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cybersecurity

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Information Warfare Monitor field research
Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
Tibetan Government-in-Exile
Offices of Tibet
Drewla
Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers
List of infected computers
Sending commands
Command results
Methods and capabilities
Analysis of list of infected computers
Methodology
Selected infections
Infection timeline
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Part Three: Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions
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Alternative explanations
Attribution
The significance of GhostNet
Part Four: About the Information Warfare Monitor
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Boxes
Box 1: Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice
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Tables
Table 1: Domain name registration information
Table 2: List of selected infections
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Figures
Fig. 1: A
Social Engineering
attack connects to GhostNet
Fig. 2: A
Socially Engineered
email sent to the International Tibet Support Network
Fig. 3: A Virus Total Screen Capture of a malware infected email attachment
Fig. 4: Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations
Fig. 5: Malware retrieving a sensitive document
Fig. 6: The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware
Fig. 7: The GhostNet control servers
Fig. 8: The GhostNet
Server List
interface
Fig. 9: The GhostNet
Send Command
interface
Fig. 10: The gh0st RAT interface
Fig. 11: The GhostNet
List Command
interface
Fig. 12: The geographic location of infected hosts
Fig. 13. GhostNet infection timeline
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JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY
Summary
Trojan horse programmes and other associated malware are often cited as vectors for conducting
sophisticated computer-based espionage. Allegations of cyber espionage (computer network
exploitation) are increasingly common, but there are few case studies in the unclassified realm that
expose the inner workings of such networks.
This study reveals the existence and operational reach of a malware-based cyber espionage network
that we call GhostNet.
Between June 2008 and March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an extensive and
exhaustive two-phase investigation focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the
Tibetan community.
We conducted field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America. In India we worked
directly with affected Tibetan organizations, including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the
Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs. In Europe and North America we worked with
Tibetan missions in London, Brussels, and New York. The fieldwork generated extensive data that