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The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Domains
filoups.info
miecros.info
The dropped samples do not listen to the same CnC most of the
time. Each listens to a different CnC using a different port.
Protection
Mechanism
The main dropper also utilizes
Malware Self Preservation
doing the following before it self-destructs:
google.homeunix.com
yahoo.blogdns.net
voanews.ath.cx
ymail.ath.cx
None observed.
Hides the location of the malware dropped files by setting
the location folder as hidden and the dropped files
themselves as hidden.
Disables
Folder Options
in Windows Explorer
Disables
Show hidden files and folders
in Windows
Explorer
Hides Internet Explorer
s Menu Bar and Toolbar
Disables System Restore
Disables Registry editing
AV Evasion
Techniques
No two dropped files are the same. The malware uses
GetTickCount to generate random keys to randomize the hex
structure of dropped files.
None observed.
One dropped file (273a51aada271e5a4a91321a3126c767) is
packed using FSG v1.3.3.
Intent
Money generation through pop-up ads and Web site redirection
Keylogging and spyware.
Information
Samples Collected/Discovered by Damballa ITW:
Samples Collected/Discovered by Damballa ITW:
02677a0770268a20f7ef0d9bd7e8eef1
9803c22252a028b050f6257e7a67d4b7
69ef60094052321d91c0094efd832b92
6e245522d710ca1564e6873a3a0e82bd
0c091b4f6b23b450ccc3d37ccff6cdd6
994a379ff057724248d8435c9be45c1f
b5b7146b07b0a0804b36b8056f316722
65510cda14bcefd2419eb1262a6d6829
a4a63756c39e345e31f1e8e698ea03a6
2794cacb3f177f340dee0aa2a71bdf1c
2f6c8d68392839cb4615c455cd25fc9c
20ddc972f71c8e584ed2c43254eb811b
1326879b25dd0d7452d7a4b674165a5a
(*) denotes that no Rich signature present in the file
(^) encrypted
Page 23
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
01b9c2c916e6d9a82bfc5912348a231f
0b4872a4f20760739b0007c6b2dc08bd
253f59417c6c784d6c0e5565736d1815
273a51aada271e5a4a91321a3126c767*^
325566e0871ac3d4fccfbb0b4efd8d07
38ee6476ffe7473707520ef7f5ed5ecb
62686fd8a1c24abfb7a621e5629ce4ab
69ef60094052321d91c0094efd832b92
6e245522d710ca1564e6873a3a0e82bd
73a88fa854e766d5d3e712db8291bcc8
863a096685354b2730ad9dfd7e91e942
b8a177d99854ccc71e94a4a6645e85e7
d112a2ed6c675158295acb4824b481d8
feb88ea662de113dcafbe45bdece82fc
(*) denotes that no Rich signature present in the file
(^) encrypted
Malware
Diagram
Page 24
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Malware Summary of Findings and Analysis
The predecessor Aurora malware comes from two different families. The newer family came
immediately 2 months after the older family, and there was no overlap in their prevalence. For the
older family, there was neither an observable protection mechanism nor an AV evasion technique. It
was simply a dropper for keylogger files. The newer family has some protection mechanisms and AV
evasion techniques. However, it lacks the sophistication found in other botnet malware families.
Below is a summary of the findings of the two malware families that were analyzed.
Common characteristics:
Served through fake AV hosting Web sites (no longer available)
Common autostart techniques
Common older stealth techniques
Multiple malware server domains to improve resiliency
Droppers and dropped files (EXE and DLLs) were compiled using Microsoft compilers
Differences:
1. Main malware component:
a. November 2009 Family
uses DLL file as one of its components
b. August 2009 Family
uses VXD and SYS files