clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Analysis of list of infected computers
A detailed analysis of the list of infected computers revealed an overwhelming number of unique
infections in many countries. The same malware that infected computers at the Dalai Lama
s office
and other Tibetan organizations had a much more extensive set of targets. The list of entities and
locations of those targeted was quite varied.
In total, we found 1,295 infected computers located in 103 countries. We found that we were able to
confidently
on a scale of low, medium, high
identify 397 of the 1,295 infected computers (26.7%),
and labelled each one as a high-value target. We did so because they were either significant to the
relationship between China and Tibet, Taiwan or India, or were identified as computers at foreign
embassies, diplomatic missions, government ministries, or international organizations.
Of the remaining infected computers, 536 appear to be computers on private broadband Internet
providers. The remaining IP addresses do not reverse resolve and available information on these
hosts does not allow us to make judgements regarding the identity or purpose of these computers.
Methodology
We compiled a unified and comprehensive list of infected computers from all the control servers,
as there was considerable duplication across them. There were several duplicate entries in the list
of infected computers
in some cases, the same infected computer was logged multiple times as it
was connecting from a different IP address. In other instances, multiple infected computers were
assigned different internal IP addresses and had different computer names but shared the same
external IP address. This signifies that there were multiple infected computers sharing Internet
access. Where possible, we filtered the results by unique computer name, and if no computer name
was present, we filtered by unique external IP address.48 (See Fig. 12 - p. 41)
On the surface, the names of the infected computers in the sample are provocative. There are references
to ministries of foreign affairs, foreign embassies, and other government entities. Some contains names of
officials or their positions/titles. However, we recognize that a computer name can be anything its owner
wishes, and may be completely unrelated to the location, function, or owner of that particular computer.
Therefore, in order to be more confident as to the true identity or purpose of the infected computer,
we relied on reverse DNS look-ups and each IP address
record from the Regional Internet Registries.
Using these two pieces of information we were able to confirm the validity of the identity of several
infected computers with a high (H) degree of confidence.
In some cases the computer name associated with the infected computer is actually a domain
name or an acronym for a recognizable institution or organization. In these cases we classified our
identification of the target with either a medium (M) or low (L) level of confidence. Medium
confidence refers to instances where we have otherwise identified a related high confidence target,
In one case we removed 117 unique IP addresses from Mexico that appeared to belong to the same computer connecting in to the
control server from a DSL provider.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 12
The geographic location of infected hosts.
This graphic illustrates the global reach of the GhostNet. There were 1,295 infected computers that reported to the control server. The
infections were spread across 103 countries. Taiwan reported the most infections followed by the United States, Vietnam and India.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
but for which we rely on the computer name for identification. Low confidence refers to instances
in which we rely solely on the computer name for identification.
Table 2: Selected infections
Organization
Confidence
Location
Infections
ASEAN
ID, MY
Asian Development Bank
PH, IN
Associated Press, UK
GB, HK
Bureau of International Trade Relations
CanTV, Venezuela
Ceger, Portugal
Consulate General of Malaysia, Hong Kong
Deloitte & Touche, New York
Department of Commerce, Solomon Islands
Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia
Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines
Department of Science and Technology, Philippines
Embassy of China, US (see footnote 50)
Embassy of Cyprus, Germany
Embassy of Germany, Australia
Embassy of India, Belgium
Embassy of India, Serbia
Embassy of India, Germany
Embassy of India, Italy
Embassy Of India, Kuwait
Embassy of India, USA
Embassy of India, Zimbabwe
Embassy of Indonesia, China
Embassy of Malaysia, Cuba
Embassy of Malaysia, Italy
Embassy of Malta
Embassy of Malta, Australia
Embassy of Malta, Belgium
Embassy of Malta, Libya
Embassy of Pakistan, Bahrain
Embassy of Papua New Guinea, China
Embassy of Portugal, Finland
Embassy of Portugal, Germany
Embassy of The Republic Of China (Taiwan), Swaziland
Embassy of Romania, Finland
Embassy of Romania, France
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Table 2: Selected infections (cont
Organization
Confidence
Location
Infections
Embassy of Romania, Norway

Analysis of list of infected computers

A detailed analysis of the list of infected computers revealed an overwhelming number of unique

infections in many countries. The same malware that infected computers at the Dalai Lama

s office

and other Tibetan organizations had a much more extensive set of targets. The list of entities and

locations of those targeted was quite varied.

In total, we found 1,295 infected computers located in 103 countries. We found that we were able to

confidently

on a scale of low, medium, high

identify 397 of the 1,295 infected computers (26.7%),

and labelled each one as a high-value target. We did so because they were either significant to the

relationship between China and Tibet, Taiwan or India, or were identified as computers at foreign

embassies, diplomatic missions, government ministries, or international organizations.

Of the remaining infected computers, 536 appear to be computers on private broadband Internet

providers. The remaining IP addresses do not reverse resolve and available information on these

hosts does not allow us to make judgements regarding the identity or purpose of these computers.

Methodology

We compiled a unified and comprehensive list of infected computers from all the control servers,

as there was considerable duplication across them. There were several duplicate entries in the list

of infected computers

in some cases, the same infected computer was logged multiple times as it

was connecting from a different IP address. In other instances, multiple infected computers were

assigned different internal IP addresses and had different computer names but shared the same

external IP address. This signifies that there were multiple infected computers sharing Internet

access. Where possible, we filtered the results by unique computer name, and if no computer name

was present, we filtered by unique external IP address.48 (See Fig. 12 - p. 41)

On the surface, the names of the infected computers in the sample are provocative. There are references

to ministries of foreign affairs, foreign embassies, and other government entities. Some contains names of

officials or their positions/titles. However, we recognize that a computer name can be anything its owner

wishes, and may be completely unrelated to the location, function, or owner of that particular computer.

Therefore, in order to be more confident as to the true identity or purpose of the infected computer,

we relied on reverse DNS look-ups and each IP address

record from the Regional Internet Registries.

Using these two pieces of information we were able to confirm the validity of the identity of several

infected computers with a high (H) degree of confidence.

In some cases the computer name associated with the infected computer is actually a domain

name or an acronym for a recognizable institution or organization. In these cases we classified our

identification of the target with either a medium (M) or low (L) level of confidence. Medium

confidence refers to instances where we have otherwise identified a related high confidence target,

In one case we removed 117 unique IP addresses from Mexico that appeared to belong to the same computer connecting in to the

control server from a DSL provider.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 12

The geographic location of infected hosts.

This graphic illustrates the global reach of the GhostNet. There were 1,295 infected computers that reported to the control server. The

infections were spread across 103 countries. Taiwan reported the most infections followed by the United States, Vietnam and India.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

but for which we rely on the computer name for identification. Low confidence refers to instances

in which we rely solely on the computer name for identification.

Table 2: Selected infections

Organization

Confidence

Location

Infections

ASEAN

ID, MY

Asian Development Bank

PH, IN

Associated Press, UK

GB, HK

Bureau of International Trade Relations

CanTV, Venezuela

Ceger, Portugal

Consulate General of Malaysia, Hong Kong

Deloitte & Touche, New York

Department of Commerce, Solomon Islands

Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia

Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines

Department of Science and Technology, Philippines

Embassy of China, US (see footnote 50)

Embassy of Cyprus, Germany

Embassy of Germany, Australia

Embassy of India, Belgium

Embassy of India, Serbia

Embassy of India, Germany

Embassy of India, Italy

Embassy Of India, Kuwait

Embassy of India, USA

Embassy of India, Zimbabwe

Embassy of Indonesia, China

Embassy of Malaysia, Cuba

Embassy of Malaysia, Italy

Embassy of Malta

Embassy of Malta, Australia

Embassy of Malta, Belgium

Embassy of Malta, Libya

Embassy of Pakistan, Bahrain

Embassy of Papua New Guinea, China

Embassy of Portugal, Finland

Embassy of Portugal, Germany

Embassy of The Republic Of China (Taiwan), Swaziland

Embassy of Romania, Finland

Embassy of Romania, France

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Table 2: Selected infections (cont

Organization

Confidence

Location

Infections

Embassy of Romania, Norway