clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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On October 1, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the London OOT. An
analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
received communication from, control servers.
The malware made connections to a control server on 58.141.132.66 using the hostname oyd.3322.
org on port 4501. The IP address 58.141.132.66 is assigned to NamBu TV in Seoul, South Korea. 3322.
org is a Chinese dynamic domain service.
New York
On March 3, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the New York OOT.
An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which attempted to send
communication to a control server.
The malware attempted to make a connection to what appears to be a control server at
125.108.172.81 but there was not an active server at that location. The IP address 125.108.172.81 is
assigned to CHINANET-ZJ-WZ (CHINANET-ZJ Wenzhou node network) in China.
Drewla
Following the discovery of targeted malware on the OHHDL, TGIE and OOT networks, we performed
similar analysis on Tibetan NGOs to see if we could identify more infected machines communicating
with control servers in China. While we carried out such analysis on a number of NGOs, in this report
we focus on Drewla
s network.
The Drewla (
connection
in Tibetan) is an online outreach project was set up in 2005 that employs
Tibetan youth with Chinese language skills to chat with people in mainland China and in the
diaspora, raising awareness about the Tibetan situation, sharing the Dalai Lama
s teachings, and
supplying information on how to circumvent Chinese government censorship on the Internet.
On September 12, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a Drewla computer. An analysis
revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
received communication from, control servers.
The malware made connections to a control server on 221.5.250.98 using the host name www.
lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169
Chongqing Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect
to a file in an attempt to inform the control server of the infected computer
s status and download
commands. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the
control server. (see Fig. 6 - p. 29)
Box 1.
Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice
During the course of our research, we were informed of the following incident. A member of
Drewla, a young woman, decided to return to her family village in Tibet after working for two
years for Drewla. She was arrested at the Nepalese-Tibetan border and taken to a detention
facility, where she was held incommunicado for two months. She was interrogated by Chinese
intelligence personnel about her employment in Dharamsala. She denied having been politically
active and insisted that she had gone to Dharamsala for studies. In response to this, the
intelligence officers pulled out a dossier on her activities and presented her with full transcripts
of her Internet chats over the years. They indicated that they were fully aware of, and were
monitoring, the Drewla outreach initiative and that her colleagues were not welcome to return
to Tibet. They then released her and she returned to her village.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 6
The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware.
This Palantir screen capture shows the relationship between an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) and the
Tibetan NGO Drewla. Both attempted to connect to the same control server in the CGI network.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers
This phase of the investigation focused on the discovery of the command and control servers. We
were able to identify and connect to the control servers used by the GhostNet by analysing the data
from the OHHDL obtained during the field investigations carried out in Phase 1. During this process
we were able to find and access web-based administration interfaces on the control server identified
from the OHHDL data. These servers contain links to other control servers as well as command
servers, and so therefore we were able to enumerate additional command and control servers.
After discovering several instances of malware on these servers, we set up a honey pot computer and
were able to identify additional malicious servers by monitoring the traffic generated by our infected
honey pot. Using the attacker(s)
web-based administration interface, we were able to command our
honey pot computer to download gh0st RAT, one of the Trojans used by GhostNet. Eventually, our
honey pot computer established a connection to the attacker(s)
gh0st RAT client. The attacker(s)
proceeded to execute commands on our honey pot. We were able to discover several IP addresses
within a DSL range in Hainan Island (PRC) that the attacker(s) used to communicate with computers
infected with gh0st RAT.
Finally, we were able to map out the methods and capabilities of the GhostNet by a triangulated
analysis of three sources: 1) data obtained from our collection of socially engineered emails with
backdoor attachments, 2) the captured network traffic from Tibetan targets; and, 3) data obtained by
gaining access to the command and control interface. (see Fig. 7 - p. 31)
While analysing the data collected from the infected OHHDL computer (xxxxxxx), we discovered
web-based administration interfaces to four control servers. Through some strategic guessing
concerning file paths and file names, we were able to access web interfaces to multiple control
servers. In total, we found 26 instances of the administration interface across the four servers. It
remains unclear why the attacker(s) did not secure access to the control interface. Perhaps the
attacker(s) concluded that the file paths and file names could not be easily guessed.
The control servers
web interface contains three main components: 1) a listing of all the infected computers
that have reported to the control server; 2) an interface to issue commands to the infected computers; and
3) an interface to monitor pending commands to infected computers and their results when completed.
The commands issued to the infected computers direct the infected computer to download files
from additional command servers under the attacker(s)
control. In some cases, these servers act as
control servers themselves; however, some appear to be used exclusively to host malicious files that
infected computers are meant to download. The attacker(s) set commands on the control servers
that instruct infected computers to download additional remote administration Trojans, such as
gh0st RAT, in order to take complete real-time control of the infected computers.
Three of the four control servers are located in three different locations in China: Hainan,
Guangdong and Sichuan. One of the control servers is located at a web-hosting company in the
United States. Five of the six command servers are located in mainland China (Hainan, Guangdong,
Sichuan and Jiangsu) and one in Hong Kong.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 7
The GhostNet control servers.

On October 1, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the London OOT. An

analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and

received communication from, control servers.

The malware made connections to a control server on 58.141.132.66 using the hostname oyd.3322.

org on port 4501. The IP address 58.141.132.66 is assigned to NamBu TV in Seoul, South Korea. 3322.

org is a Chinese dynamic domain service.

New York

On March 3, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the New York OOT.

An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which attempted to send

communication to a control server.

The malware attempted to make a connection to what appears to be a control server at

125.108.172.81 but there was not an active server at that location. The IP address 125.108.172.81 is

assigned to CHINANET-ZJ-WZ (CHINANET-ZJ Wenzhou node network) in China.

Drewla

Following the discovery of targeted malware on the OHHDL, TGIE and OOT networks, we performed

similar analysis on Tibetan NGOs to see if we could identify more infected machines communicating

with control servers in China. While we carried out such analysis on a number of NGOs, in this report

we focus on Drewla

s network.

The Drewla (

connection

in Tibetan) is an online outreach project was set up in 2005 that employs

Tibetan youth with Chinese language skills to chat with people in mainland China and in the

diaspora, raising awareness about the Tibetan situation, sharing the Dalai Lama

s teachings, and

supplying information on how to circumvent Chinese government censorship on the Internet.

On September 12, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a Drewla computer. An analysis

revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

received communication from, control servers.

The malware made connections to a control server on 221.5.250.98 using the host name www.

lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169

Chongqing Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect

to a file in an attempt to inform the control server of the infected computer

s status and download

commands. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the

control server. (see Fig. 6 - p. 29)

Box 1.

Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice

During the course of our research, we were informed of the following incident. A member of

Drewla, a young woman, decided to return to her family village in Tibet after working for two

years for Drewla. She was arrested at the Nepalese-Tibetan border and taken to a detention

facility, where she was held incommunicado for two months. She was interrogated by Chinese

intelligence personnel about her employment in Dharamsala. She denied having been politically

active and insisted that she had gone to Dharamsala for studies. In response to this, the

intelligence officers pulled out a dossier on her activities and presented her with full transcripts

of her Internet chats over the years. They indicated that they were fully aware of, and were

monitoring, the Drewla outreach initiative and that her colleagues were not welcome to return

to Tibet. They then released her and she returned to her village.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 6

The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware.

This Palantir screen capture shows the relationship between an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) and the

Tibetan NGO Drewla. Both attempted to connect to the same control server in the CGI network.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers

This phase of the investigation focused on the discovery of the command and control servers. We

were able to identify and connect to the control servers used by the GhostNet by analysing the data

from the OHHDL obtained during the field investigations carried out in Phase 1. During this process

we were able to find and access web-based administration interfaces on the control server identified

from the OHHDL data. These servers contain links to other control servers as well as command

servers, and so therefore we were able to enumerate additional command and control servers.

After discovering several instances of malware on these servers, we set up a honey pot computer and

were able to identify additional malicious servers by monitoring the traffic generated by our infected

honey pot. Using the attacker(s)

web-based administration interface, we were able to command our

honey pot computer to download gh0st RAT, one of the Trojans used by GhostNet. Eventually, our

honey pot computer established a connection to the attacker(s)

gh0st RAT client. The attacker(s)

proceeded to execute commands on our honey pot. We were able to discover several IP addresses

within a DSL range in Hainan Island (PRC) that the attacker(s) used to communicate with computers

infected with gh0st RAT.

Finally, we were able to map out the methods and capabilities of the GhostNet by a triangulated

analysis of three sources: 1) data obtained from our collection of socially engineered emails with

backdoor attachments, 2) the captured network traffic from Tibetan targets; and, 3) data obtained by

gaining access to the command and control interface. (see Fig. 7 - p. 31)

While analysing the data collected from the infected OHHDL computer (xxxxxxx), we discovered

web-based administration interfaces to four control servers. Through some strategic guessing

concerning file paths and file names, we were able to access web interfaces to multiple control

servers. In total, we found 26 instances of the administration interface across the four servers. It

remains unclear why the attacker(s) did not secure access to the control interface. Perhaps the

attacker(s) concluded that the file paths and file names could not be easily guessed.

The control servers

web interface contains three main components: 1) a listing of all the infected computers

that have reported to the control server; 2) an interface to issue commands to the infected computers; and

3) an interface to monitor pending commands to infected computers and their results when completed.

The commands issued to the infected computers direct the infected computer to download files

from additional command servers under the attacker(s)

control. In some cases, these servers act as

control servers themselves; however, some appear to be used exclusively to host malicious files that

infected computers are meant to download. The attacker(s) set commands on the control servers

that instruct infected computers to download additional remote administration Trojans, such as

gh0st RAT, in order to take complete real-time control of the infected computers.

Three of the four control servers are located in three different locations in China: Hainan,

Guangdong and Sichuan. One of the control servers is located at a web-hosting company in the

United States. Five of the six command servers are located in mainland China (Hainan, Guangdong,

Sichuan and Jiangsu) and one in Hong Kong.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 7

The GhostNet control servers.