clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Citizen Lab. IWM is part of the Citizen Lab
s network of advanced research projects, which include the
OpenNet Initiative and ONI Asia.
The Information Warfare Monitor also benefits from donations from a variety of sponsors including
Psiphon Inc, and Palantir Technologies.
The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities:
1. Case Studies. We design and carry out active case study research. These are self-generated
activities consistent with our mission.
We employ a rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to all our case studies blending qualitative, technical,
and quantitative methods. As a general rule, our investigations consist of at least two components:
Field-based investigations. We engage in qualitative research among affected
target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ
interaction with our partners, and extensive technical data collection involving
system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation. Our field-based teams
are supported by senior analysts and regional specialists, including social scientists,
computer security professionals, policy experts, and linguists, who provide additional
contextual support and substantive back-up.
Technical scouting and laboratory analysis. Data collected in the field is rigorously
analysed using a variety of advanced data fusion and visualization methods. Leads
developed on the basis of infield activities are pursued through
technical scouting,
including computer network investigations, and the resulting data and analysis
is shared with our infield teams and partners for verification and for generating
additional entry points for follow-on investigations.
2. Open Source Trend Analysis. We collect open-source information from the press and other
sources tracking global trends in cyberspace. These are published on our public website.
3. Analytical Workshops and Outreach. We work closely with academia, human rights
organizations, and the defense and intelligence community. We publish reports, and occasionally
conduct joint workshops. Our work is independent, and not subject to government classification. Our
goal is to encourage vigorous debate around critical policy issues. This includes engaging in ethical
and legal considerations of information operations, computer network attacks, and computer network
exploitation, including the targeted use of Trojans and malware, denial of service attacks, and
content filtering.
About The SecDev Group
http://www.secdev.ca
The SecDev Group is a Canadian-based operational consultancy focused on countries and regions at
risk from violence and insecurity. We deliver to our clients insights and access to a diverse range
of cultures, audiences, challenging environments and ungoverned spaces. Our approach combines
a field research capability with advanced techniques and methods for generating policy-relevant
analysis and solutions. As a think tank, we identify and communicate realistic options to enhance
effectiveness through evidence-based research on the causes, consequences and trajectories of
insecurity and violence. We are operational because we design and conduct activities in complex and
insecure environments.
About The Citizen Lab
http://www.citzenlab.org
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at
the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection
of digital media and world politics. We are a hothouse that combines the disciplines of political
science, sociology, computer science, engineering, and graphic design. Our mission is to undertake
advanced research and engage in development that monitors, analyses, and impacts the exercise of
political power in cyberspace. The Citizen Lab
s ongoing research network includes the Information
Warfare Monitor and the OpenNet Initiative, ONI Asia, and benefits from collaborative partnerships
with academic institutions, NGOs, and other partners in all regions of the world.
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
History, Patterns and Findings
Executive Overview
Following the public disclosures of electronic attacks launched against Google and
several other businesses, subsequently referred to as
Operation Aurora
, Damballa
conducted detailed analysis to confirm that existing customers were already protected
and to ascertain the sophistication of the criminal operators behind the botnet.
There has been much media attention and speculation as to the nature of the attacks.
Multiple publications have covered individual aspects of the threat
in particular
detailed analysis of forensically recovered malware and explanations of the Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT).
By contrast, Damballa has been able to compile an extensive timeline of the attack
dating back to mid-2009 that identifies unique aspects to the Aurora botnet that have
been previously unknown. Based upon this new information and our experience in
dealing with thousands of enterprise-targeted botnets, Damballa believes that the
criminal operators behind the attack are relatively unsophisticated compared other
professional botnet operators. Even so, the results proved just as damaging as a
sophisticated botnet since the threat was not quickly identified and neutralized.
Key observations discussed in the main body of this analysis report:
The major pattern of attacks previously identified as occurring in mid-December
2009 targeting Google appear to originate in July 2009 from mainland China.
Hosts compromised with Aurora botnet agents and rallied to the botnet
Command-and-Control (CnC) channels were distributed across multiple
countries before the public disclosure of Aurora, with the top five countries
being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan and the United Kingdom.
Damballa identified additional botnet CnC domains used by these criminal
operators and established a timeline of malware associations back to May 2nd
2009 by tracking the evolution of the malware used by Aurora
s operators.
Analysis of network traffic associated with the lookups of the botnet CnC is not
consistent with the publicly discussed Internet Explorer 6 infection vector.
This botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of
Dynamic DNS (DDNS) CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be
classed as
old-school
, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal
operators any more. Reliance upon DDNS CnC is typically associated with new
and amateur botnet operators
The criminals behind the Google attack appear to have built and managed a
number of separate botnets and run a series of targeted attack campaigns in
parallel. This conclusion is based upon CnC domain registration and
management information. The earliest of the CnC domains associated with
these botnets, reliant upon DDNS service provisioning, appear to have been

Citizen Lab. IWM is part of the Citizen Lab

s network of advanced research projects, which include the

OpenNet Initiative and ONI Asia.

The Information Warfare Monitor also benefits from donations from a variety of sponsors including

Psiphon Inc, and Palantir Technologies.

The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities:

1. Case Studies. We design and carry out active case study research. These are self-generated

activities consistent with our mission.

We employ a rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to all our case studies blending qualitative, technical,

and quantitative methods. As a general rule, our investigations consist of at least two components:

Field-based investigations. We engage in qualitative research among affected

target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ

interaction with our partners, and extensive technical data collection involving

system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation. Our field-based teams

are supported by senior analysts and regional specialists, including social scientists,

computer security professionals, policy experts, and linguists, who provide additional

contextual support and substantive back-up.

Technical scouting and laboratory analysis. Data collected in the field is rigorously

analysed using a variety of advanced data fusion and visualization methods. Leads

developed on the basis of infield activities are pursued through

technical scouting,

including computer network investigations, and the resulting data and analysis

is shared with our infield teams and partners for verification and for generating

additional entry points for follow-on investigations.

2. Open Source Trend Analysis. We collect open-source information from the press and other

sources tracking global trends in cyberspace. These are published on our public website.

3. Analytical Workshops and Outreach. We work closely with academia, human rights

organizations, and the defense and intelligence community. We publish reports, and occasionally

conduct joint workshops. Our work is independent, and not subject to government classification. Our

goal is to encourage vigorous debate around critical policy issues. This includes engaging in ethical

and legal considerations of information operations, computer network attacks, and computer network

exploitation, including the targeted use of Trojans and malware, denial of service attacks, and

content filtering.

About The SecDev Group

http://www.secdev.ca

The SecDev Group is a Canadian-based operational consultancy focused on countries and regions at

risk from violence and insecurity. We deliver to our clients insights and access to a diverse range

of cultures, audiences, challenging environments and ungoverned spaces. Our approach combines

a field research capability with advanced techniques and methods for generating policy-relevant

analysis and solutions. As a think tank, we identify and communicate realistic options to enhance

effectiveness through evidence-based research on the causes, consequences and trajectories of

insecurity and violence. We are operational because we design and conduct activities in complex and

insecure environments.

About The Citizen Lab

http://www.citzenlab.org

The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at

the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection

of digital media and world politics. We are a hothouse that combines the disciplines of political

science, sociology, computer science, engineering, and graphic design. Our mission is to undertake

advanced research and engage in development that monitors, analyses, and impacts the exercise of

political power in cyberspace. The Citizen Lab

s ongoing research network includes the Information

Warfare Monitor and the OpenNet Initiative, ONI Asia, and benefits from collaborative partnerships

with academic institutions, NGOs, and other partners in all regions of the world.

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

History, Patterns and Findings

Executive Overview

Following the public disclosures of electronic attacks launched against Google and

several other businesses, subsequently referred to as

Operation Aurora

, Damballa

conducted detailed analysis to confirm that existing customers were already protected

and to ascertain the sophistication of the criminal operators behind the botnet.

There has been much media attention and speculation as to the nature of the attacks.

Multiple publications have covered individual aspects of the threat

in particular

detailed analysis of forensically recovered malware and explanations of the Advanced

Persistent Threat (APT).

By contrast, Damballa has been able to compile an extensive timeline of the attack

dating back to mid-2009 that identifies unique aspects to the Aurora botnet that have

been previously unknown. Based upon this new information and our experience in

dealing with thousands of enterprise-targeted botnets, Damballa believes that the

criminal operators behind the attack are relatively unsophisticated compared other

professional botnet operators. Even so, the results proved just as damaging as a

sophisticated botnet since the threat was not quickly identified and neutralized.

Key observations discussed in the main body of this analysis report:

The major pattern of attacks previously identified as occurring in mid-December

2009 targeting Google appear to originate in July 2009 from mainland China.

Hosts compromised with Aurora botnet agents and rallied to the botnet

Command-and-Control (CnC) channels were distributed across multiple

countries before the public disclosure of Aurora, with the top five countries

being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan and the United Kingdom.

Damballa identified additional botnet CnC domains used by these criminal

operators and established a timeline of malware associations back to May 2nd

2009 by tracking the evolution of the malware used by Aurora

s operators.

Analysis of network traffic associated with the lookups of the botnet CnC is not

consistent with the publicly discussed Internet Explorer 6 infection vector.

This botnet has a simple command topology and makes extensive use of

Dynamic DNS (DDNS) CnC techniques. The construction of the botnet would be

classed as

old-school

, and is rarely used by professional botnet criminal

operators any more. Reliance upon DDNS CnC is typically associated with new

and amateur botnet operators

The criminals behind the Google attack appear to have built and managed a

number of separate botnets and run a series of targeted attack campaigns in

parallel. This conclusion is based upon CnC domain registration and

management information. The earliest of the CnC domains associated with

these botnets, reliant upon DDNS service provisioning, appear to have been