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The evidence does not explain a notice provision in the contract, but rather seeks to change it. As such, the evidence is barred under Arizona's parol evidence rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "1994 WL 462117, * 7",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement",
"sentence": "See Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 482 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it contradicts parties’ final agreement); Thurston v. Citizens Utility Co., 1994 WL 462117 * 7 (D.Ariz., June 30, 1994), aff'd, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.1996) (extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement); In re Redpath, 181 B.R. at 980 (parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1994 WL 315631, * 1",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract",
"sentence": "See also Vecsel Partners, 29 F.3d 637, 1994 WL 315631 * 1 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract)."
} | 11,216,497 | a |
The evidence does not explain a notice provision in the contract, but rather seeks to change it. As such, the evidence is barred under Arizona's parol evidence rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract",
"sentence": "See also Vecsel Partners, 29 F.3d 637, 1994 WL 315631 * 1 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement",
"sentence": "See Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 482 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it contradicts parties’ final agreement); Thurston v. Citizens Utility Co., 1994 WL 462117 * 7 (D.Ariz., June 30, 1994), aff'd, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.1996) (extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement); In re Redpath, 181 B.R. at 980 (parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement)."
} | 11,216,497 | b |
The evidence does not explain a notice provision in the contract, but rather seeks to change it. As such, the evidence is barred under Arizona's parol evidence rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement",
"sentence": "See Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 482 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it contradicts parties’ final agreement); Thurston v. Citizens Utility Co., 1994 WL 462117 * 7 (D.Ariz., June 30, 1994), aff'd, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.1996) (extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement); In re Redpath, 181 B.R. at 980 (parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1994 WL 315631, * 1",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract",
"sentence": "See also Vecsel Partners, 29 F.3d 637, 1994 WL 315631 * 1 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract)."
} | 11,216,497 | a |
The evidence does not explain a notice provision in the contract, but rather seeks to change it. As such, the evidence is barred under Arizona's parol evidence rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract",
"sentence": "See also Vecsel Partners, 29 F.3d 637, 1994 WL 315631 * 1 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 B.R. 980, 980",
"parenthetical": "parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement",
"sentence": "See Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 482 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it contradicts parties’ final agreement); Thurston v. Citizens Utility Co., 1994 WL 462117 * 7 (D.Ariz., June 30, 1994), aff'd, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.1996) (extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement); In re Redpath, 181 B.R. at 980 (parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement)."
} | 11,216,497 | b |
The evidence does not explain a notice provision in the contract, but rather seeks to change it. As such, the evidence is barred under Arizona's parol evidence rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1994 WL 315631, * 1",
"parenthetical": "extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract",
"sentence": "See also Vecsel Partners, 29 F.3d 637, 1994 WL 315631 * 1 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it is inconsistent with written contract and therefore imper-missibly contradicts or varies terms of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "181 B.R. 980, 980",
"parenthetical": "parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement",
"sentence": "See Apollo Group, 58 F.3d at 482 (extrinsic evidence rejected because it contradicts parties’ final agreement); Thurston v. Citizens Utility Co., 1994 WL 462117 * 7 (D.Ariz., June 30, 1994), aff'd, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.1996) (extrinsic evidence is rejected because it varied or contradicted, rather than explained or elaborated on, the terms of agreement); In re Redpath, 181 B.R. at 980 (parol evidence rejected because it contradicts rather than aids in interpreting, terms of the agreement)."
} | 11,216,497 | b |
The fundamental question in this regard, then, is not whether the underlying judgment itself put a dollar figure on the relief ordered, but on whether the monetary value of the judgment "can be calculated and secured with relative ease." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "927 F.Supp. 1148, 1151",
"parenthetical": "\"The right to obtain an automatic stay under Rule 62(d) is presumably premised on the fact that money judgments, and therefore the amount of the required bond, are easily calculated\"",
"sentence": "J. Perez & CIA, Inc. v. United States, 747 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J., in chambers); see also Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1148,1151 (E.D.Wis. 1996) (“The right to obtain an automatic stay under Rule 62(d) is presumably premised on the fact that money judgments, and therefore the amount of the required bond, are easily calculated”); cf. In re Tower Automotive, Inc., No. 06-CV-2105 (RWS), 2007 WL 1975447, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007) (since court’s judgment was a declaratory judgment that determined the scope of insurer’s obligation, and that “awarded no fixed sum of money,” and because “the parties agree[d] that the amount due under the insurance policy [was at that time] unknown[,] Rule 62(d) [wa]is inapplicable”); Omnioffices, Inc. v. Kaidanow, 201 F.Supp.2d 41, 43 (D.D.C.2002) (“when a judgment involves costs that cannot be calculated, it is inequitable to grant a stay and thus to deny the non-moving party assurance that it will not suffer additional harm”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "2007 WL 1975447, at *1",
"parenthetical": "since court's judgment was a declaratory judgment that determined the scope of insurer's obligation, and that \"awarded no fixed sum of money,\" and because \"the parties agree[d] that the amount due under the insurance policy [was at that time] unknown[,] Rule 62(d",
"sentence": "J. Perez & CIA, Inc. v. United States, 747 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J., in chambers); see also Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1148,1151 (E.D.Wis. 1996) (“The right to obtain an automatic stay under Rule 62(d) is presumably premised on the fact that money judgments, and therefore the amount of the required bond, are easily calculated”); cf. In re Tower Automotive, Inc., No. 06-CV-2105 (RWS), 2007 WL 1975447, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007) (since court’s judgment was a declaratory judgment that determined the scope of insurer’s obligation, and that “awarded no fixed sum of money,” and because “the parties agree[d] that the amount due under the insurance policy [was at that time] unknown[,] Rule 62(d) [wa]is inapplicable”); Omnioffices, Inc. v. Kaidanow, 201 F.Supp.2d 41, 43 (D.D.C.2002) (“when a judgment involves costs that cannot be calculated, it is inequitable to grant a stay and thus to deny the non-moving party assurance that it will not suffer additional harm”)."
} | 4,179,173 | a |
The fundamental question in this regard, then, is not whether the underlying judgment itself put a dollar figure on the relief ordered, but on whether the monetary value of the judgment "can be calculated and secured with relative ease." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "201 F.Supp.2d 41, 43",
"parenthetical": "\"when a judgment involves costs that cannot be calculated, it is inequitable to grant a stay and thus to deny the non-moving party assurance that it will not suffer additional harm\"",
"sentence": "J. Perez & CIA, Inc. v. United States, 747 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J., in chambers); see also Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1148,1151 (E.D.Wis. 1996) (“The right to obtain an automatic stay under Rule 62(d) is presumably premised on the fact that money judgments, and therefore the amount of the required bond, are easily calculated”); cf. In re Tower Automotive, Inc., No. 06-CV-2105 (RWS), 2007 WL 1975447, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007) (since court’s judgment was a declaratory judgment that determined the scope of insurer’s obligation, and that “awarded no fixed sum of money,” and because “the parties agree[d] that the amount due under the insurance policy [was at that time] unknown[,] Rule 62(d) [wa]is inapplicable”); Omnioffices, Inc. v. Kaidanow, 201 F.Supp.2d 41, 43 (D.D.C.2002) (“when a judgment involves costs that cannot be calculated, it is inequitable to grant a stay and thus to deny the non-moving party assurance that it will not suffer additional harm”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "927 F.Supp. 1148, 1151",
"parenthetical": "\"The right to obtain an automatic stay under Rule 62(d) is presumably premised on the fact that money judgments, and therefore the amount of the required bond, are easily calculated\"",
"sentence": "J. Perez & CIA, Inc. v. United States, 747 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J., in chambers); see also Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1148,1151 (E.D.Wis. 1996) (“The right to obtain an automatic stay under Rule 62(d) is presumably premised on the fact that money judgments, and therefore the amount of the required bond, are easily calculated”); cf. In re Tower Automotive, Inc., No. 06-CV-2105 (RWS), 2007 WL 1975447, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007) (since court’s judgment was a declaratory judgment that determined the scope of insurer’s obligation, and that “awarded no fixed sum of money,” and because “the parties agree[d] that the amount due under the insurance policy [was at that time] unknown[,] Rule 62(d) [wa]is inapplicable”); Omnioffices, Inc. v. Kaidanow, 201 F.Supp.2d 41, 43 (D.D.C.2002) (“when a judgment involves costs that cannot be calculated, it is inequitable to grant a stay and thus to deny the non-moving party assurance that it will not suffer additional harm”)."
} | 4,179,173 | b |
See generally 1 Reports of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 135-215 (1850) (lengthy debate over whether to abolish grand jury system). The dearth of dialogue on this provision was typical of the constitutional protections governing criminal procedure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "643 N.E.2d 296, 299-300",
"parenthetical": "concluding that main catalysts for drafting new constitution were state's financial woes and desire to limit General Assembly's ability to enact special laws dealing with local matters",
"sentence": "Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 962 (Ind.1993) (analyzing history surrounding Article I, Section 9); see also Indiana Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (Ind.1994) (concluding that main catalysts for drafting new constitution were state’s financial woes and desire to limit General Assembly’s ability to enact special laws dealing with local matters)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "644 N.E.2d 536, 539",
"parenthetical": "concluding that state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was included in Indiana Bill of Rights without much debate",
"sentence": "See Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind.1994) (concluding that state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was included in Indiana Bill of Rights without much debate); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 68-69 (Ind.1987) (discussing relatively unknown origins of state constitutional right to meet witnesses \"face to face”). Indeed, “the Bill of Rights captured only modest attention.”"
} | 11,830,118 | b |
See generally 1 Reports of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 135-215 (1850) (lengthy debate over whether to abolish grand jury system). The dearth of dialogue on this provision was typical of the constitutional protections governing criminal procedure. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "643 N.E.2d 296, 299-300",
"parenthetical": "concluding that main catalysts for drafting new constitution were state's financial woes and desire to limit General Assembly's ability to enact special laws dealing with local matters",
"sentence": "Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 962 (Ind.1993) (analyzing history surrounding Article I, Section 9); see also Indiana Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (Ind.1994) (concluding that main catalysts for drafting new constitution were state’s financial woes and desire to limit General Assembly’s ability to enact special laws dealing with local matters)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 N.E.2d 64, 68-69",
"parenthetical": "discussing relatively unknown origins of state constitutional right to meet witnesses \"face to face\"",
"sentence": "See Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind.1994) (concluding that state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was included in Indiana Bill of Rights without much debate); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 68-69 (Ind.1987) (discussing relatively unknown origins of state constitutional right to meet witnesses \"face to face”). Indeed, “the Bill of Rights captured only modest attention.”"
} | 11,830,118 | b |
The Secretary interprets the EJR statute and regulations as allowing the court only to review the "challenge to the legal validity of Medicare's related party borrowing rule." (Def.'s Reply at 1.) Thus, the court's interpretation of the EJR statute and regulations is in accord with the Secretary's interpretation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to the Secretary's interpretation of regulations with respect to a jurisdictional issue",
"sentence": "See Hinsdale Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining the substantial deference that must be given to the Secretary’s interpretation of the Medicare regulations); Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Bowen, 905 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (7th Cir.1990) (same); Edgewater Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir.1988) (explaining that the court should accord less deference to the Secretary’s actions under the Medicare Act’s reimbursement provisions); see also French Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 89 F.3d 1411, 1416 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996) (deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of regulations with respect to a jurisdictional issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 1395, 1399",
"parenthetical": "explaining the substantial deference that must be given to the Secretary's interpretation of the Medicare regulations",
"sentence": "See Hinsdale Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining the substantial deference that must be given to the Secretary’s interpretation of the Medicare regulations); Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Bowen, 905 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (7th Cir.1990) (same); Edgewater Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir.1988) (explaining that the court should accord less deference to the Secretary’s actions under the Medicare Act’s reimbursement provisions); see also French Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 89 F.3d 1411, 1416 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996) (deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of regulations with respect to a jurisdictional issue)."
} | 1,392,503 | b |
The Secretary interprets the EJR statute and regulations as allowing the court only to review the "challenge to the legal validity of Medicare's related party borrowing rule." (Def.'s Reply at 1.) Thus, the court's interpretation of the EJR statute and regulations is in accord with the Secretary's interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "857 F.2d 1123, 1130",
"parenthetical": "explaining that the court should accord less deference to the Secretary's actions under the Medicare Act's reimbursement provisions",
"sentence": "See Hinsdale Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining the substantial deference that must be given to the Secretary’s interpretation of the Medicare regulations); Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Bowen, 905 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (7th Cir.1990) (same); Edgewater Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir.1988) (explaining that the court should accord less deference to the Secretary’s actions under the Medicare Act’s reimbursement provisions); see also French Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 89 F.3d 1411, 1416 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996) (deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of regulations with respect to a jurisdictional issue)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "deferring to the Secretary's interpretation of regulations with respect to a jurisdictional issue",
"sentence": "See Hinsdale Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining the substantial deference that must be given to the Secretary’s interpretation of the Medicare regulations); Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Bowen, 905 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (7th Cir.1990) (same); Edgewater Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir.1988) (explaining that the court should accord less deference to the Secretary’s actions under the Medicare Act’s reimbursement provisions); see also French Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 89 F.3d 1411, 1416 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996) (deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of regulations with respect to a jurisdictional issue)."
} | 1,392,503 | a |
Nor does it cite any authority suggesting rescissory damages are available under the common law without showing proximate cause. Recovery of damages typically requires a showing of proximate cause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "148 F.3d 760, 763",
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement of proving loss causation is a general requirement of tort law.\"",
"sentence": "See Valley Nat’l Bank v. Brown, 110 Ariz. 260, 264, 517 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1974) (“Recovery in a tort action is limited to those damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of the defendant’s wrongful acts.”); see also Movitz v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 148 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir.1998) (“The requirement of proving loss causation is a general requirement of tort law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "110 Ariz. 260, 264",
"parenthetical": "\"Recovery in a tort action is limited to those damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of the defendant's wrongful acts.\"",
"sentence": "See Valley Nat’l Bank v. Brown, 110 Ariz. 260, 264, 517 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1974) (“Recovery in a tort action is limited to those damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of the defendant’s wrongful acts.”); see also Movitz v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 148 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir.1998) (“The requirement of proving loss causation is a general requirement of tort law.”)."
} | 3,999,341 | b |
Nor does it cite any authority suggesting rescissory damages are available under the common law without showing proximate cause. Recovery of damages typically requires a showing of proximate cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "517 P.2d 1256, 1260",
"parenthetical": "\"Recovery in a tort action is limited to those damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of the defendant's wrongful acts.\"",
"sentence": "See Valley Nat’l Bank v. Brown, 110 Ariz. 260, 264, 517 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1974) (“Recovery in a tort action is limited to those damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of the defendant’s wrongful acts.”); see also Movitz v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 148 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir.1998) (“The requirement of proving loss causation is a general requirement of tort law.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "148 F.3d 760, 763",
"parenthetical": "\"The requirement of proving loss causation is a general requirement of tort law.\"",
"sentence": "See Valley Nat’l Bank v. Brown, 110 Ariz. 260, 264, 517 P.2d 1256, 1260 (1974) (“Recovery in a tort action is limited to those damages which are the direct and proximate consequence of the defendant’s wrongful acts.”); see also Movitz v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 148 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir.1998) (“The requirement of proving loss causation is a general requirement of tort law.”)."
} | 3,999,341 | a |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "555 U.S. 223, 227",
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | a |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | a |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 U.S. 194, 201",
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | b |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "555 U.S. 223, 227",
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | b |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | b |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | b |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "555 U.S. 223, 227",
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | a |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | b |
In sum, "[w]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." That is, "[t]he relevant question ... is the objective question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the conduct at issue] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [officer who engaged in the conduct at issue] possessed." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims",
"sentence": "Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (setting forth two-step analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims); but see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that two-step Saucier analysis should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement, but that a court may consider the steps as the court deems appropriate in its discretion)."
} | 4,270,235 | b |
Other than a "recent" acquisition of certain documents relating to the Premises, referred to in the Reply, PBC has failed to provide the court with any indication of its effort to obtain information to posit an objection to the Debtor's discharge prior to July 7, 1997, the last date to file such objections. The majority view is that there can be no cause justifying an extension of time to object to discharge where the party seeking the extension failed to diligently pursue discovery pri- or to expiration of the deadline. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "171 B.R. 94, 97",
"parenthetical": "cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 B.R. 178, 183",
"parenthetical": "request for extension is inappropriate where movant made \"no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s \"",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | 940,529 | a |
Other than a "recent" acquisition of certain documents relating to the Premises, referred to in the Reply, PBC has failed to provide the court with any indication of its effort to obtain information to posit an objection to the Debtor's discharge prior to July 7, 1997, the last date to file such objections. The majority view is that there can be no cause justifying an extension of time to object to discharge where the party seeking the extension failed to diligently pursue discovery pri- or to expiration of the deadline. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "202 B.R. 831, 832",
"parenthetical": "no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 B.R. 178, 183",
"parenthetical": "request for extension is inappropriate where movant made \"no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s \"",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | 940,529 | a |
Other than a "recent" acquisition of certain documents relating to the Premises, referred to in the Reply, PBC has failed to provide the court with any indication of its effort to obtain information to posit an objection to the Debtor's discharge prior to July 7, 1997, the last date to file such objections. The majority view is that there can be no cause justifying an extension of time to object to discharge where the party seeking the extension failed to diligently pursue discovery pri- or to expiration of the deadline. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "149 B.R. 115, 117",
"parenthetical": "no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 B.R. 178, 183",
"parenthetical": "request for extension is inappropriate where movant made \"no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s \"",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | 940,529 | a |
Other than a "recent" acquisition of certain documents relating to the Premises, referred to in the Reply, PBC has failed to provide the court with any indication of its effort to obtain information to posit an objection to the Debtor's discharge prior to July 7, 1997, the last date to file such objections. The majority view is that there can be no cause justifying an extension of time to object to discharge where the party seeking the extension failed to diligently pursue discovery pri- or to expiration of the deadline. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 B.R. 178, 183",
"parenthetical": "request for extension is inappropriate where movant made \"no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s \"",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "58 B.R. 937, 938",
"parenthetical": "no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire",
"sentence": "See In re Farhid, 171 B.R. 94, 97 (N.D.Cal.1994) (cause absent where creditor failed to attend section 341 meeting of creditors or request any Rule 2004 examination); In re Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1996) (no cause where creditor failed to seek a Rule 2004 examination and moved for an extension of time on last day to file objections to discharge); In re Leary, 185 B.R. 405, 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1995) (cause absent where creditor waited until ten (10) days prior to expiration of the deadline to pursue requested Rule 2004 examinations); In re Dekelata, 149 B.R. 115, 117 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1993) (no cause where request for Rule 2004 examination was made for the first time 11 days prior to expiration of the deadline); Littell v. Littell (In re Littell), 58 B.R. 937, 938 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1986) (no cause where creditor failed to conduct discovery and motion for extension of time was filed day before deadline was to expire); see also Santana Olmo v. Quinones Rivera (In re Quinones Rivera), 184 B.R. 178, 183 (D.P.R.1995) (request for extension is inappropriate where movant made “no attempts at discovery, until his motion for extension of the deadline for objecting to discharge... s ”); 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶4004.03[2] at 4004-13 (extension inappropriate where “party seeking extension has made no attempts at discovery during all or most of the time available to it.”). But see In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37,41 (Bankr.D.P.R.1996) (“This court liberally grants motions for extension of time to object to discharge when the need for discovery is the basis of the request.”)."
} | 940,529 | b |
In the remaining Fifth Circuit opinions this Court has found where the district court had awarded damages for these expenses, the Fifth Circuit did not discuss the issue nor apparently was the issue raised by the parties. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "493 F.2d 538, 544",
"parenthetical": "aff'g denial of funeral expenses where no evidence therefor had been offered",
"sentence": "See Verdin v. C & B Boat Co., 860 F.2d 150, 157 n. 6, 158 (5th Cir.) (upholding liability for unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence), reh’g denied mem., 862 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.1988); In re Patton-Tully Transportation Co., 191 F.2d 206, 209 n. 1 (5th Cir.) (same), reh’g denied mem., 800 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.1986); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 216 n. 2 (5th Cir.1980) (upholding liability for unseaworthiness and under DOHSA and the Jones Act); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481, 487 (5th Cir.) (upholding liability for unseaworthiness for death of a Sieracki-longshoreman), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 986, 89 S.Ct. 2143, 23 L.Ed.2d 775 (1969); see also Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc., 493 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir.1974) (aff’g denial of funeral expenses where no evidence therefor had been offered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding liability for unseaworthiness and under DOHSA and the Jones Act",
"sentence": "See Verdin v. C & B Boat Co., 860 F.2d 150, 157 n. 6, 158 (5th Cir.) (upholding liability for unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence), reh’g denied mem., 862 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.1988); In re Patton-Tully Transportation Co., 191 F.2d 206, 209 n. 1 (5th Cir.) (same), reh’g denied mem., 800 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.1986); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 216 n. 2 (5th Cir.1980) (upholding liability for unseaworthiness and under DOHSA and the Jones Act); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481, 487 (5th Cir.) (upholding liability for unseaworthiness for death of a Sieracki-longshoreman), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 986, 89 S.Ct. 2143, 23 L.Ed.2d 775 (1969); see also Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc., 493 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir.1974) (aff’g denial of funeral expenses where no evidence therefor had been offered)."
} | 7,391,135 | b |
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 330, 338-39",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"injury to business or property\" was not limited to commercial interests",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18",
"parenthetical": "holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | 11,833,197 | a |
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18",
"parenthetical": "holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"injury to business or property\" was not limited to commercial interests",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | 11,833,197 | b |
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18",
"parenthetical": "holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that \"injury to business or property\" was not limited to commercial interests",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | 11,833,197 | b |
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "457 U.S. 465, 473",
"parenthetical": "holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18",
"parenthetical": "holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | 11,833,197 | a |
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18",
"parenthetical": "holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545",
"parenthetical": "holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | 11,833,197 | b |
Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18",
"parenthetical": "holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property",
"sentence": "See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (holding that “injury to business or property” was not limited to commercial interests); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982) (holding that a subscriber to a health plan who had employed the services of a psychologist alleged a redressable antitrust injury); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111, 1115-18 (E.D.Pa.1979) (holding that an employee of an alleged antitrust violator was injured in his business or property). The question which we now face is different; it is whether antitrust laws apply only to the alleged infringer’s commercial activities."
} | 11,833,197 | a |
. We note that a defendant charged with violating a condition of supervised release has limited due process rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.3d 283, 291",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation\"",
"sentence": "See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty” but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir.2013) (holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "408 U.S. 471, 480",
"parenthetical": "holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty\" but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions\"",
"sentence": "See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty” but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir.2013) (holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation”)."
} | 4,166,608 | b |
. We note that a defendant charged with violating a condition of supervised release has limited due process rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.3d 283, 291",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation\"",
"sentence": "See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty” but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir.2013) (holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty\" but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions\"",
"sentence": "See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty” but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir.2013) (holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation”)."
} | 4,166,608 | b |
. We note that a defendant charged with violating a condition of supervised release has limited due process rights. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty\" but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions\"",
"sentence": "See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty” but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir.2013) (holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "732 F.3d 283, 291",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation\"",
"sentence": "See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that revocation of parole does not impinge upon \"absolute liberty” but only on \"the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”); see also United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir.2013) (holding that \"there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation”)."
} | 4,166,608 | a |
We rested this statement on the premise that a plaintiff may invoke "the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties under NEPA." We express no opinion on whether the "public interest" rationale remains cognizable in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 351, 351-53",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"commutative\" theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | 4,235,545 | a |
We rested this statement on the premise that a plaintiff may invoke "the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties under NEPA." We express no opinion on whether the "public interest" rationale remains cognizable in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 351, 351-53",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"commutative\" theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that \"standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | 4,235,545 | a |
We rested this statement on the premise that a plaintiff may invoke "the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties under NEPA." We express no opinion on whether the "public interest" rationale remains cognizable in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that \"standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "547 U.S. 351, 351-53",
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"commutative\" theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | 4,235,545 | b |
We rested this statement on the premise that a plaintiff may invoke "the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties under NEPA." We express no opinion on whether the "public interest" rationale remains cognizable in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"commutative\" theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | 4,235,545 | b |
We rested this statement on the premise that a plaintiff may invoke "the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties under NEPA." We express no opinion on whether the "public interest" rationale remains cognizable in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"commutative\" theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that \"standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | 4,235,545 | a |
We rested this statement on the premise that a plaintiff may invoke "the 'public interest' in requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory duties under NEPA." We express no opinion on whether the "public interest" rationale remains cognizable in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting \"commutative\" theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that \"standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53, 126 S.Ct. 1854 (rejecting “commutative” theory of standing whereby standing as to one claim would suffice for all claims arising from same nucleus of operative fact); see also id. at 353 n. 5,126 S.Ct. 1854 (distinguishing Adams from case at bar but expressing no opinion on its validity); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (where injunction requiring provision of certain services to inmates concerned inadequacies other than those that harmed plaintiffs, noting that “standing is not dispensed in gross. If the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review.”)."
} | 4,235,545 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 344, 349",
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "185 Misc.2d 828, 835",
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 344, 349",
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "185 Misc.2d 828, 835",
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110",
"parenthetical": "Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "776 So.2d 1105, 1107",
"parenthetical": "Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 344, 349",
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "776 So.2d 1105, 1107",
"parenthetical": "Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "776 So.2d 1105, 1107",
"parenthetical": "Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "776 So.2d 1105, 1107",
"parenthetical": "Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "185 Misc.2d 828, 835",
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 344, 349",
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "185 Misc.2d 828, 835",
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 344, 349",
"parenthetical": "Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | a |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
Finally, other state courts have also found their nonparental visitation statutes to be constitutionally infirm. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "185 Misc.2d 828, 835",
"parenthetical": "Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "186 Misc.2d 222, 226",
"parenthetical": "New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity",
"sentence": "See Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 147, 87 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110 (2001) (Relying on Troxel, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court's application of California's nonparental visitation statute over mother's objections violated mother's fundamental parental rights where the mother was fit and was willing to voluntarily schedule visitation and the trial court applied an erroneous presumption that visitation with the paternal grandparents was in the child's best interest.); Belair v. Drew, 776 So.2d 1105, 1107 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal discussed Troxel and held that Florida's grandparent visitation statute is facially unconstitutional under the privacy rights protected by Florida's Constitution.); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla.2000) (The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that pursuant to Troxel, the award of grandparent visitation in this case under Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional rights as the parents objected to visitation and the grandmother made no showing of harm.). See also Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500, 186 Misc.2d 222, 226 (2000) (New York's grandparent visitation statute violated parents' substantive due process rights because it allowed the trial judge to solely determine best interest and accorded parents' decision of children's best interest no presumption of validity); but see Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503, 186 Misc.2d 344, 349 (2000) (Discusses Troxel and notes that New York's statute is not as broad as the statute in Troxel. Denies motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation.) and Smolen v. Smolen, 713 N.Y.S.2d 903, 185 Misc.2d 828, 835 (2000) (Denying motion to dismiss petition for grandparent visitation prior to evidentiary hearing.)."
} | 11,080,398 | b |
. Specifically, I discussed this Court's jurisdictional authority to review plaintiffs' constitutional claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 52, 59",
"parenthetical": "finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is 'clear and convincing' \"",
"sentence": "See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’’); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (\"[A] necessary predicate to the application of Webster's heightened standard [is] a statute that purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is ‘clear and convincing’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 592, 603",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.''",
"sentence": "See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’’); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (\"[A] necessary predicate to the application of Webster's heightened standard [is] a statute that purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is ‘clear and convincing’ ”)."
} | 4,228,216 | b |
. Specifically, I discussed this Court's jurisdictional authority to review plaintiffs' constitutional claims. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 52, 59",
"parenthetical": "finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is 'clear and convincing' \"",
"sentence": "See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’’); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (\"[A] necessary predicate to the application of Webster's heightened standard [is] a statute that purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is ‘clear and convincing’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.''",
"sentence": "See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’’); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (\"[A] necessary predicate to the application of Webster's heightened standard [is] a statute that purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is ‘clear and convincing’ ”)."
} | 4,228,216 | b |
. Specifically, I discussed this Court's jurisdictional authority to review plaintiffs' constitutional claims. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.''",
"sentence": "See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’’); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (\"[A] necessary predicate to the application of Webster's heightened standard [is] a statute that purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is ‘clear and convincing’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "264 F.3d 52, 59",
"parenthetical": "finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is 'clear and convincing' \"",
"sentence": "See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.’’); see also Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (\"[A] necessary predicate to the application of Webster's heightened standard [is] a statute that purports to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C.Cir.2001) (finding \"preclusion of review for both as applied and facial constitutional challenges only if the evidence of congressional intent to preclude is ‘clear and convincing’ ”)."
} | 4,228,216 | a |
The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court's belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that "simply was not credible." We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's '\"materially false statements [made] under oath' are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 46, 46",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | 12,034,087 | b |
The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court's belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that "simply was not credible." We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "501 U.S. 46, 46",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 544, 544",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"not every instance in which a district court credits one side's witnesses over another's is an occasion for sanctions\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | 12,034,087 | a |
The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court's belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that "simply was not credible." We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's '\"materially false statements [made] under oath' are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2133, 2133",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | 12,034,087 | b |
The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court's belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that "simply was not credible." We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2133, 2133",
"parenthetical": "noting that the \"inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 544, 544",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"not every instance in which a district court credits one side's witnesses over another's is an occasion for sanctions\"",
"sentence": "See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendant’s ‘“materially false statements [made] under oath’ are, having been critical to the success of his case, alone, enough to support a finding of bad faith”); Carrión v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.1976) (affirming fee award after a civil rights bench trial where the court found that plaintiffs testimony was an “unmitigated tissue of lies”). However, “[a] factfinder’s decision that one party’s version of the events is more credible than the other party’s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees_” Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that “not every instance in which a district court credits one side’s witnesses over another’s is an occasion for sanctions”)."
} | 12,034,087 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | 10,670,940 | b |
C.Complete Bar to Recovery of Child Rearing Costs. A third approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, completely bars recovery of child rearing costs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981",
"sentence": "McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. United States, 510 F.Supp. 146 (D.Kan.1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718 (Ala.1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, — So.2d (Fla.1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App.1980); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983) (reversing 99 Ill.App.3d 271, 54 Ill.Dec. 751, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky.App.1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927, 94 S.Ct. 1434, 39 L.Ed.2d 484 (1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1982)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child",
"sentence": "Cf. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (damages restricted to expenses in excess of the cost of the birth and rearing of a healthy child)."
} | 10,670,940 | a |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | b |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | b |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | b |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | a |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | a |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | a |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | b |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | a |
{P 12} Finally, Wallace complains that Judge Dezso has failed to schedule hearings and to rule on his motions. But a judge's alleged failure to set a matter for hearing or to promptly rule on a motion is not grounds for disqualification. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "an affidavit of disqualification \"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law\"",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4",
"parenthetical": "a judge's action -- or inaction -- on a motion is within the judge's sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice",
"sentence": "In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 4 (a judge’s action — or inaction — on a motion is within the judge’s sound discretion and is not evidence of bias or prejudice); see also In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 4 (an affidavit of disqualification “is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law”)."
} | 4,125,127 | b |
(Compile 20-23, 26.) Although Fleming claims to have suffered this harassment both at the Woodside Garage and at CPCC, Van Houten's alleged conduct created one hostile work environment because he supervised Fleming throughout both periods. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "23 F.3d 704, 704",
"parenthetical": "holding that a hostile work environment continued even after plaintiffs three-year absence because plaintiff \"suffered the same kinds of harassment ... under the aegis of some of the same supervisory personnel\"",
"sentence": "See Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 704 (holding that a hostile work environment continued even after plaintiffs three-year absence because plaintiff “suffered the same kinds of harassment ... under the aegis of some of the same supervisory personnel”); see also Fitzgerald, 251 F.3d at 362-63 (allegations of a “constant stream of unjustified criticisms of [plaintiffs] work described ... a continuity of allegedly unlawful conduct”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 362, 362-63",
"parenthetical": "allegations of a \"constant stream of unjustified criticisms of [plaintiffs] work described ... a continuity of allegedly unlawful conduct\"",
"sentence": "See Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 704 (holding that a hostile work environment continued even after plaintiffs three-year absence because plaintiff “suffered the same kinds of harassment ... under the aegis of some of the same supervisory personnel”); see also Fitzgerald, 251 F.3d at 362-63 (allegations of a “constant stream of unjustified criticisms of [plaintiffs] work described ... a continuity of allegedly unlawful conduct”)."
} | 2,687,049 | a |
Defendants are both members of the New York State Police. (Dkt. 1 at PP2-4). "Claims against state employees in their official capacity are deemed claims against the state itself, and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 5080195, at *2",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims against New York State Troopers in their official capacities",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Beale, 636 F.Supp.2d 207, 212 (W.D.N.Y.2009); see Gianni v. Kopp, No. 1:11-cv-498 (GLS/DRH), 2011 WL 5080195, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing claims against New York State Troopers in their official capacities)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "478 U.S. 265, 276",
"parenthetical": "\"This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.\"",
"sentence": "See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (“This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”)."
} | 4,359,481 | a |
Defendants are both members of the New York State Police. (Dkt. 1 at PP2-4). "Claims against state employees in their official capacity are deemed claims against the state itself, and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 5080195, at *2",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims against New York State Troopers in their official capacities",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Beale, 636 F.Supp.2d 207, 212 (W.D.N.Y.2009); see Gianni v. Kopp, No. 1:11-cv-498 (GLS/DRH), 2011 WL 5080195, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing claims against New York State Troopers in their official capacities)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.\"",
"sentence": "See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (“This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”)."
} | 4,359,481 | a |
Defendants are both members of the New York State Police. (Dkt. 1 at PP2-4). "Claims against state employees in their official capacity are deemed claims against the state itself, and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 5080195, at *2",
"parenthetical": "dismissing claims against New York State Troopers in their official capacities",
"sentence": "Coleman v. Beale, 636 F.Supp.2d 207, 212 (W.D.N.Y.2009); see Gianni v. Kopp, No. 1:11-cv-498 (GLS/DRH), 2011 WL 5080195, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing claims against New York State Troopers in their official capacities)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.\"",
"sentence": "See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (“This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”)."
} | 4,359,481 | a |
(Emphasis added.) Thus, if Defendant was incarcerated in California, or any other state, awaiting extradition for this forgery charge, he would be entitled to credit for the time served. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "55 Wash.App. 738, 757",
"parenthetical": "defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes",
"sentence": "State v. Mahler, 128 Ariz. 429, 430, 626 P.2d 593, 594 (1981) (defendant arrested on fugitive warrant, waived extradition); People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763, 764 (Colo.App.1982); State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 757, 780 P.2d 880, 890 (1989) (defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 Haw. 231, 231-32",
"parenthetical": "lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed",
"sentence": "See Brant, 72 Haw. at 231-32, 813 P.2d at 855 (lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed)."
} | 12,259,606 | a |
(Emphasis added.) Thus, if Defendant was incarcerated in California, or any other state, awaiting extradition for this forgery charge, he would be entitled to credit for the time served. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "55 Wash.App. 738, 757",
"parenthetical": "defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes",
"sentence": "State v. Mahler, 128 Ariz. 429, 430, 626 P.2d 593, 594 (1981) (defendant arrested on fugitive warrant, waived extradition); People v. Hardman, 653 P.2d 763, 764 (Colo.App.1982); State v. Brown, 55 Wash.App. 738, 757, 780 P.2d 880, 890 (1989) (defendants awarded credit for time served awaiting extradition under similar statutes)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "813 P.2d 855, 855",
"parenthetical": "lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed",
"sentence": "See Brant, 72 Haw. at 231-32, 813 P.2d at 855 (lower court credited time defendant served in custody awaiting extradition, issue was not appealed)."
} | 12,259,606 | a |
Subsets and Splits