clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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commonly associated with new and amateur botnet operators
2. There were several CnC domains were identified based upon key characteristics of the
registration and management of the previously publicly disclosed CnC domains.
3. The major pattern of attacks in mid-December appear to have their origin in July 2009 in
mainland China. This likely corresponds to early testing of the botnet CnC.
4. Some of the infections appeared to start within Google
s network. Some of apparent botnet
the traffic is not consistent with an IE6/WinXP infection and cannot be easily explained.
5. The attackers had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse hosting colocations
certainly a high number for a botnet. Further, the botnet used over a dozen
domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC.
6. Only the US victims were compelled to perform MX queries, an event that would typically
indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services.
7. Some of the botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain
might have been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims.
8. A review of the TTL period suggests that botmasters de-registered their domains around
December 18, 2009.
Passive DNS Data Summary
Based upon analysis of DNS resolution data gathered through a global network of passive DNS
monitoring sensors, the key findings are as follows:
1. Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions provides adequate sampling to identify
the initialization and growth phases of the Aurora botnet, which also reveals active operation
of the CnC channels dating back to June 14th 2009.
2. The victim
s computers connected to, or were part of, 64 different networks, based upon
Autonomous Systems (AS) breakdown of Internet netblocks which could represent the upper
bound of organizations that may have been breached in the larger Aurora attack. Some
organizations (such as Google) own and manage several AS networks. Some of the other AS
networks were associated with public Internet Service Providers, which may encompass
multiple small and medium businesses.
Page 27
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
3. The various CnC domains used by the criminal botnet operators peaked at different times with
different rates of lookup by victim systems. These observations correspond to different
campaigns run in parallel by different botnet operators and represent the widely publicized
attacks that appeared to make use of the Internet Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit. It is a common
tactic by botnet operators to run multiple campaigns at the same time, using different
infection vectors (e.g. drive-by downloads, FakeAV, USB infections, etc.) over extended periods
of time. This strategy is very consistent with APT campaign methodologies.
4. The vast majority of victim systems appear to have been based in the United States.
5. It is possible to identify the various CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown
phases of the Aurora botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have been
dormant for a period of time after they had infected number victim systems. This type of
activity can sometimes be associated with an update to the botnet malware or if the criminal
operator sells/trades a segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.
Malware Analysis Summary
Damballa has an array of sources for obtaining new and Zero-Day malware that range from
commercial security sharing programs and spam traps to samples gathered from within its enterprise
customers
networks. By automatically analyzing tens-of-thousands of new and unique samples each
day and extracting their CnC behaviors, Damballa can cluster these malware variants with different
botnets. Based upon our analysis of malware samples that relied upon the Aurora CnC domains, our
key findings are as follows:
1. The botnet operators behind the Google Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior
to the Trojan.Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other.
2. Two additional families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as
Fake AV
Alert / Scareware
Login Software 2009
and
Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service
both of
which were deployed using fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineering the
victim into installing the malicious botnet agents.
3. By tracking the evolution of the malware, Damballa was able to identify additional botnet CnC
domains used by the criminal operators and establish a timeline of malware associations
going back to May 2nd 2009, based upon when a malware sample was captured within an
enterprise customer network.
4. Over the time period of this study, the botnet operators improved upon the malware they
were deploying. The relative sophistication and armoring of the malware families grow over
the months the operators were deploying it, and when they transitioned to entirely new
malware families.
5. The major malware families associated with the Aurora botnet attacks are distinct and are
unlikely to have been developed by the same malware engineer. This finding is typical of the
botnets that Damballa observes targeting enterprise networks. Relatively few botnet criminal
operators develop and maintain their own malware. Instead, they typically rely upon thirdparty contractors or off-the-shelf malware construction kits. As such, core features and
functionality changes can occur overnight, but the CnC transitions slowly as the botnet
operator ensures that backup CnC domains remain in operation until the victim malware
updates (or migration) is complete.
Page 28
The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet
Conclusions
Damballa
s findings concerning Operation Aurora can be summarized by the following:
At the time the attack was first noticed by Google in December 2009, systems within at least 7
countries had already been affected. By the time Google made the public disclosure of the attack
on January 12 2010, systems in over 22 countries had been affected and were attempting to
contact the CnC servers - the top five countries being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan
and the United Kingdom.
The Trojan.Hydraq malware, which has been previously identified as the primary malware used by
the attackers, is actually a later staging of a series of malware used in the attacks which consisted
of at least three different malware
families
. Two additional families of malware (and their
evolutionary variants) have been identified, and they were deployed using fake antivirus infection
messages tricking the victim into installing the malicious botnet agents.
The attacks that eventually targeted Google can be traced back to July 2009, with what appears to
be the first testing of the botnet by its criminal operators. The analysis identifies the various CnC
testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of the botnet CnC channels.
The botnets used dozens of domains in diverse Dynamic DNS networks for CnC. Some of the

commonly associated with new and amateur botnet operators

2. There were several CnC domains were identified based upon key characteristics of the

registration and management of the previously publicly disclosed CnC domains.

3. The major pattern of attacks in mid-December appear to have their origin in July 2009 in

mainland China. This likely corresponds to early testing of the botnet CnC.

4. Some of the infections appeared to start within Google

s network. Some of apparent botnet

the traffic is not consistent with an IE6/WinXP infection and cannot be easily explained.

5. The attackers had access to large numbers of CnC hosts in geographically diverse hosting colocations

certainly a high number for a botnet. Further, the botnet used over a dozen

domains in diverse DDNS networks for CnC.

6. Only the US victims were compelled to perform MX queries, an event that would typically

indicate attempted document exfiltration via email services.

7. Some of the botnets focused on victims outside of Google, suggesting that each domain

might have been dedicated to a distinct class or vertical of victims.

8. A review of the TTL period suggests that botmasters de-registered their domains around

December 18, 2009.

Passive DNS Data Summary

Based upon analysis of DNS resolution data gathered through a global network of passive DNS

monitoring sensors, the key findings are as follows:

1. Cumulative volume of CnC domain name resolutions provides adequate sampling to identify

the initialization and growth phases of the Aurora botnet, which also reveals active operation

of the CnC channels dating back to June 14th 2009.

2. The victim

s computers connected to, or were part of, 64 different networks, based upon

Autonomous Systems (AS) breakdown of Internet netblocks which could represent the upper

bound of organizations that may have been breached in the larger Aurora attack. Some

organizations (such as Google) own and manage several AS networks. Some of the other AS

networks were associated with public Internet Service Providers, which may encompass

multiple small and medium businesses.

Page 27

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

3. The various CnC domains used by the criminal botnet operators peaked at different times with

different rates of lookup by victim systems. These observations correspond to different

campaigns run in parallel by different botnet operators and represent the widely publicized

attacks that appeared to make use of the Internet Explorer 6 Zero-Day exploit. It is a common

tactic by botnet operators to run multiple campaigns at the same time, using different

infection vectors (e.g. drive-by downloads, FakeAV, USB infections, etc.) over extended periods

of time. This strategy is very consistent with APT campaign methodologies.

4. The vast majority of victim systems appear to have been based in the United States.

5. It is possible to identify the various CnC testing, deployment, management and shutdown

phases of the Aurora botnet CnC channels. Some of the CnC domains appear to have been

dormant for a period of time after they had infected number victim systems. This type of

activity can sometimes be associated with an update to the botnet malware or if the criminal

operator sells/trades a segment of the botnet to another criminal operator.

Malware Analysis Summary

Damballa has an array of sources for obtaining new and Zero-Day malware that range from

commercial security sharing programs and spam traps to samples gathered from within its enterprise

customers

networks. By automatically analyzing tens-of-thousands of new and unique samples each

day and extracting their CnC behaviors, Damballa can cluster these malware variants with different

botnets. Based upon our analysis of malware samples that relied upon the Aurora CnC domains, our

key findings are as follows:

1. The botnet operators behind the Google Aurora attacks deployed other malware families prior

to the Trojan.Hydraq release. Some of these releases overlapped with each other.

2. Two additional families of malware (and their evolutionary variants) were identified as

Fake AV

Alert / Scareware

Login Software 2009

and

Fake Microsoft Antispyware Service

both of

which were deployed using fake antivirus infection messages to socially engineering the

victim into installing the malicious botnet agents.

3. By tracking the evolution of the malware, Damballa was able to identify additional botnet CnC

domains used by the criminal operators and establish a timeline of malware associations

going back to May 2nd 2009, based upon when a malware sample was captured within an

enterprise customer network.

4. Over the time period of this study, the botnet operators improved upon the malware they

were deploying. The relative sophistication and armoring of the malware families grow over

the months the operators were deploying it, and when they transitioned to entirely new

malware families.

5. The major malware families associated with the Aurora botnet attacks are distinct and are

unlikely to have been developed by the same malware engineer. This finding is typical of the

botnets that Damballa observes targeting enterprise networks. Relatively few botnet criminal

operators develop and maintain their own malware. Instead, they typically rely upon thirdparty contractors or off-the-shelf malware construction kits. As such, core features and

functionality changes can occur overnight, but the CnC transitions slowly as the botnet

operator ensures that backup CnC domains remain in operation until the victim malware

updates (or migration) is complete.

Page 28

The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet

Conclusions

Damballa

s findings concerning Operation Aurora can be summarized by the following:

At the time the attack was first noticed by Google in December 2009, systems within at least 7

countries had already been affected. By the time Google made the public disclosure of the attack

on January 12 2010, systems in over 22 countries had been affected and were attempting to

contact the CnC servers - the top five countries being the United States, China, Germany, Taiwan

and the United Kingdom.

The Trojan.Hydraq malware, which has been previously identified as the primary malware used by

the attackers, is actually a later staging of a series of malware used in the attacks which consisted

of at least three different malware

families

. Two additional families of malware (and their

evolutionary variants) have been identified, and they were deployed using fake antivirus infection

messages tricking the victim into installing the malicious botnet agents.

The attacks that eventually targeted Google can be traced back to July 2009, with what appears to

be the first testing of the botnet by its criminal operators. The analysis identifies the various CnC

testing, deployment, management and shutdown phases of the botnet CnC channels.

The botnets used dozens of domains in diverse Dynamic DNS networks for CnC. Some of the