clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
ai_n31140190 ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf
http://www.insidetech.com/news/articles/1630-mysterious-forces-hack-pro-tibet-save-darfur-sites ; http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/20/AR2008032003193.html
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks:
the challenge of attribution
Determining those responsible for cyber attacks, commonly known as the attribution problem, is
a major challenge. The Internet was never built with security as a priority. The current version of
the Internet
s address assignment system, IP V4, provides a wealth of loopholes and methods by
which a perpetrator can mask his or her real identity and location. Online identities and servers
can be cleverly hidden. Packet flows and connections can be masked and redirected through
multiple servers. A clever attacker can often hijack a machine belonging to an otherwise innocent
organization and use it as a base for launching attacks.
Hand-in-hand with the problem of attribution is the difficulty of identifying motivating factors
behind a cyber attack. Many perpetrators of Internet-based attacks and exploits are individuals whose
motivation can vary from a simple profit motive through to fear of prosecution or strong emotional
feelings, including religious belief and nationalism. Many cyber attacks and exploits which seem to
benefit states may be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. This
makes it difficult to separate the motivation of the individual from the potential motives of the
party on whose behalf the attacks have occurred, or a prospective client to which the perpetrator
is trying to market his or her wares. In either case, the challenge of identifying perpetrators and
understanding their motives gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to
officially distance themselves from attacks.
Cyber campaigns can also take on a life of their own. Even though a state might
seed
a particular
campaign through tacit encouragement or the absence of sanctions or prosecutions, these campaigns
are inherently chaotic and unpredictable in scope and outcome.20 Phenomena such as spontaneous
cyber rioting
can surpass the initial purposes of the cyber campaign. Low barriers to entry to this
sort of activity enable anyone with a computer and Internet connection to take part in a cyberattack.21 For the most part, governments appear to passively benefit from online manifestations of
nationalistic and patriotic fervour, although outcomes are inherently unpredictable.22
In China, the authorities most likely perceive individual attackers and their online activities as
convenient instruments of national power.23 A favourite target of Chinese hackers is Taiwanese
computer systems, especially during times of Sino-Taiwanese tensions, such as elections and
http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/canada-watch/obama/pdfs/Deibert.pdf
http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=343
For instance, during the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, tools were made available online for those who wished to
participate in the ongoing
cyber-war
against Georgian websites. http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ;
http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijingsrising-hackers.pdf
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
referendums.24 In April 2001, following the death of a Chinese fighter pilot after a collision with an
American spy plane near the Chinese island of Hainan, Chinese hackers began a sustained campaign
to target American computer networks. No link was made with elements of the Chinese government.25
However, governments cannot always preserve direct control over such activities; groups can maintain
their freelance and autonomous status and undertake their own cyber initiatives that may not always
attain official sanction or serve state interests.26
Targeting Tibet
Accusations of Chinese cyber war being waged against the Tibetan community have been
commonplace for the past several years. The Chinese government has been accused of orchestrating
and encouraging such activity as part of a wider strategy to crack down on dissident groups and
subversive activity.27 Earlier research has traced these attacks against Tibetan groups to IP addresses
registered in the People
s Republic of China. The attacks used malware hidden in legitimate-looking
email messages, infecting unsuspecting users
computers and exploiting the data on it by sending it
to control servers.28
The identity of the attackers has never been attributed in a conclusive manner to any specific group
or individual.29 The motivation of those behind the attacks, despite conjecture, is also unproven.
In earlier studies, researchers focused on attacks specifically targeting the Tibetan community.
But a wide variety of other victims of computer penetrations have reported infections similar to
those used against Tibetan organizations, following a similar modus operandi and also reporting
to control servers usually located in China. These additional targets include the Falun Gong30, the
U.S. Government, and multinational corporations.31 While reports of these targeted attacks have
circulated, the extent to which attackers successfully exploited the affected computers is unknown.
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1305755.stm
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102605.html
See, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177 ; http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4176 and http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.
de/isn/2002/09/msg00086.html for background information on these attacks.
Attribution for previous penetrations of Tibetan groups has never been publicly attributed and is not available from open sources.
Classified studies may reveal a finer grained detail, as many of the attacks are relatively unsophisticated, and given proper assets,
could be traced back to specific locations and presumably individuals.
Research by Maarten Van Horenbeeck shows that similar attacks have targeted the Falun Gong. http://www.daemon.be/
maarten/Crouching_Powerpoint_Hidden_Trojan_24C3.pdf and http://isc.sans.org/presentations/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_
Vanhorenbeeck.pdf
See http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
Conduct of the investigation
From June 2008 to March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation
of alleged cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. We chose this case study because of the
unprecedented access that we were granted to Tibetan institutions through one of our researchers, and
persistent allegations that confidential information on secure computers was somehow being compromised.
Our lead field investigator had a long history of working with the Tibetan community, and was able
to work with the private office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and a number of
Tibetan non-governmental organizations.
The investigation consisted of two distinct phases.
Phase 1: Field-based investigations in India, Europe, and North America (June-November 2008)
Field research was carried out in Dharamsala, India, the location of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
Follow-up research was conducted at Tibetan missions abroad in London, Brussels and New York. During
this phase we had unprecedented access to the Tibetan government and other Tibetan organizations.
This allowed us to establish a baseline understanding of information security practices at these
locations and to design an evidence-based approach to the investigation.
We also conducted extensive on-site interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the
private office of the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan non-governmental organizations. The interviews focused on

ai_n31140190 ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf

http://www.insidetech.com/news/articles/1630-mysterious-forces-hack-pro-tibet-save-darfur-sites ; http://www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/20/AR2008032003193.html

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE

Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks:

the challenge of attribution

Determining those responsible for cyber attacks, commonly known as the attribution problem, is

a major challenge. The Internet was never built with security as a priority. The current version of

the Internet

s address assignment system, IP V4, provides a wealth of loopholes and methods by

which a perpetrator can mask his or her real identity and location. Online identities and servers

can be cleverly hidden. Packet flows and connections can be masked and redirected through

multiple servers. A clever attacker can often hijack a machine belonging to an otherwise innocent

organization and use it as a base for launching attacks.

Hand-in-hand with the problem of attribution is the difficulty of identifying motivating factors

behind a cyber attack. Many perpetrators of Internet-based attacks and exploits are individuals whose

motivation can vary from a simple profit motive through to fear of prosecution or strong emotional

feelings, including religious belief and nationalism. Many cyber attacks and exploits which seem to

benefit states may be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. This

makes it difficult to separate the motivation of the individual from the potential motives of the

party on whose behalf the attacks have occurred, or a prospective client to which the perpetrator

is trying to market his or her wares. In either case, the challenge of identifying perpetrators and

understanding their motives gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to

officially distance themselves from attacks.

Cyber campaigns can also take on a life of their own. Even though a state might

seed

a particular

campaign through tacit encouragement or the absence of sanctions or prosecutions, these campaigns

are inherently chaotic and unpredictable in scope and outcome.20 Phenomena such as spontaneous

cyber rioting

can surpass the initial purposes of the cyber campaign. Low barriers to entry to this

sort of activity enable anyone with a computer and Internet connection to take part in a cyberattack.21 For the most part, governments appear to passively benefit from online manifestations of

nationalistic and patriotic fervour, although outcomes are inherently unpredictable.22

In China, the authorities most likely perceive individual attackers and their online activities as

convenient instruments of national power.23 A favourite target of Chinese hackers is Taiwanese

computer systems, especially during times of Sino-Taiwanese tensions, such as elections and

http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/canada-watch/obama/pdfs/Deibert.pdf

http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=343

For instance, during the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, tools were made available online for those who wished to

participate in the ongoing

cyber-war

against Georgian websites. http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ;

http://www.slate.com/id/2197514

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijingsrising-hackers.pdf

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE

referendums.24 In April 2001, following the death of a Chinese fighter pilot after a collision with an

American spy plane near the Chinese island of Hainan, Chinese hackers began a sustained campaign

to target American computer networks. No link was made with elements of the Chinese government.25

However, governments cannot always preserve direct control over such activities; groups can maintain

their freelance and autonomous status and undertake their own cyber initiatives that may not always

attain official sanction or serve state interests.26

Targeting Tibet

Accusations of Chinese cyber war being waged against the Tibetan community have been

commonplace for the past several years. The Chinese government has been accused of orchestrating

and encouraging such activity as part of a wider strategy to crack down on dissident groups and

subversive activity.27 Earlier research has traced these attacks against Tibetan groups to IP addresses

registered in the People

s Republic of China. The attacks used malware hidden in legitimate-looking

email messages, infecting unsuspecting users

computers and exploiting the data on it by sending it

to control servers.28

The identity of the attackers has never been attributed in a conclusive manner to any specific group

or individual.29 The motivation of those behind the attacks, despite conjecture, is also unproven.

In earlier studies, researchers focused on attacks specifically targeting the Tibetan community.

But a wide variety of other victims of computer penetrations have reported infections similar to

those used against Tibetan organizations, following a similar modus operandi and also reporting

to control servers usually located in China. These additional targets include the Falun Gong30, the

U.S. Government, and multinational corporations.31 While reports of these targeted attacks have

circulated, the extent to which attackers successfully exploited the affected computers is unknown.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1305755.stm

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102605.html

See, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177 ; http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4176 and http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.

de/isn/2002/09/msg00086.html for background information on these attacks.

Attribution for previous penetrations of Tibetan groups has never been publicly attributed and is not available from open sources.

Classified studies may reveal a finer grained detail, as many of the attacks are relatively unsophisticated, and given proper assets,

could be traced back to specific locations and presumably individuals.

Research by Maarten Van Horenbeeck shows that similar attacks have targeted the Falun Gong. http://www.daemon.be/

maarten/Crouching_Powerpoint_Hidden_Trojan_24C3.pdf and http://isc.sans.org/presentations/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_

Vanhorenbeeck.pdf

See http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE

Conduct of the investigation

From June 2008 to March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation

of alleged cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. We chose this case study because of the

unprecedented access that we were granted to Tibetan institutions through one of our researchers, and

persistent allegations that confidential information on secure computers was somehow being compromised.

Our lead field investigator had a long history of working with the Tibetan community, and was able

to work with the private office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and a number of

Tibetan non-governmental organizations.

The investigation consisted of two distinct phases.

Phase 1: Field-based investigations in India, Europe, and North America (June-November 2008)

Field research was carried out in Dharamsala, India, the location of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.

Follow-up research was conducted at Tibetan missions abroad in London, Brussels and New York. During

this phase we had unprecedented access to the Tibetan government and other Tibetan organizations.

This allowed us to establish a baseline understanding of information security practices at these

locations and to design an evidence-based approach to the investigation.

We also conducted extensive on-site interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the

private office of the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan non-governmental organizations. The interviews focused on