clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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registered on July 13th 2009.
Take Back Command-and-Control
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
The botnet operators had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse
hosting co-locations from the very start
a fairly high cost for a botnet. Further, the botnet
employed over a dozen domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC. Some of the botnet agents
focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain might have been dedicated
to a distinct class or vertical of victims.
Only the US victims of the attack were compelled to perform mail-based DNS queries
an event
that would typically indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services.
Damballa identified multiple CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of
the botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have become dormant for a
period of time after they infected victim systems. This type of activity can sometimes be
associated with an update to the botnet malware, or when the criminal operator sells/trades a
segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.
The botnet operators behind the Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior to the
key Trojan.Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other. Two additional
families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as
Fake AV Alert /
Scareware
Login Software 2009
and
Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service,
both of which
employed fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineer victims into installing malicious
botnet agents.
By studying the evolution of the Google attacks and tracking the malicious campaigns conducted
before (and in parallel to) the public disclosure of
Operation Aurora
in January 2010, Damballa has
established a detailed timeline of infections. Instead of this attack being a sophisticated APT
operation, it appears that the attacks originated from a Chinese botnet operations team, and that the
attack vector underwent several different phases of botnet building and malware deployment before
being discovered by Google.
The fact that some of the later attacks utilized a different family of malware and may have exploited
Zero-Day vulnerabilities within Internet Explorer 6 as one of the infection vectors is typical for modern
botnet distribution campaigns. Botnet operators also increasingly trade or sell segments of the
botnets they build. Once sold, the owner of the botnet typically deploys a new suite of malware onto
compromised systems. The CnC provides the link between various campaigns run by the botnet
operators and the multiple malware iterations. Since Damballa focuses on malicious, remotecontrolled crimeware that depends on CnC to function, we were able to determine the evolution and
sophistication of the Aurora botnet and its operators with greater detail and accuracy than other
reports to-date.
In general, Aurora is
just another botnet
and typifies the advanced nature of the threat and the
criminal ecosystem that supports it. It is important to note, however, that botnets linked to the
criminal operators behind Aurora may have been sold or traded to other botnet operators, either in
sections or on an individual victim basis. This kind of transaction is increasingly popular. Specialist
botnet builders sell access to victim systems or networks for a fee
making it very simple for other
entities to access confidential business systems and information without needing be technologically
proficient. These transactions between criminals are very difficult to detect.
Page 2
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Introduction
The progression of semi-autonomous malware into globe-spanning botnets with victims numbering
in the millions continues to accelerate. In short, botnets, and the criminal ecosystem that supports
them, lie at the heart of modern cybercrime. Specialist contractors and service providers occupy every
online niche, enabling both newbie hackers and professional botnet operators to overcome
technological hurdles and operational barriers for a small price
typically stolen identities or access to
hijacked systems rather than dollars.
All it takes to get started is an Internet search engine and the ability to install software on a computer.
Devastating attacks start with a nominal fee for acquiring advanced malware construction tools
capable of automatically generating customized botnet agents dramatically superior to tools used by
professional hackers only three years ago. Fierce competition within the ecosystem has resulted in the
commoditization of these tools and services, which has lowered price points and driven suppliers to
differentiate with 24x7 support, money-back guarantees, replacement warrantees and even SLAs.
Major international corporations have begun to publicly acknowledge this electronic threat. On
January 12, 2010, Google announced that it had been the victim of a targeted attack and had
subsequently identified over 34 additional organizations that had similarly been breached by the
same criminal team. One major industrial powerhouse has publicly focused on the risks posed by
persistent electronic attacks by including references to these threats in their quarterly 10-K filing.
Report Objectives
The purpose of this report is to explain the advanced state of today
s botnet ecosystem by way of
example, and to examine the ways in which criminal operators rely upon botnet technologies to
breach corporate networks and extract secrets from their victims. Much media fervor has surrounded
Google
s public disclosure of the successful attacks against their systems. 33 other victims also fell prey
to what has been frequently referred to as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This report closely
examines the methods employed by the criminal operators who conducted this botnet campaign.
Many security vendors have explained the operation against Google, dubbed
Operation Aurora,
using a military vernacular. However, based upon analysis of exhaustive data surrounding these
attacks and examination of both the malware and the CnC topologies used by the criminals behind
Aurora, it appears that this threat can best be classified as a just another common botnet attack
and
one that is more amateur than average.
This report details new analysis of the malware evolution and the CnC construction behind these
attacks, and provides unique insight into similar threats facing large business. Comparisons are made
between the Aurora attacks and professionally orchestrated campaigns run by sophisticated cyber
criminals. Timelines track the evolution of this threat help to identify the objectives of the criminals
behind the Aurora attacks, and illustrate the advanced state of the botnet ecosystem.
Understanding Aurora
Malware samples recovered from victim systems using forensic techniques lie at the heart of almost all
public analysis of Aurora. The samples directly associated with Aurora are commonly referred to as
Trojan.Hydraq. Damballa analyzed the Trojan.Hydraq outbreak using DNS monitoring logs obtained

registered on July 13th 2009.

Take Back Command-and-Control

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

The botnet operators had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse

hosting co-locations from the very start

a fairly high cost for a botnet. Further, the botnet

employed over a dozen domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC. Some of the botnet agents

focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain might have been dedicated

to a distinct class or vertical of victims.

Only the US victims of the attack were compelled to perform mail-based DNS queries

an event

that would typically indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services.

Damballa identified multiple CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of

the botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have become dormant for a

period of time after they infected victim systems. This type of activity can sometimes be

associated with an update to the botnet malware, or when the criminal operator sells/trades a

segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.

The botnet operators behind the Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior to the

key Trojan.Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other. Two additional

families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as

Fake AV Alert /

Scareware

Login Software 2009

and

Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service,

both of which

employed fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineer victims into installing malicious

botnet agents.

By studying the evolution of the Google attacks and tracking the malicious campaigns conducted

before (and in parallel to) the public disclosure of

Operation Aurora

in January 2010, Damballa has

established a detailed timeline of infections. Instead of this attack being a sophisticated APT

operation, it appears that the attacks originated from a Chinese botnet operations team, and that the

attack vector underwent several different phases of botnet building and malware deployment before

being discovered by Google.

The fact that some of the later attacks utilized a different family of malware and may have exploited

Zero-Day vulnerabilities within Internet Explorer 6 as one of the infection vectors is typical for modern

botnet distribution campaigns. Botnet operators also increasingly trade or sell segments of the

botnets they build. Once sold, the owner of the botnet typically deploys a new suite of malware onto

compromised systems. The CnC provides the link between various campaigns run by the botnet

operators and the multiple malware iterations. Since Damballa focuses on malicious, remotecontrolled crimeware that depends on CnC to function, we were able to determine the evolution and

sophistication of the Aurora botnet and its operators with greater detail and accuracy than other

reports to-date.

In general, Aurora is

just another botnet

and typifies the advanced nature of the threat and the

criminal ecosystem that supports it. It is important to note, however, that botnets linked to the

criminal operators behind Aurora may have been sold or traded to other botnet operators, either in

sections or on an individual victim basis. This kind of transaction is increasingly popular. Specialist

botnet builders sell access to victim systems or networks for a fee

making it very simple for other

entities to access confidential business systems and information without needing be technologically

proficient. These transactions between criminals are very difficult to detect.

Page 2

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Introduction

The progression of semi-autonomous malware into globe-spanning botnets with victims numbering

in the millions continues to accelerate. In short, botnets, and the criminal ecosystem that supports

them, lie at the heart of modern cybercrime. Specialist contractors and service providers occupy every

online niche, enabling both newbie hackers and professional botnet operators to overcome

technological hurdles and operational barriers for a small price

typically stolen identities or access to

hijacked systems rather than dollars.

All it takes to get started is an Internet search engine and the ability to install software on a computer.

Devastating attacks start with a nominal fee for acquiring advanced malware construction tools

capable of automatically generating customized botnet agents dramatically superior to tools used by

professional hackers only three years ago. Fierce competition within the ecosystem has resulted in the

commoditization of these tools and services, which has lowered price points and driven suppliers to

differentiate with 24x7 support, money-back guarantees, replacement warrantees and even SLAs.

Major international corporations have begun to publicly acknowledge this electronic threat. On

January 12, 2010, Google announced that it had been the victim of a targeted attack and had

subsequently identified over 34 additional organizations that had similarly been breached by the

same criminal team. One major industrial powerhouse has publicly focused on the risks posed by

persistent electronic attacks by including references to these threats in their quarterly 10-K filing.

Report Objectives

The purpose of this report is to explain the advanced state of today

s botnet ecosystem by way of

example, and to examine the ways in which criminal operators rely upon botnet technologies to

breach corporate networks and extract secrets from their victims. Much media fervor has surrounded

Google

s public disclosure of the successful attacks against their systems. 33 other victims also fell prey

to what has been frequently referred to as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This report closely

examines the methods employed by the criminal operators who conducted this botnet campaign.

Many security vendors have explained the operation against Google, dubbed

Operation Aurora,

using a military vernacular. However, based upon analysis of exhaustive data surrounding these

attacks and examination of both the malware and the CnC topologies used by the criminals behind

Aurora, it appears that this threat can best be classified as a just another common botnet attack

and

one that is more amateur than average.

This report details new analysis of the malware evolution and the CnC construction behind these

attacks, and provides unique insight into similar threats facing large business. Comparisons are made

between the Aurora attacks and professionally orchestrated campaigns run by sophisticated cyber

criminals. Timelines track the evolution of this threat help to identify the objectives of the criminals

behind the Aurora attacks, and illustrate the advanced state of the botnet ecosystem.

Understanding Aurora

Malware samples recovered from victim systems using forensic techniques lie at the heart of almost all

public analysis of Aurora. The samples directly associated with Aurora are commonly referred to as

Trojan.Hydraq. Damballa analyzed the Trojan.Hydraq outbreak using DNS monitoring logs obtained