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cyclones in cyberspace |
were sufficient to |
precipitate events outside of cyberspace.11 |
International cooperation has for the most part focused on establishing capabilities for counteracting |
the criminal use of cyberspace, and with good reason. In 2009, the FBI estimated that cybercrime is |
responsible for over $10 billion worth of losses each year.12 Cybercrime is a relatively low cost, low |
threshold activity. Techniques such as phishing and targeted malware are easy to construct, and the |
chances of prosecution are minimal given a general lack of international coordination. |
This is slowly changing as national and international authorities become more aware of the threat. |
The attacks on Estonia, for example, led to the establishment of NATO |
s Cooperative Cyber Defence |
Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.13 The International Telecommunication Union has also |
established its own specialized agency, IMPACT, designed to aid intelligence sharing and tracking of |
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ; http://www.slate.com/id/2197514 |
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0123/p04s03-wome.html |
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/01/24/man-convicted-in-estonia-cyber-attack |
For example, a US government investigation of systematic hacking of Department of Defense networks and defence laboratories |
dubbed |
Titan Rain |
never provided conclusive evidence to substantiate allegations that the hacking was conducted at the behest of |
the Chinese government. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html |
A good example is the 1998 |
Solar Sunrise |
investigation. The evidence gathered by US authorities eventually led to the conviction |
of an Israeli citizen, Ehud Tenebaum, although the involvement of Israeli security services was never proven. http://www.sans.org/ |
resources/idfaq/solar_sunrise.php |
http://opennet.net/special/kg/ |
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf |
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2146 |
http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/0903/hacking-goes-pro-0903.cfm |
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html |
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION |
malicious criminal activity in cyberspace.14 Countries such as the United States, Russia and China |
have also entered into bilateral agreements with allied countries and partners. |
A focus on China |
Recent allegations of Chinese cyber espionage largely rely on anecdotal evidence. The most common |
proof provided by victims of these attacks consists of log files or malware that shows connections |
being made by infected computers to IP addresses assigned to the People |
s Republic of China. |
This kind of evidence is circumstantial at best. Internet usage statistics suggest that focusing on |
Chinese instances of information warfare is misleading.15 With 41% of the world |
s Internet users |
located in Asia, China alone accounts for the largest national population of Internet users |
some 300 |
million, nearly one-fifth of the global number of users. Coupled with the rapid growth in Chinese use |
of the Internet |
a 1,200% increase in the period 2000-2008 |
this would more than account for the |
rise in instances of Chinese-oriented malware.16 |
At the same time, however, allegations of Chinese hacking and exploitation of private and |
government computer systems are persistent enough to warrant an evidence-based investigation. |
This report provides such an investigation. |
Outline of report |
This report is divided into three parts: |
Part one provides a brief introduction to the context and background to this report. We examine past |
allegations of cyber espionage by China-based actors and the challenge of evidence-based research |
in this field. Part one concludes with a brief description of the methods used in our two-phase |
investigation. |
Part two provides a detailed account of the conduct of our investigation. The findings of each phase |
are presented sequentially. |
Part three analyses the overall findings of the investigation, suggests alternative explanations and |
assesses the implications. |
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/impact/index.html |
For global Internet usage statistics please see http://www.internetworldstats.com |
http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/03/03/wheres-the-badware |
PART ONE: |
Context and background |
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE |
Context and background: Alleged Chinese operations |
in cyberspace |
China has been developing its cyberspace doctrine and capabilities since the late 1990s as part of its military |
modernization programme. The Chinese doctrine of |
active defence, |
which is the belief that China must be ready |
to respond to aggression immediately, places an emphasis on the development of cyber warfare capabilities. |
The Chinese focus on cyber capabilities as part of its strategy of national asymmetric warfare involves |
deliberately developing capabilities that circumvent U.S. superiority in command-and-control warfare. |
The strategy recognizes the critical importance of the cyber domain to American military and economic |
power and the importance of offensive cyber operations to victory in a modern conflict with the United |
States. Chinese doctrine also emphasizes the contiguity between military and non-military realms.17 |
In recent years, there has been an increase in allegations that China-based hackers are responsible for |
high-level penetrations of computer systems in Europe, North America and Asia. Attackers originating |
in China have been accused of infiltrating government computers in the United States, Britain, France, |
Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. China-based hackers have been accused of data theft from foreign |
government computers and commercial and financial institutions. The U.S. Department of Defense |
reports it is continuously targeted by Chinese attackers, most notably in the series of attacks since 2003 |
known as |
Titan Rain, |
which targeted the Department of Defense and numerous defence companies.18 |
There are also allegations of attacks originating from China directed against non-governmental |
organizations active in regions where China has a national interest. This includes organizations |
advocating on the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,19 Tibetan groups active in India, and the |
Falun Gong. The majority of attacks involve website defacements, denial of service attacks, or virus |
writing campaigns. Nationalistic and patriotic cyber-activity by Chinese nationals intensifies during |
crises, such as during Sino-American or Sino-Taiwanese tensions (see below). To date none of these |
attacks have been traced back to Chinese state authorities or specific individuals, although many |
have benefited official Chinese policy and interests. |
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&na |
me=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1 ; http://www.heritage.org/Research/asiaandthepacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf |
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html ; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ |
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