clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
(CHINANET Chongqing)
(FDC Servers, US Chicago)
(Level 3, US Washington)
The pattern of these lookups suggests that the author was performing testing, and had access to two
different transits (e.g., a school network and an ISP).
CnC_Domain.2
The first query for the CnC_Domain.2 domain came from Google
s Mountain View recursive.
2009-12-17 22:39:09
2009-12-18 06:27:58
2009-12-18 06:27:58
2009-12-18 18:15:18
2009-12-18 18:15:18
2009-12-18 18:15:18
2009-12-18 18:19:30
2009-12-18 18:19:30
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
(Google Mountain View)
(Google Mountain View)
(Google Mountain View)
(Comcast; San Jose)
(Comcast; San Jose)
(Comcast; San Jose)
(Google-IT)
(Google-IT)
The CnC_Domain.2 CnC domain is also notable because it witnessed queries from many other
networks outside of Google before the public news broke. This domain has never been identified
publicly as part of Aurora. Networks performing queries up to January 10, 2010 include numerous ISPs.
Observed Loss of Queries
When a botnet is remediated at the DNS level, the associated victims continue to query the authority
DNS server. Unless and until the local network cleans the hosts or imposes network blocks, victim
traffic to the authority will continue. A sudden loss of network traffic from a country, however, can be
unusual, particularly where the victims are spread over disparate (heterogeneous policy) networks.
That is, it is unlikely that many different networks would simultaneously remediate hosts. Thus, while it
may seem likely that all victims in a single network disappear (e.g., as when a network operator
deploys a firewall rule), it is remarkable when all victims in diverse policy boundaries also disappear.
Such centralized control speaks to the management of the botnet, and gives clues as to the policy
preferences of the botmaster to attack/not attack a given suite of networks or countries.
Hosts performing DNS queries exhibited a random pattern of A queries. The TTL periods for the CnC
domains was always short, meaning there was only a short period of time during which a stub query
could be answered from cache, and not recorded at the authority. This behavior is typical of fast flux
Page 16
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
networks. An increase in TTL from 60 to 360 seconds was identified, which signifies the cut over from
the default zone TTL to the SOA.minimum used for wildcarded domains. Thus, the DDNS domains
used in the attack appear to have been deregistered before December 18 and remained
open
for
anyone in the world to register until the first week of January 2010.
The Malware Evolution
Aurora malware families date as far back as August of 2009. This trail helps determine the evolution
and common characteristics of malware used by Operation Aurora, as well as a common modus
operandi on the bot agents deployed as part of the attacks. The result is more than just an analysis of
individual malware families. Rather, it helps profile the criminal operators behind Aurora via:
Malware Delivery Method
How does the malware get into the system? Is there a common
delivery method or is it random?
System Behavior
Are the symptoms evident in the system common to all Aurora malware
families or do they differ? Do the families use the same infection techniques, protection
mechanisms and/or AV evasion techniques?
Network Behavior
Do the malware families exhibit the same network behavior?
CnC Server Trials Powered by Zero-Day Malware Variants
The table below lists significant events in the deployment and use of one of the Aurora botnet CnC
servers known to the public, filoups.info, based on our data mining and analysis of malware
samples and network traffic collected by Damballa. Several initial trials were conducted by the botnet
operator prior to the
production
use of this CnC server.
The first set of CnC domains appeared in a FakeAV Trojan malware family1-a in the beginning of May
2009. There were several variants of the family1 malware in the wild in 2009. The second set of CnC
domains was used by a new family1-b malware variant in October 2009. By leveraging new Zero-Day
malware variants, the botnet operator(s) could easily evade AV product detection and experiment
with different CnC domain construction and communication. For example, different combinations of
CnC domains were tried by both family1-c and family1-d malware variants in late October 2009.
Finally, the CnC domain filoups.info was deployed and used by malware family1-e in November 2009.
Domain
mcsmc.org
thcway.info
miecros.info
mnprfix.cn
micronetsys.org
filoups.info
family1-a
family1-b
family1-c
family1-d
family1-e
Date
5/2/2009
8/18/2009
10/20/2009
10/22/2009
11/26/2009
Table 5: Botnet CnC trial evolution powered by Zero-Day malware variants.
Page 17
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

(CHINANET Chongqing)

(FDC Servers, US Chicago)

(Level 3, US Washington)

The pattern of these lookups suggests that the author was performing testing, and had access to two

different transits (e.g., a school network and an ISP).

CnC_Domain.2

The first query for the CnC_Domain.2 domain came from Google

s Mountain View recursive.

2009-12-17 22:39:09

2009-12-18 06:27:58

2009-12-18 18:15:18

2009-12-18 18:19:30

AAAA

(Google Mountain View)

(Comcast; San Jose)

(Google-IT)

The CnC_Domain.2 CnC domain is also notable because it witnessed queries from many other

networks outside of Google before the public news broke. This domain has never been identified

publicly as part of Aurora. Networks performing queries up to January 10, 2010 include numerous ISPs.

Observed Loss of Queries

When a botnet is remediated at the DNS level, the associated victims continue to query the authority

DNS server. Unless and until the local network cleans the hosts or imposes network blocks, victim

traffic to the authority will continue. A sudden loss of network traffic from a country, however, can be

unusual, particularly where the victims are spread over disparate (heterogeneous policy) networks.

That is, it is unlikely that many different networks would simultaneously remediate hosts. Thus, while it

may seem likely that all victims in a single network disappear (e.g., as when a network operator

deploys a firewall rule), it is remarkable when all victims in diverse policy boundaries also disappear.

Such centralized control speaks to the management of the botnet, and gives clues as to the policy

preferences of the botmaster to attack/not attack a given suite of networks or countries.

Hosts performing DNS queries exhibited a random pattern of A queries. The TTL periods for the CnC

domains was always short, meaning there was only a short period of time during which a stub query

could be answered from cache, and not recorded at the authority. This behavior is typical of fast flux

Page 16

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

networks. An increase in TTL from 60 to 360 seconds was identified, which signifies the cut over from

the default zone TTL to the SOA.minimum used for wildcarded domains. Thus, the DDNS domains

used in the attack appear to have been deregistered before December 18 and remained

open

for

anyone in the world to register until the first week of January 2010.

The Malware Evolution

Aurora malware families date as far back as August of 2009. This trail helps determine the evolution

and common characteristics of malware used by Operation Aurora, as well as a common modus

operandi on the bot agents deployed as part of the attacks. The result is more than just an analysis of

individual malware families. Rather, it helps profile the criminal operators behind Aurora via:

Malware Delivery Method

How does the malware get into the system? Is there a common

delivery method or is it random?

System Behavior

Are the symptoms evident in the system common to all Aurora malware

families or do they differ? Do the families use the same infection techniques, protection

mechanisms and/or AV evasion techniques?

Network Behavior

Do the malware families exhibit the same network behavior?

CnC Server Trials Powered by Zero-Day Malware Variants

The table below lists significant events in the deployment and use of one of the Aurora botnet CnC

servers known to the public, filoups.info, based on our data mining and analysis of malware

samples and network traffic collected by Damballa. Several initial trials were conducted by the botnet

operator prior to the

production

use of this CnC server.

The first set of CnC domains appeared in a FakeAV Trojan malware family1-a in the beginning of May

2009. There were several variants of the family1 malware in the wild in 2009. The second set of CnC

domains was used by a new family1-b malware variant in October 2009. By leveraging new Zero-Day

malware variants, the botnet operator(s) could easily evade AV product detection and experiment

with different CnC domain construction and communication. For example, different combinations of

CnC domains were tried by both family1-c and family1-d malware variants in late October 2009.

Finally, the CnC domain filoups.info was deployed and used by malware family1-e in November 2009.

Domain

mcsmc.org

thcway.info

miecros.info

mnprfix.cn

micronetsys.org

filoups.info

family1-a

family1-b

family1-c

family1-d

family1-e

Date

5/2/2009

8/18/2009

10/20/2009

10/22/2009

11/26/2009

Table 5: Botnet CnC trial evolution powered by Zero-Day malware variants.

Page 17

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet