clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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2. Main function:
a. November 2009 Family
pop-up ads
b. August 2009 Family
Suspected keylogger (actual files are no longer available for
analysis)
3. Protection Mechanism:
a. November 2009 Family
uses basic protection mechanisms to hide itself
b. August 2009 Family
none observed
Comparing them to Trojan.Hydraq:
1. Code obfuscation
Trojan.Hydraq uses
spaghetti code
in which program elements are separated into small
chunks and connected via jump instructions. This technique complicates following the
code, and is similar to the tactics employed in old PE viruses that write to small spaces in
the host and connect themselves through jump instructions.
November 2009 Family
Does not use any code obfuscation. One dropped file is
actually packed using FSG v1.33.
August 2009 Family
None observed.
2. Autostart Technique
Trojan.Hydraq uses Svchost process in Windows by adding its service name in
netsvcs
When Windows starts, it will load the service into memory.
November 2009 Family
Uses common autostart technique using the
key.
Page 25
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
August 2009 Family
Uses common autostart technique using the
key.
3. Intent / Payload
Trojan.Hydraq
Information gathering
November 2009 Family
Pops up ads and Web site redirector
August 2009 Family
Information gathering
Malware Significance
Basing on the profile of the two malware families that were analyzed, they are obviously different from
each other. The key thing they have in common is that the CnC they utilize are publicly associated with
the Aurora botnet.
The botnet controllers preyed on the fear of users that their system is infected with malware. This
method saves the botnet controllers from the technical complexity of bypassing Windows
UAC by
using the weakest link in host security
which is the user. The misled user typically clicks OK to
everything, bypassing UAC and giving the malware dropper explicit permission to execute.
Neither of the malware predecessor families exhibit the sophistication found in newer malware. Some
of the evasion techniques are almost a decade old. Both families use two sets of domains: one for
serving malware and the other for CnC.
The droppers and dropped files were compiled using Microsoft Compilers. This is evidenced by the
presence of the string
Rich
before the PE header. This watermark is undocumented, meaning there is
no mention of this watermark from Microsoft references but they are present in binaries compiled
using Microsoft Compilers. Knowing the compiler of choice might help investigators narrow down the
individuals or group of individuals responsible for the code.
The simplicity and relative obsolescence of the early versions of the Aurora malware suggest that
these malware families were created or written by an individual or group of individuals new to the
production of commercial grade malware. Based solely on these families of malwares, it also appears
that different individuals or group of individuals created the code:
The only association the different families have with each other is that they used CnCs
associated with Operation Aurora, and they were distributed via similar means. That said, it is
possible that two different groups purchased the services of the same crimeware group
(probably the same people behind Operation Aurora) to distribute and manage their malware
family. Or the crimeware group rented out different variants of the same malware to different
groups with different intentions. Price may also be a factor. The less resilient the malware family
is, the cheaper it is to purchase or rent.
The intent of each malware family is different.
There is no natural progression seen between the two families. Usually malware writers evolve in
both technology and protection of their creation but these two families did not show any
related evolution. The malware families appear to exist independently, and then become
superseded by Trojan.Hydraq.
Piecing it Together
Damballa analyzed network DNS information from a number of distinct and complementary sources
ranging from global monitoring systems, enterprise monitoring sensors, passive DNS resolution data
Page 26
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
and other DNS streams for this report. At the same time, Damballa also analyzed the malware
commonly associated with the Aurora attacks disclosed by Google in January. The result has been a
definite correlation between key CnC channels with other malware families that are associated with
the criminal operators behind the Aurora botnet.
Based upon our analysis of this attack and the surrounding evidence currently available, we classify
the attacks against Google and the other previously identified victim organizations as being typical of
current botnet criminal practices. The attack is most notable not for its advanced use of an Internet
Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit, but rather for its unsophisticated design and a pedigree that points to a
fast-learning but nevertheless amateur criminal botnet team.
DDNS Findings Summary
Based upon Damballas investigation of DDNS data, the key findings are as follows:
1. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of DDNS CnC
techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed as
old-school
, and is rarely used
by professional botnet criminal operators any more. However, such reliance upon DDNS CnC is

2. Main function:

a. November 2009 Family

pop-up ads

b. August 2009 Family

Suspected keylogger (actual files are no longer available for

analysis)

3. Protection Mechanism:

a. November 2009 Family

uses basic protection mechanisms to hide itself

b. August 2009 Family

none observed

Comparing them to Trojan.Hydraq:

1. Code obfuscation

Trojan.Hydraq uses

spaghetti code

in which program elements are separated into small

chunks and connected via jump instructions. This technique complicates following the

code, and is similar to the tactics employed in old PE viruses that write to small spaces in

the host and connect themselves through jump instructions.

November 2009 Family

Does not use any code obfuscation. One dropped file is

actually packed using FSG v1.33.

August 2009 Family

None observed.

2. Autostart Technique

Trojan.Hydraq uses Svchost process in Windows by adding its service name in

netsvcs

When Windows starts, it will load the service into memory.

November 2009 Family

Uses common autostart technique using the

key.

Page 25

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

August 2009 Family

Uses common autostart technique using the

key.

3. Intent / Payload

Trojan.Hydraq

Information gathering

November 2009 Family

Pops up ads and Web site redirector

August 2009 Family

Information gathering

Malware Significance

Basing on the profile of the two malware families that were analyzed, they are obviously different from

each other. The key thing they have in common is that the CnC they utilize are publicly associated with

the Aurora botnet.

The botnet controllers preyed on the fear of users that their system is infected with malware. This

method saves the botnet controllers from the technical complexity of bypassing Windows

UAC by

using the weakest link in host security

which is the user. The misled user typically clicks OK to

everything, bypassing UAC and giving the malware dropper explicit permission to execute.

Neither of the malware predecessor families exhibit the sophistication found in newer malware. Some

of the evasion techniques are almost a decade old. Both families use two sets of domains: one for

serving malware and the other for CnC.

The droppers and dropped files were compiled using Microsoft Compilers. This is evidenced by the

presence of the string

Rich

before the PE header. This watermark is undocumented, meaning there is

no mention of this watermark from Microsoft references but they are present in binaries compiled

using Microsoft Compilers. Knowing the compiler of choice might help investigators narrow down the

individuals or group of individuals responsible for the code.

The simplicity and relative obsolescence of the early versions of the Aurora malware suggest that

these malware families were created or written by an individual or group of individuals new to the

production of commercial grade malware. Based solely on these families of malwares, it also appears

that different individuals or group of individuals created the code:

The only association the different families have with each other is that they used CnCs

associated with Operation Aurora, and they were distributed via similar means. That said, it is

possible that two different groups purchased the services of the same crimeware group

(probably the same people behind Operation Aurora) to distribute and manage their malware

family. Or the crimeware group rented out different variants of the same malware to different

groups with different intentions. Price may also be a factor. The less resilient the malware family

is, the cheaper it is to purchase or rent.

The intent of each malware family is different.

There is no natural progression seen between the two families. Usually malware writers evolve in

both technology and protection of their creation but these two families did not show any

related evolution. The malware families appear to exist independently, and then become

superseded by Trojan.Hydraq.

Piecing it Together

Damballa analyzed network DNS information from a number of distinct and complementary sources

ranging from global monitoring systems, enterprise monitoring sensors, passive DNS resolution data

Page 26

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

and other DNS streams for this report. At the same time, Damballa also analyzed the malware

commonly associated with the Aurora attacks disclosed by Google in January. The result has been a

definite correlation between key CnC channels with other malware families that are associated with

the criminal operators behind the Aurora botnet.

Based upon our analysis of this attack and the surrounding evidence currently available, we classify

the attacks against Google and the other previously identified victim organizations as being typical of

current botnet criminal practices. The attack is most notable not for its advanced use of an Internet

Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit, but rather for its unsophisticated design and a pedigree that points to a

fast-learning but nevertheless amateur criminal botnet team.

DDNS Findings Summary

Based upon Damballas investigation of DDNS data, the key findings are as follows:

1. The botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of DDNS CnC

techniques. The construction of the botnet would be classed as

old-school

, and is rarely used

by professional botnet criminal operators any more. However, such reliance upon DDNS CnC is