clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more.
The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries.
Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located
at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The
Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began,
were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to
potentially sensitive information.
But the study clearly raises more questions than it answers.
From the evidence at hand, it is not clear whether the attacker(s) really knew what they had
penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for commercial or intelligence value.
Some may conclude that what we lay out here points definitively to China as the culprit. Certainly
Chinese cyber-espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities have made it clear that they
consider cyberspace a strategic domain, one which helps redress the military imbalance between
China and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). They have correctly identified
cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. military and economic dominance depends.
But attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by
the Chinese state is wrong and misleading. Numbers can tell a different story. China is presently
the world
s largest Internet population. The sheer number of young digital natives online can more
than account for the increase in Chinese malware. With more creative people using computers, it
expected that China (and Chinese individuals) will account for a larger proportion of cybercrime.
Likewise, the threshold for engaging in cyber espionage is falling. Cybercrime kits are now available
online, and their use is clearly on the rise, in some cases by organized crime and other private actors.
Socially engineered malware is the most common and potent; it introduces Trojans onto a system,
and then exploits social contacts and files to propagate infections further.
Furthermore, the Internet was never built with security in mind. As institutions ranging from
governments through to businesses and individuals depend on 24-hour Internet connectivity, the
opportunities for exploiting these systems increases.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD
This report serves as a wake-up call. At the very least, a large percentage of high-value targets
compromised by this network demonstrate the relative ease with which a technically unsophisticated
approach can quickly be harnessed to create a very effective spynet
These are major disruptive
capabilities that the professional information security community, as well as policymakers, need to
come to terms with rapidly.
These are major disruptive capabilities that the professional information security community, as well
as policymakers, need to come to terms with rapidly.
Ron Deibert, Director, the Citizen Lab,
Munk Centre for International Studies,
University of Toronto.
Rafal Rohozinski, Principal and CEO,
The SecDev Group,
Ottawa, Canada.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Acknowledgements
This investigation was prepared by a dedicated team of professionals.
Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research in India, Tibetan Missions
abroad, and Europe. Greg is a SecDev Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor
website. He is currently a SecDev Fellow at the Citizen Lab. The Indian portion of the field work
benefited from the expertise of Dr. Shishir Nagaraja, Security Laboratory, Cambridge University.
Dr. Nagaraga visited Dharamsala for a period of five days in September to assist on aspects of the
technical data collection.1
The technical scouting and computer network interrogation was carried out by Nart Villenueve. Nart
is the CTO of Psiphon Inc, and the Psiphon Fellow at the Citizen Lab. His investigations included the
discovery and exploration of the GhostNet control servers. He led the data analysis research, which
included log files gathered in the field, as well as data obtained through technical scouting of the
GhostNet control servers.
This report represents a collective effort. The drafting team consisted of the following individuals
(listed in alphabetical order). Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab), Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group),
Rafal Rohozinski (SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc.), Nart Villeneuve (Psiphon Fellow, Citizen Lab)
and Greg Walton (SecDev Fellow, Citizen Lab). Layout and design was led by Jane Gowan (Psiphon
Inc. and Citizen Lab). Belinda Bruce (Blurb Media) and James Tay (Citizen Lab), provided additional
support to the team.
Countless others also contributed to the research effort. This includes individuals in India and Tibet,
who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Private Office of his Holiness
the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the missions of Tibet in London, Brussels, and New
York, and Drewla (a Tibetan NGO).
Aspects of the research carried out by Dr. Nagaraga focusing on socially engineered malware are published in a separate study.
See, The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement, Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson, Cambridge
University Computer Laboratory Technical Report, Mar 29 2009
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary
p. 5
Introduction
p. 7
Rise of the cyber spies
A focus on China
Outline of Report
Part One: Context and background
Alleged Chinese operations in cyberspace
Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks: the challenge of attribution
Targeting Tibet
Conduct of the investigation
Phase 1: Field investigation
Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers
Part Two: Tracking Ghostnet
p. 7
p. 9
p. 9
p. 10
p. 11
p. 12
p. 13
p. 14
p. 14
p. 14
p. 16
Phase I: Field investigation
Targeted malware
previous research

The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more.

The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries.

Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located

at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The

Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began,

were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to

potentially sensitive information.

But the study clearly raises more questions than it answers.

From the evidence at hand, it is not clear whether the attacker(s) really knew what they had

penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for commercial or intelligence value.

Some may conclude that what we lay out here points definitively to China as the culprit. Certainly

Chinese cyber-espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities have made it clear that they

consider cyberspace a strategic domain, one which helps redress the military imbalance between

China and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). They have correctly identified

cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. military and economic dominance depends.

But attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by

the Chinese state is wrong and misleading. Numbers can tell a different story. China is presently

the world

s largest Internet population. The sheer number of young digital natives online can more

than account for the increase in Chinese malware. With more creative people using computers, it

expected that China (and Chinese individuals) will account for a larger proportion of cybercrime.

Likewise, the threshold for engaging in cyber espionage is falling. Cybercrime kits are now available

online, and their use is clearly on the rise, in some cases by organized crime and other private actors.

Socially engineered malware is the most common and potent; it introduces Trojans onto a system,

and then exploits social contacts and files to propagate infections further.

Furthermore, the Internet was never built with security in mind. As institutions ranging from

governments through to businesses and individuals depend on 24-hour Internet connectivity, the

opportunities for exploiting these systems increases.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD

This report serves as a wake-up call. At the very least, a large percentage of high-value targets

compromised by this network demonstrate the relative ease with which a technically unsophisticated

approach can quickly be harnessed to create a very effective spynet

These are major disruptive

capabilities that the professional information security community, as well as policymakers, need to

come to terms with rapidly.

These are major disruptive capabilities that the professional information security community, as well

as policymakers, need to come to terms with rapidly.

Ron Deibert, Director, the Citizen Lab,

Munk Centre for International Studies,

University of Toronto.

Rafal Rohozinski, Principal and CEO,

The SecDev Group,

Ottawa, Canada.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgements

This investigation was prepared by a dedicated team of professionals.

Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research in India, Tibetan Missions

abroad, and Europe. Greg is a SecDev Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor

website. He is currently a SecDev Fellow at the Citizen Lab. The Indian portion of the field work

benefited from the expertise of Dr. Shishir Nagaraja, Security Laboratory, Cambridge University.

Dr. Nagaraga visited Dharamsala for a period of five days in September to assist on aspects of the

technical data collection.1

The technical scouting and computer network interrogation was carried out by Nart Villenueve. Nart

is the CTO of Psiphon Inc, and the Psiphon Fellow at the Citizen Lab. His investigations included the

discovery and exploration of the GhostNet control servers. He led the data analysis research, which

included log files gathered in the field, as well as data obtained through technical scouting of the

GhostNet control servers.

This report represents a collective effort. The drafting team consisted of the following individuals

(listed in alphabetical order). Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab), Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group),

Rafal Rohozinski (SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc.), Nart Villeneuve (Psiphon Fellow, Citizen Lab)

and Greg Walton (SecDev Fellow, Citizen Lab). Layout and design was led by Jane Gowan (Psiphon

Inc. and Citizen Lab). Belinda Bruce (Blurb Media) and James Tay (Citizen Lab), provided additional

support to the team.

Countless others also contributed to the research effort. This includes individuals in India and Tibet,

who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Private Office of his Holiness

the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the missions of Tibet in London, Brussels, and New

York, and Drewla (a Tibetan NGO).

Aspects of the research carried out by Dr. Nagaraga focusing on socially engineered malware are published in a separate study.

See, The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement, Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson, Cambridge

University Computer Laboratory Technical Report, Mar 29 2009

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary

p. 5

Introduction

p. 7

Rise of the cyber spies

A focus on China

Outline of Report

Part One: Context and background

Alleged Chinese operations in cyberspace

Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks: the challenge of attribution

Targeting Tibet

Conduct of the investigation

Phase 1: Field investigation

Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers

Part Two: Tracking Ghostnet

p. 7

p. 9

p. 10

p. 11

p. 12

p. 13

p. 14

p. 16

Phase I: Field investigation

Targeted malware

previous research