clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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of communications between the infected computer and the control servers, they are related such
that there appear to be two distinct families of malware. In both cases, the malware uses the
protocol for standard web traffic, HTTP, in order make the network activity appear as if it were
normal Internet browsing.
The first family of malware used HTTP connections to connect to PHP files.41 Despite connecting
to different IP addresses and requesting different files, both used the same unique key when
communicating, indicating that they are part of the same family of malware.
1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxxx
using two host names, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The IP address
xxxxxxxxx is in a range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) in China. The malware used HTTP to connect to various PHP files
on the control server in order to update its status and receive instructions about where
to download commands. The commands are embedded in what appear to be image files
(e.g. JPEG).
2) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxx, port
8000. This IP address reverse resolved to xxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.
com.cn and is in an IP range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (HAIFU node adsl dialup
ports) in China. The malware used HTTP POST to upload content to the control server.42
The investigation carried out in Phase 2 identified the network of control servers used in this
particular attack. The control servers we discovered include the control server used in the welldocumented instances of social malware used frequently against Tibetan targets during the 2008
Olympics in Beijing.
The second family of malware used HTTP POST to connect to a CGI43 script to communicate between
the infected computer and the control server. While their functions appear to be different, with one
malware focusing on reporting and commands and the other on document retrieval, they are likely part
of the same family of malware. In addition, the domain names used, www.lookbytheway.net and www.
macfeeresponse.org, are registered to the same person,
zhou zhaojun
([email protected]).
1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address 221.5.250.98 using
the host name www.lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to
CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169 Chongqing Province Network) in China. The
malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file in an attempt to
inform the control server of the infected computer
s status and to download commands.
PHP is a popular scripting language often used in web applications.
HTTP POST is a method often used to upload content to a web server.
CGI scripts are often written in the Perl programming language.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
In one case, the file the infected computer was requesting was not present and the
infected computer received a 404 error. However, successful connections were made
via HTTP to CGI scripts. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI
scripts hosted on the control server.
2) The malware made connections to a control server on 218.241.153.61 using the host name
www.macfeeresponse.org. The IP address 218.241.153.61 is assigned to BITNET (Beijing
Bitone United Networks) in Beijing, China. The malware on the infected computer used
HTTP to connect to a file to inform the control server of the infected computer
s status
and download commands. In addition, connections were made via HTTP to CGI scripts. The
infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control
server. Connections to one CGI script appear to inform the control server of the presence of
particular documents, while connections to a second CGI script appear to cause the infected
computer to upload documents to the control server using HTTP POST.
Instances of malware that connect to control server locations www.lookbytheway.net and www.
macfeeresponse.org have been analysed by security companies.44 This network extends to a variety
of domain names including:
www.lookbytheway.com
210.51.7.155
www.macfeeresponse.com - 210.51.7.155
www.msnppt.net - 221.5.250.98
www.msnxy.net - 210.51.7.155
www.msnyf.com - 221.5.250.98
www.networkcia.com - 210.51.7.155
www.indexnews.org - 61.188.87.58
www.indexindian.com - 210.51.7.155
During the in situ investigation at the Dalai Lama
s private office we observed several documents
being exfiltrated from the computer network and uploaded to www.macfeeresponse.org, including
a document containing thousands of email addresses and one detailing and discussing the Dalai
Lama
s envoy
s negotiating position. (see Fig. 5 - p. 26)
Our investigators did not have access to the stolen documents for reasons of confidentiality.
However, we can assume their significance to Sino-Tibetan negotiations. One example is the fact
that GhostNet penetrated computers of organizations involved in China-TGIE negotiations.45
See, http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=79f7f4695b8878cf1760e8626129ca88 and http://www.threatexpert.com/report.
aspx?md5=ea03a7359505e19146994ad77b2a1e46
Lodi Gyari is the lead person designated by the Dalai Lama to coordinate negotiations with the Chinese government. Our invesigator
interviewed him in December 2008 in Delhi. We briefed him on our ongoing investigation and offered advice on information security
while engaged in negotiations in Beijing. Lodi Gyari is also the Executive Chairman of the Board of the International Campaign for
Tibet (ICT), an independent Washington-based human rights advocacy group. (Note that our investigation uncovered that seven of
s computers were compromised by GhostNet).
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 5
Malware retrieving a sensitive document.
This screen capture of the Wireshark network analysis tool shows an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama uploading a
sensitive document to one of the CGI network
s control servers.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE)
On September 11, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a TGIE computer xxxxxxx. An
analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
received communication from, control servers.
The malware made connections to a control server on 221.10.254.248 using the host name 927.
bigwww.com. The IP address 221.10.254.248 is assigned to CNCGROUP-SC (CNC Group CHINA169
Sichuan Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect
to a JPEG file, which was not an image file but instead contains an IP address and port number
(124.135.97.21:8005). This IP address, 124.135.97.21, is assigned to CNCGROUP-SD (CNC Group
CHINA169 Shandong Province Network) in China.
Offices of Tibet
London

of communications between the infected computer and the control servers, they are related such

that there appear to be two distinct families of malware. In both cases, the malware uses the

protocol for standard web traffic, HTTP, in order make the network activity appear as if it were

normal Internet browsing.

The first family of malware used HTTP connections to connect to PHP files.41 Despite connecting

to different IP addresses and requesting different files, both used the same unique key when

communicating, indicating that they are part of the same family of malware.

1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxxx

using two host names, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The IP address

xxxxxxxxx is in a range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) in China. The malware used HTTP to connect to various PHP files

on the control server in order to update its status and receive instructions about where

to download commands. The commands are embedded in what appear to be image files

(e.g. JPEG).

2) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxx, port

8000. This IP address reverse resolved to xxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.

com.cn and is in an IP range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (HAIFU node adsl dialup

ports) in China. The malware used HTTP POST to upload content to the control server.42

The investigation carried out in Phase 2 identified the network of control servers used in this

particular attack. The control servers we discovered include the control server used in the welldocumented instances of social malware used frequently against Tibetan targets during the 2008

Olympics in Beijing.

The second family of malware used HTTP POST to connect to a CGI43 script to communicate between

the infected computer and the control server. While their functions appear to be different, with one

malware focusing on reporting and commands and the other on document retrieval, they are likely part

of the same family of malware. In addition, the domain names used, www.lookbytheway.net and www.

macfeeresponse.org, are registered to the same person,

zhou zhaojun

([email protected]).

1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address 221.5.250.98 using

the host name www.lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to

CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169 Chongqing Province Network) in China. The

malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file in an attempt to

inform the control server of the infected computer

s status and to download commands.

PHP is a popular scripting language often used in web applications.

HTTP POST is a method often used to upload content to a web server.

CGI scripts are often written in the Perl programming language.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

In one case, the file the infected computer was requesting was not present and the

infected computer received a 404 error. However, successful connections were made

via HTTP to CGI scripts. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI

scripts hosted on the control server.

2) The malware made connections to a control server on 218.241.153.61 using the host name

www.macfeeresponse.org. The IP address 218.241.153.61 is assigned to BITNET (Beijing

Bitone United Networks) in Beijing, China. The malware on the infected computer used

HTTP to connect to a file to inform the control server of the infected computer

s status

and download commands. In addition, connections were made via HTTP to CGI scripts. The

infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control

server. Connections to one CGI script appear to inform the control server of the presence of

particular documents, while connections to a second CGI script appear to cause the infected

computer to upload documents to the control server using HTTP POST.

Instances of malware that connect to control server locations www.lookbytheway.net and www.

macfeeresponse.org have been analysed by security companies.44 This network extends to a variety

of domain names including:

www.lookbytheway.com

210.51.7.155

www.macfeeresponse.com - 210.51.7.155

www.msnppt.net - 221.5.250.98

www.msnxy.net - 210.51.7.155

www.msnyf.com - 221.5.250.98

www.networkcia.com - 210.51.7.155

www.indexnews.org - 61.188.87.58

www.indexindian.com - 210.51.7.155

During the in situ investigation at the Dalai Lama

s private office we observed several documents

being exfiltrated from the computer network and uploaded to www.macfeeresponse.org, including

a document containing thousands of email addresses and one detailing and discussing the Dalai

Lama

s envoy

s negotiating position. (see Fig. 5 - p. 26)

Our investigators did not have access to the stolen documents for reasons of confidentiality.

However, we can assume their significance to Sino-Tibetan negotiations. One example is the fact

that GhostNet penetrated computers of organizations involved in China-TGIE negotiations.45

See, http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=79f7f4695b8878cf1760e8626129ca88 and http://www.threatexpert.com/report.

aspx?md5=ea03a7359505e19146994ad77b2a1e46

Lodi Gyari is the lead person designated by the Dalai Lama to coordinate negotiations with the Chinese government. Our invesigator

interviewed him in December 2008 in Delhi. We briefed him on our ongoing investigation and offered advice on information security

while engaged in negotiations in Beijing. Lodi Gyari is also the Executive Chairman of the Board of the International Campaign for

Tibet (ICT), an independent Washington-based human rights advocacy group. (Note that our investigation uncovered that seven of

s computers were compromised by GhostNet).

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 5

Malware retrieving a sensitive document.

This screen capture of the Wireshark network analysis tool shows an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama uploading a

sensitive document to one of the CGI network

s control servers.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE)

On September 11, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a TGIE computer xxxxxxx. An

analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and

received communication from, control servers.

The malware made connections to a control server on 221.10.254.248 using the host name 927.

bigwww.com. The IP address 221.10.254.248 is assigned to CNCGROUP-SC (CNC Group CHINA169

Sichuan Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect

to a JPEG file, which was not an image file but instead contains an IP address and port number

(124.135.97.21:8005). This IP address, 124.135.97.21, is assigned to CNCGROUP-SD (CNC Group

CHINA169 Shandong Province Network) in China.

Offices of Tibet

London