clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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allowed us to examine Tibetan information security practices, as well as capture real-time evidence
of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems.
During the second phase of our investigation, the data was analyzed, and led to the discovery of
insecure, web-based interfaces to four control servers. These interfaces allow attacker(s) to send
instructions to, and receive data from, compromised computers. Our research team successfully
scouted these servers, revealing a wide-ranging network of compromised computers. This extensive
network consists of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries.
Significantly, close to 30% of the infected computers can be considered high-value and include the
ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados
and Bhutan; embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan,
Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat,
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news
organizations; and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters.
The GhostNet system directs infected computers to download a Trojan known as gh0st RAT that allows
attackers to gain complete, real-time control. These instances of gh0st RAT are consistently controlled
from commercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan, People
s Republic of China.
Our investigation reveals that GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers,
including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including
microphones and web cameras.
The vector for spreading the GhostNet infection leverages social means. Contextually relevant emails
are sent to specific targets with attached documents that are packed with exploit code and Trojan
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY
horse programmes designed to take advantage of vulnerabilities in software installed on the target
computer.
Once compromised, files located on infected computers may be mined for contact information,
and used to spread malware through e-mail and document attachments that appear to come from
legitimate sources, and contain legitimate documents and messages. It is therefore possible that the
large percentage of high value targets identified in our analysis of the GhostNet are coincidental,
spread by contact between individuals who previously communicated through e-mail.
Nonetheless the existence of the GhostNet network is a significant fact in and of itself. At the very
least, it demonstrates the ease by which computer-based malware can be used to build a robust, lowcost intelligence capability and infect a network of potentially high-value targets.
Key findings:
Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network
GhostNet
infecting at least 1,295
computers in 103 countries, of which close to 30% can be considered as high-value
diplomatic, political, economic, and military targets.
Documented evidence of GhostNet penetration of computer systems containing sensitive
and secret information at the private offices of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan
targets.
Documentation and reverse engineering of the modus operandi of the GhostNet
system
including vectors, targeting, delivery mechanisms, data retrieval and control
systems
reveals a covert, difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage system
capable of taking full control of affected systems.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Computer network exploitation represents the leading edge of signals intelligence in the information
age. The proliferation of computer systems throughout governments, businesses, and civic
organizations represents a boon for would-be cyber spies.
Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, and even basic information security practices, is in its infancy, and
largely absent in most organizations outside of the classified realm. Commercial computer systems, which
represent most of the world
s installed base, are insecure. This lack of security consciousness is reflective
of the infancy of the information age. The Internet was never designed for security and, for the most part,
there has been little incentive for software manufacturers to make security a first priority in the design
and development of products, many of which are destined for consumer and/or small business use.
These challenges are present in advanced industrial societies, but are amplified many times over
in developing countries. Ownership of computers is a relative rarity among many government
departments. Where they exist, they often use grey market or pirated software. Resources are lacking
to employ properly trained computer professionals, and many staff are barely computer literate. In
this context, information security is often a distant priority.
And yet, computers in the hands of individuals or at government offices, ministries, embassies, and
civic and non-governmental organizations contain information that can be valuable. Files and e-mails
with contact information, lists of meetings and attendees, draft position papers, internal PowerPoint
presentations, organizational budgets, and lists of visitors can represent items of strategic value
to rivals and enemies. Organizations, like individuals, can be subject to identity theft, leading to
potentially serious breaches of security.
Rise of the cyber spies
Little is known of the sophistication of state-based cyber espionage capabilities, such as those of the
United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, all considered leaders in this field. They are assumed
to be considerable as the security doctrines of these countries treat cyberspace as a strategic domain
equivalent to that of land, air, sea, and space.2
Other powers including China have made cyberspace a key pillar of their national security strategies.
China is actively developing an operational capacity in cyberspace, correctly identifying it as the
domain in which it can achieve strategic parity, if not superiority, over the military establishments
of the United States and its allies. Chinese cyber warfare doctrine is well developed, and significant
resources have been invested by the People
s Liberation Army and security services in developing
defensive and offensive capabilities.3
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&
name=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
But the most significant actors in cyberspace are not states. The online engagements that
accompanied the recent Russia-Georgia conflict in August 20084 and Israel
s January 2009 offensive
in Gaza5 were carried out by independent attackers. The May 2007 denial of service attacks against
Estonia6 resulted in a single conviction of a Russian living in Estonia. Likewise, previous high-profile
investigations of hacking against strategic U.S. targets were never positively attributed to foreign
intelligence services7, and in many cases were the work of individuals.8
The contest in the shadows currently underway in cyberspace appears to rely largely on third parties.
In numerous instances, including case studies conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor
s sister
project, the OpenNet Initiative, third party attackers were responsible for triggering national-level
cyber events. In Kyrgyzstan (2005)9, Belarus (2006)10, during the Russia Georgia war (2008), and
Kyrgyzstan (2009), individuals and/or loose coalitions were responsible for publishing target lists
and attack tools on semi-private websites. The ensuing

allowed us to examine Tibetan information security practices, as well as capture real-time evidence

of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems.

During the second phase of our investigation, the data was analyzed, and led to the discovery of

insecure, web-based interfaces to four control servers. These interfaces allow attacker(s) to send

instructions to, and receive data from, compromised computers. Our research team successfully

scouted these servers, revealing a wide-ranging network of compromised computers. This extensive

network consists of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries.

Significantly, close to 30% of the infected computers can be considered high-value and include the

ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados

and Bhutan; embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan,

Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat,

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news

organizations; and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters.

The GhostNet system directs infected computers to download a Trojan known as gh0st RAT that allows

attackers to gain complete, real-time control. These instances of gh0st RAT are consistently controlled

from commercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan, People

s Republic of China.

Our investigation reveals that GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers,

including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including

microphones and web cameras.

The vector for spreading the GhostNet infection leverages social means. Contextually relevant emails

are sent to specific targets with attached documents that are packed with exploit code and Trojan

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY

horse programmes designed to take advantage of vulnerabilities in software installed on the target

computer.

Once compromised, files located on infected computers may be mined for contact information,

and used to spread malware through e-mail and document attachments that appear to come from

legitimate sources, and contain legitimate documents and messages. It is therefore possible that the

large percentage of high value targets identified in our analysis of the GhostNet are coincidental,

spread by contact between individuals who previously communicated through e-mail.

Nonetheless the existence of the GhostNet network is a significant fact in and of itself. At the very

least, it demonstrates the ease by which computer-based malware can be used to build a robust, lowcost intelligence capability and infect a network of potentially high-value targets.

Key findings:

Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network

GhostNet

infecting at least 1,295

computers in 103 countries, of which close to 30% can be considered as high-value

diplomatic, political, economic, and military targets.

Documented evidence of GhostNet penetration of computer systems containing sensitive

and secret information at the private offices of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan

targets.

Documentation and reverse engineering of the modus operandi of the GhostNet

system

including vectors, targeting, delivery mechanisms, data retrieval and control

systems

reveals a covert, difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage system

capable of taking full control of affected systems.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Computer network exploitation represents the leading edge of signals intelligence in the information

age. The proliferation of computer systems throughout governments, businesses, and civic

organizations represents a boon for would-be cyber spies.

Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, and even basic information security practices, is in its infancy, and

largely absent in most organizations outside of the classified realm. Commercial computer systems, which

represent most of the world

s installed base, are insecure. This lack of security consciousness is reflective

of the infancy of the information age. The Internet was never designed for security and, for the most part,

there has been little incentive for software manufacturers to make security a first priority in the design

and development of products, many of which are destined for consumer and/or small business use.

These challenges are present in advanced industrial societies, but are amplified many times over

in developing countries. Ownership of computers is a relative rarity among many government

departments. Where they exist, they often use grey market or pirated software. Resources are lacking

to employ properly trained computer professionals, and many staff are barely computer literate. In

this context, information security is often a distant priority.

And yet, computers in the hands of individuals or at government offices, ministries, embassies, and

civic and non-governmental organizations contain information that can be valuable. Files and e-mails

with contact information, lists of meetings and attendees, draft position papers, internal PowerPoint

presentations, organizational budgets, and lists of visitors can represent items of strategic value

to rivals and enemies. Organizations, like individuals, can be subject to identity theft, leading to

potentially serious breaches of security.

Rise of the cyber spies

Little is known of the sophistication of state-based cyber espionage capabilities, such as those of the

United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, all considered leaders in this field. They are assumed

to be considerable as the security doctrines of these countries treat cyberspace as a strategic domain

equivalent to that of land, air, sea, and space.2

Other powers including China have made cyberspace a key pillar of their national security strategies.

China is actively developing an operational capacity in cyberspace, correctly identifying it as the

domain in which it can achieve strategic parity, if not superiority, over the military establishments

of the United States and its allies. Chinese cyber warfare doctrine is well developed, and significant

resources have been invested by the People

s Liberation Army and security services in developing

defensive and offensive capabilities.3

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&

name=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION

But the most significant actors in cyberspace are not states. The online engagements that

accompanied the recent Russia-Georgia conflict in August 20084 and Israel

s January 2009 offensive

in Gaza5 were carried out by independent attackers. The May 2007 denial of service attacks against

Estonia6 resulted in a single conviction of a Russian living in Estonia. Likewise, previous high-profile

investigations of hacking against strategic U.S. targets were never positively attributed to foreign

intelligence services7, and in many cases were the work of individuals.8

The contest in the shadows currently underway in cyberspace appears to rely largely on third parties.

In numerous instances, including case studies conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor

s sister

project, the OpenNet Initiative, third party attackers were responsible for triggering national-level

cyber events. In Kyrgyzstan (2005)9, Belarus (2006)10, during the Russia Georgia war (2008), and

Kyrgyzstan (2009), individuals and/or loose coalitions were responsible for publishing target lists

and attack tools on semi-private websites. The ensuing