clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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the allegations of cyber espionage. We also sought alternative explanations for leakage of confidential
documents and information and examined basic information security practices at these locations.
Network monitoring software was installed on various computers so as to collect forensic technical
data from affected computer systems, and initial results were analysed in situ.32 This initial analysis
confirmed the existence of malware and the transfer of information between infected computers and
a number of control servers.33
Phase 2: Computer-based scouting, target selection, and data analysis (December 2008-March 2009)
During the second phase of the investigation, researchers based at the Citizen Lab analysed the data
collected by the field team.
The data collected in Dharamsala and at Tibetan missions abroad led to the discovery of four control
servers and six command servers. These control servers were identified and geo-located from the captured
A portion of the fieldwork was carried out in conjunction with Dr. Shishir Nagaraja who spent five days in Dharamsala at the request
of IWM researchers and assisted in conducting technical tests.
A packet capturing program, Wireshark, was installed at each test location. All traffic from each of the affected systems was
captured in real-time, and recorded for further analysis. Compromised systems try to connect to control servers in order check-in and
report an infection. Once a connection is made, infected computers may receive instructions or additional locations from where they
are to download instructions. The Wireshark data is sufficient to analyse these connections, determine the behaviour of the attack
vector, and identify the location of control servers.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
traffic using a simple IP lookup.34 The control servers were then probed and web-based control interfaces
were identified on four control servers, which allowed us to view and control the network. The system was
actively monitored for two weeks, which allowed us to derive an extensive list of infected systems, and to
also monitor the systems operator(s) as the operator(s) specifically instructed target computers.
The data collected during both phases was integrated in Palantir, a data visualization and analysis
tool. The Palantir platform provides a data fusion and visualization environment that enhances
analytical capabilities.
We looked up the associated Internet Protocol (IP) address in all five Regional Internet Registries in order to identify the country
and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name System (DNS) look-up on each IP
address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses; reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address
into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP
address. If we discovered a domain name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain
name registrations and provides information about who registered the domain name.
PART TWO:
Tracking GhostNet
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Phase 1: Field investigation
We conducted our investigation in Dharamsala between July and September 2008. The initial purpose
was to gather targeted malware samples from Tibetan NGOs based in the area and to brief the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (TGIE) on the basics of information security. This included raising end-user
awareness about social engineering and its policy implications for the secure use of information systems.
The investigator met with the Dalai Lama
s representative in Geneva, Tseten Samdup. During the
meeting, Samdup inquired about the potential threat to computer security at the Office of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) in light of the targeted malware threat. Samdup requested that
the investigator perform a preliminary security review of OHHDL systems, including Dalailama.com
and the office computer network. A five day mission was scheduled in early September. Malware
was discovered on computers located in the OHHDL.
Following the discovery of malware in the OHHDL, our investigator shifted focus to the campus
network of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. We approached Thubten Samphel, a senior civil
servant in the Department for Information and International Relations, and sought permission
to run Wireshark on several key computer systems, and to access the firewall logs at the Tibetan
Computing Resource Centre. This access was readily granted.
Additional testing was carried out at a Tibetan NGO. This was done at the suggestion of Phuntsok
Dorjee, the director of a local NGO, TibTec. Dorjee suggested that we conduct testing and monitoring at
the offices of Drewla.35 As was the case at other sitesthe investigator conducted a series of interviews
with the NGO staff.
Targeted malware
previous research
In September 2002, Tibetan groups reported that they were targeted with malware originating
from servers in mainland China. They claimed that this was a coordinated attempt to disrupt their
operations and spy on their computer networks. Similar attacks have occurred since then against a
range of Tibetan non-state actors, including exile groups, human rights organizations, trade unions
and labour organizers, writers, scholars and intellectuals.
In 2005, a member of our investigating team convened a working group that coordinated the
collection and archiving of the malware, including the payloads and associated examples of social
engineering employed. Since early 2008, we have analysed every sample available to us, and
identified control servers for at least fifty incidents.
During an analysis of attacks which occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympics we discovered
the location of a control server that was later identified as part of the network which infected a
computer in the private office of the Dalai Lama.
The Drewla Initiative Project is an outreach model that seeks new ways to communicate directly with citizens of the People
Republic of China. It relies heavily on the Internet.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
We were able to gain access to the command interface of this control server and identify the
infected computers which reported back to this server. While were are unable to prove exactly how
the computer in the Dalai Lama
s office became infected, this case demonstrates one of the attack
vectors used by the attacker(s) behind the network of infected computers we later uncovered.36
The following steps illustrate the attack vector using the malicious document we collected, which was
configured to connect to a control server to which we later acquired access. (See Fig. 1 - p.19)
An email message arrives in the target
s inbox carrying the malware in an attachment or web link.
The attackers(s)
objective is to get the target to open the attachment or malicious link so that the
malicious code can execute. In this case, the attacker(s) sent a carefully crafted email message which
was configured to appear as if it was sent from [email protected] with an attached infected
Word document named
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
to entice
the recipient to open the file.37 (See Fig. 2 - p. 20)
Over time, it has been observed that the carrier emails have become more sophisticated in their
targeting and content in order to trick their recipients into believing that they are receiving
legitimate messages. This is also known as
social engineering.
It is common to see legitimate
documents recycled for such attacks or the attacker injecting their message into an ongoing group
conversation. There are also cases where it appears that content stolen from previously-infected
machines was recycled to enhance the appearance of legitimacy.
The targeted user proceeds to opens the attachment or malicious link. Once opened, the infected
file or link exploits a vulnerability on the user

the allegations of cyber espionage. We also sought alternative explanations for leakage of confidential

documents and information and examined basic information security practices at these locations.

Network monitoring software was installed on various computers so as to collect forensic technical

data from affected computer systems, and initial results were analysed in situ.32 This initial analysis

confirmed the existence of malware and the transfer of information between infected computers and

a number of control servers.33

Phase 2: Computer-based scouting, target selection, and data analysis (December 2008-March 2009)

During the second phase of the investigation, researchers based at the Citizen Lab analysed the data

collected by the field team.

The data collected in Dharamsala and at Tibetan missions abroad led to the discovery of four control

servers and six command servers. These control servers were identified and geo-located from the captured

A portion of the fieldwork was carried out in conjunction with Dr. Shishir Nagaraja who spent five days in Dharamsala at the request

of IWM researchers and assisted in conducting technical tests.

A packet capturing program, Wireshark, was installed at each test location. All traffic from each of the affected systems was

captured in real-time, and recorded for further analysis. Compromised systems try to connect to control servers in order check-in and

report an infection. Once a connection is made, infected computers may receive instructions or additional locations from where they

are to download instructions. The Wireshark data is sufficient to analyse these connections, determine the behaviour of the attack

vector, and identify the location of control servers.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE

traffic using a simple IP lookup.34 The control servers were then probed and web-based control interfaces

were identified on four control servers, which allowed us to view and control the network. The system was

actively monitored for two weeks, which allowed us to derive an extensive list of infected systems, and to

also monitor the systems operator(s) as the operator(s) specifically instructed target computers.

The data collected during both phases was integrated in Palantir, a data visualization and analysis

tool. The Palantir platform provides a data fusion and visualization environment that enhances

analytical capabilities.

We looked up the associated Internet Protocol (IP) address in all five Regional Internet Registries in order to identify the country

and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name System (DNS) look-up on each IP

address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses; reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address

into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP

address. If we discovered a domain name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain

name registrations and provides information about who registered the domain name.

PART TWO:

Tracking GhostNet

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Phase 1: Field investigation

We conducted our investigation in Dharamsala between July and September 2008. The initial purpose

was to gather targeted malware samples from Tibetan NGOs based in the area and to brief the Tibetan

Government-in-Exile (TGIE) on the basics of information security. This included raising end-user

awareness about social engineering and its policy implications for the secure use of information systems.

The investigator met with the Dalai Lama

s representative in Geneva, Tseten Samdup. During the

meeting, Samdup inquired about the potential threat to computer security at the Office of His

Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) in light of the targeted malware threat. Samdup requested that

the investigator perform a preliminary security review of OHHDL systems, including Dalailama.com

and the office computer network. A five day mission was scheduled in early September. Malware

was discovered on computers located in the OHHDL.

Following the discovery of malware in the OHHDL, our investigator shifted focus to the campus

network of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. We approached Thubten Samphel, a senior civil

servant in the Department for Information and International Relations, and sought permission

to run Wireshark on several key computer systems, and to access the firewall logs at the Tibetan

Computing Resource Centre. This access was readily granted.

Additional testing was carried out at a Tibetan NGO. This was done at the suggestion of Phuntsok

Dorjee, the director of a local NGO, TibTec. Dorjee suggested that we conduct testing and monitoring at

the offices of Drewla.35 As was the case at other sitesthe investigator conducted a series of interviews

with the NGO staff.

Targeted malware

previous research

In September 2002, Tibetan groups reported that they were targeted with malware originating

from servers in mainland China. They claimed that this was a coordinated attempt to disrupt their

operations and spy on their computer networks. Similar attacks have occurred since then against a

range of Tibetan non-state actors, including exile groups, human rights organizations, trade unions

and labour organizers, writers, scholars and intellectuals.

In 2005, a member of our investigating team convened a working group that coordinated the

collection and archiving of the malware, including the payloads and associated examples of social

engineering employed. Since early 2008, we have analysed every sample available to us, and

identified control servers for at least fifty incidents.

During an analysis of attacks which occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympics we discovered

the location of a control server that was later identified as part of the network which infected a

computer in the private office of the Dalai Lama.

The Drewla Initiative Project is an outreach model that seeks new ways to communicate directly with citizens of the People

Republic of China. It relies heavily on the Internet.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

We were able to gain access to the command interface of this control server and identify the

infected computers which reported back to this server. While were are unable to prove exactly how

the computer in the Dalai Lama

s office became infected, this case demonstrates one of the attack

vectors used by the attacker(s) behind the network of infected computers we later uncovered.36

The following steps illustrate the attack vector using the malicious document we collected, which was

configured to connect to a control server to which we later acquired access. (See Fig. 1 - p.19)

An email message arrives in the target

s inbox carrying the malware in an attachment or web link.

The attackers(s)

objective is to get the target to open the attachment or malicious link so that the

malicious code can execute. In this case, the attacker(s) sent a carefully crafted email message which

was configured to appear as if it was sent from [email protected] with an attached infected

Word document named

Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc

to entice

the recipient to open the file.37 (See Fig. 2 - p. 20)

Over time, it has been observed that the carrier emails have become more sophisticated in their

targeting and content in order to trick their recipients into believing that they are receiving

legitimate messages. This is also known as

social engineering.

It is common to see legitimate

documents recycled for such attacks or the attacker injecting their message into an ongoing group

conversation. There are also cases where it appears that content stolen from previously-infected

machines was recycled to enhance the appearance of legitimacy.

The targeted user proceeds to opens the attachment or malicious link. Once opened, the infected

file or link exploits a vulnerability on the user