clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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from CnC authority DNS servers. Since every infected host in the Aurora botnet contacted the
Page 3
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
authority server, DNS logs provided a rich inventory of the botnet
s resolution behavior. The logs also
delivered insights into the development, gestation and growth of the Aurora botnet. This data leads to
several interesting questions:
Origins
Which network first resolved the botnet CnC domains? Who was the first victim? Are
there clues in the first DNS lookups as to the authors or origin of the network?
The analysis below shows that a university in China, and a Chinese collocation facility (colo),
were critical early incubators of the infection. Portions of the infection originated from within
Google China
s offices.
Remediation and Damage Assessment
Who else resolved the botnet CnC domains before
news of the malware became public? What were the victim systems forced to do?
Public accounts state that the botnet harvested email information. The DNS log analysis
reveals numerous MX-lookups (mail-related DNS lookups). If these lookups are related to
document theft, it is reasonable to estimate the number and timing of attempted exfiltration
events. In addition to the type of DNS traffic, the log analysis also reveals where the victims are
located.
Almost all (99%) of these events took place inside Google
s US network. No victim in any other
country performed MX lookups, suggesting Aurora
s data exfiltration targets were all in the
U.S. The pattern of MX lookups appears automated and lacks any diurnal properties.
Capabilities
What else does DNS log analysis suggest, and what other questions does it raise
about the attack?
Damballa
s analysis helps illumine the origin of the botnet, based on years of observing the
authority servers used in the Aurora CnC.
Previously Disclosed Aurora Knowledge
Operation Aurora
refers to the investigations of a cyber attack which appeared to have begun in midDecember 2009 and continued through to February 2010. Aurora was first publicly disclosed by
Google on January 12, 2010
and is commonly associated with attacks originating from China. The
Aurora name was originally publicized by Dmitri Alperovitch, Vice President of Threat Research at
McAfee, and refers to a file path artifact that might reveal what the criminal authors of the malware
named their operation.
Key facts publicly associated with Aurora:
a) Google stated that some of their intellectual property had been stolen and publicly
announced the attack on January 12th 2010.
b) While the scope of reported victims includes around 34 organizations, only Google, Adobe
Systems, Juniper Networks and Rackspace have publicly confirmed that they were targeted.
Various media reports have stated that Yahoo, Symantec, Northrop Grumman, Dow Chemical
and the Rand Corporation were also among the targets.
c) Many security agencies and experts claim the attack to be a sophisticated use of
advanced
tools and techniques
most notably the use of a Zero-Day exploit for a previously unknown
vulnerability in Microsoft
s Internet Explorer 6 browser technology.
d) The public name for the malware component that allowed the Aurora criminal operators to
remotely control their victims system is called Trojan.Hydraq.
e) The Aurora attacks are widely assumed to be an APT originating from within China.
Page 4
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a cybercrime category directed at business and political
targets. APTs require a high degree of stealithiness over a prolonged duration of operation in order to
be successful. The attack objectives therefore typically extend beyond immediate financial gain, and
compromised systems continue to be of service even after key systems have been breached and initial
goals reached.
Definitions of precisely what an APT is can vary widely, but can best be summarized by their named
requirements:
Advanced
Criminal operators behind the threat utilize the full spectrum of computer
intrusion technologies and techniques. While individual components of the attack may not be
classed as particularly
advanced
(e.g. malware components generated from commonly
available DIY construction kits, or the use of easily procured exploit materials), their operators
typically access and develop more advanced tools as required. They combine multiple attack
methodologies and tools in order to reach and compromise their target.
Persistent
Criminal operators give priority to a specific task, rather than opportunistically
seeking immediate financial gain. This distinction implies that the attackers are guided by
external entities. The attack is conducted through continuous monitoring and interaction of a
botnet in order to achieve the defined objectives. It does not mean a barrage of constant
attacks and malware updates. In fact, a
low-and-slow
approach is usually more successful.
Threat
Means that there is a level of coordinated human involvement in the attack. The
criminal operators have a specific objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and well
funded.
Damballa
s Perspective
Damballa
s research and technical expertise focuses on the detection of CnC tethering and the
malicious communications between a victim
s computer and the remote criminal operator. Damballa
detects new botnet CnC channels as they are created and used by criminal operators. This globespanning array of network sensors monitors CnC use to identify victims that join botnets.
Damaballa used key DNS observations about the operational characteristics of Dynamic DNS zones
(e.g. zone cuts, TTL changes, NS changes, etc.) in order to identify the different states in which the
botnet was operated by its criminal controllers. Changes in the way that a DNS zone is structured by
criminals typically denotes an intension to develop, test, and operate malicious infrastructure, or
abandon a particular zone and move to a new one. Damballa also reviewed historical DNS resolution

from CnC authority DNS servers. Since every infected host in the Aurora botnet contacted the

Page 3

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

authority server, DNS logs provided a rich inventory of the botnet

s resolution behavior. The logs also

delivered insights into the development, gestation and growth of the Aurora botnet. This data leads to

several interesting questions:

Origins

Which network first resolved the botnet CnC domains? Who was the first victim? Are

there clues in the first DNS lookups as to the authors or origin of the network?

The analysis below shows that a university in China, and a Chinese collocation facility (colo),

were critical early incubators of the infection. Portions of the infection originated from within

Google China

s offices.

Remediation and Damage Assessment

Who else resolved the botnet CnC domains before

news of the malware became public? What were the victim systems forced to do?

Public accounts state that the botnet harvested email information. The DNS log analysis

reveals numerous MX-lookups (mail-related DNS lookups). If these lookups are related to

document theft, it is reasonable to estimate the number and timing of attempted exfiltration

events. In addition to the type of DNS traffic, the log analysis also reveals where the victims are

located.

Almost all (99%) of these events took place inside Google

s US network. No victim in any other

country performed MX lookups, suggesting Aurora

s data exfiltration targets were all in the

U.S. The pattern of MX lookups appears automated and lacks any diurnal properties.

Capabilities

What else does DNS log analysis suggest, and what other questions does it raise

about the attack?

Damballa

s analysis helps illumine the origin of the botnet, based on years of observing the

authority servers used in the Aurora CnC.

Previously Disclosed Aurora Knowledge

Operation Aurora

refers to the investigations of a cyber attack which appeared to have begun in midDecember 2009 and continued through to February 2010. Aurora was first publicly disclosed by

Google on January 12, 2010

and is commonly associated with attacks originating from China. The

Aurora name was originally publicized by Dmitri Alperovitch, Vice President of Threat Research at

McAfee, and refers to a file path artifact that might reveal what the criminal authors of the malware

named their operation.

Key facts publicly associated with Aurora:

a) Google stated that some of their intellectual property had been stolen and publicly

announced the attack on January 12th 2010.

b) While the scope of reported victims includes around 34 organizations, only Google, Adobe

Systems, Juniper Networks and Rackspace have publicly confirmed that they were targeted.

Various media reports have stated that Yahoo, Symantec, Northrop Grumman, Dow Chemical

and the Rand Corporation were also among the targets.

c) Many security agencies and experts claim the attack to be a sophisticated use of

advanced

tools and techniques

most notably the use of a Zero-Day exploit for a previously unknown

vulnerability in Microsoft

s Internet Explorer 6 browser technology.

d) The public name for the malware component that allowed the Aurora criminal operators to

remotely control their victims system is called Trojan.Hydraq.

e) The Aurora attacks are widely assumed to be an APT originating from within China.

Page 4

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Advanced Persistent Threats

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a cybercrime category directed at business and political

targets. APTs require a high degree of stealithiness over a prolonged duration of operation in order to

be successful. The attack objectives therefore typically extend beyond immediate financial gain, and

compromised systems continue to be of service even after key systems have been breached and initial

goals reached.

Definitions of precisely what an APT is can vary widely, but can best be summarized by their named

requirements:

Advanced

Criminal operators behind the threat utilize the full spectrum of computer

intrusion technologies and techniques. While individual components of the attack may not be

classed as particularly

advanced

(e.g. malware components generated from commonly

available DIY construction kits, or the use of easily procured exploit materials), their operators

typically access and develop more advanced tools as required. They combine multiple attack

methodologies and tools in order to reach and compromise their target.

Persistent

Criminal operators give priority to a specific task, rather than opportunistically

seeking immediate financial gain. This distinction implies that the attackers are guided by

external entities. The attack is conducted through continuous monitoring and interaction of a

botnet in order to achieve the defined objectives. It does not mean a barrage of constant

attacks and malware updates. In fact, a

low-and-slow

approach is usually more successful.

Threat

Means that there is a level of coordinated human involvement in the attack. The

criminal operators have a specific objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and well

funded.

Damballa

s Perspective

Damballa

s research and technical expertise focuses on the detection of CnC tethering and the

malicious communications between a victim

s computer and the remote criminal operator. Damballa

detects new botnet CnC channels as they are created and used by criminal operators. This globespanning array of network sensors monitors CnC use to identify victims that join botnets.

Damaballa used key DNS observations about the operational characteristics of Dynamic DNS zones

(e.g. zone cuts, TTL changes, NS changes, etc.) in order to identify the different states in which the

botnet was operated by its criminal controllers. Changes in the way that a DNS zone is structured by

criminals typically denotes an intension to develop, test, and operate malicious infrastructure, or

abandon a particular zone and move to a new one. Damballa also reviewed historical DNS resolution