clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each set of domains might have
been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims.
Some of the CnC domains appear to have been dormant for a period of time after they had
infected a number of victim systems. This can occur after the botnet operator has updated the
botnet malware with new (more powerful) variants or when the criminal operator sells/trades a
segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.
There were network artifacts that suggest that the botnet malware operating with the US-based
victims
networks made use of email services to extract the stolen data from the breached
organizations.
There is evidence that there were multiple criminal operators involved, and that the botnet
operators were of an amateur level. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes
extensive use of Dynamic DNS CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed
old-school
, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal operators today
Damballa was able to discover these details on Operation Aurora because of a different approach to
researching and neutralizing botnets and other remote-controlled crimeware threats. Command-andControl
not malware or access point for the attack vector
is the essential element for a successful
botnet attack. Everything else about a botnet may change, but CnC must remain in place for the
botnet to act in any sort of cohesive manner.
Damballa is the only company that monitors detailed criminal CnC activity within enterprise networks
and uses this focus to detect and sever malicious CnC communications. As a result, Damballa has been
collecting CnC data for over 4 years, utilizing a globe-spanning array of network sensors within large
enterprise customers and Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers. It is this deep visibility into
Operation Aurora Cnc that revealed the details in this report.
Although the methods used in Operation Aurora are amateurish and commonplace, the results were
just as damaging as a sophisticated botnet because the threat was not quickly identified and
neutralized. Aurora
s success proves that any breach by a botnet agent, regardless of the quality of the
attack vector, is a dangerous security exposure. The result is always hidden and criminal remote
Page 29
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
control of enterprise assets, with all of the legal, financial and reputational liabilities that accompany
such a serious security lapse.
Additional Reading
How can I tell if I was infected by aurora
, McAfee, 2010,
http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf
Extracting CnC from Malware: The Role of Malware Sample Analysis in Botnet Detection
, Damballa, 2009,
http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Malware_Samples_Botnet_Detection.pdf
Serial Variant Evasion Tactics: Techniques Used to Automatically Bypass Antivirus Technologies
, Damballa,
2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_SerialVariantEvasionTactics.pdf
Botnet Communication Topologies: Understanding the intricacies of botnet Command-and-Control
Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Botnet_Communications_Primer.pdf
The Botnet vs. Malware Relationship: The One-to-One Botnet Myth
, Damballa, 2009,
http://www.damballa.com/downloads/d_pubs/WP_Botnet_vs_Malware.pdf
MTrends: The Advanced Persistent Threat
, Mandiant, 2010
Google china cyberattack part of vast espionage campaign, experts say
, Washington Post, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011300359.html
Trojan.hydraq
, Symantec, 2010, http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010011114-1830-99
Contributors
Manos Antonakakis
Christopher Elisan
David Dagon
Gunter Ollmann
Erik Wu
Page 30
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
About Damballa, Inc.
Damballa stops crimeware threats that exploit enterprise networks for illegal activity by finding and
disrupting the hidden communications channels used to control internal servers and hosts. This
concentrated focus on malicious remote control delivers fast, accurate insight into advanced network
threats, including termination of criminal activity and remediation guidance. Damballa
s technology
integrates easily with existing infrastructure for cost-effective protection against dangerous security
breaches that evade other solutions. The result is smarter, more flexible network security that stops
current and future threats, prevents fiduciary breaches and enhances regulatory compliance.
Damballa
s customers include major banks, Internet service providers, government agencies,
educational organizations, manufacturers and other organizations concerned with taking back the
command-and-control of their networks. Privately held, Damballa is headquartered in Atlanta, GA.
Copyright
2010, Damballa, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.
This page contains the most current trademarks for Damballa, Inc., which include Damballa and the Damballa logo. The absence
of a name or logo on this page does not constitute a waiver of any and all intellectual property rights that Damballa, Inc. has
established in any of its products, services, names, or logos. All other marks are the property of their respective owners in their
corresponding jurisdictions, and are used here in an editorial context, without intent of infringement.
Page 31
O PERATION A URORA
D E T E C T , D I A G N OS E , R E S P ON D
Jan 27, 2010
Cyber Espionage is a critical issue. Over 80% of intellectual property is stored online digitally.
The computing infrastructure in a typical Enterprise is more vulnerable to attack than ever
before. Current security solutions are proving ineffective at stopping cyber espionage.
Malware is the single greatest problem in computer security today. Yet, malware represents
only the tip of the spear. The true threat is the human being who is operating the malware.
This human, or the organization he represents, is the true threat that is targeting information for
the purposes of financial gain, theft of state secrets, and theft of intellectual property. True
threat intelligence requires reaching beyond malware infections to identify the individuals,
country of origin, and intent of the attacker.
T HREAT S UMMARY
The Aurora malware operation was identified recently and made public by Google and McAfeei.
This malware operation has been associated with intellectual property theft including source

botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each set of domains might have

been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims.

Some of the CnC domains appear to have been dormant for a period of time after they had

infected a number of victim systems. This can occur after the botnet operator has updated the

botnet malware with new (more powerful) variants or when the criminal operator sells/trades a

segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.

There were network artifacts that suggest that the botnet malware operating with the US-based

victims

networks made use of email services to extract the stolen data from the breached

organizations.

There is evidence that there were multiple criminal operators involved, and that the botnet

operators were of an amateur level. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes

extensive use of Dynamic DNS CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed

old-school

, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal operators today

Damballa was able to discover these details on Operation Aurora because of a different approach to

researching and neutralizing botnets and other remote-controlled crimeware threats. Command-andControl

not malware or access point for the attack vector

is the essential element for a successful

botnet attack. Everything else about a botnet may change, but CnC must remain in place for the

botnet to act in any sort of cohesive manner.

Damballa is the only company that monitors detailed criminal CnC activity within enterprise networks

and uses this focus to detect and sever malicious CnC communications. As a result, Damballa has been

collecting CnC data for over 4 years, utilizing a globe-spanning array of network sensors within large

enterprise customers and Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers. It is this deep visibility into

Operation Aurora Cnc that revealed the details in this report.

Although the methods used in Operation Aurora are amateurish and commonplace, the results were

just as damaging as a sophisticated botnet because the threat was not quickly identified and

neutralized. Aurora

s success proves that any breach by a botnet agent, regardless of the quality of the

attack vector, is a dangerous security exposure. The result is always hidden and criminal remote

Page 29

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

control of enterprise assets, with all of the legal, financial and reputational liabilities that accompany

such a serious security lapse.

Additional Reading

How can I tell if I was infected by aurora

, McAfee, 2010,

http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf

Extracting CnC from Malware: The Role of Malware Sample Analysis in Botnet Detection

, Damballa, 2009,

http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Malware_Samples_Botnet_Detection.pdf

Serial Variant Evasion Tactics: Techniques Used to Automatically Bypass Antivirus Technologies

, Damballa,

2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_SerialVariantEvasionTactics.pdf

Botnet Communication Topologies: Understanding the intricacies of botnet Command-and-Control

Damballa, 2009, http://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Botnet_Communications_Primer.pdf

The Botnet vs. Malware Relationship: The One-to-One Botnet Myth

, Damballa, 2009,

http://www.damballa.com/downloads/d_pubs/WP_Botnet_vs_Malware.pdf

MTrends: The Advanced Persistent Threat

, Mandiant, 2010

Google china cyberattack part of vast espionage campaign, experts say

, Washington Post, 2010,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR2010011300359.html

Trojan.hydraq

, Symantec, 2010, http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010011114-1830-99

Contributors

Manos Antonakakis

Christopher Elisan

David Dagon

Gunter Ollmann

Erik Wu

Page 30

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

About Damballa, Inc.

Damballa stops crimeware threats that exploit enterprise networks for illegal activity by finding and

disrupting the hidden communications channels used to control internal servers and hosts. This

concentrated focus on malicious remote control delivers fast, accurate insight into advanced network

threats, including termination of criminal activity and remediation guidance. Damballa

s technology

integrates easily with existing infrastructure for cost-effective protection against dangerous security

breaches that evade other solutions. The result is smarter, more flexible network security that stops

current and future threats, prevents fiduciary breaches and enhances regulatory compliance.

Damballa

s customers include major banks, Internet service providers, government agencies,

educational organizations, manufacturers and other organizations concerned with taking back the

command-and-control of their networks. Privately held, Damballa is headquartered in Atlanta, GA.

Copyright

This page contains the most current trademarks for Damballa, Inc., which include Damballa and the Damballa logo. The absence

of a name or logo on this page does not constitute a waiver of any and all intellectual property rights that Damballa, Inc. has

established in any of its products, services, names, or logos. All other marks are the property of their respective owners in their

corresponding jurisdictions, and are used here in an editorial context, without intent of infringement.

Page 31

O PERATION A URORA

D E T E C T , D I A G N OS E , R E S P ON D

Jan 27, 2010

Cyber Espionage is a critical issue. Over 80% of intellectual property is stored online digitally.

The computing infrastructure in a typical Enterprise is more vulnerable to attack than ever

before. Current security solutions are proving ineffective at stopping cyber espionage.

Malware is the single greatest problem in computer security today. Yet, malware represents

only the tip of the spear. The true threat is the human being who is operating the malware.

This human, or the organization he represents, is the true threat that is targeting information for

the purposes of financial gain, theft of state secrets, and theft of intellectual property. True

threat intelligence requires reaching beyond malware infections to identify the individuals,

country of origin, and intent of the attacker.

T HREAT S UMMARY

The Aurora malware operation was identified recently and made public by Google and McAfeei.

This malware operation has been associated with intellectual property theft including source