Datasets:
clydeiii
/
cybersecurity

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component to
C:\Documents and Settings\<User>\Local
Settings
folder. It calls itself Login Software 2009. The dropped
file is then executed to make it active in memory. It survives
reboot by autostarting using a common registry entry:
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
The rest of the components must also be downloaded and
executed for them to be active. They are placed in the same folder
as the first dropped file. These components create exact copies of
themselves with names varying from:
debug.exe
mqbxt.exe
msinits.exe
win16.exe
winlogon.exe
lsass.exe
drweb.exe
taskmgr.exe
win32.exe
EXE
The component posing as Microsoft Antispyware Services
VXD
The main dropper downloads and installs ntconf32.vxd,
ntsys32.vxd, msimsg32.vxd
SYS
The main dropper downloads and installs msconfig32.sys
Once the dropper has executed, it can easily bypass UAC since it is
given explicit permission by the user, who thought the installation was
a real AV product. The first thing the dropper does is to connect to its
malware server domain to download its components.
The VXD components are often connected to malware families that
have keylogging and spyware behavior. They are also found in some
IRC bots. The SYS Component is related to the publicly known and
notoriously popular Aurora variant tied to the Google attack.
The EXE component disguises itself as Microsoft Antispyware Services.
It runs on Startup using two basic registry keys:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVers
ion\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
This screen capture shows the dropper attempting to connect to
Amazon EC2.
Page 20
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
These components are hidden from the user by hiding the folder
where they are dropped and changing the attributes of the
dropped files to hidden. To survive reboot, these components also
are set to autostart using the same technique as the main
dropped file.
A DLL file is also dropped in
C:\Windows\System32
with a
random filename. Aside from registering (regsvr32.exe) the
dropped DLL file to make it active, the malware dropper also
modifies the registry to see it as a Browser Helper Object (BHO). It
also sets up the DLL to autostart every boot up by using
SharedTaskScheduler:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\
SharedTaskScheduler
This process paves the way for tracking cookies to be downloaded
for ads to be served to the compromised host. This DLL is not
hidden unlike the other components.
After setting up all the dropped files, the main dropper protects
the dropped files by manipulating the settings of Windows
Explorer and Internet Explorer. See Protection Mechanism section
for more details.
Once all of these
malware installation
tasks are completed by
the main dropper, the main dropper activates a batch file to
unload itself from memory and deletes both the dropper and the
batch file.
The installed malware set is now all active and ready to
communicate with CnC.
Page 21
This screen capture shows a memory string dump that reveals the CnC
sought by the EXE malware component.
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
This screen capture shows a memory string dump that reveals the
CnC sought by the EXE malware component
Network
Behavior
Malware
Server
Domains
The malware uses domains for two purposes: a malware server
domain that hosts the dropped executables and a CnC connection
to listen for additional commands.
mcsmc.org
micronetsys.org
mnprfix.cn
Page 22
The malware uses domains for two purposes: malware server domain
that hosts the dropped executables and a CnC connection to listen for
additional commands. This malware uses Amazon
s EC2 services to
serve its malware components.
ec2-79-125-21-42.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com
ip-173-201-21-161.ip.secureserver.net
inekoncuba.inekon.co.cu