clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows how the attacker(s) can send specific commands to infected computers. It has been
obscured to protect the identity of the victims.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 10
The gh0st RAT interface.
This screen capture of the English language version of the gh0st RAT software shows the commands that an attacker is able to execute on the
compromised computer.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
The gh0st RAT tool attempts to connect to IP addresses of a DSL provider in Hainan, China:
xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
After a successful connection, the attacker(s) proceed to issue commands on our infected
computer in real-time.
We found similar but unsuccessful connections to the same IP address range from some of the
infected computers we analysed and discovered that a rudimentary version of the web-based
administration interface contained only one infection from the same IP address range in Hainan.
In addition, one of the servers used to host the attacker(s)
malicious files is a Government of
Hainan web server located in Hainan, and one of the control server interfaces we gained access
to is also located in Hainan. However, one should not rush to judgement concerning the identity
of the attacker(s) based on this location. The gh0st RAT software can be configured with a proxy
server; therefore it is possible that the attacker(s) were using a compromised system as a proxy to
hide their true location.
Command results
The Command Result page lists the commands issued through the Send Command page and the
status of those commands. Each entry in this interface shows what command was sent to the
infected computer, including the URL to the command server and the command file (the malicious
file disguised as an image). Upon the successful completion of a command, the relevant date, time,
and result are recorded. (See Fig. 11 - p. 38)
The Command Result page contains a column that displays the content sent back to the control
server from the infected computer. The command issued to retrieve this content in the Send
Command interface is labelled
Acquire System Information.
Even though we have been unable
to properly decode the content,47 the plain text values in the binary content indicate that these
entries contain information about the infected computer (CPU, memory, operating system,
programmes installed) as well as file names of documents on the computer, presumably for later
retrieval. This information is likely used to determine which targets the attacker(s) will further
exploit and control using remote administration tools such as gh0st RAT.
The content is base64 encoded and XORed with values we have yet to identify.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 11
The GhostNet
List Command
interface.
This screen capture of the GhostNet interface lists the commands issued to infected computers. It has been obscured to protect the identity of
the victims.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Methods and capabilities
The attacker(s) are able to exploit several infection vectors. First, they create web pages that
contain
drive by
exploit code that infects the computers of those who visit the page. Second, the
attacker(s) have also shown that they engage in spear phishing in which contextually relevant emails
are sent to targets with PDF and DOC attachments which, when executed, create back doors that
cause the infected computer to connect to a control server and await further instructions.
With each successful infection the attacker(s) may use any contextually relevant data to further
exploit the targeted community and may also impersonate the initial target in order to infect all the
targets
contacts. Finally, the targets themselves may infect others by forwarding infected documents
to their contacts. In this way, the network of infected computers grows organically.
The first stage of infection focuses on getting targets to execute malicious code. Once infected, the target
computer routinely checks in with a control server in order to receive further instructions. At this stage,
the attacker(s) acquires some initial information regarding the identity of the infected computer.
Newer versions of the administration interface contain a direct link to a web service that looks up
the relevant WHOIS information about the IP address of the infected computer along with a simple
port scan. This version also does a geoIP lookup on the infected computer
s IP address and lists the
country in which the computer is located, indicating that the attacker(s) has an interest in the
geographical location of the infected computers.
The attack may also issue an acquire system information command that causes the infected computer to upload
its hardware statistics, list of programs installed, list of recent documents, and current network connections.
The attacker(s) may use this information to target the infected computer for further exploitation.
The attacker(s) directs the infected computers to download and install a remote administration
Trojan. The attacker(s) have demonstrated a preference for gh0st RAT but may choose from a variety
of Trojans. The attacker(s) simply browses to the
send command
interface and pastes in a link to
a version of gh0st RAT on a
command
server under his or her control. The next time the infected
computer checks in to the control server, it will be instructed to download and execute gh0st RAT.
Upon completion, the infected computer notifies the control server and the result appears in the
attacker(s)
web interface.
Once gh0st RAT is installed on the target, the infected computer will periodically check a specific
location and retrieve the IP address to which it is supposed to connect. When the attacker(s)
is not available, he or she will often change this IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost) so that the amount
of potentially suspicious external traffic is limited. When the attacker(s) is ready to receive
connections, the IP address is changed to a valid external IP address.
When the attacker(s) turns on gh0st RAT, he or she is able to see all the infected machines that have
established connections to him or her. The attacker(s) may then execute a wide variety of commands,
including file manager, screen capture, keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture,
as well as the ability to force the infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as
a gh0st RAT update. The attacker(s) may also secretly execute programs on the target computer.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows how the attacker(s) can send specific commands to infected computers. It has been

obscured to protect the identity of the victims.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 10

The gh0st RAT interface.

This screen capture of the English language version of the gh0st RAT software shows the commands that an attacker is able to execute on the

compromised computer.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

The gh0st RAT tool attempts to connect to IP addresses of a DSL provider in Hainan, China:

xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn

After a successful connection, the attacker(s) proceed to issue commands on our infected

computer in real-time.

We found similar but unsuccessful connections to the same IP address range from some of the

infected computers we analysed and discovered that a rudimentary version of the web-based

administration interface contained only one infection from the same IP address range in Hainan.

In addition, one of the servers used to host the attacker(s)

malicious files is a Government of

Hainan web server located in Hainan, and one of the control server interfaces we gained access

to is also located in Hainan. However, one should not rush to judgement concerning the identity

of the attacker(s) based on this location. The gh0st RAT software can be configured with a proxy

server; therefore it is possible that the attacker(s) were using a compromised system as a proxy to

hide their true location.

Command results

The Command Result page lists the commands issued through the Send Command page and the

status of those commands. Each entry in this interface shows what command was sent to the

infected computer, including the URL to the command server and the command file (the malicious

file disguised as an image). Upon the successful completion of a command, the relevant date, time,

and result are recorded. (See Fig. 11 - p. 38)

The Command Result page contains a column that displays the content sent back to the control

server from the infected computer. The command issued to retrieve this content in the Send

Command interface is labelled

Acquire System Information.

Even though we have been unable

to properly decode the content,47 the plain text values in the binary content indicate that these

entries contain information about the infected computer (CPU, memory, operating system,

programmes installed) as well as file names of documents on the computer, presumably for later

retrieval. This information is likely used to determine which targets the attacker(s) will further

exploit and control using remote administration tools such as gh0st RAT.

The content is base64 encoded and XORed with values we have yet to identify.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 11

The GhostNet

List Command

interface.

This screen capture of the GhostNet interface lists the commands issued to infected computers. It has been obscured to protect the identity of

the victims.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Methods and capabilities

The attacker(s) are able to exploit several infection vectors. First, they create web pages that

contain

drive by

exploit code that infects the computers of those who visit the page. Second, the

attacker(s) have also shown that they engage in spear phishing in which contextually relevant emails

are sent to targets with PDF and DOC attachments which, when executed, create back doors that

cause the infected computer to connect to a control server and await further instructions.

With each successful infection the attacker(s) may use any contextually relevant data to further

exploit the targeted community and may also impersonate the initial target in order to infect all the

targets

contacts. Finally, the targets themselves may infect others by forwarding infected documents

to their contacts. In this way, the network of infected computers grows organically.

The first stage of infection focuses on getting targets to execute malicious code. Once infected, the target

computer routinely checks in with a control server in order to receive further instructions. At this stage,

the attacker(s) acquires some initial information regarding the identity of the infected computer.

Newer versions of the administration interface contain a direct link to a web service that looks up

the relevant WHOIS information about the IP address of the infected computer along with a simple

port scan. This version also does a geoIP lookup on the infected computer

s IP address and lists the

country in which the computer is located, indicating that the attacker(s) has an interest in the

geographical location of the infected computers.

The attack may also issue an acquire system information command that causes the infected computer to upload

its hardware statistics, list of programs installed, list of recent documents, and current network connections.

The attacker(s) may use this information to target the infected computer for further exploitation.

The attacker(s) directs the infected computers to download and install a remote administration

Trojan. The attacker(s) have demonstrated a preference for gh0st RAT but may choose from a variety

of Trojans. The attacker(s) simply browses to the

send command

interface and pastes in a link to

a version of gh0st RAT on a

command

server under his or her control. The next time the infected

computer checks in to the control server, it will be instructed to download and execute gh0st RAT.

Upon completion, the infected computer notifies the control server and the result appears in the

attacker(s)

web interface.

Once gh0st RAT is installed on the target, the infected computer will periodically check a specific

location and retrieve the IP address to which it is supposed to connect. When the attacker(s)

is not available, he or she will often change this IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost) so that the amount

of potentially suspicious external traffic is limited. When the attacker(s) is ready to receive

connections, the IP address is changed to a valid external IP address.

When the attacker(s) turns on gh0st RAT, he or she is able to see all the infected machines that have

established connections to him or her. The attacker(s) may then execute a wide variety of commands,

including file manager, screen capture, keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture,

as well as the ability to force the infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as

a gh0st RAT update. The attacker(s) may also secretly execute programs on the target computer.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO