clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
recursive server discovers these name servers, queries for the Aurora CnC domain, and caches the
answer.
Dynamic DNS and IP-Agility
Botnets have used Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) for nearly 8 years. For the most part, the role of
DDNS in professional, criminal botnets is historic. Concentrated cleanup efforts and a few well
documented arrests have changed the class of botmaster using DDNS. For the most part, professional
cyber criminals do not use DDNS for botnet rallying, since DDNS providers:
Page 11
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
a) are generally responsive to law enforcement;
b) keep logs; and
c) a few are famously known to actively monitor and remediate their networks.
Since 2007, most
professional criminal
botnet CnCs (e.g., Russian mafia) have moved away from
DDNS, because of the aggressive stance taken by the major DDNS providers against botnet abuse.
While there has been a recent return of novice botmasters to the free DNS services, the professional
criminal botmasters have largely moved on to more resilient, agile DNS technologies. For example,
professional botnets buy tens of thousands of domain names, and use domain agility instead of the IP
agility found in DDNS. The best example of this is Conficker.C. The decline in
professional
botnet use
of DDNS services has been so dramatic that many anti-botnet researchers changed their focus to new
areas of threat.
The average botmaster still using DDNS is generally a novice, and the malware they seed on victim
machines is often kit-generated. There are a few exceptions where amateur botmasters evolve into
professionals, but the bulk of botnets relying upon DDNS remain novice efforts, and use only a few
domain names with a single DDNS provider.
The Aurora botnet uses DDNS and
old school
coordination techniques not used by sophisticated
botmasters who have the means to purchase and manage dozens of domain names. And yet despite
having the signature of a novice effort, it also used numerous different DDNS services.
Network Analysis
The network analysis in this report encompasses the CnC domain names known to be publicly
associated with the Aurora attacks, plus an additional four non-public domains (listed below) which
are related to the criminal operators behind the Aurora attacks through shared DDNS registration
credentials and their synchronized management.
Domain
Authority Creation Date (UTC)
CnC_Domain.1
December 15, 2009
CnC_Domain.2
December 15, 2009
CnC_Domain.3
July 13, 2009
CnC_Domain.4
December 15, 2009
blog1.servebeer.com
December 15, 2009
Table 2: DDNS botnets with characteristics identical to the Aurora botnet and shared
DDNS credentials. The first four of these CnC domains have been intentionally
obscured.
The DNS TTL data associated with these interlinked Aurora domain names reveals that there were
different phases to their use. The figure below indicates when a particular CnC domain name was
sinkholed or idle (i.e. not pointing to a specific Internet IP address, or pointing to a local loopback
address such as 127.0.0.1), it was pointing at probable development IP addresses as the criminal
operators experimented with their attack tools, such as when the CnC domain names were pointing at
the IP addresses associated with two of the CnC servers used during the Aurora attack.
Page 12
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Figure 5: CnC domain name transition changes as the attackers developed botnet attacks.
Based upon passively obtained DNS resolution data from sensors scattered around the globe (but
predominantly US based), Damballa observed that several key CnC domains resolved to different
server IP addresses over the period of study. The transitions from one IP address to another can be
used to identify the different phases of botnet development (e.g. as depicted in the figure above), as
well as the nature of the CnC servers hosting and botnet topology (e.g. whether parts of the CnC
network were using fast-flux services). The table below lists the number of IP address changes to the
CnC domain name resolution
and is a lower bound number, since Damballa does not monitor all
Internet traffic.
CnC Domain Name
Distinct IP Addresses
baltika1.servebeer.com
m7been.zapto.org
miecros.info
mcsmc.org
yahoo.blogdns.net
filoups.info
google.homeunix.com
Table 3: The number of distinct IP addresses observed by Damballa and associated
with each of the CnC domain names for the period of August 2009 to the Google
Aurora disclosure on January 12, 2010.
Page 13
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Overview of CnC Domains
Not all of the authority servers hosted by the DDNS providers for this botnet were monitored by
Damballa and sampling practices were adopted for this analysis. In general, for large botnets, the
sampling this produces is more than adequate to detect
professional cyber criminal botnets.
Around 5,236 recursive DNS servers visiting the Aurora CnC authorities used BIND. The table below
lists the major types. Damballa identified a signature specific to Chinese closed recursive DNS servers
that provides policy insight to some selected resolvers.
The table below provides counts of queries from recursive DNS servers for both ISO-3166 country code
and qtype. All data was gathered on or before January 11, 2010 (the eve of the Google public
announcement) to avoid polluting queries from the press and researchers. It is estimated that Google
discovered this attack in mid to late December, 2009, so some of the resolution traffic could be
associated with their internal remediation.
The table also demonstrates that only US victims were required to perform MX queries, hinting at data
extraction via SMTP mail services.

recursive server discovers these name servers, queries for the Aurora CnC domain, and caches the

answer.

Dynamic DNS and IP-Agility

Botnets have used Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) for nearly 8 years. For the most part, the role of

DDNS in professional, criminal botnets is historic. Concentrated cleanup efforts and a few well

documented arrests have changed the class of botmaster using DDNS. For the most part, professional

cyber criminals do not use DDNS for botnet rallying, since DDNS providers:

Page 11

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

a) are generally responsive to law enforcement;

b) keep logs; and

c) a few are famously known to actively monitor and remediate their networks.

Since 2007, most

professional criminal

botnet CnCs (e.g., Russian mafia) have moved away from

DDNS, because of the aggressive stance taken by the major DDNS providers against botnet abuse.

While there has been a recent return of novice botmasters to the free DNS services, the professional

criminal botmasters have largely moved on to more resilient, agile DNS technologies. For example,

professional botnets buy tens of thousands of domain names, and use domain agility instead of the IP

agility found in DDNS. The best example of this is Conficker.C. The decline in

professional

botnet use

of DDNS services has been so dramatic that many anti-botnet researchers changed their focus to new

areas of threat.

The average botmaster still using DDNS is generally a novice, and the malware they seed on victim

machines is often kit-generated. There are a few exceptions where amateur botmasters evolve into

professionals, but the bulk of botnets relying upon DDNS remain novice efforts, and use only a few

domain names with a single DDNS provider.

The Aurora botnet uses DDNS and

old school

coordination techniques not used by sophisticated

botmasters who have the means to purchase and manage dozens of domain names. And yet despite

having the signature of a novice effort, it also used numerous different DDNS services.

Network Analysis

The network analysis in this report encompasses the CnC domain names known to be publicly

associated with the Aurora attacks, plus an additional four non-public domains (listed below) which

are related to the criminal operators behind the Aurora attacks through shared DDNS registration

credentials and their synchronized management.

Domain

Authority Creation Date (UTC)

CnC_Domain.1

December 15, 2009

CnC_Domain.2

December 15, 2009

CnC_Domain.3

July 13, 2009

CnC_Domain.4

December 15, 2009

blog1.servebeer.com

December 15, 2009

Table 2: DDNS botnets with characteristics identical to the Aurora botnet and shared

DDNS credentials. The first four of these CnC domains have been intentionally

obscured.

The DNS TTL data associated with these interlinked Aurora domain names reveals that there were

different phases to their use. The figure below indicates when a particular CnC domain name was

sinkholed or idle (i.e. not pointing to a specific Internet IP address, or pointing to a local loopback

address such as 127.0.0.1), it was pointing at probable development IP addresses as the criminal

operators experimented with their attack tools, such as when the CnC domain names were pointing at

the IP addresses associated with two of the CnC servers used during the Aurora attack.

Page 12

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Figure 5: CnC domain name transition changes as the attackers developed botnet attacks.

Based upon passively obtained DNS resolution data from sensors scattered around the globe (but

predominantly US based), Damballa observed that several key CnC domains resolved to different

server IP addresses over the period of study. The transitions from one IP address to another can be

used to identify the different phases of botnet development (e.g. as depicted in the figure above), as

well as the nature of the CnC servers hosting and botnet topology (e.g. whether parts of the CnC

network were using fast-flux services). The table below lists the number of IP address changes to the

CnC domain name resolution

and is a lower bound number, since Damballa does not monitor all

Internet traffic.

CnC Domain Name

Distinct IP Addresses

baltika1.servebeer.com

m7been.zapto.org

miecros.info

mcsmc.org

yahoo.blogdns.net

filoups.info

google.homeunix.com

Table 3: The number of distinct IP addresses observed by Damballa and associated

with each of the CnC domain names for the period of August 2009 to the Google

Aurora disclosure on January 12, 2010.

Page 13

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Overview of CnC Domains

Not all of the authority servers hosted by the DDNS providers for this botnet were monitored by

Damballa and sampling practices were adopted for this analysis. In general, for large botnets, the

sampling this produces is more than adequate to detect

professional cyber criminal botnets.

Around 5,236 recursive DNS servers visiting the Aurora CnC authorities used BIND. The table below

lists the major types. Damballa identified a signature specific to Chinese closed recursive DNS servers

that provides policy insight to some selected resolvers.

The table below provides counts of queries from recursive DNS servers for both ISO-3166 country code

and qtype. All data was gathered on or before January 11, 2010 (the eve of the Google public

announcement) to avoid polluting queries from the press and researchers. It is estimated that Google

discovered this attack in mid to late December, 2009, so some of the resolution traffic could be

associated with their internal remediation.

The table also demonstrates that only US victims were required to perform MX queries, hinting at data

extraction via SMTP mail services.