clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
to the C&C server.
RECENT GLOBAL ACTIVITY
The concentration of the java-script exploit used to deliver Aurora is rising.
The primary source countries are China, Korea, India, and Polandv.
F IGURE 2 - C&C C OMMAND P ARSER
TODO: INSERT DATA FEED STATS HERE.
R ESPOND
Several Enterprise products have the capability to scan for and potentially remove the Aurora malware. Detection of the
malware is covered in detail, from multiple aspects, in the Detect section above. When using a Digital DNA(tm) capable
platform such as McAfee ePO, Guidance EnCase Enterprise, or Verdasys Digital Guardian, you can search the Enterprise
for the following Digital DNA sequence (recommend a tight match, 90% or higher).
Digital DNA Sequence for Aurora Malware
01 B4 EE 00 AE DA 00 8C 16 00 89 22 00 46 73 00 C6 49 00 0B AE 01 E7 9F 04 05 81
01 0E DF 01 79 D8 00 25 6A 00 15 49 00 47 22 00 4B 67 0F 2D CC 01 29 67 01 35 99
To thwart command and control and prevent data loss, known C&C domains should be blocked at the egress firewall.
The domains listed in the Detect section represent a significant set of those currently known to be operating. IDS
signatures similar to the one illustrated in the Detect section should be used to detect inbound exploit attempts, and
machines accepting this data should be scanned for potential infections. Many A/V products now contain signatures for
the Aurora exploit and will be effective in detection and removal. However, the attackers that represent the threat will
not be deterred, and variants of the attack are nearly assured.
Factors
Description
C&C protocol
If a variant is developed, it will very likely use the same C&C protocol, but
may change the header of the packet and the constants used for connection
setup. This will evade IDS / Firewall rules designed to detect the current
scheme. It is unlikely the attackers will change the encryption setup,
however.
The method used to install the service is highly effective. Although the
filenames will likely change, the actual method will likely remain.
Installation and Deployment
INOCU LATION SHOT
HBGary has prepared an inoculation shot for this malware. The inoculation shot is a small, signed binary
that will allow you to scan for, and optionally remove, this malware from your Enterprise network.
Remediation and Prevention with the HBGary Inoculation Shot
The AuroraInnoculation.exe is a simple WMI-based utility for scanning windows-based machines for the presence of the Aurora APT malware package.
The aurora innoculator also has the option of automatically removing a discovered infection and rebooting the box automatically. When the aurora
innoculator is executed it will query the user for authentication credentials. Optionally the user can just hit "cancel" to use the currently logged on
USER's authentication token. Some sample usages are listed below.
To scan a single machine:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan 192.168.0.1 or AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan MYBOXNAME
To scan multiple machines:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254
To automatically attempt a clean operation:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254 -clean
To scan a list of machines in a .txt file:
AuroraInnoculation.exe -list targets.txt
VERDASYS DIGITAL GUARDIAN
DG Agents can be used to remediate and prevent further infections within the enterprise without waiting for the
development of an AV signature. In this case:
Remediation and Prevention with Digital Guardian
A DGUpdate package can be deployed to all agents to perform the file and registry key delete operations to inactivate and remove the malware.
Several control rules can be added to prevent the Aurora malware infection specifically and to generically block other infection vectors:
Prevent network operations on remote port 443 if the current process image was launched from %%APPDATA% and registry keys exist in
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\IsoTp
or
HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk
or
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\SysIns
Prevent iexplore.exe from writing files with .exe extensions
Prevent files with .exe extensions from being written, copied, moved or renamed into the root of %APPDATA%
Prevent files with .exe extensions from launching in the root of %APPDATA%
Prevent network operations to demo1.ftpaccess.cc
Prevent executables launched from the root of %APPDATA% from performing file open on kernel32.dll
Prevent executables launched from the root of %APPDATA% from writing, copying, moving or renaming files with a .dll extension to
%SystemRoot%\system32
M ORE I NFORMATION
A BOU T H B GARY
HBGary, Inc is the leading provider of solutions to detect, diagnose and respond to advance
malware threats in a thorough and forensically sound manner. We provide the active
intelligence that is critical to understanding the intent of the threat, the traits associated with the
malware and information that will help make your existing investment in your security
infrastructure more valuable.
Corporate Address: 3604 Fair Oaks Blvd Suite 250 Sacramento, CA 95762 Phone: 916-4594727 Fax 916-481-1460 [email protected]
ABOUT VERDASYS
Verdasys provides Enterprise Information Protection solutions that are the foundation of our
customer
s global data security strategy. With greater than 2 million security agents deployed at
over 150 of the world
s leading organizations, Verdasys is the proven global leader of Enterprise
Information Protection and compliance solutions. Companies serious about information
protection choose Verdasys.
Verdasys is headquartered in Waltham, MA.
For more information, go to www.verdasys.com
Verdasys Contact:
Jamie Warren
Verdasys, Inc.
Phone: (781) 902-5685
Email: [email protected]
http://siblog.mcafee.com/cto/operation-%E2%80%9Caurora%E2%80%9D-hit-google-others/
http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201004/5151/Was-Operation-Aurora-nothing-morethan-a-conventional-attack
http://www.fjbmcu.com/chengxu/crcsuan.htm (via:
http://www.secureworks.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/20/operation-aurora-clues-inthe-code/)
http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/18/an-insight-into-the-auroracommunication-protocol/
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident-analysis-aurora-0-dayexploit
CASE STUDY: OPERATION AURORA
Triumfant has performed extensive research into the behaviors of the recent attack directed at Google called Operation
Aurora. This case study provides a detailed description of how Triumfant would detect, analyze and remediate the attack
on an endpoint machine running the Triumfant agent.

to the C&C server.

RECENT GLOBAL ACTIVITY

The concentration of the java-script exploit used to deliver Aurora is rising.

The primary source countries are China, Korea, India, and Polandv.

F IGURE 2 - C&C C OMMAND P ARSER

TODO: INSERT DATA FEED STATS HERE.

R ESPOND

Several Enterprise products have the capability to scan for and potentially remove the Aurora malware. Detection of the

malware is covered in detail, from multiple aspects, in the Detect section above. When using a Digital DNA(tm) capable

platform such as McAfee ePO, Guidance EnCase Enterprise, or Verdasys Digital Guardian, you can search the Enterprise

for the following Digital DNA sequence (recommend a tight match, 90% or higher).

Digital DNA Sequence for Aurora Malware

01 B4 EE 00 AE DA 00 8C 16 00 89 22 00 46 73 00 C6 49 00 0B AE 01 E7 9F 04 05 81

01 0E DF 01 79 D8 00 25 6A 00 15 49 00 47 22 00 4B 67 0F 2D CC 01 29 67 01 35 99

To thwart command and control and prevent data loss, known C&C domains should be blocked at the egress firewall.

The domains listed in the Detect section represent a significant set of those currently known to be operating. IDS

signatures similar to the one illustrated in the Detect section should be used to detect inbound exploit attempts, and

machines accepting this data should be scanned for potential infections. Many A/V products now contain signatures for

the Aurora exploit and will be effective in detection and removal. However, the attackers that represent the threat will

not be deterred, and variants of the attack are nearly assured.

Factors

Description

C&C protocol

If a variant is developed, it will very likely use the same C&C protocol, but

may change the header of the packet and the constants used for connection

setup. This will evade IDS / Firewall rules designed to detect the current

scheme. It is unlikely the attackers will change the encryption setup,

however.

The method used to install the service is highly effective. Although the

filenames will likely change, the actual method will likely remain.

Installation and Deployment

INOCU LATION SHOT

HBGary has prepared an inoculation shot for this malware. The inoculation shot is a small, signed binary

that will allow you to scan for, and optionally remove, this malware from your Enterprise network.

Remediation and Prevention with the HBGary Inoculation Shot

The AuroraInnoculation.exe is a simple WMI-based utility for scanning windows-based machines for the presence of the Aurora APT malware package.

The aurora innoculator also has the option of automatically removing a discovered infection and rebooting the box automatically. When the aurora

innoculator is executed it will query the user for authentication credentials. Optionally the user can just hit "cancel" to use the currently logged on

USER's authentication token. Some sample usages are listed below.

To scan a single machine:

AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan 192.168.0.1 or AuroraInnoculation.exe -scan MYBOXNAME

To scan multiple machines:

AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254

To automatically attempt a clean operation:

AuroraInnoculation.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254 -clean

To scan a list of machines in a .txt file:

AuroraInnoculation.exe -list targets.txt

VERDASYS DIGITAL GUARDIAN

DG Agents can be used to remediate and prevent further infections within the enterprise without waiting for the

development of an AV signature. In this case:

Remediation and Prevention with Digital Guardian

A DGUpdate package can be deployed to all agents to perform the file and registry key delete operations to inactivate and remove the malware.

Several control rules can be added to prevent the Aurora malware infection specifically and to generically block other infection vectors:

Prevent network operations on remote port 443 if the current process image was launched from %%APPDATA% and registry keys exist in

HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\IsoTp

or

HKLM\Software\Sun\1.1.2\AppleTlk

or

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows

NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\SysIns

Prevent iexplore.exe from writing files with .exe extensions

Prevent files with .exe extensions from being written, copied, moved or renamed into the root of %APPDATA%

Prevent files with .exe extensions from launching in the root of %APPDATA%

Prevent network operations to demo1.ftpaccess.cc

Prevent executables launched from the root of %APPDATA% from performing file open on kernel32.dll

Prevent executables launched from the root of %APPDATA% from writing, copying, moving or renaming files with a .dll extension to

%SystemRoot%\system32

M ORE I NFORMATION

A BOU T H B GARY

HBGary, Inc is the leading provider of solutions to detect, diagnose and respond to advance

malware threats in a thorough and forensically sound manner. We provide the active

intelligence that is critical to understanding the intent of the threat, the traits associated with the

malware and information that will help make your existing investment in your security

infrastructure more valuable.

Corporate Address: 3604 Fair Oaks Blvd Suite 250 Sacramento, CA 95762 Phone: 916-4594727 Fax 916-481-1460 [email protected]

ABOUT VERDASYS

Verdasys provides Enterprise Information Protection solutions that are the foundation of our

customer

s global data security strategy. With greater than 2 million security agents deployed at

over 150 of the world

s leading organizations, Verdasys is the proven global leader of Enterprise

Information Protection and compliance solutions. Companies serious about information

protection choose Verdasys.

Verdasys is headquartered in Waltham, MA.

For more information, go to www.verdasys.com

Verdasys Contact:

Jamie Warren

Verdasys, Inc.

Phone: (781) 902-5685

Email: [email protected]

http://siblog.mcafee.com/cto/operation-%E2%80%9Caurora%E2%80%9D-hit-google-others/

http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201004/5151/Was-Operation-Aurora-nothing-morethan-a-conventional-attack

http://www.fjbmcu.com/chengxu/crcsuan.htm (via:

http://www.secureworks.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/20/operation-aurora-clues-inthe-code/)

http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2010/01/18/an-insight-into-the-auroracommunication-protocol/

http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident-analysis-aurora-0-dayexploit

CASE STUDY: OPERATION AURORA

Triumfant has performed extensive research into the behaviors of the recent attack directed at Google called Operation

Aurora. This case study provides a detailed description of how Triumfant would detect, analyze and remediate the attack

on an endpoint machine running the Triumfant agent.