clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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data derived from our passive observation systems to identify when (and how frequently) the CnC
domain names associated with the Aurora botnet were queried. This information provided valuable
insight into the pace at which victims rallied to the botnet and established a timeline for Aurora.
Page 5
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
1000000
100000
10000
1000
7/1/2009
8/1/2009
9/1/2009 10/1/2009 11/1/2009 12/1/2009 1/1/2010
Figure 1: Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions. Absolute numbers do not represent
individual victims (i.e. victim computers make repeated lookups based upon the TTL of the CnC
domain and relative malware activity on the system), but do depict approximately when the CnC
domains were first used by the Aurora botnet. From this passive DNS resolution dataset, that date
appears to be June 14, 2009.
These network observations combine with Damballa
s ability to identify Zero-Day remote access
malware and botnet agents within customers
networks to determine additional CnC relationships.
Zero-Day malware samples are automatically passed to Damballa
s analysis cloud
along with tens-ofthousands of new malware variants obtained through industry security sharing programs. These
network behaviors are extracted, and provide Damballa with additional insight into CnC evolution and
criminal ownership. They also allow us to cluster various malware and botnet agents automatically
with their respective criminal operators
despite factors such as serial variant production, migrations
to new malware families and sub-contracting malware development to other criminal authors.
Trojan.Hydraq is the name of a family of malware now synonymous with Operation Aurora. To date,
only a handful of related samples have been made public by various security vendors
almost all of
which were gathered through forensic analysis of compromised computers. However, it is important
to understand that not only are there multiple variants of malware within the Trojan.Hydraq family, but
that criminal operators also use(d) other malware families in their attacks. Based upon analysis of
samples and data gathered by Damballa, malware associated with the criminal operators behind the
Aurora botnet can be traced back to August 2009.
A holistic DNS forensic analysis of any botnet that utilizes DNS as a critical communication element
requires DNS information from both the iterative and recursive DNS phases. Utilizing large scale
passive DNS information from large ISPs and DNS traces from a significant portion of the CnC
s DNS
authority servers (ANS) Damballa has identified more than many infected hosts that attempted to
connect or rally to the five CnC domain names associated with the Aurora botnet and investigated in
this report. These hosts where distributed across multiple countries at the time of the public Google
disclosure (January 12, 2010).
Page 6
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Position
Country
United States
China
Germany
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Table 1: Top 5 countries with Aurora botnet victims
Damballa
s passive DNS data collection indicates that the infection vector was not centralized, and that
a significant number of infected assets tried to look up CnC domain names throughout the US, with a
higher frequency in the Northeast.
Figure 2: Volume of DNS queries per Aurora CnC domain associated with the attacks within the USA,
by geographic region
Some interesting observations can be made about the lifetime and
popularity
of the CnC domains
used. The next figure shows that portions of the CnC domain names were active since the beginning
of September 2009 (e.g. google.homelinux.com, yahoo.blogdns.net, mcsmc.org).
These domain names reveal two important trends
a downward-spike during the month of October
and a steady hit rate for the remaining months. Beside these long-lived CnC domain names, Damballa
observed a number of domain names that become active in the early days of November. Some of
them were active only for a couple of months (e.g. filoups.info), while others where active longer
Page 7
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
(e.g. m7been.zapto.org, baltika1.servebeer.com, etc.) before they where sinkholed by
corresponding DNS operators.
Figure 3: Volume of DNS resolution queries per Aurora botnet, per month. Spikes in query volume
typically indicate growth of a botnet and renewed CnC interaction.
The Major Components
Botnets are a business. Professional criminal operators employ specialist tools, services and
methodologies to conduct their botnet operations. While botnet discussion has been tied malware
families in the past (e.g.
The Conficker Botnet
The Koobface Botnet
), today
s botnet operators
regularly employ multiple families of malware, considering them disposable attack tools. The key
elements of a botnet are:
Malware
The tool used by botnet operators to conduct malicious activities on victims
computers and to provide remote control capabilities.
CnC
The electronic tether between the criminal operator, a control server and victims
computers.
CnC Domain
The domain name of the host being used for CnC conduct or to route
communications between the control server and the victim
s computer.
CnC Server
The server used by the botnet operators to rally and provide electronic tethers to
victim computers.

data derived from our passive observation systems to identify when (and how frequently) the CnC

domain names associated with the Aurora botnet were queried. This information provided valuable

insight into the pace at which victims rallied to the botnet and established a timeline for Aurora.

Page 5

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

1000000

100000

10000

1000

7/1/2009

8/1/2009

9/1/2009 10/1/2009 11/1/2009 12/1/2009 1/1/2010

Figure 1: Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions. Absolute numbers do not represent

individual victims (i.e. victim computers make repeated lookups based upon the TTL of the CnC

domain and relative malware activity on the system), but do depict approximately when the CnC

domains were first used by the Aurora botnet. From this passive DNS resolution dataset, that date

appears to be June 14, 2009.

These network observations combine with Damballa

s ability to identify Zero-Day remote access

malware and botnet agents within customers

networks to determine additional CnC relationships.

Zero-Day malware samples are automatically passed to Damballa

s analysis cloud

along with tens-ofthousands of new malware variants obtained through industry security sharing programs. These

network behaviors are extracted, and provide Damballa with additional insight into CnC evolution and

criminal ownership. They also allow us to cluster various malware and botnet agents automatically

with their respective criminal operators

despite factors such as serial variant production, migrations

to new malware families and sub-contracting malware development to other criminal authors.

Trojan.Hydraq is the name of a family of malware now synonymous with Operation Aurora. To date,

only a handful of related samples have been made public by various security vendors

almost all of

which were gathered through forensic analysis of compromised computers. However, it is important

to understand that not only are there multiple variants of malware within the Trojan.Hydraq family, but

that criminal operators also use(d) other malware families in their attacks. Based upon analysis of

samples and data gathered by Damballa, malware associated with the criminal operators behind the

Aurora botnet can be traced back to August 2009.

A holistic DNS forensic analysis of any botnet that utilizes DNS as a critical communication element

requires DNS information from both the iterative and recursive DNS phases. Utilizing large scale

passive DNS information from large ISPs and DNS traces from a significant portion of the CnC

s DNS

authority servers (ANS) Damballa has identified more than many infected hosts that attempted to

connect or rally to the five CnC domain names associated with the Aurora botnet and investigated in

this report. These hosts where distributed across multiple countries at the time of the public Google

disclosure (January 12, 2010).

Page 6

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Position

Country

United States

China

Germany

Taiwan

United Kingdom

Table 1: Top 5 countries with Aurora botnet victims

Damballa

s passive DNS data collection indicates that the infection vector was not centralized, and that

a significant number of infected assets tried to look up CnC domain names throughout the US, with a

higher frequency in the Northeast.

Figure 2: Volume of DNS queries per Aurora CnC domain associated with the attacks within the USA,

by geographic region

Some interesting observations can be made about the lifetime and

popularity

of the CnC domains

used. The next figure shows that portions of the CnC domain names were active since the beginning

of September 2009 (e.g. google.homelinux.com, yahoo.blogdns.net, mcsmc.org).

These domain names reveal two important trends

a downward-spike during the month of October

and a steady hit rate for the remaining months. Beside these long-lived CnC domain names, Damballa

observed a number of domain names that become active in the early days of November. Some of

them were active only for a couple of months (e.g. filoups.info), while others where active longer

Page 7

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

(e.g. m7been.zapto.org, baltika1.servebeer.com, etc.) before they where sinkholed by

corresponding DNS operators.

Figure 3: Volume of DNS resolution queries per Aurora botnet, per month. Spikes in query volume

typically indicate growth of a botnet and renewed CnC interaction.

The Major Components

Botnets are a business. Professional criminal operators employ specialist tools, services and

methodologies to conduct their botnet operations. While botnet discussion has been tied malware

families in the past (e.g.

The Conficker Botnet

The Koobface Botnet

), today

s botnet operators

regularly employ multiple families of malware, considering them disposable attack tools. The key

elements of a botnet are:

Malware

The tool used by botnet operators to conduct malicious activities on victims

computers and to provide remote control capabilities.

CnC

The electronic tether between the criminal operator, a control server and victims

computers.

CnC Domain

The domain name of the host being used for CnC conduct or to route

communications between the control server and the victim

s computer.

CnC Server

The server used by the botnet operators to rally and provide electronic tethers to

victim computers.