clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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s machine and installs the malware on the user
computer, along with a seemingly benign file. From the user
s perspective, the infected document
will often open normally, leaving the user unaware of the infection that just took place.
Only 11 of the 34 anti-virus programs provided by Virus Total38 recognized the malware embedded in
the document. Attackers often use executable packers to obfuscate their malicious code in order to
avoid detection by anti-virus software. (See Fig. 3 - p. 21)
Researchers monitoring the use of socially engineered malware attacks against the Tibetan
community have identified over eight different Trojan families in use.39 Control over some targeted
machines is maintained using the Chinese gh0st RAT (Remote Access Tool). These Trojans generally
allow for near-unrestricted access to the infected systems.
A detailed technical investigation of a similar case of a targeted attack which connected to the same control server is available
here: http://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; another investigation of targeted attacks connecting to the same control
server is available here: http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
For a detailed list of malicious files and control servers see xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
VirusTotal.com is a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with 34 leading anti-virus products.
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 1
Social Engineering
attack connects to GhostNet.
This Palantir screen capture summarizes the relationships between an
unknown sender
pretending to be
[email protected]
, the email
sent to the International Tibet Support Network , and the attachment (
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
that contained malware that connected to a GhostNet control server.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 2
Socially Engineered
email sent to the International Tibet Support
Network.
This email was sent on July 25, 2008 by an unknown attacker pretending to be
[email protected]
to the International Tibet Support
Network. Attached to the message was a Microsoft Word document named
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
that exploits a vulnerability in Word to install malware on the target
s computer system.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 3
A Virus Total screen capture of a malware infected email attachment.
This is a screen capture from VirusTotal.com, a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with
anti-virus products. It shows that only 11 of 34 anti-virus products detected the malicious file (
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book
for Tibetans in Exile.doc
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
After infecting the target, the Trojan packed in the Word document performed a DNS look-up to
find its control server and then connected to that server. This Trojan attempted to connect to
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. This is one of the control servers that we later scouted and was in the same
Trojan family that infected computers in the Dalai Lama
s private office.
About 70% of the control servers behind the attacks on Tibetan organizations are located on IP
addresses assigned to China. However, servers have also been identified in the United States,
Sweden, South Korea and Taiwan. The host names pointing to these servers are quite often
configured on dynamic DNS services, such as 3322.org. While these services in and of themselves
are not malicious, they are heavily used in these specific attacks.40
Information Warfare Monitor field research
In September and October 2008 the Information Warfare Monitor investigated information security
practices and alleged cyber espionage activities on the computer systems in various offices related
to the work of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan groups. The offices that we investigated were:
the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), based in Dharamsala, India; the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (TGIE); various Offices of Tibet (OOT) in New York City, London, Paris, Brussels,
and Geneva; and the Tibetan activist NGO, Drewla. (See Fig. 4 - p. 23)
Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
The OHHDL is the personal office of the Dalai Lama. The OHHDL provides secretarial assistance and
is responsible for all matters related to the Dalai Lama and acts on his behalf. It is worth noting
that the OHHDL
s primary responsibilities include organization of the Dalai Lama
s international
schedule, handling all diplomatic, governmental and personal correspondence, and acting as
the liaison between the Dalai Lama and officials of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and
the Offices of Tibet (OOT) worldwide. Therefore the OHHDL
s computer network is continuously
transmitting and receiving extremely sensitive data.
While the Office does not have any secrets, it is essentially the hub of the Tibetan movement and
thus handles strategic, time-sensitive communications. Examples of these communications include
scheduling meetings with world leaders, and, since 2002, coordinating the negotiations between
the People
s Republic of China and Dharamsala.
On September 10, 2008, we used Wireshark to capture packets from an OHHDL computer named
xxxxxx. We chose xxxxxxx from among 23 computers on the OHHDL internal network due to
time constraints and consultations with office staff to identify the computers most likely to be
infected, such as those operated by relatively inexperienced users vulnerable to social engineering
techniques, or those handling particularly sensitive data.
An analysis of the data collected reveals that this computer was compromised by malware that was
in interactive communication with identified control servers. The infected computer connected to
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 4
Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations.
A Palantir screen capture showing the Tibetan organizations at which we conducted field research and the connections from infected
computers at these locations and various control servers located in China. The locations at which we found evidence of infection are:
the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Offices of Tibet in New York City and London and the Tibetan
activist NGO, Drewla.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
four different IP addresses, each with a somewhat different method. While there are four groupings

s machine and installs the malware on the user

computer, along with a seemingly benign file. From the user

s perspective, the infected document

will often open normally, leaving the user unaware of the infection that just took place.

Only 11 of the 34 anti-virus programs provided by Virus Total38 recognized the malware embedded in

the document. Attackers often use executable packers to obfuscate their malicious code in order to

avoid detection by anti-virus software. (See Fig. 3 - p. 21)

Researchers monitoring the use of socially engineered malware attacks against the Tibetan

community have identified over eight different Trojan families in use.39 Control over some targeted

machines is maintained using the Chinese gh0st RAT (Remote Access Tool). These Trojans generally

allow for near-unrestricted access to the infected systems.

A detailed technical investigation of a similar case of a targeted attack which connected to the same control server is available

here: http://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; another investigation of targeted attacks connecting to the same control

server is available here: http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

For a detailed list of malicious files and control servers see xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

VirusTotal.com is a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with 34 leading anti-virus products.

http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 1

Social Engineering

attack connects to GhostNet.

This Palantir screen capture summarizes the relationships between an

unknown sender

pretending to be

[email protected]

, the email

sent to the International Tibet Support Network , and the attachment (

Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc

that contained malware that connected to a GhostNet control server.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 2

Socially Engineered

email sent to the International Tibet Support

Network.

This email was sent on July 25, 2008 by an unknown attacker pretending to be

[email protected]

to the International Tibet Support

Network. Attached to the message was a Microsoft Word document named

Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc

that exploits a vulnerability in Word to install malware on the target

s computer system.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 3

A Virus Total screen capture of a malware infected email attachment.

This is a screen capture from VirusTotal.com, a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with

anti-virus products. It shows that only 11 of 34 anti-virus products detected the malicious file (

Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book

for Tibetans in Exile.doc

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

After infecting the target, the Trojan packed in the Word document performed a DNS look-up to

find its control server and then connected to that server. This Trojan attempted to connect to

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. This is one of the control servers that we later scouted and was in the same

Trojan family that infected computers in the Dalai Lama

s private office.

About 70% of the control servers behind the attacks on Tibetan organizations are located on IP

addresses assigned to China. However, servers have also been identified in the United States,

Sweden, South Korea and Taiwan. The host names pointing to these servers are quite often

configured on dynamic DNS services, such as 3322.org. While these services in and of themselves

are not malicious, they are heavily used in these specific attacks.40

Information Warfare Monitor field research

In September and October 2008 the Information Warfare Monitor investigated information security

practices and alleged cyber espionage activities on the computer systems in various offices related

to the work of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan groups. The offices that we investigated were:

the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), based in Dharamsala, India; the Tibetan

Government-in-Exile (TGIE); various Offices of Tibet (OOT) in New York City, London, Paris, Brussels,

and Geneva; and the Tibetan activist NGO, Drewla. (See Fig. 4 - p. 23)

Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama

The OHHDL is the personal office of the Dalai Lama. The OHHDL provides secretarial assistance and

is responsible for all matters related to the Dalai Lama and acts on his behalf. It is worth noting

that the OHHDL

s primary responsibilities include organization of the Dalai Lama

s international

schedule, handling all diplomatic, governmental and personal correspondence, and acting as

the liaison between the Dalai Lama and officials of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and

the Offices of Tibet (OOT) worldwide. Therefore the OHHDL

s computer network is continuously

transmitting and receiving extremely sensitive data.

While the Office does not have any secrets, it is essentially the hub of the Tibetan movement and

thus handles strategic, time-sensitive communications. Examples of these communications include

scheduling meetings with world leaders, and, since 2002, coordinating the negotiations between

the People

s Republic of China and Dharamsala.

On September 10, 2008, we used Wireshark to capture packets from an OHHDL computer named

xxxxxx. We chose xxxxxxx from among 23 computers on the OHHDL internal network due to

time constraints and consultations with office staff to identify the computers most likely to be

infected, such as those operated by relatively inexperienced users vulnerable to social engineering

techniques, or those handling particularly sensitive data.

An analysis of the data collected reveals that this computer was compromised by malware that was

in interactive communication with identified control servers. The infected computer connected to

http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 4

Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations.

A Palantir screen capture showing the Tibetan organizations at which we conducted field research and the connections from infected

computers at these locations and various control servers located in China. The locations at which we found evidence of infection are:

the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Offices of Tibet in New York City and London and the Tibetan

activist NGO, Drewla.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

four different IP addresses, each with a somewhat different method. While there are four groupings