clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Embassy of Romania, PRC
Embassy of Thailand, Philippines
Embassy of the Republic of Korea, China
Government Integrated Telecommunication Network, Malaysia
High Commission of India, Cyprus
High Commission Of India, United Kingdom
Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan
International Campaign for Tibet
International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom
Lanka Education and Research Network, Sri Lanka
Malta External Trade Corporation Ltd.
Maritime Police, Solomon Islands
Ministry of Communications, Brunei
Ministry of Education, Solomon Islands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barbados
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Iran
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Vietnam
Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Bhutan
National Informatics Centre, India
NATO, (SHAPE HQ)
Net Trade, Taiwan
New Tang Dynasty Television, United States
Office of the Dalai Lama, India
Pakistan Mission to The United Nations
US, JP
Permanent Delegation of Cyprus to the European Union
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations
PetroVietnam
Prime Minister
s Office, Laos
Public Service Division, Solomon Islands
Russian Federal University Network, Russian Federation
Software Technology Parks of India, India
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
BD, US
Students for a Free Tibet, United States
TAITRA, Taiwan
TW, NG
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Table 2: Selected infections (cont
Organization
Confidence
Location
Infections
Taiwan Government Service Network, Taiwan
Tibetan Government in Exile, India
IN, US
Trade and Industry Department, Government of Hong Kong
Infection timeline
The earliest infected computer called home to the control server on May 22, 2007. The most recent
entry in our sample is March 12, 2009. On average, the amount of time that a host was actively
infected was 145 days.49 While 90 infected computers were only infected for one day, 145 were
infected for over 400 days. The longest infection span was 660 days. In total, 422 hosts checked in
March 1-12, 2009; 373 of these computers were infected in 2008. The data indicates that despite a
reduction in new infections, the network continues to be operational. (See Fig. 13 - p. 45)
There are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.
There were 320 infections in December 2007 spread across 56 countries. However, 113 were located
within Taiwan and the majority of these infections occurred within a single organization: the
Taiwan External Trade Development Council. During this same period, computers at the Embassies
of India in Belgium and Zimbabwe were infected as were the Embassies of Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea in the People
s Republic of China. In addition, computers at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Iran were infected as were several computers at the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
The spike in August 2008 totalled 258 infections spread across 46 countries. The OHHDL computer
was infected during one of these spikes in August 2008 (It last checked in to the control server
in September 2008). This spike included the Chinese Embassy in the United States,50 3 computers
at the Embassy of India in the Unites States, and the High Commission of India in the United
Kingdom and in Cyprus. It also included the Embassy of Cyprus in Germany, the Embassy of
Malaysia in Cuba, the Embassy of Thailand in the Philippines and the Ministry of Industry in
Vietnam. Several companies were also compromised, including Net Trade in Taiwan, the New York
Office of Deloitte & Touche, and PetroVietnam, the government-owned oil and gas Company.
The average number of days from the initial infection to the last time an infected computer
checked in
with a control server.
It is unclear whether the affected embassy is the Republic of China (Taiwan) or People
s Republic of China.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 13
GhostNet infection timeline.
This screen capture of a timeline generated with Palantir illustrates when and how many computers were infected by the GhostNet.
It shows that there are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.
PART THREE:
Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
The evidence presented in this report
through a combination of field investigations,
interviews, technical scouting, data analysis, mining and visualization
paints a
disturbing picture.
GhostNet represents a network of compromised computers resident in high-value political,
economic, and media locations spread across numerous countries worldwide. At the time of writing,
these organizations are almost certainly oblivious to the compromised situation in which they find
themselves. The computers of diplomats, military attach
s, private assistants, secretaries to Prime
Ministers, journalists and others are under the concealed control of unknown assailant(s).
In Dharamsala and elsewhere, we have witnessed machines being profiled and sensitive documents

Embassy of Romania, PRC

Embassy of Thailand, Philippines

Embassy of the Republic of Korea, China

Government Integrated Telecommunication Network, Malaysia

High Commission of India, Cyprus

High Commission Of India, United Kingdom

Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan

International Campaign for Tibet

International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom

Lanka Education and Research Network, Sri Lanka

Malta External Trade Corporation Ltd.

Maritime Police, Solomon Islands

Ministry of Communications, Brunei

Ministry of Education, Solomon Islands

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barbados

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei

Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Iran

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia

Ministry of Industry and Trade, Vietnam

Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Bhutan

National Informatics Centre, India

NATO, (SHAPE HQ)

Net Trade, Taiwan

New Tang Dynasty Television, United States

Office of the Dalai Lama, India

Pakistan Mission to The United Nations

US, JP

Permanent Delegation of Cyprus to the European Union

Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations

PetroVietnam

Prime Minister

s Office, Laos

Public Service Division, Solomon Islands

Russian Federal University Network, Russian Federation

Software Technology Parks of India, India

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

BD, US

Students for a Free Tibet, United States

TAITRA, Taiwan

TW, NG

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Table 2: Selected infections (cont

Organization

Confidence

Location

Infections

Taiwan Government Service Network, Taiwan

Tibetan Government in Exile, India

IN, US

Trade and Industry Department, Government of Hong Kong

Infection timeline

The earliest infected computer called home to the control server on May 22, 2007. The most recent

entry in our sample is March 12, 2009. On average, the amount of time that a host was actively

infected was 145 days.49 While 90 infected computers were only infected for one day, 145 were

infected for over 400 days. The longest infection span was 660 days. In total, 422 hosts checked in

March 1-12, 2009; 373 of these computers were infected in 2008. The data indicates that despite a

reduction in new infections, the network continues to be operational. (See Fig. 13 - p. 45)

There are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.

There were 320 infections in December 2007 spread across 56 countries. However, 113 were located

within Taiwan and the majority of these infections occurred within a single organization: the

Taiwan External Trade Development Council. During this same period, computers at the Embassies

of India in Belgium and Zimbabwe were infected as were the Embassies of Indonesia and the

Republic of Korea in the People

s Republic of China. In addition, computers at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs in Iran were infected as were several computers at the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.

The spike in August 2008 totalled 258 infections spread across 46 countries. The OHHDL computer

was infected during one of these spikes in August 2008 (It last checked in to the control server

in September 2008). This spike included the Chinese Embassy in the United States,50 3 computers

at the Embassy of India in the Unites States, and the High Commission of India in the United

Kingdom and in Cyprus. It also included the Embassy of Cyprus in Germany, the Embassy of

Malaysia in Cuba, the Embassy of Thailand in the Philippines and the Ministry of Industry in

Vietnam. Several companies were also compromised, including Net Trade in Taiwan, the New York

Office of Deloitte & Touche, and PetroVietnam, the government-owned oil and gas Company.

The average number of days from the initial infection to the last time an infected computer

checked in

with a control server.

It is unclear whether the affected embassy is the Republic of China (Taiwan) or People

s Republic of China.

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO

Fig. 13

GhostNet infection timeline.

This screen capture of a timeline generated with Palantir illustrates when and how many computers were infected by the GhostNet.

It shows that there are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.

PART THREE:

Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions

JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE

The evidence presented in this report

through a combination of field investigations,

interviews, technical scouting, data analysis, mining and visualization

paints a

disturbing picture.

GhostNet represents a network of compromised computers resident in high-value political,

economic, and media locations spread across numerous countries worldwide. At the time of writing,

these organizations are almost certainly oblivious to the compromised situation in which they find

themselves. The computers of diplomats, military attach

s, private assistants, secretaries to Prime

Ministers, journalists and others are under the concealed control of unknown assailant(s).

In Dharamsala and elsewhere, we have witnessed machines being profiled and sensitive documents