" which allowed the release of an impounded PFA only for purposes of its use as evidence in a judicial proceeding, and only then upon judicial order following a verified petition properly noticed to all interested parties. Yet, such a procedural error at most might establish that Judge Sylvester acted in excess of her jurisdiction, not that she acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1106, 1106",
"parenthetical": "\"A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th Cir.1988) (“Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "502 U.S. 13, 13",
"parenthetical": "holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call",
"sentence": "See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th Cir.1988) (“Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.”)."
} | 1,743,306 | a |
We will accept Gallas' allegation that Judge Sylvester violated a court "rule" which allowed the release of an impounded PFA only for purposes of its use as evidence in a judicial proceeding, and only then upon judicial order following a verified petition properly noticed to all interested parties. Yet, such a procedural error at most might establish that Judge Sylvester acted in excess of her jurisdiction, not that she acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "112 S.Ct. 289, 289",
"parenthetical": "holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call",
"sentence": "See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th Cir.1988) (“Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1106, 1106",
"parenthetical": "\"A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th Cir.1988) (“Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.”)."
} | 1,743,306 | b |
We will accept Gallas' allegation that Judge Sylvester violated a court "rule" which allowed the release of an impounded PFA only for purposes of its use as evidence in a judicial proceeding, and only then upon judicial order following a verified petition properly noticed to all interested parties. Yet, such a procedural error at most might establish that Judge Sylvester acted in excess of her jurisdiction, not that she acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "848 F.2d 163, 164-65",
"parenthetical": "\"Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th Cir.1988) (“Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1106, 1106",
"parenthetical": "\"A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.\"",
"sentence": "See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); see also Mí-reles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th Cir.1988) (“Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had not followed procedural rules, his action would still be within his jurisdiction.”)."
} | 1,743,306 | b |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "861 F.2d 972, 977",
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.2d 298, 298",
"parenthetical": "cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants' failure to testify because it \"failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants'] silence\"",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | a |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 1064, 1069",
"parenthetical": "prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.2000) (prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "861 F.2d 972, 977",
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | b |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.2d 298, 298",
"parenthetical": "cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants' failure to testify because it \"failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants'] silence\"",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | a |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 1064, 1069",
"parenthetical": "prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.2000) (prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | b |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.2d 298, 298",
"parenthetical": "cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants' failure to testify because it \"failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants'] silence\"",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | a |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 1064, 1069",
"parenthetical": "prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.2000) (prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | b |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.2d 298, 298",
"parenthetical": "cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants' failure to testify because it \"failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants'] silence\"",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | 11,167,736 | a |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial judge's instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because \"[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense's objections\" and the \"judge did not mention the prosecutor's improper comments\" during his general charge to the jury",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 1064, 1069",
"parenthetical": "prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.2000) (prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct)."
} | 11,167,736 | a |
Instead, it was given only after closing arguments had been completed and, even then, after a fifteen-minute recess. Therefore, there was nothing directly linking this jury instruction to the prosecutor's misconduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "500 F.2d 298, 298",
"parenthetical": "cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants' failure to testify because it \"failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants'] silence\"",
"sentence": "See Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 977 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100, 109 S.Ct. 1577, 103 L.Ed.2d 943 (1989) (trial judge’s instructions did not cure the error caused by the misconduct because “[n]o curative instructions were given at the time of defense’s objections” and the “judge did not mention the prosecutor’s improper comments” during his general charge to the jury); see also Smith, 500 F.2d at 298 (cautionary instruction did not neutralize the prejudice of comments that called attention to the defendants’ failure to testify because it “failed expressly to instruct the jury that no adverse inference could be drawn from [the defendants’] silence”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "227 F.3d 1064, 1069",
"parenthetical": "prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Cruz-Padilla, 227 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.2000) (prejudice caused by prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument was not cured because the district court issued no curative instructions where the defense failed to object to the misconduct)."
} | 11,167,736 | a |
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that Huang failed to establish that conditions in China had changed materially for Falun Gong practitioners. While the evidence indicated that repression of Falun Gong practitioners increased around the 2008 Olympics, the evidence also demonstrated that the repression has been constant and ongoing since the time of Huang's hearing in 2001, and Huang did not submit evidence indicating that any increased repression of Falun Gong practitioners continued after the 2008 Olympics and into 2009. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 F.3d 160, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "546 F.3d 138, 169",
"parenthetical": "reviewing the BIA's factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard",
"sentence": "See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard)."
} | 3,928,178 | a |
There can be no serious dispute with the court's finding of a "massive fraud of the court." The district court was authorized to compel discovery which would reveal existence of the fraud as well as efforts to conceal it. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding crime-fraud exception applied to testimony of attorney and accountant, who prepared his client's tax returns during grand jury investigation for tax evasion",
"sentence": "In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding crime-fraud exception applied to testimony of attorney and accountant, who prepared his client’s tax returns during grand jury investigation for tax evasion); see also In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d 363, 367 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Every district court has the power to conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has been the victim of fraud.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "99 F.3d 363, 367",
"parenthetical": "\"Every district court has the power to conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has been the victim of fraud.\"",
"sentence": "In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding crime-fraud exception applied to testimony of attorney and accountant, who prepared his client’s tax returns during grand jury investigation for tax evasion); see also In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d 363, 367 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Every district court has the power to conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has been the victim of fraud.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)."
} | 12,403,743 | a |
Finding the Commonwealth Court's constitutionality ruling is properly before us, we move to the merits of this appeal. The Uniformity Clause prescribes "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, \"which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | 7,255,898 | b |
Finding the Commonwealth Court's constitutionality ruling is properly before us, we move to the merits of this appeal. The Uniformity Clause prescribes "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 A. 429, 430",
"parenthetical": "noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, \"which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | 7,255,898 | b |
Finding the Commonwealth Court's constitutionality ruling is properly before us, we move to the merits of this appeal. The Uniformity Clause prescribes "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, \"which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "149 A. 653, 654",
"parenthetical": "\"Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | 7,255,898 | b |
Finding the Commonwealth Court's constitutionality ruling is properly before us, we move to the merits of this appeal. The Uniformity Clause prescribes "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "149 A. 653, 654",
"parenthetical": "\"Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "73 A. 429, 430",
"parenthetical": "noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, \"which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate\"",
"sentence": "Clifton v. Allegheny County, 600 Pa. 662, 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (2009) (citing Leonard v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 817, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1985); In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930) (“Scientific formulae, arithmetical deductions and mental contemplations, have small value in making assessments under our practical system of taxation.”)). “Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity \"with a limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210-11 (citations omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73 A. 429, 430 (1909) (noting Uniformity Clause requires only substantial uniformity, “which means as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate”)."
} | 7,255,898 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 81, 93-95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 731, 734",
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 81, 93-95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "548 U.S. 81, 93-95",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 731, 734",
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Kenner did not complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"proper exhaustion\" under SS 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief",
"sentence": "See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief, even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief)."
} | 4,253,235 | a |
Subsets and Splits