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cyclones in cyberspace
were sufficient to
precipitate events outside of cyberspace.11
International cooperation has for the most part focused on establishing capabilities for counteracting
the criminal use of cyberspace, and with good reason. In 2009, the FBI estimated that cybercrime is
responsible for over $10 billion worth of losses each year.12 Cybercrime is a relatively low cost, low
threshold activity. Techniques such as phishing and targeted malware are easy to construct, and the
chances of prosecution are minimal given a general lack of international coordination.
This is slowly changing as national and international authorities become more aware of the threat.
The attacks on Estonia, for example, led to the establishment of NATO
s Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.13 The International Telecommunication Union has also
established its own specialized agency, IMPACT, designed to aid intelligence sharing and tracking of
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ; http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0123/p04s03-wome.html
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/01/24/man-convicted-in-estonia-cyber-attack
For example, a US government investigation of systematic hacking of Department of Defense networks and defence laboratories
dubbed
Titan Rain
never provided conclusive evidence to substantiate allegations that the hacking was conducted at the behest of
the Chinese government. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html
A good example is the 1998
Solar Sunrise
investigation. The evidence gathered by US authorities eventually led to the conviction
of an Israeli citizen, Ehud Tenebaum, although the involvement of Israeli security services was never proven. http://www.sans.org/
resources/idfaq/solar_sunrise.php
http://opennet.net/special/kg/
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2146
http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/0903/hacking-goes-pro-0903.cfm
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
malicious criminal activity in cyberspace.14 Countries such as the United States, Russia and China
have also entered into bilateral agreements with allied countries and partners.
A focus on China
Recent allegations of Chinese cyber espionage largely rely on anecdotal evidence. The most common
proof provided by victims of these attacks consists of log files or malware that shows connections
being made by infected computers to IP addresses assigned to the People
s Republic of China.
This kind of evidence is circumstantial at best. Internet usage statistics suggest that focusing on
Chinese instances of information warfare is misleading.15 With 41% of the world
s Internet users
located in Asia, China alone accounts for the largest national population of Internet users
some 300
million, nearly one-fifth of the global number of users. Coupled with the rapid growth in Chinese use
of the Internet
a 1,200% increase in the period 2000-2008
this would more than account for the
rise in instances of Chinese-oriented malware.16
At the same time, however, allegations of Chinese hacking and exploitation of private and
government computer systems are persistent enough to warrant an evidence-based investigation.
This report provides such an investigation.
Outline of report
This report is divided into three parts:
Part one provides a brief introduction to the context and background to this report. We examine past
allegations of cyber espionage by China-based actors and the challenge of evidence-based research
in this field. Part one concludes with a brief description of the methods used in our two-phase
investigation.
Part two provides a detailed account of the conduct of our investigation. The findings of each phase
are presented sequentially.
Part three analyses the overall findings of the investigation, suggests alternative explanations and
assesses the implications.
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/impact/index.html
For global Internet usage statistics please see http://www.internetworldstats.com
http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/03/03/wheres-the-badware
PART ONE:
Context and background
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
Context and background: Alleged Chinese operations
in cyberspace
China has been developing its cyberspace doctrine and capabilities since the late 1990s as part of its military
modernization programme. The Chinese doctrine of
active defence,
which is the belief that China must be ready
to respond to aggression immediately, places an emphasis on the development of cyber warfare capabilities.
The Chinese focus on cyber capabilities as part of its strategy of national asymmetric warfare involves
deliberately developing capabilities that circumvent U.S. superiority in command-and-control warfare.
The strategy recognizes the critical importance of the cyber domain to American military and economic
power and the importance of offensive cyber operations to victory in a modern conflict with the United
States. Chinese doctrine also emphasizes the contiguity between military and non-military realms.17
In recent years, there has been an increase in allegations that China-based hackers are responsible for
high-level penetrations of computer systems in Europe, North America and Asia. Attackers originating
in China have been accused of infiltrating government computers in the United States, Britain, France,
Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. China-based hackers have been accused of data theft from foreign
government computers and commercial and financial institutions. The U.S. Department of Defense
reports it is continuously targeted by Chinese attackers, most notably in the series of attacks since 2003
known as
Titan Rain,
which targeted the Department of Defense and numerous defence companies.18
There are also allegations of attacks originating from China directed against non-governmental
organizations active in regions where China has a national interest. This includes organizations
advocating on the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,19 Tibetan groups active in India, and the
Falun Gong. The majority of attacks involve website defacements, denial of service attacks, or virus
writing campaigns. Nationalistic and patriotic cyber-activity by Chinese nationals intensifies during
crises, such as during Sino-American or Sino-Taiwanese tensions (see below). To date none of these
attacks have been traced back to Chinese state authorities or specific individuals, although many
have benefited official Chinese policy and interests.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&na
me=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1 ; http://www.heritage.org/Research/asiaandthepacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html ; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/