clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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This Palantir screen capture shows the GhostNet servers we uncovered and their relationship with the malicious email sent to, 1) the
International Tibet Support Network, 2) the infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama; and, 3) the honey pot network set
up at the Citizen Lab.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
The four control servers are:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Hainan-TELECOM, CN
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, US
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx CHINANET-SC, CN
The six control/command servers are:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-HI, CN
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CUHKNET, HK
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-JS, CN
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN
The data obtained from WHOIS records concerning domain name registration reveals that most
of the domains are traceable to the same individual. However, the attacker(s) could have simply
stolen the domains from someone else, or compromised the servers hosting these domains.
Table 1: Domain name registration information
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
25/04/06
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
26/11/07
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
20/06/08
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
03/09/08
List of infected computers (see Fig. 8 - p. 33)
The Server List interface provides information on each computer infected by the attacker(s)
malware, indicating the name given to the computer (by its owner/operator), its IP address, when
it was first infected, when it last called home (i.e. the control server), and how many times it
has called home. Each infected computer is assigned a unique identification number so that the
infected computer can be tracked even when its IP address changes. The page also features a link
to the Send Command interface, through which the attacker(s) sends instructions to the infected
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 8
The GhostNet
Server List
interface.
This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows all infected computers that have
checked in
with the control server. It has been obscured
to protect the identity of the victims.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
computers. There is also a button at the top of the page that links to a Command Result page that
shows the status of the commands sent to the host and their results.
To corroborate our findings, there was an entry in the Server List page of the infected OHHDL
computer that we analysed during our field investigations outlined in Part One. It contained the
unique ID, the IP address, computer name, and a link to issue commands to the infected computer.
Sending commands
The Send Command link provided for each entry yields an interface that allows an attacker(s) to
send specific commands to the selected infected computer. In addition to a custom command, the
attacker(s) may choose from a menu of commands, which includes options to download binaries that
provide additional functionality (such as keystroke logging or remote administration), acquire system
information (list computer information, software and documents on the computer), or cause the
malware to become dormant. (See Fig. 9 - p. 35)
Using the Send Command interface, the attacker(s) issues instructions to the infected computers to
download malicious files that are disguised as standard image files. As mentioned above, the files
are most often hosted on additional command servers that appear to be dedicated to hosting these
infected files.46 These command servers contain a variety of files. While the exact function of each
file is not known, the file names given to them by the attacker(s) provide some indication of their
functionality. There are file names associated with the retrieval of files as well as keystroke logging.
One of the commands available to the attacker(s) instructs infected computers to download the
gh0st RAT remote administration tool, which gives the attacker(s) full, real-time control of the infected
computer. Gh0st RAT is an open source Trojan that is widely available online. It was developed by
Chinese programmers but has now been translated into English. The program allows an attacker to
create an executable file that can be repacked and disguised and used to infect and compromise a target
computer. This file can be configured to directly connect to the gh0st RAT owner or to a third location, a
control server, when it retrieves the current IP address of the gh0st RAT owner. (See Fig. 10 - p. 36)
Once the infected computer connects to the gh0st RAT owner, an entry appears in the Connection
window with some information about the infected computer. The gh0st RAT owner may then
issue commands to the infected computer. These commands include file manager, screen capture,
keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture, as well as the ability to force the
infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as a gh0st RAT update.
During the course of the investigation, we infected a honey pot computer with the attacker(s)
malware. We instructed our infected computer to download the attacker(s)
version of gh0st RAT
using the malicious network
s web-based administration interface. The gh0st RAT attempted to
connect to several *.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn IP addresses before finally successfully
connecting to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn).
In some cases the malicious image files are hosted on the control servers themselves.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 9
The GhostNet
Send Command
interface.

This Palantir screen capture shows the GhostNet servers we uncovered and their relationship with the malicious email sent to, 1) the

International Tibet Support Network, 2) the infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama; and, 3) the honey pot network set

up at the Citizen Lab.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

The four control servers are:

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Hainan-TELECOM, CN

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, US

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx CHINANET-SC, CN

The six control/command servers are:

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-HI, CN

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CUHKNET, HK

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-JS, CN

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN

The data obtained from WHOIS records concerning domain name registration reveals that most

of the domains are traceable to the same individual. However, the attacker(s) could have simply

stolen the domains from someone else, or compromised the servers hosting these domains.

Table 1: Domain name registration information

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

25/04/06

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

26/11/07

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

20/06/08

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

03/09/08

List of infected computers (see Fig. 8 - p. 33)

The Server List interface provides information on each computer infected by the attacker(s)

malware, indicating the name given to the computer (by its owner/operator), its IP address, when

it was first infected, when it last called home (i.e. the control server), and how many times it

has called home. Each infected computer is assigned a unique identification number so that the

infected computer can be tracked even when its IP address changes. The page also features a link

to the Send Command interface, through which the attacker(s) sends instructions to the infected

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 8

The GhostNet

Server List

interface.

This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows all infected computers that have

checked in

with the control server. It has been obscured

to protect the identity of the victims.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

computers. There is also a button at the top of the page that links to a Command Result page that

shows the status of the commands sent to the host and their results.

To corroborate our findings, there was an entry in the Server List page of the infected OHHDL

computer that we analysed during our field investigations outlined in Part One. It contained the

unique ID, the IP address, computer name, and a link to issue commands to the infected computer.

Sending commands

The Send Command link provided for each entry yields an interface that allows an attacker(s) to

send specific commands to the selected infected computer. In addition to a custom command, the

attacker(s) may choose from a menu of commands, which includes options to download binaries that

provide additional functionality (such as keystroke logging or remote administration), acquire system

information (list computer information, software and documents on the computer), or cause the

malware to become dormant. (See Fig. 9 - p. 35)

Using the Send Command interface, the attacker(s) issues instructions to the infected computers to

download malicious files that are disguised as standard image files. As mentioned above, the files

are most often hosted on additional command servers that appear to be dedicated to hosting these

infected files.46 These command servers contain a variety of files. While the exact function of each

file is not known, the file names given to them by the attacker(s) provide some indication of their

functionality. There are file names associated with the retrieval of files as well as keystroke logging.

One of the commands available to the attacker(s) instructs infected computers to download the

gh0st RAT remote administration tool, which gives the attacker(s) full, real-time control of the infected

computer. Gh0st RAT is an open source Trojan that is widely available online. It was developed by

Chinese programmers but has now been translated into English. The program allows an attacker to

create an executable file that can be repacked and disguised and used to infect and compromise a target

computer. This file can be configured to directly connect to the gh0st RAT owner or to a third location, a

control server, when it retrieves the current IP address of the gh0st RAT owner. (See Fig. 10 - p. 36)

Once the infected computer connects to the gh0st RAT owner, an entry appears in the Connection

window with some information about the infected computer. The gh0st RAT owner may then

issue commands to the infected computer. These commands include file manager, screen capture,

keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture, as well as the ability to force the

infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as a gh0st RAT update.

During the course of the investigation, we infected a honey pot computer with the attacker(s)

malware. We instructed our infected computer to download the attacker(s)

version of gh0st RAT

using the malicious network

s web-based administration interface. The gh0st RAT attempted to

connect to several *.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn IP addresses before finally successfully

connecting to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn).

In some cases the malicious image files are hosted on the control servers themselves.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 9

The GhostNet

Send Command

interface.