clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Botnet
The collective name for malware-infected victims with established connections to a
CnC server and remotely controlled by criminal operators.
Criminal Operators
The person or team that builds, manages and reaps financial reward
from a botnet.
Page 8
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
How Advanced Persistent Threats Breach Enterprises
APTs breach enterprises through a wide variety of vectors, even in the presence of properly designed
and maintained defense-in-depth strategies:
Internet-based malware infection
Physical malware infection
External exploitation
Well funded APT adversaries do not necessarily need to breach perimeter security controls from an
external perspective. They can, and often do, leverage
insider threat
and
trusted connection
vectors
to access and compromise targeted systems.
Abuse and compromise of
trusted connections
is a key ingredient for many APTs. While the targeted
organization may employ sophisticated technologies in order to prevent infection and compromise of
their digital systems, criminal operators often tunnel into an organization using the hijacked
credentials of employees or business partners, or via less-secured remote offices. As such, almost any
organization or remote site may fall victim to an APT and be utilized as a soft entry or information
harvesting point.
A key requirement for APTs (as opposed to an
everyday
botnet) is to remain invisible for as long as
possible. As such, the criminal operators of APT technologies tend to focus on
low and slow
attacks
stealthily moving from one compromised host to the next, without generating regular or predictable
network traffic
to hunt for specific data or system objectives. Tremendous effort is invested to ensure
that malicious actions cannot be observed by legitimate operators of these systems.
Page 9
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Malware is a key ingredient in successful APT operations. Modern
off-the-shelf
and commercial
malware includes all of the features and functionality necessary to infect digital systems, hide from
host-based detection systems, navigate networks, capture and extricate key data, provide video
surveillance and deliver silent covert channels for remote control. APT operators often use custom
malware tools to achieve specific objectives and harvest information from non-standard systems.
At the very heart of every APT lies remote control functionality. Criminal operators need this capability
in order to navigate to specific hosts within target organizations, exploit and manipulate local systems,
and gain continuous access to critical information. If an APT cannot connect with its criminal
operators, then it cannot transmit any intelligence it may have captured. In effect, it has been
neutered. This characteristic makes APTs appear as a sub-category of botnets.
While APT malware can remain stealthy at the host level, the network activity associated with remote
control is more easily identified. As such, APTs are most effectively identified, contained and disrupted
at the network level.
Controlling the Victim
Once the victim
s computer has been compromised, the malware component will typically establish its
first CnC session to register itself with the botnet CnC server. In order for this to occur, the botnet
operator must correctly set up the CnC servers and also configure appropriate resolution services such
as registering domain names and configuring DNS resolution settings.
Depending upon the sophistication of the botnet operators, this CnC infrastructure can take on many
different forms, with each alternative offering varying degrees of robustness and flexibility. Readers
are encouraged to read Damballa
s earlier whitepaper titled,
Botnet Communication Topologies:
Understanding the Intricacies of Botnet Command-and-Control,
for more information on this topic.
Page 10
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Detailed analysis of DNS intricacies for CnC domain name querying and management follow.
Key Concepts: DNS Overview
DNS resolution can be generally viewed as having two phases
a private stub (or
recursive
) layer,
and a public authoritative (or
iterative
) layer.
Figure 4: Conceptual view of Aurora DNS lookups and multiple monitoring opportunities. Damballa
used the convenience of an authority monitoring system to gather [qr aa] responses.
The figure above illustrates how Aurora victims performed DNS lookups, and provides a simplified
delegation tree for several of the Aurora-related CnC domains. An Aurora authority DNS zone is
depicted: the light blue zone delegated to No-IP. The No-IP zone has been simplified in the diagram to
include the authority DNS servers, nf[1-4].no-ip.com, as well as the actual Aurora CnC domain,
blog1.servebeer.com, even though in practice these are separate delegations from the .com TLD
parent. An infected host is depicted in the light green area. Its resolution path consists of the virus
code (designated as VX), a local stub resolver (often available through various statically named or
random DLL files on Windows hosts), and a local recursive DNS server. The
private
portions of DNS
traffic occur within this local envelope, colored as the light green area. No DNS monitoring takes place
here, in part because of the possible presence of PII, and because of the staggering volume of traffic
monitoring might entail, for even a small network. Such networks often generate billions of queries
per day below the recursive.
When a victim attempts to contact the Aurora CnC domain blog1.servebeer.com, it must first
discover the delegation of the zone to the No-IP authority name servers. (To save space, these steps
are not shown in the figure above). The overall delegation of authority is shown in the figure as a tree.
The hosts nf[1-4].no-ip.com are the authorities for the CnC zone. Thus, the victim network

Botnet

The collective name for malware-infected victims with established connections to a

CnC server and remotely controlled by criminal operators.

Criminal Operators

The person or team that builds, manages and reaps financial reward

from a botnet.

Page 8

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

How Advanced Persistent Threats Breach Enterprises

APTs breach enterprises through a wide variety of vectors, even in the presence of properly designed

and maintained defense-in-depth strategies:

Internet-based malware infection

Physical malware infection

External exploitation

Well funded APT adversaries do not necessarily need to breach perimeter security controls from an

external perspective. They can, and often do, leverage

insider threat

and

trusted connection

vectors

to access and compromise targeted systems.

Abuse and compromise of

trusted connections

is a key ingredient for many APTs. While the targeted

organization may employ sophisticated technologies in order to prevent infection and compromise of

their digital systems, criminal operators often tunnel into an organization using the hijacked

credentials of employees or business partners, or via less-secured remote offices. As such, almost any

organization or remote site may fall victim to an APT and be utilized as a soft entry or information

harvesting point.

A key requirement for APTs (as opposed to an

everyday

botnet) is to remain invisible for as long as

possible. As such, the criminal operators of APT technologies tend to focus on

low and slow

attacks

stealthily moving from one compromised host to the next, without generating regular or predictable

network traffic

to hunt for specific data or system objectives. Tremendous effort is invested to ensure

that malicious actions cannot be observed by legitimate operators of these systems.

Page 9

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Malware is a key ingredient in successful APT operations. Modern

off-the-shelf

and commercial

malware includes all of the features and functionality necessary to infect digital systems, hide from

host-based detection systems, navigate networks, capture and extricate key data, provide video

surveillance and deliver silent covert channels for remote control. APT operators often use custom

malware tools to achieve specific objectives and harvest information from non-standard systems.

At the very heart of every APT lies remote control functionality. Criminal operators need this capability

in order to navigate to specific hosts within target organizations, exploit and manipulate local systems,

and gain continuous access to critical information. If an APT cannot connect with its criminal

operators, then it cannot transmit any intelligence it may have captured. In effect, it has been

neutered. This characteristic makes APTs appear as a sub-category of botnets.

While APT malware can remain stealthy at the host level, the network activity associated with remote

control is more easily identified. As such, APTs are most effectively identified, contained and disrupted

at the network level.

Controlling the Victim

Once the victim

s computer has been compromised, the malware component will typically establish its

first CnC session to register itself with the botnet CnC server. In order for this to occur, the botnet

operator must correctly set up the CnC servers and also configure appropriate resolution services such

as registering domain names and configuring DNS resolution settings.

Depending upon the sophistication of the botnet operators, this CnC infrastructure can take on many

different forms, with each alternative offering varying degrees of robustness and flexibility. Readers

are encouraged to read Damballa

s earlier whitepaper titled,

Botnet Communication Topologies:

Understanding the Intricacies of Botnet Command-and-Control,

for more information on this topic.

Page 10

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Detailed analysis of DNS intricacies for CnC domain name querying and management follow.

Key Concepts: DNS Overview

DNS resolution can be generally viewed as having two phases

a private stub (or

recursive

) layer,

and a public authoritative (or

iterative

) layer.

Figure 4: Conceptual view of Aurora DNS lookups and multiple monitoring opportunities. Damballa

used the convenience of an authority monitoring system to gather [qr aa] responses.

The figure above illustrates how Aurora victims performed DNS lookups, and provides a simplified

delegation tree for several of the Aurora-related CnC domains. An Aurora authority DNS zone is

depicted: the light blue zone delegated to No-IP. The No-IP zone has been simplified in the diagram to

include the authority DNS servers, nf[1-4].no-ip.com, as well as the actual Aurora CnC domain,

blog1.servebeer.com, even though in practice these are separate delegations from the .com TLD

parent. An infected host is depicted in the light green area. Its resolution path consists of the virus

code (designated as VX), a local stub resolver (often available through various statically named or

random DLL files on Windows hosts), and a local recursive DNS server. The

private

portions of DNS

traffic occur within this local envelope, colored as the light green area. No DNS monitoring takes place

here, in part because of the possible presence of PII, and because of the staggering volume of traffic

monitoring might entail, for even a small network. Such networks often generate billions of queries

per day below the recursive.

When a victim attempts to contact the Aurora CnC domain blog1.servebeer.com, it must first

discover the delegation of the zone to the No-IP authority name servers. (To save space, these steps

are not shown in the figure above). The overall delegation of authority is shown in the figure as a tree.

The hosts nf[1-4].no-ip.com are the authorities for the CnC zone. Thus, the victim network