clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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being removed. At our Laboratory, we have analysed our own infected
honey pot
computer
and discovered that the capabilities of GhostNet are potent and wide ranging. Almost certainly,
documents are being removed without the targets
knowledge, keystrokes logged, web cameras are
being silently triggered, and audio inputs surreptitiously activated.
This raises the question, how many sensitive activities have been preemptively anticipated by
intelligence gathered through this network? How many illegal transactions have been facilitated by
information harvested through GhostNet? Worst of all, how many people may have been put at risk?
While these questions are compelling, it would be imprudent to read these findings as an indictment,
or to attribute to the owners of GhostNet motivations and intentions for which there is no evidence.
Alternative explanations
The list of computers controlled by the GhostNet is significant, and certainly atypical for a cybercrime
network. The size of the network is small, and the concentration of high-value systems is significant.
At the same time, penetrations of this type are not uncommon. Recently, several large-scale spy
nets have been discovered, including ones containing lists of affected computers of a magnitude
higher than that harvested by GhostNet.
This trend is predictable, converging with accumulating incidents of cyber-attacks facilitated by
lower entry-thresholds for computer exploitation methods and technologies. The tools we profile in
our investigation, though apparently amassed in a complex way to achieve a definite purpose, are
not restricted to an exclusive guild of experts with specialized and confidential knowledge.
Today, pirated cyber-crime kits circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by
anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.51 Cyberspace has empowered individuals and small
groups of non-state actors to do many things, including executing sophisticated computer network
operations that were previously only the domain of state intelligence agencies. We have entered
the era of do-it-yourself (DIY) signals intelligence.
http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/zeus-crimeware-kit-gets-carding-layout.html
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
Attribution
Who is ultimately in control of the GhostNet system? While our analysis reveals that numerous
politically sensitive and high-value computer systems were compromised, we do not know the
motivation or the identity of the attacker(s) or how to accurately characterize this network of
infections as a whole. We have not been able to ascertain the type of data that has been obtained
by the attacker(s), apart from the basic system information and file listings of the documents
located on the target computers. Without this data we are unable to deduce with any certainty
what kind of data the attacker(s) were after. There are thus several possibilities for attribution.
The most obvious explanation, and certainly the one in which the circumstantial evidence tilts the
strongest, would be that this set of high profile targets has been exploited by the Chinese state for
military and strategic-intelligence purposes. Indeed, as described above, many of the high confidence,
high-value targets that we identified are clearly linked to Chinese foreign and defence policy,
particularly in South and South East Asia. Like radar sweeping around the southern border of China,
there is an arc of infected nodes from India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, through Laos, Brunei,
Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Many of the high profile targets reflect some of China
s most
vexing foreign and security policy issues, including Tibet and Taiwan. Moreover, the attacker(s)
addresses examined here trace back in at least several instances to Hainan Island, home of the Lingshui
signals intelligence facility and the Third Technical Department of the People
s Liberation Army.52
However, we must be cautious to rush to judgement in spite of circumstantial and other evidence,
as alternative explanations are certainly possible and charges against a government of this nature
are gravely serious. On the other end of the spectrum is the explanation that this is a random set
of infected computers that just happens to include high profile targets of strategic significance
to China, collected by an individual or group with no political agenda per se. Similarly one can
postulate that the targets gathered together happened less by concerted effort than by sheer
coincidence. Given the groupings of various entities in the infected computer list (by country
and organization), internal email communications and sloppy security practices could have led to
cross-infection and subsequent listing on the control servers.
Another possible explanation is that there is a single individual or set of individuals (criminal networks,
for example) who are targeting these high-value targets for profit. This can be in the form of stealing
financial information or critical data that can be sold to clients, be they states or private entities. There
are countless examples of large-scale fraud and data theft worldwide and numerous apparent instances
of outsourcing to third parties of cyber-attacks and espionage, some of which the Information Warfare
Monitor and its related research project, the OpenNet Initiative, have documented. GhostNet could very
well be a for-profit, non-state venture. Even
patriotic hackers
could be acting on their own volition,
or with the tacit approval of their government, as operators of the GhostNet.
Finally, it is not inconceivable that this network of infected computers could have been targeted
by a state other than China, but operated physically within China (and at least one node in
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/lingshui.htm
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
the United States) for strategic purposes. Compromised proxy computers on Hainan Island, for
example, could have been deployed as staging posts, perhaps in an effort to deliberately mislead
observers as to the true operator(s) and purpose of the GhostNet system.
The Significance of GhostNet
GhostNet is significant, as it does not appear to be a typical cybercrime network. The potential
political fallout is enormous. But ultimately, the question of who is behind the GhostNet may
matter less than the strategic significance of the collection of affected targets. What this study
discovered is serious evidence that information security is an item requiring urgent attention at
the highest levels. It demonstrates that the subterranean layers of cyberspace, about which most
users are unaware, are domains of active reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation.
Regardless of who or what is ultimately in control of GhostNet, its capabilities of exploitation and
the strategic intelligence that can be harvested from it matter most. Indeed, although the Achilles
heel of the GhostNet system allowed us to monitor and document its far-reaching network of
infiltration, we can safely hypothesize that it is neither the first nor the only one of its kind.
PART FOUR:
About Information Warfare Monitor
About the Information Warfare Monitor
http://infowar-monitor.net/
The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research activity tracking the emergence of cyberspace
as a strategic domain. We are an independent research effort. Our mission is to build and broaden the
evidence base available to scholars, policymakers, and others. We aim to educate and inform.
The Information Warfare Monitor is a public-private venture between two Canadian institutions: The
SecDev Group, an operational think tank based in Ottawa (Canada), and the Citizen Lab at the Munk
Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. The Principal Investigators and
co-founders of the Information Warfare Monitor are Rafal Rohozinski (The SecDev Group) and
Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab).
The Information Warfare Monitor is supported by The SecDev Group which conducts field-based
investigations and data gathering. Our advanced research and analysis facilities are located at the

being removed. At our Laboratory, we have analysed our own infected

honey pot

computer

and discovered that the capabilities of GhostNet are potent and wide ranging. Almost certainly,

documents are being removed without the targets

knowledge, keystrokes logged, web cameras are

being silently triggered, and audio inputs surreptitiously activated.

This raises the question, how many sensitive activities have been preemptively anticipated by

intelligence gathered through this network? How many illegal transactions have been facilitated by

information harvested through GhostNet? Worst of all, how many people may have been put at risk?

While these questions are compelling, it would be imprudent to read these findings as an indictment,

or to attribute to the owners of GhostNet motivations and intentions for which there is no evidence.

Alternative explanations

The list of computers controlled by the GhostNet is significant, and certainly atypical for a cybercrime

network. The size of the network is small, and the concentration of high-value systems is significant.

At the same time, penetrations of this type are not uncommon. Recently, several large-scale spy

nets have been discovered, including ones containing lists of affected computers of a magnitude

higher than that harvested by GhostNet.

This trend is predictable, converging with accumulating incidents of cyber-attacks facilitated by

lower entry-thresholds for computer exploitation methods and technologies. The tools we profile in

our investigation, though apparently amassed in a complex way to achieve a definite purpose, are

not restricted to an exclusive guild of experts with specialized and confidential knowledge.

Today, pirated cyber-crime kits circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by

anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.51 Cyberspace has empowered individuals and small

groups of non-state actors to do many things, including executing sophisticated computer network

operations that were previously only the domain of state intelligence agencies. We have entered

the era of do-it-yourself (DIY) signals intelligence.

http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/zeus-crimeware-kit-gets-carding-layout.html

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE

Attribution

Who is ultimately in control of the GhostNet system? While our analysis reveals that numerous

politically sensitive and high-value computer systems were compromised, we do not know the

motivation or the identity of the attacker(s) or how to accurately characterize this network of

infections as a whole. We have not been able to ascertain the type of data that has been obtained

by the attacker(s), apart from the basic system information and file listings of the documents

located on the target computers. Without this data we are unable to deduce with any certainty

what kind of data the attacker(s) were after. There are thus several possibilities for attribution.

The most obvious explanation, and certainly the one in which the circumstantial evidence tilts the

strongest, would be that this set of high profile targets has been exploited by the Chinese state for

military and strategic-intelligence purposes. Indeed, as described above, many of the high confidence,

high-value targets that we identified are clearly linked to Chinese foreign and defence policy,

particularly in South and South East Asia. Like radar sweeping around the southern border of China,

there is an arc of infected nodes from India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, through Laos, Brunei,

Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Many of the high profile targets reflect some of China

s most

vexing foreign and security policy issues, including Tibet and Taiwan. Moreover, the attacker(s)

addresses examined here trace back in at least several instances to Hainan Island, home of the Lingshui

signals intelligence facility and the Third Technical Department of the People

s Liberation Army.52

However, we must be cautious to rush to judgement in spite of circumstantial and other evidence,

as alternative explanations are certainly possible and charges against a government of this nature

are gravely serious. On the other end of the spectrum is the explanation that this is a random set

of infected computers that just happens to include high profile targets of strategic significance

to China, collected by an individual or group with no political agenda per se. Similarly one can

postulate that the targets gathered together happened less by concerted effort than by sheer

coincidence. Given the groupings of various entities in the infected computer list (by country

and organization), internal email communications and sloppy security practices could have led to

cross-infection and subsequent listing on the control servers.

Another possible explanation is that there is a single individual or set of individuals (criminal networks,

for example) who are targeting these high-value targets for profit. This can be in the form of stealing

financial information or critical data that can be sold to clients, be they states or private entities. There

are countless examples of large-scale fraud and data theft worldwide and numerous apparent instances

of outsourcing to third parties of cyber-attacks and espionage, some of which the Information Warfare

Monitor and its related research project, the OpenNet Initiative, have documented. GhostNet could very

well be a for-profit, non-state venture. Even

patriotic hackers

could be acting on their own volition,

or with the tacit approval of their government, as operators of the GhostNet.

Finally, it is not inconceivable that this network of infected computers could have been targeted

by a state other than China, but operated physically within China (and at least one node in

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/lingshui.htm

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE

the United States) for strategic purposes. Compromised proxy computers on Hainan Island, for

example, could have been deployed as staging posts, perhaps in an effort to deliberately mislead

observers as to the true operator(s) and purpose of the GhostNet system.

The Significance of GhostNet

GhostNet is significant, as it does not appear to be a typical cybercrime network. The potential

political fallout is enormous. But ultimately, the question of who is behind the GhostNet may

matter less than the strategic significance of the collection of affected targets. What this study

discovered is serious evidence that information security is an item requiring urgent attention at

the highest levels. It demonstrates that the subterranean layers of cyberspace, about which most

users are unaware, are domains of active reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation.

Regardless of who or what is ultimately in control of GhostNet, its capabilities of exploitation and

the strategic intelligence that can be harvested from it matter most. Indeed, although the Achilles

heel of the GhostNet system allowed us to monitor and document its far-reaching network of

infiltration, we can safely hypothesize that it is neither the first nor the only one of its kind.

PART FOUR:

About Information Warfare Monitor

About the Information Warfare Monitor

http://infowar-monitor.net/

The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research activity tracking the emergence of cyberspace

as a strategic domain. We are an independent research effort. Our mission is to build and broaden the

evidence base available to scholars, policymakers, and others. We aim to educate and inform.

The Information Warfare Monitor is a public-private venture between two Canadian institutions: The

SecDev Group, an operational think tank based in Ottawa (Canada), and the Citizen Lab at the Munk

Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. The Principal Investigators and

co-founders of the Information Warfare Monitor are Rafal Rohozinski (The SecDev Group) and

Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab).

The Information Warfare Monitor is supported by The SecDev Group which conducts field-based

investigations and data gathering. Our advanced research and analysis facilities are located at the