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The family1-e malware is part of Fake AV Alert/Scareware family analyzed below. The behavior of Fake |
Alert/Scareware is quite similar to Trojan.Hydraq malware associated with the actual Aurora attacks, |
albeit in a much more primitive form. |
Sample Analysis Details |
The additional samples in Damballa |
s possession that have been clustered as part of Aurora botnet |
malware can be separated into two distinct families of Fake AV Alert / Scareware: Login Software 2009 |
and Microsoft Antispyware Services. The first samples of each family were discovered by Damballa on |
November 26 2009 and August 19, 2009 respectively. The analysis details are broken down into the |
following: |
First Discovered |
The time when the sample was first discovered and acquired by Damballa. |
Prevalence |
The date range when the samples are still being seen in the wild by Damballa. |
Infection Vector |
How the samples are delivered to the unsuspecting victims. |
Symptoms |
Observable behaviors in the system that signals the possible presence of |
malware without actually looking at the registry or searching for the malware file itself. |
System Behavior |
How the malware works its way through the system to execute its |
objective. |
Network Behavior |
A detailed look at how the malware utilizes the domains it connects to. |
Protection Mechanism |
How the malware hides from the user or system inspection tools. |
AV Evasion Techniques |
How the malware protects itself from being detected by AV host |
solutions. |
Intent |
The main purpose of the malware family |
Page 18 |
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet |
Fake AV Alert / Scareware |
Login Software 2009 |
Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service |
Discovered |
2009-11-26 |
2009-08-19 |
Prevalence |
November 2009 |
January 2010 |
August 2009 |
September 2009 |
Infection |
Vector |
Fake AV alerts on compromised or malicious Web sites |
Fake AV / Scareware |
Symptoms |
System |
Behavior |
Login Software 2009 process in startup |
Menu Bar and Toolbar of Internet Explorer is missing |
System Restore is disabled |
Folder Options in Windows Explorer is disabled |
Extensions of known file types are hidden |
Registry Tools disabled, rendering registry editing |
inoperable |
Local Settings |
folder under |
C:\Documents and |
Settings\<User>\ |
(where the malware dropper places the |
dropped and downloaded executables) |
Presence of |
C:\Documents and |
Settings\<User>\Windows\system |
folder |
Pop-up ads |
Presence of tracking cookies and displays ads from: |
counter.surfcounters.com |
looksmart.com |
maxsun.biz |
moreverde.com |
oranges88.com |
smarttechnik.com |
www.prma-enhance.com |
Malware propagates through fake malware alerts. The supposed |
AV installer is actually the malware dropper. Its main purpose is to |
drop and install the rest of the malware components. Upon |
execution, it assigns a specific ID to the compromised host, then |
Page 19 |
Microsoft Antispyware Services process in startup |
Malware propagates through fake malware alerts. The supposed AV |
installer is actually the malware dropper. Its main purpose is to drop |
and install the rest of the malware components, typically: |
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet |
registers it to its malware server Web site and downloads the rest |
of the malware to the compromised host. |
To ensure that the malware is downloaded, the creator of this |
malware dropper uses redundancy in its malware serving Web |
infrastructure. The dropper checks three different Web sites: |
mcsmc.org |
micronetsys.org |
mnprfix.cn |
When Damballa discovered this malware dropper in August 2009, |
the downloaded executable was version 0. The current version is |
3. The functionalities remain similar. |
After the successful download of the main component, the main |
dropper generates a random name and copies the downloaded |
Subsets and Splits
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